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This thesis contributes to the literature on the politics of bureaucracy. I show how 
politicised bureaucratic appointments in Pakistan ‘get things done’ even beyond the 
career advancement of a particular patron and her bureaucratic appointee. In order to 
show this, I trace the politicised appointment of senior and mid-tier bureaucrats by 
political and bureaucratic patrons using legal, extra-legal, and illegal methods in 
pursuit of three types of outcomes: (i) bureaucratic efficiency; (ii) electoral gain; and 
(iii) personal enrichment and protection. I contend that particular combinations of 
actor ‘objectives’ and ‘methods’ result in particular types of bonds – either strong or 
diffuse – between the patron and the appointed bureaucrat. It is, in turn, the 
interaction of these three variables (objective, method, bond) that determines whether 
or not the patron achieves the outcome she wanted, i.e. ‘what gets done’.  
 
This research is motivated by two questions: What do bureaucrats need to ‘deliver’ 
and how is this ‘delivery’ linked to bureaucratic appointments? Based on interviews, 
semi-participant ethnographic observation, and newspaper archives, I find that those 
in a position to influence bureaucratic appointments are better able to achieve their 
desired outcomes, not when they undertake formally 'illegal' appointments (which 
introduce higher personal and political costs), but when they exploit loopholes in 
existing appointment procedures. As such, I stress ‘extra-legal’ appointments. 
Furthermore, I note that the centralisation of discretion and patronage in the hands of 
political leaders and their political and bureaucratic allies (here, a provincial Chief 
Minister’s ‘kitchen cabinet’) has empowered some to make legal and extra-legal 
bureaucratic appointments more than others. Those excluded from this inner circle are 
pushed towards illegal methods of appointment to achieve their objectives.  
 
In short, I argue that understanding patterns of bureaucratic appointment facilitates 
our understanding of governance. Though I focus on appointment practices in one 
province (Punjab), my conclusions are applicable more broadly—within Pakistan and 
beyond.   
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crucial first few interviews and I owe a special thanks to Shahzada Irfan, for always 
answering my emails. But most of all, this thesis would not have been possible had 
politicians and bureaucrats (at various levels of their respective hierarchies) not given 
me their valuable time, and trusted me with accounts of their experiences with 
Pakistan’s political and bureaucratic system. In particular, I am indebted to the 
bureaucrats serving in Punjab’s School Education and Irrigation departments, and in 
many offices across the Punjab Civil Secretariat in Lahore. 
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Aabiana  Tax paid for irrigation water 
Awami   Of the people 
Baap   Father, also sometimes used to refer to patron 
Babu Term used pejoratively for bureaucrats, implying elitism and 
dominance 
Baildaar Junior (street-level) bureaucrat in the Irrigation Department, 
responsible for checking and maintaining water channels 
Biraderi  Extended family or clan network based on lineage 
Booti   Cheat sheet for examinations  
Daala   Pickup truck 
Dera Abode. A space maintained by a politician to meet with constituents 
Ghalat   Wrong 
Ittehad   Unified 
Insaaf   Justice 
Jaagirdar Landlord of property granted by the British colonial state 
Jaiz/na-jaiz  Just/un-just 
Jamhoori  Democratic 
Jamaat   Assembly, gathering 
Jamiat   Organisation or party 
Jurat   Daring 
Kaam   Work or job 
Kamzor   Weak 
Kharab   Bad, faulty, offensive 
Majboori  Compulsion 
Majlis   Council 
Majlis-e-Shura National Assembly; given this ‘Islamic’ name during Zia ul Haq’s 
regime 
Markaz Administrative unit used by the Punjab School Education 
Department. Equivalent to Circle. 
Mistri Mason, an official of the Irrigation Department, in charge of 
maintaining distributary channels 
Munshi   Secretary or personal assistant 
Muttahida  United 
Nazim   Local mayor 
Parchi   Slip of paper, often used to refer to sifarish 
Patwaris Street level bureaucrats, lowest-level official in the Revenue 
Department 
Pir Saint or spiritual guide, directly descended from prominent Sufi saint 
Quaid   Leader 
Sahab   Term of respect; Sir 
Sifarish/sifarishee Seeking a favour through privileged access/person requesting favour 
Taaqatwar  Powerful, strong 
Tehreek  Movement 
Tehsil Administrative division within a district, comprising towns and 
villages 
Ulema   Group of Muslim scholars  
Wazir   Minister, vizier 
Zidd   Obstinate; perverse or intransigent 
Zamindaar Landowner, as a category of the occupational castes   
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Currency – 1 GBP = approx. 135 PKR  
(At the time my fieldwork was conducted the rate was approx. 1GBP = 165 PKR) 
 
The use of the term ‘District Coordination Officer’ or ‘DCO’ throughout this thesis 
reflects the nomenclature for the post at the time fieldwork was conducted for this 
thesis (2014-2015). Since then, the post has once again been given the title of ‘Deputy 
Commissioner’.  
 
The use of the term Executive District Officer or EDO, and the titles of other posts at 
district level reflect the nomenclature at the time fieldwork was conducted for this 
thesis (2014-2015). Since then, a new local government system has substantially 
altered some of these posts and titles.  
 
The North West Frontier Province (NWFP) was renamed Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in 
2010. In sections of this thesis that relate events prior to this event, the term NWFP is 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
"[W]hat is surprising is that bureaucrats work at all ... rather than shirk at every 
opportunity…[the answer is that] bureaucrats have preferences ... among them is the 
desire to do the job".  
 
- James Q. Wilson (1989, 156-159) 
 
Overview 
On 25 February 2009, Governor’s Rule was imposed in Punjab when both 
Nawaz and Shahbaz Sharif of the Pakistan Muslim League–Nawaz Group (PMLN) 
were declared ineligible to contest elections or hold public office by the Supreme 
Court. With Punjab Chief Minister (CM) Shahbaz Sharif forced to step aside, the 
Governor of Punjab, Salmaan Taseer of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), took 
control of Pakistan’s most populous and important province. His first actions involved 
shuffling bureaucrats appointed to key provincial posts. The officers that Chief 
Minister Shahbaz Sharif had painstakingly appointed to the Chief Minister’s 
Secretariat and other senior positions were all made Officers on Special Duty (OSD).1 
In their place, the PPP-led federal government introduced its own loyalists to exercise 
control, through Governor Taseer, over the opposition-ruled Punjab.2 Once the top tier 
bureaucrats in Punjab had been replaced, the task of reshuffling more junior 
bureaucrats began. In all, over a thousand officials were moved.3  
However, Governor’s Rule only lasted till 30 March 2009 - the Sharifs won an 
appeal and the Supreme Court suspended its earlier decision. Once Shahbaz Sharif 
returned to the post of Chief Minister, the bureaucratic shuffle began again – this time 
bringing back the hand-picked team he had put in place in June 2008 following 
                                                 
1 Punjab govt reshuffles bureaucracy. March 6, 2009. The Daily Times. Available at: 
<http://archives.dailytimes.com.pk/national/06-Mar-2009/punjab-govt-reshuffles-bureaucracy> 
[Accessed 26 April 2016]. 
2 Ghumman, K. Bureaucratic reshuffle in Punjab. February 28, 2009. DAWN. Available at: 
<http://www.dawn.com/news/447233/bureaucratic-reshuffle-in-punjab> [Accessed 26 April 2016]. An 
argument was made by the press that many of those appointed to Punjab at this time were bureaucrats 
who had served under the Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid (PMLQ) government in the province 
between 2002 and 2007 and, in appointing them, the PPP leadership was appeasing potential future 
coalition partners. N.A., Major reshuffle in Punjab bureaucracy. April 1, 2009. AAJ News. Available at: 
<http://aaj.tv/2009/04/major-reshuffle-in-punjab-bureaucracy/> [Accessed 26 April 2016]. 
3 40 mainstream officials re-inducted. April 3, 2009. DAWN. Available at: 
<http://www.dawn.com/news/953572/40-mainstream-officials-re-inducted> [Accessed 26 April 2016]. 
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provincial elections.4 However, this time, CM Shahbaz Sharif was favouring not only 
his own bureaucratic team, but especially the bureaucrats who had supported the 
Sharifs during the period of Governor Rule.5  
The chaos that played out within the Punjab bureaucracy during these few 
days in 2009 is a good example not only of the weight senior politicians like the CM 
and his advisers give to the bureaucratic team they assemble, but, as I will explain, 
also of certain electoral and government performance advantages to be gained by 
manipulating bureaucratic appointments. In exploring such phenomenon, this thesis 
seeks to answer two research questions: First, how do ‘politicised bureaucratic 
appointments’ impact electoral politics and bureaucratic efficiency in the delivery of 
services to ordinary citizens in Punjab, Pakistan? And second, how do specific 
objectives for making politicised bureaucratic appointments, and the specific methods 
used to make such appointments, come together in patterns that shape the delivery of 
services?  
We often read that the politicisation of the bureaucracy breaks down the 
neutrality of the bureaucracy, rendering bureaucrats beholden to certain politicians 
rather than the government as a whole.6 Politicisation can (and does) ‘target’ the work 
of bureaucracies. However, through the careful monitoring of service delivery to 
specific beneficiaries, politicisation may help to tie both formal and informal 
institutions together in ways that are helpful…for some.7 This thesis does not address 
whether or not the ‘targeting’ that results from politicisation is a ‘good’ thing. It does 
not address how policies ‘should’ be implemented. Instead it simply focuses on what I 
call ‘outcomes’.  
                                                 
4 Chaudhry, A. Spoils in the Punjab. April 13, 2009. The Nation. Available at: 
<http://nation.com.pk/columns/13-Apr-2009/Spoils-in-the-Punjab> [Accessed 26 April 2016]. 
Bureaucratic shake-up. April 3, 2009. The Nation. Available at: <http://nation.com.pk/editorials/03-
Apr-2009/Bureaucratic-shakeup> [Accessed 26 April 2016]. Punjab bureaucracy, police get 
bosses. April 2, 2009. DAWN. Available at: <http://www.dawn.com/news/893651/punjab-
bureaucracy-police-get-old-bosses> [Accessed 26 April 2016]. Political polarisation of bureaucracy. 
April 3, 2009. The Nation. Available at: <http://nation.com.pk/lahore/03-Apr-2009/Political-
polarisation-of-bureaucracy> [Accessed 26 April 2016]. 
5 The Unification Group, a faction of PMLQ MPAs in the Punjab Assembly. Forward bloc being 
accommodated in financial admin matters. April 9, 2009. The Daily Times. Available at: 
<http://archives.dailytimes.com.pk/main/09-Apr-2009/forward-bloc-being-accommodated-in-financial-
admin-matters> [Accessed 26 April 2016]. 
6 See, for instance, Boissevain 1965; R. E. Scott 1974; Grindle 2012; and of course Weber 1978.  
7 See Grindle 2012; McCubbins and Schwartz 1984 
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This concept (‘outcomes’) emerged from my discussions with politicians and 
bureaucrats – discussions in which the quest to ‘deliver’8 came up repeatedly. I was 
told that bureaucrats with a reputation/record for ‘delivering’ are the ones who 
advance in the bureaucracy, that there was constant pressure to ‘deliver’ from higher 
authorities (political and bureaucratic), and that ‘delivery’ was the most important 
target for bureaucrats. This left me with two questions: First, what do bureaucrats 
need to ‘deliver’? Second, how is this ‘delivery’ linked to bureaucratic appointments?  
‘Delivering’ does not necessarily mean ‘policy outcomes’. In fact, ‘delivering’ 
may encompass objectives that have nothing to do with policy. As the preferred term 
of the administration and political elite in Punjab, ‘delivery’ refers to achieving an 
official, political, or personal goal set by a given patron. Depending on the objectives 
of the patron, ‘delivery’ might refer to public goods – something that an entire 
community can (at least theoretically) enjoy, such as a new school or electrification – 
or private goods – something that only an individual or a specific group will enjoy, 
such as a job or money or votes.  
For citizens, public and private goods are an integral part of their relationship 
with the state, and in countries like Pakistan and India the enjoyment of these goods is 
the key expectation citizens have of the politicians they elect. For politicians, 
furthermore, the provision of public and private goods is the most effective means of 
winning elections (Piliavsky 2014, 165). It is also the means through which they 
recoup the resources they have invested in the electoral process: contesting an election 
is an expensive business, and most politicians say they spend upwards of Rs 2-3 
million on their election campaign.9 Winning, and thereby gaining access to state 
resources and services, is generally perceived as the only means of ensuring that that 
money invested is not lost. For bureaucrats, however, resource and service provision 
is the primary responsibility of the job itself. Delivery can therefore refer simply to 
bureaucratic efficiency – a bureaucrat must ‘deliver’ targets set by a superior, for 
example.  
For the purposes of this thesis, therefore, I divide patronage-based ‘delivery’ 
(or ‘outcomes’) into three types:  
                                                 
8 This was the term used by bureaucrats and politicians alike, and I use it throughout this thesis. 
9 A candidate will have to pay for staff, publicity, venues and seating for rallies, arrangements to 
transport and feed supporters at rallies and on election day, and of course, for the nomination papers 





(1) Bureaucratic Efficiency – appointing the right people to deliver (i) policy or 
project implementation deadlines (for example, constructing an underpass 
within six months or developing a policy on banning teacher transfers within 
two weeks and, then, implementing it in a month); (ii) project monitoring to 
ensure that targets are met (for example, monitoring student enrolment in a 
district over six months or cases of water theft in an irrigation zone); and (iii) 
the managed distribution of state resources (for example, development budget 
allocations) 
(2) Electoral Gain – appointing the right people to deliver (i) money for an 
election campaign; or (ii) votes through targeted service delivery, job 
provision, or the distribution of state finances 
(3) Personal Enrichment or Protection – appointing the right people to deliver 
benefits for the patron and his family/friends/cronies (e.g. recovering 
campaign investments) from ‘targeted’ service and resource delivery (for 
example, a ‘selective’ electricity, gas, or telephone connection, re-surfacing a 
particular road, a government job); or allowing the patron and his 
family/friends/cronies to evade disciplinary procedures or criminal legal 
proceedings.  
 
There are multiple ways to ‘deliver’ these outcomes: through the design of 
contracts, the design of oversight mechanisms, etc. However, this thesis focuses on a 
method that precedes and enables these, namely, appointing the right official to the 
right post. For my purposes, distributing state resources and services is a later 
objective. The first objective concerns the appointment of a bureaucrat for this task.  
In what follows, I trace the production of ‘outcomes’ back to three factors: the 
objectives of the patron (politician or bureaucrat) to politicise appointments, the 
method chosen to make bureaucratic appointments (legal, extra-legal, or illegal), and 
the patterned nature of the resultant bonds between patron and client (strong or 
diffuse). I use an account of the interaction between these three factors to account for 
specific patterns in the ‘delivery’ of outcomes, viz. (a) bureaucratic efficiency, (b) 
electoral gain, and (c) personal enrichment and protection. I find that, for those with 
an objective to undertake ‘politicised’ appointments (and the ability to do so by virtue 
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of their position), the most effective means of satisfying their ‘outcome’ objective is 
not to make fully legal or fully illegal appointments, but rather to exploit specific 
loopholes in the rules for bureaucratic appointment, transfer, and promotion. In short, 
extra-legal appointments are attractive and effective. 
This finding has implications for patterns of electoral politics (e.g. politicians 
enjoy more electoral support – by, for instance, blocking opponents’ campaign events 
while facilitating their own – from ‘biased bureaucrats’ if those bureaucrats were 
appointed via loopholes). It also has implications for patterns of bureaucratic 
efficiency (e.g. projects are more likely to succeed/fail according to the wishes of a 
patron if the relevant bureaucrat was appointed via loopholes). And, finally, it has 
implications for the targeted delivery of services to ordinary citizens (e.g. service 
delivery is more likely to be unequal in ways that benefit the patron – such as 
spending disproportionate amounts of development funds on the patron’s constituency 
– if it is managed by bureaucrats appointed via loopholes). In each case, I also believe 
my findings can be generalised beyond Pakistan. 
The following sections of this introduction provide an overview of my 
argument, tying specific bureaucratic appointment patterns to specific outcomes. 
Along the way I define various terms that will be used throughout this thesis, 
including ‘politicisation’, the ‘objectives’ that patrons pursue, and the strong and 
diffuse politician/bureaucrat ‘bonds’ that underpin particular outcomes. In Chapter 2, 
I provide a brief history of Pakistan’s bureaucracy before outlining the legal (regular 
and irregular) ‘methods’ of appointment, the loopholes within them that allow extra-
legal ‘methods’ of appointment, and finally, the illegal ‘methods’ of appointment on 
which the remainder of the thesis rests.  
 
The Puzzle 
The popular perception in Pakistan is that the bureaucracy is deeply 
compromised, not because of inherent flaws in the training or recruitment of 
bureaucrats, but owing to ‘political’ machinations that compromise the authority, 
independence, and integrity of the bureaucracy. This is certainly the view in Punjab 
where one party, the PMLN, has remained in power throughout most of the 1990s, 
and again from 2008 to the present, i.e. throughout most of Pakistan’s postcolonial 
‘democratic’ history.  
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Few would argue that bureaucratic appointments, promotions, and transfers 
are free of political influence. Some officers say that such influence is pervasive to the 
point that no appointment decision can be made without the direct interference of an 
MPA or MNA, and that no officer is free of the threat of being transferred to the 
fringes of the province if she dares to disobey a politician. Others provide a more 
nuanced account: although there is political pressure to make particular appointments, 
politicians will usually accept the judgement of the officer (for example, if the officer 
makes his case with evidence and policy-based rules to back him, the politician will 
concede). Some insist that there is no political pressure of any kind on appointments 
(although it is difficult to take these officers seriously: often, contradictions pointing 
to explicit examples of politicisation came up in their own accounts, or their 
recollection of recent events was directly refuted by other accounts from the same 
region or department).  
Regardless of where an official, a politician, or an ordinary citizen is situated 
on this spectrum (between ‘pervasive’ politicisation and ‘no’ politicisation), the 
concept of politicisation is not new to anyone who has studied the bureaucracy in 
Pakistan, particularly with respect to appointments. However, when one probes 
further and asks why and how politicised appointments take place, and with what 
effect, responses are usually vague, suggesting that ‘politicians and bureaucrats do it 
to achieve their own ends’ or that politicians manage (mythically, magically) to ‘make 
it happen’. The implication is that a politician engages in some kind of illegal activity 
to appoint ‘his man’ in the bureaucracy.  
Even as bureaucrats lump all kinds of influence over appointments together 
into one ‘illegal’ category, however, politicisation is not simply about politicians 
making illegal appointments to the bureaucracy. Politicisation is also about 
bureaucrats making illegal appointments.10 It is also about both politicians and 
bureaucrats using significant loopholes to make technically legal but entirely 
unpredictable appointments to satisfy their own goals. This thesis seeks to complicate 
the picture that has developed of politicians controlling bureaucratic behaviour 
illegally.  
Introducing complexity to the discussion on politician-bureaucrat 
relationships, and the politicisation of bureaucratic appointments, is important. The 
                                                 
10 It is important that we see ‘bureaucrats as agents exercising choice in varying degrees of self-
awareness and for a wide range of ends’ (Herzfeld 2005, 373). 
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middle class’s dislike of ‘the political’ and their embracing of organisations that 
disavow political leanings – ostensibly, the military and the bureaucracy – has meant 
that political forces sit at the bottom of a clear hierarchy of middle-class preferences 
when it comes to state institutions in Pakistan. However, it is important to stress that 
the elected elite are not the only ones to influence patterns of bureaucratic 
appointment, and thereby patterns of policy implementation (or outcomes), to their 
own (electoral or personal) advantage. Bureaucratic elites are just as likely to exercise 
such influence. Therefore, understanding how desired bureaucratic outcomes are 
achieved (or not) is critical to understanding how Punjab (and Pakistan) is governed. 
A bureaucrat’s ‘delivery’ of desired outcomes takes place within a certain 
local political context and with reference to the accumulation of different types of 
power (votes, money, administrative prestige, etc.) in the hands of local actors. The 
bureaucrat is just one actor in the local political economy of personal advancement – 
others are seeking their own ends. Elite bureaucrats (from the Pakistan Administrative 
Service) move in the same circles as businessmen, politicians, and the military elite. 
Armytage (2015) argues that it is through these social and capitalist connections that 
they maintain their power and influence. However, even the elite cadres of the PAS 
have become more demographically diverse over the last few years. As the private 
sector has grown, the bureaucracy is no longer seen as the best career path for the 
offspring of the Pakistani elite. As a result, at least some of the bureaucrats in the PAS 
must earn their place amongst the Pakistani elite, and then maintain it, by ‘delivering’ 
desired outcomes.  
Furthermore, the pursuit of these outcomes (whether bureaucratic efficiency, 
electoral gain, personal enrichment, or personal protection) through bureaucratic 
channels requires allies within the bureaucracy, both at the level of the elite cadres 
and amongst more junior bureaucrats. Mid-tier and street-level bureaucrats lack elite 
access and connections with them cannot be developed in social settings. At the same 
time, junior bureaucrats are seeking to develop networks of their own to advance their 
interests. I argue that, in these circumstances, professional networks often prove most 
useful in ensuring the ‘delivery’ of desired outcomes.  
The failure of numerous programs (funded internally or by international 
organisations) to improve service delivery in an equal and sustainable fashion has 
been a problem in Pakistan, even in its most populous, developed, and stable 
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province, Punjab. For instance, despite significant investment in the school education 
sector, millions of children remain out of school and learning standards within 
government schools remain extremely low (Habib 2013).11 Most of all, there is a vast 
chasm between service provision in northern and southern Punjab.12 One area where 
this divide is starkly visible is the health sector: despite funding from the World Bank 
for the Punjab Health Sector Reform Project commencing in 201313, southern 
districts, in contrast to northern and central districts, continue to do poorly on key 
health indicators such as maternal and new-born deaths (Callen, et al 2013).14   
 
Table 1: Distribution of seats in Pakistan’s National Assembly 

















- - - - - - 10 
Total 183 17 43 75 12 2 342 







                                                 
11 Abbasi, K. ‘22.6m Pakistani children still out of school: report’. March 9, 2017. DAWN. Available 
at: <https://www.dawn.com/news/1319300> [Accessed 15 May 2017]; ‘Pakistan shows modest 
improvement in standard of education, say report’. March 7, 2016. DAWN. Avilable at: 
<https://www.dawn.com/news/1180139> [Accessed 15 May 2017]. 
12 Jamal, N. ‘A raw deal for South Punjab’. June 1, 2015. DAWN. Available at: 
<https://www.dawn.com/news/1185343> [Accessed 15 May 2017]. 
13 Punjab Health Sector Reform Project. World Bank: Projects and Operations. Available at: 
<http://projects.worldbank.org/P123394/punjab-health-sector-reform-project?lang=en> [Accessed 15 
May 2017]. 
14 Chaudhry, A. ‘41pc births handled by unskilled staff in Punjab’. May 16, 2015. DAWN. Available 
at: <https://www.dawn.com/news/1182264> [Accessed 15 May 2017]. 
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Table 2: Regional and other quotas for recruitment  


















7.5% 50% 6% 11.5% 7.6% 11.4% 4% 2% 
*Within each quota, 10% is reserved for women and 5% is reserved for minorities, and if the 
reservation is not met, it can be carried forward to the following year. 
Adapted from the official website of the Federal Public Service Commission 
 
With the most seats in the National Assembly15 and the federal bureaucracy, 
Punjab is also the de facto seat of power (elected or otherwise). The province has had 
relatively stable governments, it has less violence, and it has more money16 than any 
of Pakistan’s other provinces. Policy failures growing out of bureaucratic weakness 
are generally thought to be least likely in Punjab. In fact, where they occur, such 
failures are all the more apparent when compared to failures in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 
(which has been plagued by war), let alone Balochistan (where high levels of poverty 
and an insurgency have persisted since independence). While flaws in the formulation 
of policy point to viable explanations for program failures, relatively little time has 
been spent in understanding (analytically) the people (bureaucrats and politicians) 
actually involved in implementing policy. 
‘Corruption’ is a popular explanation offered for policy failure. However, like 
Nayanika Mathur (2015), I found that accusations of corruption – a term that remains 
quite amorphous despite reams of literature on it – often conceal more than they 
reveal about the state and bureaucratic practice. There is, fortunately, work that goes 
against this ‘ambiguity’ trend. Robert Wade (1982; 1985), for instance, links frequent 
bureaucratic transfers to ‘corrupt’ practices in an irrigation department, connecting 
administrative to political corruption in the process. However, as noted above, this is 
                                                 
15 As the province with the most population, Punjab has the most constituencies, and thereby the most 
seats in the National Assembly. Both democratic and non-democratic forces are well aware that they 
cannot control the country unless they control the Punjab. 
16 National Finance Commission Awards by the central government divide money amongst provinces 
on the basis of a formula based largely on population. Despite attempts to make the formula fairer to 
the less populated provinces, Punjab remains the main beneficiary of state funds. 
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not a thesis about ‘corruption’.17 It simply engages with practices often considered 
corrupt and ‘the worlds they might produce’ (Anjaria 2011, 62). In particular, it 
focuses on politicised bureaucratic appointments.  
Though there are multiple accounts of how bureaucracies function across a 
range of countries and time periods (Shefter 1977; Wade 1982, 1985; Wood 1988; 
Bearfield 2009; Grindle 2012; Gupta 2006), and how politicians control their 
behaviour18 , there is not much literature analysing the political and bureaucratic 
objectives underpinning bureaucratic appointments. Principal-agent theory (PAT)19, 
for instance, emphasises politicians’ policy goals, based on the assumption that close 
political control and oversight will improve bureaucratic performance. In other words, 
it begins by viewing the relationship between politician and bureaucrat as uni-
directional: politicians regulate bureaucratic behaviour. A note of dissent responding 
to this literature, however, was introduced by Moe (1984, 1990, 2005), who argued 
that bureaucrats must be studied as agents in themselves (for example, with personal 
interests and preferences). This is, of course, a note of dissent I support. At the same 
time, however, academics began applying principal-agent theory to relationships 
within the bureaucracy (Mitnick and Backoff 1984). Tirole (1986), for instance, 
introduced the concept of an intermediary between the principal and the agent, 
allowing PAT to be applied to more complex situations. Waterman and Meier (1998) 
argued for a more flexible application of principal-agent roles. But, for the most part, 
it is probably fair to say that PAT remains closely tied to a relatively rigid frame: one 
party regulates the other’s behaviour to achieve its policy goals. It does not consider 
in any depth the initial appointment of bureaucrats, i.e. questions of politicised 
appointments. This thesis turns to a more elastic set of concepts to analyse 
bureaucratic appointments and the political and bureaucratic objectives underpinning 
them. It focuses on notions of patronage.  
Gilmartin (2014, 128), citing Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007), notes that the 
pre-eminence of patronage in Indian electoral politics has been viewed as ‘an 
adaptation to India’s own distinctive political history, especially to the history of 
                                                 
17 On corruption, see Wade 1982, 1985; Gupta 1995, 2005; Parry 2000; Herzfeld 2005; and Jauregui 
2014. 
18 See for instance, Iyer and Mani 2012; Berenschot 2014; Wilkinson 2014; Fiorina and Noll 1978; 
Khan 1998; Gulzar and Pasquale 2017. Or see Pollack 2002 and Huber and Shipan 2000 for an 
overview of some of this literature. 
19 See, for example, Aberbach 1990; Weingast and Moran 1983; Bawn 1992, 1995; Gilligan, Marshall 
and Weingast 1989; McCubbins, Noll and Weingast 1987; and McCubbins and Schwartz 1984. 
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colonial bureaucracy, to India’s ethnic and religious heterogeneity, and to the 
distinctive evolution of its political parties over time’. In other words, patronage is 
India’s way of conciliating state and society. What most academics have not 
acknowledged is that, just like politicians and voters, bureaucrats in both India and 
Pakistan have also adapted. Though much of the narrative around patronage continues 
to focus on its role in bending or breaking the law, the literature on South Asia tends 
to overlook the use of patronage to make bureaucracies work (Grindle 2012). More 
broadly, work on bureaucratic appointments, such as Grindle’s, acknowledges the 
variety of ways in which patronage can be used without explaining how, precisely, 
patronage-based appointments are used to achieve desired outcomes.  
Though there has been some interest in experimental work on Pakistan’s 
bureaucracy as it relates to service delivery (Gulzar and Pasquale 2017; Callen, et al 
2016), much of the literature on bureaucratic appointments is, if not out-of-date 
(Braibanti 1966), then rather narrowly focused on one or two key sections of the 
bureaucracy – typically, the bottom tier (patwaris, for example Nelson 2011) or the 
top (PAS/DMG, for example Waseem 1989, La Porte 1976, or Kennedy 1987). 
Alternatively, it has focused on just one side of the appointment equation, either 
politicians (Mohmand 2011, Shami 2010) or bureaucrats (Hull 2012), rather than the 
larger picture of politicians interacting with bureaucrats.  
Developing this larger picture will allow us to understand how policy 
implementation works in Pakistan and, especially, how patterns of bureaucratic 
appointment (influenced by elected and bureaucratic elites) intervene. This thesis 
contends that an explanation for policy implementation patterns, and thereby of 
governance, is tied to complex processes of determining (via appointments) who gets 
to interpret and implement programmes on the ground. Together with senior federal 
bureaucrats (the PAS/DMG) and senior provincial bureaucrats (the PMS), I argue that 
the middle section of the provincial bureaucratic hierarchy is critical.20  
Appointments to senior and mid-tier posts responsible for (a) implementing 
policy; (b) distributing state resources; and (c) making appointments to lower tiers of 
the bureaucracy are crucial for determining policy outcomes and who benefits from 
them. With this in mind, I focus on appointments to posts that have the power to 
appoint/transfer/promote juniors, as these are the appointments that allow a patron to 
                                                 
20 Though very relevant to the subject, I do not study the police. For an exploration of patronage and 
corruption amongst police officials, see Jauregui 2014.  
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control not only the tasks assigned to that officer, but also the work and fate of 
bureaucrats who are junior to that official. Despite recent initiatives to improve 
bureaucratic recruitment through merit-based practices and training at the lower tiers 
of the hierarchy (considered the most corrupt bureaucrats)—e.g. patwaris and 
teachers (see Nelson 2011; 2014 unpublished manuscript) – I argue that operations at 
this level remain susceptible to pressure from middle-tier actors. These middle-tier 
actors lie at the centre of this thesis. 
This thesis seeks to unravel the relationships, transactions, and ties between 
politicians and bureaucrats, or between bureaucrats themselves, to achieve specific 
‘outcomes’ (bureaucratic efficiency, electoral gain, and personal gain or protection) 
through favoured appointments. In doing so, I do not contend that politicised 
appointments have made Punjab or Pakistan into a strong state ruling over a weak 
society (or vice versa), to adopt Joel Migdal’s (1988) categorisation.21 Instead, I 
subscribe to Susan and Lloyd Rudolph’s (1987) notion of the ‘weak-strong state’ – 
the state is omnipresent and regulatory, but it lacks the ‘capacity to meet the demand 
it generates’ (Berenschot 2014, 200). The state is not the legal-rational entity that 
Weber (1978), for example, envisioned. It is, instead, ‘the negotiations around the thin 
lines between the legal and the illegal’ (Das 2007, 177) that matter and deserve our 
attention. 
In what follows, I contribute to the literature in four ways. My first 
contribution is a criticism of the political-economy literature on Principal-Agent 
Theory (PAT). I find that PAT oversimplifies and misrepresents the relationship 
between politicians and bureaucrats as being one of oversight and delegation versus 
subversion through information control, and it tends to limit itself to the study of 
senior, elite bureaucratic cadres. In this thesis, I explore the myriad ways (formal, 
quasi-formal, and informal) in which bureaucrats and politicians – at different levels 
of their respective hierarchies – interact with each other, not merely via delegation 
and information control but also exchange or ‘patronage’. Within the political science 
literature on bureaucratic appointments, I emphasise that the relationships between 
politicians and bureaucrats, and bureaucrats themselves, are curated by these actors to 
suit their strategic objectives. In effect, I provide further evidence (if more was 
                                                 
21 A work that does do so is Malik 2011. 
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needed) that Weber’s ideal-typical vision of a fully rational, rule-bound bureaucracy 
does not exist in practice. 
In order to make the argument above, and as my second contribution, I move 
beyond the PAT literature to the political science literature on patronage, using it to 
explain how politicised bureaucratic appointments are made by politicians and 
bureaucrats. However, departing from an earlier focus on patronage and criminality in 
South Asia (Piliavsky 2014; Michelutti 2010, 2014) or patronage and electoral politics 
in Pakistan specifically (Nelson 2011; Mohmand 2011; Javid 2012), this thesis also 
considers how some of the political science literature on ‘patronage’ helps us 
understand forms of bureaucratic achievement. In their comparative work on the use 
of patronage in bureaucracies, political scientists like Grindle (2012) argue that career 
bureaucracies used patronage to enhance ‘competence’.22 This perspective has not 
figured prominently in the literature on bureaucracy in South Asia to date, however, 
and I fill this gap. In addition, Grindle’s argument addresses the prevalence of 
patronage either before the creation of a career civil service or early on in the 
development of a country’s career civil service. As a result, her argument does not 
explain the prevalence of patronage in countries like Pakistan that inherited a fully 
formed career civil service prior to establishing a government. 
Furthermore, the literature that uses notions of patronage to study bureaucratic 
appointments and outputs - Grindle 2012, for example – looks at patronage as a 
means for bureaucrats to move up the career ladder. It does not explore how 
bureaucrats, or politicians and bureaucrats, engage in (curated, strategic) relationships 
of patronage to achieve objectives that are more diverse, and more elaborate, than 
climbing the career ladder (e.g. policy implementation). Neither does it explore the 
centrality of politicised bureaucratic appointments or provide an explanation for what 
motivates these appointments. In fact, departing somewhat from the anthropological 
literature on patronage, I found that a strong political science literature on 
‘politicisation’ (as a concept) was lacking, despite the ubiquity of this term in public 
discourse. The emphasis of this thesis, therefore, is on the behaviour of those 
operating within and alongside institutional and structural hierarchies (explored in 
Chapter 2) and the outcomes those actors are able to achieve through politicised 
bureaucratic appointments. I focus on the relationships between politicians and 
                                                 
22 In the development literature, Levy (2014) refers to a similar approach as ‘working with the grain’. 
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bureaucrats, and in doing so, I highlight the ways in which these actors interact with 
each other, or are let down by each other, in pursuit of their objectives. Therefore, I 
move beyond the study of political and bureaucratic turnovers – i.e. the appointments 
of fresh bureaucrats after an election (Iyer and Mani 2012; Akhtari, et al. 2017) – to 
understand the movement of bureaucrats from one post to another whether or not an 
election has taken place.   
Unlike the political-economy literature on PAT (which focuses on senior 
bureaucrats) and patronage (which increasingly focuses on junior street-level 
bureaucrats), this thesis considers the objectives and relationships of both these tiers. 
In addition, I emphasise the crucial role played by mid-tier bureaucrats in ‘delivering’ 
the bureaucratic outcomes of political and bureaucratic patrons alike. I do not 
consider bureaucrats as just intermediaries in politicians’ interactions with citizens. I 
see them as actors in their own right, with motivations and objectives that they 
endeavour to pursue.  
In addition, focusing on Punjab, I note that the centralisation of discretion and 
patronage has limited access to legal and extra-legal bureaucratic appointments to the 
CM and those within his kitchen cabinet. Those excluded from this inner circle must 
employ illegal methods of bureaucratic appointment to achieve their goals. In 
highlighting this growing centralisation of discretion and patronage in Punjab, for 
instance, I thus provide crucial insights into how governance works in Punjab and 
why it does not seem to ‘deliver’ in a consistent fashion for citizens. I show how 
bureaucratic appointments are used (successfully and unsuccessfully) to help 
politicians trump their opponents (within and outside their party) and win votes. And I 
explain how politicised appointments can provide politicians and bureaucrats with 
personal riches or services, as well as a safety net when it comes to accountability 
investigations. In short, I contribute to the political science literature on the politics of 
bureaucracy by showing how politicized bureaucratic appointments ‘get things done’ 
even beyond the career advancement of a particular patron and his/her bureaucratic 
appointee.  
Work on bureaucracies in South Asia is heavily India-centric (Gupta 2006; 
2012, Mathur 2016, Iyer and Mani 2012, Gulzar and Pasquale 2017) and, with this 
thesis, I bring some balance to the literature on the politics of South Asian 
bureaucracy. Though some of the conclusions may vary across countries, I believe the 
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study of politician-and-bureaucrat interactions across South Asia illuminates a number 
of similarities.  
Fourth, I contribute to the literature on Pakistan in particular, and South Asia 
more generally. Political science literature on the Pakistan bureaucracy takes one of 
three approaches: 1) newer literature that takes a quantitative approach – regressions, 
large-N studies, randomised control trials, and experiments (Callen, et al. 2016; 
Gulzar and Pasquale 2017) (2) older literature exploring the colonial impact on state 
structures, changes to that structure over time post-independence, and (attempts at) 
reform of the civil service (Braibanti 1966; La Porte 1976; Kennedy 1987; Shafqat 
1999 & 2013) and, 3) literature that sees bureaucrats as intermediaries between 
politicians and citizens, with an emphasis on corruption and electoral politics (Nelson 
2011; Shami 2011; Mohmand 2011; Mufti 2010; Jaffrelot 2014; Martin 2014, 2016) 
as well as literature that looks at the ways in which paperwork and regulation are used 
by bureaucrats to confound citizen demands (Hull 2012; Gupta 2012). I move beyond 
all three. In particular, I use a qualitative approach with 159 interviews, semi-
participant ethnographic observation (during visits to the offices of bureaucrats and 
politicians, the Punjab Assembly, and the court rooms of the Punjab Services Tribunal 
between September 2014 and July 2015), and extensive research through newspaper 
archives (online archives of daily English newspapers DAWN, the Daily Times, The 
Express Tribune, The News, The Nation, and Pakistan Today dating from 2000 to the 
present, as well as the Herald and The Friday Times magazines from 1988 to the 
present)23, thus providing a ‘thick description’ (Geertz 1973) of the bureaucratic and 
political landscape of Punjab. I ensured that my research was not limited to a specific 
party, a specific leader, or a specific regime, but that it provided an overview of the 
development of bureaucratic politicisation in Punjab (and, to some extent, Pakistan 
more generally) over the last nearly thirty years. 
However, I do not make any definitive claims as to politicised appointments 
beyond the Punjab. Undoubtedly, the politicisation of bureaucratic appointments takes 
place across the country. But this thesis focuses on the Punjab and to a limited extent, 
the federal bureaucracy in Islamabad. The specificity of politician-bureaucrat or 
bureaucrat-bureaucrat interaction in the other provinces requires further research with 
                                                 
23 My newspaper research involved identifying key events and actors identified both through my 
interviews and observations in the field and through a snowball technique – using references within 
articles to identify others.  
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particular attention to their political and administrative realities. For instance, 
Punjab’s bureaucratic and political circumstances are very different from Sindh’s, 
where the PPP has dominated electorally since the 1990s. The results of this 
dominance have been very different to the PMLN’s recent dominance in Punjab. I 
would hypothesise that whether the PPP was in power at both the centre and in Sindh, 
or only in Sindh, bureaucratic appointments have been primarily utilised for personal 
enrichment and protection. Electoral gain motives may well be present, but I believe 
them to be a secondary consideration for the PPP in Sindh – for now, there is little 
chance of them losing their grip over the province. Bureaucratic efficiency has rarely 
been a visible outcome of political appointments in Sindh, not in the manner of 
Punjab where the PMLN has invested in very visible development projects. I would 
expect that, like Punjab, illegal appointments are most likely to take place at the junior 
levels of the bureaucracy in Sindh.  However, unlike Punjab, many of these 
appointments are, by my estimate, made on the basis of biraderi or family ties (unlike 
bureaucrats’ emphasis on professional ties in Punjab) – from the relatives of Asif Ali 
Zardari or his sisters Faryal Talpur and Azra Pechuho, to the ‘ghost’ relatives of 
bureaucrats given teaching posts in schools in interior Sindh. 
Moreover, I do not engage with two features of the formal state architecture 
that have received significant attention elsewhere: the police and the judiciary. 
Though the police play an important role in the political economy of the state, I did 
not expect to find dramatically different bureaucratic appointment practices within 
the Police Service of Pakistan – as such, I did not expect the inclusion of the police as 
a third case (beyond the education and irrigation departments) to alter my key 
findings. And, in any case, I found that I could not do justice, in terms of time or 
resources, to three separate arms of the bureaucracy in one thesis.  
The judiciary is, of course, not a part of the administrative branch of the state; 
it is a separate branch with entirely separate appointment procedures and, indeed, a 
separate academic literature on the politics of judicial appointments and judicial 
decisions (Newberg 2002; Siddique 2013; Waseem 2011b). As a result, I do not focus 
on the politics of appointments, promotions, and transfers within the judicial branch 
of the state.  
There is no doubt that the police are used to threaten and intimidate, 
particularly at the district level where the local Station House Officer (SHO) is closely 
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allied to prominent politicians and bureaucrats. At more senior levels, there can be a 
tussle between the centre and a province on the appointment of the provincial 
Inspector General Police (as for instance between the PMLN government at the centre 
and the PPP government in Sindh throughout 2017). As far as bureaucratic 
appointments outside of the police service are concerned, legal appointments do not 
involve the police (for obvious reasons) and extra-legal appointments are designed to 
avoid the very publicity that police involvement can bring. The involvement of the 
police is most likely where illegal appointments are made – to threaten and intimidate, 
where an FIR needs to be lodged and arrests made. To this extent, the police are 
mentioned in Chapter 5 of this thesis. However, I have not added ‘the police’ as a 
separate area of investigation with respect to bureaucratic appointments.  
The judiciary is mentioned at various points in this thesis as one of the 
avenues through which aggrieved parties have sought justice for appointments they 
considered illegal – the district courts, the High Courts, and the Supreme Court. As 
such, my research draws a great deal on court judgements, from the high courts and 
the Supreme Court, and from observing the activities at the Punjab Services Tribunal 
and the Federal Services Tribunal. The role played by the judiciary in the context of 
bureaucratic appointments I, therefore, evident at several points in the empirical 
chapters of this thesis. The courts were co-opted during the Musharraf era, for 
instance, excusing all kinds of illegal practices on the grounds that they were 
prevalent (see the Anwar Saifullah Khan case discussed in Chapter 5). Under Chief 
Justice Iftikhar Ahmed Chaudhry, the Supreme Court became an activist court that 
sought to right all kinds of alleged wrongs, including cases of politicised 
appointments (see the Orya Maqbool Abbasi case in Chapter 5).24 But I do not 
explore the appointment of judges or the network of patronage ties within the judicial 
system or with actors outside it. I acknowledge that, as with police officials, there are 
often close ties between district level judges and other judicial employees and local 
influentials (see Nelson 2011), stressing that these ties are most likely to be useful 
where illegal appointments are involved. However, as noted above, I did not add ‘the 
judiciary’ as a separate area of investigation with respect to appointments (i.e. judicial 
appointments). in this thesis, I focus strictly on the politics of bureaucratic 
appointments within two areas of Punjab’s executive branch (irrigation and education) 
                                                 




– two areas where I was able to gain adequate access for my fieldwork, and two areas 
that, I believe, indicate broader trends within the political economy of bureaucratic 
appointments as a whole.  
It may be a limitation of this thesis that I lacked the access and resources to 
explore appointment dynamics within the Police Service of Pakistan and/or the 
judiciary, and explore in any detail their interactions with other actors. This thesis is 
also limited in terms of its specific focus on Punjab rather than other provinces, as 
well as its lack of diachronic focus on the impact of various local government systems 
over the years and their impact on bureaucratic appointments in Pakistan. I believe 
that further research regarding these additional branches of the state, inter-provincial 
differences, and historical comparisons may serve to shed additional light on the 





At ten o'clock I went to the President's house; but the Secretary of War was with him, and in 
the entry and rooms below and in the chambers above there were eight or ten solitary strollers 
to and fro, waiting for admission — all, except one member of Congress, wolves of the 
antechamber, prowling for offices. 
 
              - John Quincy Adams26 
 
Between Formal and Informal Institutions 
Before proceeding further, it is important to define the term ‘politicisation’. 
Peters and Pierre (2004, 2) define it as ‘the substitution of political criteria for merit-
based criteria in the selection, retention, promotion, rewards, and disciplining of 
members of the public service’. Politicisation is not necessarily a bad thing, and in 
many countries discretionary (politicised) appointments are legal (the US and 
Germany, for example). However, as Peters and Pierre (2004, 2) acknowledge, there 
are cases where politicised appointments are extra-legal in the sense that they involve 
‘personal, almost clientelistic, loyalties to ministers and other political leaders’ in 
                                                 
25 Jauregui 2014 discusses patronage and the police with reference to northern India. 
26 Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, comprising portions of his diary from 1795 to 1848. Charles 
Francis Adams (ed.), Vol XI – I0, Chapter XXI, 19th of June. Available at: 
<https://archive.org/stream/memoirsofjohnqui11lcadam/memoirsofjohnqui11lcadam_djvu.txt> 
[Accessed 1 June 2017]. 
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addition to ‘partisan allegiance’ in both the appointment of other bureaucrats and the 
delivery of services. Such extra-legal politicisation is based on the notion that ‘the 
best way to gain control over the [outputs of the] public bureaucracy is to have the 
capability of appointing one’s own faithful to positions that influence or control [here, 
the implementation of] public policy’ (Peters and Pierre 2004, 4).  
My approach expands on the political science contributions of Peters and 
Pierre. First, Peters and Pierre (2004, 4) limit their attention to the scope of politicised 
appointments by suggesting that appointments are made ‘to positions that influence or 
control public policy’. While appointments to such posts would of course be very 
important in controlling the formulation of policy, this definition limits politicisation 
to posts at the senior-most tiers of any bureaucratic hierarchy. I take a more 
inclusive/expansive view, including appointments to posts that influence or control 
public policy making as well as posts that implement policy, directly redistribute state 
resources and services, and make their own bureaucratic appointments to lower tiers 
of the hierarchy.  
Second, as political scientists focusing on what might be described as ‘the 
politics of politicisation’, Peters and Pierre (2004, 2) limit the process of politicisation 
to an exchange between ‘ministers and other political leaders’, on the one hand, and 
bureaucrats, on the other. Again, my view is different. In what follows, I see 
politicisation as an exchange between, not only politicians and bureaucrats, but also 
amongst bureaucrats. Here, ‘politicisation’ involves complex transactional bonds, but 
not only with elected elites. 
Third, Peters and Pierre use phrases like ‘one’s own faithful’ (2004, 4) and 
‘almost clientelistic’ (2004, 2), suggesting a hesitation to think about politicised 
appointments as transactional or patronage-based relationships. Like PAT, they view 
politicisation as a process in which politicians have the upper hand and are able to 
direct ‘faithful’ loyal bureaucrats like pawns on a chessboard. While I agree with 
Peters and Pierre that politicisation is a process of putting the right people in the right 
posts, I draw on political science notions of patronage to see it as a strategic 
transactional relationship. Actors accept politicised appointments because they stand 
to gain something from doing so. It is not one sided. The bureaucrat is not simply 
doing the politician a favour because he always likes him (or the party he belongs to). 
The relationship is situational and strategic. 
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When an actor joins an organisation, such as a political party or the 
bureaucracy, her behaviour is subject not only to binding formal rules, but also to 
informal norms established and enforced by members of the organisation. Formal 
rules define who can make bureaucratic appointments (politicised or otherwise) 
without fear of formal sanctions. However, politicisation often reflects the influence 
of those who do not have any formal powers to influence bureaucratic appointments. 
For instance, a Member of the National Assembly (MNA) has no legal right to 
influence teacher appointments in his constituency; however, relationships of 
patronage with those in charge of making such appointments (that is, mid-tier 
bureaucrats in the district) allow an MNA to influence – informally – which teachers 
are allocated to which posts. These appointments reflect transactional relationships 
developed through membership in informal networks.  
Both formal and informal institutions27, as formal and informal ‘rules of the 
game’, shape motivations (or ‘objectives’ as I refer to them throughout this thesis). 
Formal institutions include the constitution, the form of government (presidential, 
parliamentary, or hybrid), the division of powers, the party system, and other legal 
provisions or rules of business. Since this project deals specifically with 
administrative appointments within the executive branch of the state, the formal (rule-
mandated) structure of the bureaucracy is particularly significant, as is the formal 
hierarchy built into the delegation of power in ministries and districts. Informal 
institutions involve ‘socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, 
communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels’ (Helmke and 
Levitsky, 2004, 727) – for example, informal networks and transactional bonds. 
Informal institutions often fill the gaps left by formal institutions. In South Asia, 
biraderi/caste/kinship ties are the most commonly identified informal networks across 
multiple settings.28 Though such ties do matter in a bureaucratic setting, I focus on 
professional networks, and to a lesser extent school, training, or university networks, 
as well as residential community networks because I found that many bureaucrats 
emphasised these more than kinship ties.  
                                                 
27 Helmke and Levitsky (2004, 727) define institutions as ‘rules and procedures (both formal and 
informal) that structure social interaction by constraining and enabling actors' behavior’. 




Formally, there are three broad ways to make a bureaucratic appointment: 
legal, extra-legal, or illegal.29 A legal appointment is one in which an individual is 
either (a) newly recruited to the service and assigned to a post, or, after completing 
the required term in office, (b) transferred to a post that is open to someone of his 
grade, (c) duly promoted to the next grade (in accordance with the seniority list), or 
(d) transferred to a post that is open to an official of his new grade. There are 
advantages to making legal appointments when an actor wants to achieve something 
(i.e. wants something delivered): a legal appointee is automatically on the moral and 
legal high ground as a ‘Mr Clean’ brought in to ensure that the system works as it 
should. (For junior officials, a superior who made it to his seat without any undue 
influence is a man that deserves a measure of respect. Whether s/he earns that respect 
is, of course, another matter.) 
An extra-legal appointment is one that exploits a loophole or a gap in the 
formal rules. It takes a legal practice and extends it to circumstances outside its usual 
domain. For example, the designation ‘Officer on Special Duty’ is meant for officials 
awaiting posting but is often used as a punitive measure. ‘Additional charge’ 
appointments are meant to allow a bureaucrat to take on a second post temporarily till 
a suitable candidate can be found to fill it, but they are often held by bureaucrats for 
years. Extra-legal appointments are primarily about discretion - where the law 
provides for an ‘irregular’ appointment due to ‘the public interest’, a great deal of 
discretion lies with bureaucrats, who use it strategically. By walking the line between 
legal and illegal, such practices produce the most interesting machinations. There is 
also a degree of flexibility in making bureaucratic appointments without raising any 
flags for corruption or malfeasance. At the same time, such flexibility allows existing 
laws to stand so that they can be followed when this suits the actors in question. 
Illegal appointments are those that clearly violate the formal rules, beyond 
mere manipulation. It is important to acknowledge that, although all the methods I 
categorise in this thesis as illegal break the rules, the form varies. Faking the signature 
of a senior official is a different form of illegal practice than using physical violence 
to intimidate.   
                                                 
29
 See, for instance, Michelutti 2010, 2014; Gayer 2014; Piliavsky 2014; and Vaishnav 2017 on 




I do not categorise ‘extra-legal’ or ‘illegal’ appointments as ‘informal 
institutions’. Doing so would fall into the trap of treating informal institutions as a 
residual category in which everything that isn’t legal counts as an informal institution. 
Instead, I treat ‘extra-legal’ or ‘illegal’ appointments as methods of appointment, and 
I combine these methods with patronage relationships that exist beyond the state as 
‘informal institutions’. These carefully curated transactional relationships are based 
on, for example, school groups, work networks, kinship, and so on. They shape the 
objectives that drive actors to make and accept extra-legal or illegal appointments.30  
Where the political science literature on bureaucracies considers bureaucratic 
appointments, it tends to concentrate on legal (even if politically motivated) 
appointments (for instance, a transfer when a new government takes the reigns – 
Golden 2003; Iyer and Mani 2012; Akhtari, et al. 2017) or on illegal appointments 
(for example, the sale of transfers – Wade 1984). A further strand of the literature 
explores bureaucratic performance without unpacking bureaucratic appointments at 
all (Callen, et al. 2013). This thesis goes further in three ways.  
First, I provide a more complex view of legal and illegal appointments. For 
legal appointments, I argue that their legality does not preclude transactional 
patronage relationships. And, for illegal appointments, I explain that although junior 
bureaucrats might try to break the law to get (or make) an illegal appointment, they 
still turn to the same body of laws – as well as their department’s Efficiency & 
Discipline Wing (or the Services Tribunal) – to seek justice whenever their attempts 
are stymied by the behaviour of the other party. 
Second, moving beyond both legal and illegal appointments, I identify 
loopholes in the federal and provincial regulations for bureaucratic appointments in 
order to show how politicians and bureaucrats exploit these loopholes to make extra-
legal appointments in pursuit of their own objectives. In doing so, I focus not just on 
bureaucratic turnover as a consequence of political turnover (Golden 2003, Iyer and 
Mani 2012, Akhtari, et al. 2017), but also bureaucratic postings regardless of any 
change in political leadership. Third, I consider not just the initial recruitment of 
bureaucrats, but also their transfer, promotion, and patterns of irregular appointment 
(e.g. additional charge, OSD, etc. – see Chapter 2). 
                                                 
30 I see patronage relationships and objectives as coterminous, co-produced. 
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Furthermore, moving beyond the extensive focus on biraderi/kinship ties in 
both the political and the bureaucratic sphere (Nelson 2011; Michelutti 2010, 2014; 
Mohmand 2011; Martin 2016), I draw on extensive fieldwork to emphasise 
professional networks (and to a lesser extent, biraderi/kinship, school, training, and 
residential networks) as key links in relationships between politicians and bureaucrats 
or bureaucrats themselves.  
In making politicised bureaucratic appointments, I find that the method most 
likely to produce successful outcomes (in light of a patron’s objectives) are extra-legal 
methods of appointment (as opposed to legal or illegal ones) – making my exploration 
of loopholes in government regulations a valuable contribution not just to the political 
science literature on South Asia, but also to the literature on the politics of 
bureaucracy more generally. That said, I further nuance my contribution by 
contending that (a) legal (and to some extent, extra-legal) methods are most likely to 
result in successful bureaucratic efficiency outcomes, (b) extra-legal methods are 
more likely to result in successful electoral gain outcomes, and (c) illegal (and to 
some degree, extra-legal) methods – typically involving fraud more than force (and, 
thus, typically steering clear of any direct engagement with the police and what is 
more commonly described in the literature on South Asia as ‘criminality’) – are more 
likely to produce successful personal enrichment and protection outcomes. In sum, I 
show how politicised appointments ensure the achievement of objectives well beyond 
electoral gain or career advancement. 
 
A Case of Patronage 
 
‘Patronage systems have been resilient historically in part because they can be impressively 
responsive to the objectives of those who control them – despots, criminals, modernizers, and 
progressives alike.’  
- Grindle (2012, 38) 
 
A brief note may help to explain why, building on the extant political science 
literature, I use the concept of ‘patronage’ (rather than ‘clientelism’) in the way I do. 
Gordin (2002, 516) points out the ambiguity of the term clientelism as it has been 
used in much of the political science literature, presenting it as an example of what 
Sartori (1970) calls ‘conceptual stretching’. Hopkin (2006, 2) adds that the term 
clientelism ‘creates confusion and controversy because of the wide and diverse range 
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of political exchanges which can be accommodated by the term’. In particular, 
Hopkin (2006, 3) differentiates between “‘old clientelism’” and ‘new clientelism’, 
noting that ‘[o]ld clientelism’ ensures continuity at the level of traditional ties 
between peasants, landlords and politicians (or voters, party representatives and 
politicians)’ whereas new clientelism is regulated by utility, and, thus, by “‘economic’ 
or ‘market’ exchange” because the client is not entirely subservient to the patron, and, 
thus, is able to change patrons if it is to his benefit (Hopkin 2006, 4).  
Hopkin’s vision of ‘new clientelism’ comes closer to the political science 
literature I draw on in this thesis. For Hopkin, political clientelism is ‘a form of direct 
exchange between citizens and holders of political authority’ (Hopkin, 2006, 5). He 
sees the relationship between the patron (for Hopkin, a political party) and the client 
(the voter) as mediated by local party representatives. Yet, even as Hopkin comes 
closer to the transactional understanding I adopt in this thesis, he leaves us with an 
overly simplistic view of ‘direct exchange’ (Hopkin, 2006, 5). In particular, he leaves 
us with a focus on delivery of votes in exchange for private, club, or public goods 
offered by the politician. In short, he that limits our appreciation for the various actors, 
relationships, and transactions that may be involved in the transactional relationships 
that interest us.  
Though the terms are often used interchangeably, Kopecky (2011, 717) is 
careful to differentiate ‘patronage’ from ‘clientelism’ by arguing that, as in this thesis, 
‘patronage appointments are not inherently clientelistic, since jobs can be handed out 
in order to control policy formulation and implementation, and not just to buy votes or 
reward organisational loyalty’. This distinction is crucial to this thesis. Within the 
political science literature, it is critical to stress that patronage appointments may 
involve the pursuit of outcomes other than electoral gain – for instance, bureaucratic 
efficiency, personal enrichment, and protection. Indeed, this distinction helps us to 
consider relationships that may involve actors other than the citizen (or voters). 
However, as I will demonstrate at various points throughout this thesis, it is important 
to add a qualifier here. Even if an appointment is made to advance a particular policy 
aim, that does not preclude an interest in winning more votes or rewarding loyalty. In 
India, as in Pakistan, voting is often less about policy and more about the ability ‘to 
offer short-term highly specific inducements’ and ‘personal clientele followings’ 
(Wade 1985, 472). In such a situation, an appointment made with a policy outcome in 
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mind may also be about offering inducements or building a following. By Kopecky’s 
(2011, 717) own admission, job allocation (say, appointments) can be ‘used in a 
clientelistic way’, by placing certain people in positions where they can serve their 
own interests as well as those of their ‘patron’.  
One approach to the distinction between the political science and a socio-
anthropological understanding of patronage is addressed by Weingrod (1968, 379-
380), who noted that, in sociological or anthropological work, patronage often refers 
to ‘how persons of unequal authority, yet linked through ties of interest and 
friendship, manipulate their relationships in order to attain their ends'. In the political 
science literature, however, the focus is often narrower – that is, ‘patronage is most 
clearly enunciated during election campaigns’ (Weingrod 1968, 379-80), for example, 
in the course of distributing goods in exchange for votes. Bearfield (2009, 66) notes 
that, as a result of this distinction, ‘acts of patronage that occur outside the context of 
a political party or machine receive little or no attention’ in the political science 
literature.  
It is this gap in the political science literature, however, that this thesis seeks to 
fill, adding to the political science literature on patronage by looking at relationships 
between the political and bureaucratic elites (as well as amongst bureaucratic elites) – 
relationships in which informal ties between actors within the state and considerations 
both electoral and non-electoral figure prominently. 
This thesis seeks to advance the political science literature on patronage, 
particularly as it is used in works on the bureaucracy (for instance, Kennedy 1987; 
Grindle 2012). It does not address the anthropological literature on patronage to the 
same extent (Scott 1972; Boissevain 1966; Lande 1973, Gupta 2006, 2012; etc.).  
For the purposes of this thesis, a patronage relationship is ‘a more or less 
personalized relationship between [state] actors or sets of actors, commanding 
unequal wealth, status or influence, based on conditional loyalties, involving mutually 
beneficial transactions’ (Lemarchand and Legg 1972, 151-152).31 Basically, a 
patronage relationship is like an employment relationship, but more personalised and, 
in bridging the gap between formal and informal institutions, not strictly contractual. 
                                                 
31 Piliavsky’s ‘Introduction’ to Patronage as Politics in South Asia (2014) provides an excellent 
overview of the literature on patronage with an additional focus on South Asia.   
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It is useful to break this concept down into its component parts and discuss them one 
by one.  
By referring to patronage-based politicisation as a ‘personalized relationship 
between [state] actors’, I note that the patronage relationship is curated. It is not a 
natural bond, neither is it socially or officially mandated. Instead, it develops on 
personal time and due to personal initiative, motivated by the promise and prospect of 
‘mutually beneficial transactions’.  
The basis of any patronage relationship lies in its ‘conditional loyalties’. It is a 
transactional bond that is limited by the usefulness of each party to the other. If one 
party ceases to find the other useful in achieving his ends, the relationship will 
collapse. The impermanence of the patronage bond is, in part, due to the fact that it is 
based on ‘unequal wealth, status or influence’ or as Gilmartin (2014, 125) puts it, 
‘“unequal reciprocal exchange”’. It is important, however, to make two clarifications 
here. The first is that although patronage ties involve inequality, this does not mean 
that one party is powerless. Patronage ties always involve transactional relationships 
of mutual dependence in which both sides of the equation contribute (Piliavsky 2014, 
160) and face the implied hazards associated with breaking the bond of dependence. 
Piliavsky makes this point while exploring ties of patronage between politicians and 
voters, but it is also of significance in this project, where relationships unfold between 
state actors (politicians and bureaucrats) with distinct but often substantial powers. 
Second, the term ‘transaction’ does not mean a rigid contractual exchange that is 
either achieved or not. Instead, transactions are flexible and adaptable relations of 
exchange (Piliavsky 2014, 159).  
Prior to forming a transactional or strategic relationship of patronage, patrons 
and clients must first know each other to the extent that (a) they understand what 
powers are available to the other, and, (b) they trust each other (somewhat). The 
‘trust’ underpinning this patronage relationship is achieved through networks and 
repeated interactions, i.e. informal institutions. These networks/interactions/ 
institutions provide the intervening connection between an actor who has the 
motivation to make a politicised appointment and a bureaucrat who is motivated to 
accept it. Though family, kinship, or biraderi networks are often highlighted in the 
literature (particularly with reference to lower-level bureaucratic appointments), I 
contend that professional or work networks and old school or training networks are 
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particularly important for links between politicians and senior or mid-tier bureaucrats, 
and especially between bureaucrats themselves. In particular, I found that professional 
ties between senior bureaucrats and their subordinates were central to the formation of 
intra-state patronage bonds and the exchange of favours between them. 
By professional or work networks, I mean relationships formed as a result of 
working together in the same department or area (e.g. on the same project). Training 
and school networks refer to a shared past at a training academy, school or college. 
For example, old Aitchisonians32 watch out for each other, while Government College 
Lahore alumni often maintain close contacts.33 These ties are different to familial, 
kinship, and biraderi ties because people are not born into them. Neither are they 
members by virtue of belonging to a particular social class. Both work and old school 
networks require effort to build them up, to establish trust, and to decide which ties 
will be most useful when making bureaucratic appointments. Consequently, the 
relationships of patronage (indeed, the ‘informal institutions’) that interest me are 
strategic – actors curate them in ways that benefit themselves.  
 
Objectives 
So, what are the objectives that push actors to make bureaucratic 
appointments? What are the objectives behind bureaucrats accepting politicised 
appointments?  In this section, I explore this question of objectives and note that the 
desired ‘outcome’ need not be a ‘public good’ with any direct benefit to the citizenry 
as a whole. It could be a ‘private good’ targeted at a relatively small group of people 
like the politician’s or the bureaucrat’s own family or colleagues – even the politician 
or bureaucrat himself.  
In this context, an objective is something that motivates an individual to make 
a particular decision. I argue that the objectives behind making bureaucratic 
appointments have to do with a desire to ‘deliver’ specific ‘outcomes’. A bureaucrat’s 
objective in accepting a politicised appointment involve what I call career ‘stability’. 
Both sets of objectives are shaped by formal and informal constraints on each actors’ 
                                                 
32 Aitchison College is an elite boys’ school in Lahore, Punjab founded during the colonial era. 
33 See the work of Soufia Siddique, PhD Oxford 
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behaviour – that is, (1) the rules (formal or informal) that regulate their behaviour, and 
(2) the expectations that others (voters, colleagues, citizens) tend to have of them.34  
 
What Politicians Want 
Like politicians everywhere (Geddes 1994), Punjab’s politicians are 
preoccupied with winning elections. To do so they adopt a range of measures to 
insulate themselves from defeat. Specifically, they influence bureaucratic 
appointments so they can (1) regulate bureaucratic performance, (2) acquire electoral 
gains, and (3) enrich themselves and their cronies through the targeted distribution of 
state resources (while protecting themselves and their cronies from any stringent form 
of accountability; Nelson 2011). For politicians, the objective behind influencing 
appointments (so as to demand ‘delivery’) is often an electoral one. But of course 
politicians may be seeking forms of personal benefits as well.  
Due to the complex nature of political competition35 in Pakistan, involving 
both party-based and independent candidates, politicians know very well that people 
do not always vote for them because of their ideological leanings. The poor electoral 
performance of religious parties, despite the religiosity of the public, speaks to this 
point. Equally, winning an election is not always dependent on one’s party label 
(contra Wilder 1999). The remarkable success of candidates who have switched 
parties a few months prior to election day, and the success of candidates contesting as 
independents, particularly when their opponent is an established politician, suggests 
that party labels are not always essential. What then determines who gets the vote, if it 
is not ideological or party affiliation? I argue that people vote for politicians who offer 
the best ‘delivery’ of resources (see also Nelson 2011 on the ‘delivery’ of impunity 
services in the context of local disputes, and Piliavsky 2014 on how politicians woo 
voters in rural north India). A politician’s ability to influence bureaucratic 
appointments is crucial to the ‘delivery’ underpinning electoral success. Provincial 
politicians in Pakistan know that, ideally, their primary objective should be to 
legislate, but they disproportionately focus on the kind of delivery that is ordinarily 
the domain of local government. In Pakistan, the most successful politician 
                                                 
34 For more on this point, see Geddes 1994. 
35 For more detail, see Mufti 2016.  
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(electorally speaking) is not the great legislator, but the one who gets things done with 
a cooperative bureaucrat on his side.  
Keeping this in mind, I divide the objectives behind politicians making 
bureaucratic appointments into three types: bureaucratic efficiency interests, personal 
political and electoral gain interests, and personal enrichment (and protection) 
interests.  
 
Bureaucratic Efficiency Interests  
The objectives behind influencing bureaucratic appointments while holding a 
senior public office (for example, as a minister or a state minister) differ somewhat 
from the objectives of an ordinary constituency politician. A prominent political 
position brings with it specific responsibilities and risks, including a stake in ensuring 
that the party as a whole does well, and a great deal of scrutiny from the media. In 
addition to the concerns of every constituency politician (keeping voters happy and 
retaining their votes), the priorities of senior office holders include (1) the 
implementation of policies for which they have been put in charge (including 
performance management) and (2) maintaining the image of the party and its 
leadership with regard to governance. These priorities provide the motivation to 
influence bureaucratic appointments above and beyond the ‘bureaucratic 
performance’ interests that all constituency politicians pursue when they influence 
bureaucratic appointments. To sum up, senior politicians politicise appointments to 
facilitate policy implementation, monitoring, and image maintenance.  
 
Personal Political and Electoral Gain Interests  
Private political interests can be of two types: votes, or resource delivery to a 
narrow group not much larger than the politician’s own community. In some cases, 
the only reason a politician has to appoint a particular bureaucrat is that that 
bureaucrat will carry the votes of the bureaucrat’s own extended family into the next 
election. This usually happens in smaller communities for posts at the lower end of 
the bureaucratic scale where politicians and bureaucrats are deeply rooted in the day-
to-day life of a community.  
45 
 
More common are bureaucratic appointments made to achieve private political 
interests through the regulation of resources within a community. In such cases, the 
politician aims to win over parts of his constituency (either his strongholds or parts of 
the constituency where his hold is weak) by ensuring that they (rather than others) get 
a new road or electrification, or that they (rather than others) are advantaged when 
teachers are hired, or that they (rather than others) get more funding for the repair of 
school buildings. The politician will ‘deliver’ these outcomes by making bureaucratic 
appointments to positions that will influence decisions regarding the distribution of 
resources. For example, influencing appointments to the post of district budgetary 
officer for School Education means that the politician can direct funds towards 
particular schools (to the detriment of other areas).  Personal political outcomes of this 
sort are the concern of local politicians. Consequently, these politicians maintain close 
ties with district bureaucrats, with substantial motivation to influence their 
appointments. 
 
Personal Enrichment and Protection Interests  
Finally, personal interests have to do with the delivery of resources to a 
narrow section of the population – the politician himself and his family or immediate 
community. This may involve laying a sewage line in the politician’s own 
neighbourhood, getting a relative a telephone connection, getting a relative a contract 
to provide for a local government school canteen, or getting a family member a 
government job. The bureaucracy tends to give citizens (even elected ones) the run 
around, embroiling them in endless red tape. The politicians I spoke to expressed 
annoyance at the number of trips they would have to make to request that bureaucrats 
fulfil even legitimate demands (the draining of flood water from the politician’s own 
street, for example). Appointing a trusted bureaucrat in the right post can make these 
tasks much easier to achieve, thereby providing the politician with a personal benefit 
from public office.  
Personal ‘protection’ interests are the means by which politicians ensure that 
they avoid the taint of criminal or legal proceedings (for instance, in land or water 
disputes), accountability investigations (by the National Accountability Bureau 
[NAB] or the provincial Anti-Corruption Establishment [ACE]) or accusations of any 
activity that may be considered illegal. It is rare for politicians to actually face any 
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consequences for their misdeeds, but with the massive growth of the media in 
Pakistan, even small forms of malfeasance are subject to a 24-hour news cycle and 
close scrutiny on social media. Though such allegations, even if proven, may only 
marginally impact a politician’s vote share, they do damage his reputation. Such 
damage has become more meaningful in the last few years with a political party 
known as Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf providing vociferous anti-corruption opposition 
and the PMLN demonstrating an increasing awareness of their public image.36 For 
instance, a PMLN MNA from Lahore, who was also holding a ministerial post at the 
time, was investigated for gas theft and found guilty during his term in office (2008-
2013). Though the politician won his seat comfortably in 2013, he was removed from 
his federal ministerial position and never offered one again. Protection from such 
investigations with the help of a loyal bureaucrat is, therefore, valuable to politicians 
since it can result in the preservation of perks and privileges.  
The growth of the media has introduced some limits on the protection that can 
be afforded to politicians and bureaucrats. For example, a news channel (ARY) 
released a video of provincial Minister Rana Mashood allegedly accepting a bribe37 as 
NAB initiated multiple investigations against him.38 The minister then came under 
immense pressure to resign from multiple ministerial posts.39 For the moment, Mr 
Mashood remains Minister for School Education while the cases against him are 
pending. But, in such cases, even the ability to delay the course of accountability 
investigations is a valuable form of protection (on such delays, see Nelson 2011). 
Appointments to accountability organisations such as NAB and the provincial 
ACE have been particularly fraught for many years. For the post of NAB Chairman, 
each successive federal government has sought to appoint someone who is likely to 
overlook their misdeeds (while pursuing those of their opponents). The provincial 
ACE has also been hamstrung by a shortage of investigators or the appointment of 
                                                 
36 For instance, during a fumigation drive in schools in summer 2015, I observed that the bureaucrat in 
charge was more concerned about whether or not photos had been taken of the process for the CM and 
the press rather than whether the process had actually been thorough.  
37 This video is available online at: <https://tune.pk/video/4488096/rana-mashood-caught-red-handed-
while-taking-bribe-leaked-vide> [Accessed 25 April 2017]. 
38 NAB authorises several probes against Rana Mashood and Pervez Ashraf. December 4, 2015. 
Pakistan Today. Available at: <http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2015/12/04/news/nab-authorises-
several-probes-against-rana-mashood-and-pervez-ashraf/> [Accessed 10 May 2016]. 
39 Tahir, Z. Minister insists he won’t resign over ‘baseless allegations’. September 11, 2015. DAWN. 
Available at: <http://www.dawn.com/news/1206206> [Accessed 10 May 2016]. 
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unqualified and ‘disinterested’ candidates by the provincial Services & General 
Administration Department (Interview 131).40  
 
What Bureaucrats Want  
Exploring the motivations of bureaucrats is important because at any given 
moment, a bureaucrat is being influenced by multiple actors (Moe 1987; 2005)– his 
family and friends, his departmental superior, his batch mates and professional 
networks, businessmen, politicians, political fixers, and the courts. Each bureaucrat 
sets up his own hierarchy of demands depending on his particular motivations and 
then, he forms bonds with the actors who can help him achieve his goals. Therefore, 
as with politicians, I divide the objectives bureaucrats have to make appointments into 
three types: (a) official bureaucratic efficiency and performance interests; (b) personal 
political and electoral gain interests, and (c) personal enrichment and protection 
interests.  
Though required to be neutral, many bureaucrats (at both the senior and mid-
tier levels) have regional (village, constituency, district), political (party or 
independent), and personal (self, friends, families, cronies) affiliations that they try to 
service through the appointment of like-minded bureaucrats. Some bureaucrats also 
have political aspirations (local, provincial, or national government), and these can 
provide the motivation for influencing appointments. However, more often, the 
objective behind influencing an appointment is an official one – for example, 
appointing a skilled bureaucrat to manage a new project.  
 
Bureaucratic Efficiency Interests  
A bureaucrat’s job is to ensure that policies, once passed into law (where 
necessary), are implemented. Often, influencing the appointment of other bureaucrats 
is a means of ensuring the proper implementation of a policy or the proper monitoring 
of officials. Such ‘monitoring’ or ‘performance management’ appointments are 
                                                 
40 Sumra, A. ACE riddled with dishonest, disinterested officials: DG. 2 July 2010. The Express 
Tribune. Available at: < https://tribune.com.pk/story/25144/ace-riddled-with-dishonest-disinterested-
officials-dg/> [Accessed 6 June 2017]. At the departmental level, ministers may seek to influence 
appointments to posts in charge of department monitoring, discipline, and accountability. Successfully 
regulating appointments to these posts can allow ministers to make demands of department 
bureaucrats while protecting them from any investigation or consequence. 
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common when it comes to senior department posts at the secretariat level (PAS 
officers) or a department’s district-level posts (mid-tier bureaucrats). 
Notwithstanding a move toward higher salaries and benefits commensurate 
with equivalent private sector postings for senior bureaucrats, the pay and benefits for 
the bulk of the bureaucracy are not at a sufficient level to drive exceptional 
performance. Despite that, and in difficult circumstances, many bureaucrats continue 
to carry out their duties to the best of their ability. This behaviour is explained by 
Akerlof and Kranton (2005) who contend that those who ‘identify’ with their work or 
firm (or their bosses) are more likely to put in greater effort to achieve organisational 
goals.41  
 
Personal Political and Electoral Gain Interests  
Though most bureaucrats will not admit it, many have established party 
affiliations that impact their official behaviour. In the case of senior officials in 
Punjab, there have been cases of bureaucrats resigning to start political careers or 
doing so after retirement (for example, one of the sitting MPAs in Rawalpindi retired 
from the civil service and contested elections; a civil servant who held the post of 
Chief Secretary Punjab, now retired, is also planning to launch a political party). Such 
political interests may cause bureaucrats to influence appointments to benefit specific 
constituencies.  
 
Personal Enrichment and Protection Interests  
Though bureaucrats are supposed to be neutral in implementing policy, in fact 
they are embedded in networks and relationships just like other actors. In some cases, 
bureaucrats have close ties to their home district and, where they are able, they will 
make appointments to benefit that district or the people in particular parts of it. 
Personal interests are also at play in appointment decisions for lower tier posts at the 
district level (for instance teachers, patwaris, baildaars, etc). Another example is 
where a bureaucrat owns land and wants to appoint officials who will re-direct water 
to that land, or fudge the local land records for him (Nelson 2011).  
 
                                                 
41 See also Wilson 1989; Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole 1999; Prendergast 2007; Benabou and Tirole 
2006 and Besley and Ghatak 2005. 
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Why Do Bureaucrats Accept a Politicised Appointment?  
 
Mera too baap aisa nahin hai, mujhe too baap dhoondhna parre ga (My father is not like that, 
I will have to search for a father [i.e. a patron]). 
 
- Interview 18, a bureaucrat from a well-connected family, recounting remarks made to her 
by a colleague 
 
Positions in the bureaucracy are permanent – a bureaucrat can be appointed all 
over the country or province, but she cannot be dismissed barring exceptional 
circumstances.42 So, if the job and pension are guaranteed, what do bureaucrats want? 
Bureaucrats want stability. They may not lose their jobs, but experiences of serving in 
the bureaucracy vary immensely depending on specific appointments. 
When asked why they joined the bureaucracy, senior officers tend to say what 
you expect to hear –to make a difference in the country, to bring justice for all, to 
right the wrongs they saw being committed since they were six years old. Mid-tier 
officials, however, are more honest. They tell you they joined because they were not 
sufficiently qualified or connected for private sector jobs, because the civil service 
means you have a guaranteed job and a pension, and so forth. Still, they want a 
relatively smooth career, facilitated by a patron, moving from one good post to 
another, getting promoted on time, and retiring in due course at the top of the 
bureaucratic ladder.43 They do not want to be the sort of bureaucrat who fails to adapt 
(to political and bureaucratic pressure): those bureaucrats find that their promotions 
are endlessly delayed, they are not regularised (meaning they are not guaranteed 
pensions), they are transferred with their families to lawless or backward areas, or 
they are given the status of an Officer on Special Duty (OSD).  
As many officials point out, everybody wants coveted appointments, 
comfortable housing, good schools and colleges in big cities like Lahore or 
Faisalabad, as well as a reasonable commute to work. The simplest way to ensure 
such stability is for a bureaucrat to find a patron – either a politician or a senior 
bureaucrat – who will support them. And, in exchange for delivering the desired 
‘outcomes’ of their patron, they want a comfortable life. 
                                                 
42 However, there are various means of disciplining bureaucrats who are non-compliant – punitive 
transfers and special duties, for example. 
43 Wilson 1989 found that career concerns are primary amongst bureaucrats in the US. 
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Of course, not all bureaucrats indulge in informal relationships with politicians 
and bureaucrats to deliver the outcomes desired by their patrons. Some take pride in 
remaining (or claiming to remain) aloof; they usually differentiate themselves from 
the hoi polloi in terms of their education and training (engineers, for example). 
However, even so called ‘principled’ bureaucrats are mired in a system that creates 
incentives for patronage-based transactional behaviour. Wade (1985, 484) reports 
something similar – ‘[e]ven within the same person, the sense of propriety and 
professional integrity, the sense of remorse and shame, are subject to alteration and 
ambivalence’. Though the person may be unwilling to perform illegal acts, they often 
turn to extra-legal means as a way to ‘get things done’ without tarnishing their clean 
image. This disconnect is intriguing. A bureaucrat will in one breath condemn others 
for bringing in an ‘influential’ to pressure their superior for a transfer and then, call up 
a senior bureaucrat regarding their housing file and ask if a visit from the minister 
would be sufficient to move it along faster. I argue that such seemingly contradictory 
behaviour is the result of knowing that, for all her upright behaviour and honesty, she 
will not have the career stability she craves if she does not accept a politicised 
appointment when offered one (using the reciprocal exchange underpinning it to exert 
a bit of extra pressure where possible).  
This is a project that seeks to nuance our understanding of how government 
works in Pakistan, and particularly in its most prosperous and stable province, Punjab. 
Thus far I have argued that understanding ‘strategic patronage bonds’ is key to 
understanding politicised appointments.  The nature of these bonds (‘strong’ or 
‘diffuse’ as a function of bureaucrats’ and politicians’ objectives as well as the 
method of bureaucratic appointment) determines the degree to which a patron is able 

















Strategic and transactional (‘patronage’) ties produce important bonds, but 
these bonds vary in type and strength. And, in this project, I draw special attention to 
the fact that this variation results from two factors, namely (1) the objective sought in 
making a politicised appointment (see above), and (2) the method employed to make 
the appointment: legal, extra-legal, or illegal (see below).44 In other words, different 
permutations of patron objectives, and appointment methods produce different kinds 
of bonds: strong or diffuse.45  Throughout the empirical chapters of this thesis, I 
connect expected ‘outcomes’ (bureaucratic efficiency, electoral gain, and personal 
enrichment or protection) to (1) the relationship between patrons and bureaucrats that 
forms the basis of a strategic patronage bond; and (2) that bond’s relative strength or 
diffusion. 
Traditionally discussions of social relations in South Asia have focused on 
biraderi or kinship, but in the course of my research I found that strategic and 
transactional patronage bonds between patrons and bureaucratic appointees were most 
frequently based on professional or work relationships arising out of politicians and 
                                                 
44 Grindle (1977, 40), in her study of the Mexico bureaucracy, proposes four tools of patronage that 
allow an individual to move up the bureaucratic hierarchy – trust, lever, team, and clique. 
45 The term ‘strong bond’ is used by John Malcolm (1832, II, 52-53) to describe the ties bureaucrats 




bureaucrats having served in departments or districts together (and to a lesser extent 
on training, school or university networks). This is not to say that ties of biraderi and 
kinship do not exist – they do. However, I found them to be less significant than I had 
expected, with the exception of cases where bureaucrats sought personal outcomes 
through illegal appointments. 
Work relationships produce ties of trust46, reliance, and mentorship, 
particularly when initiated in the formative years of a bureaucrat’s career, and these 
ties led to the formation of particular bonds. In some cases, it was intriguing to note 
that relationships were based on a political patron’s perception of (i) a bureaucrat’s 
attitude toward, or working relationship with, political opponents or (ii) a bureaucrats’ 
reputation based on experience, merit, or neutrality. The evidence of these ties 
emerged in bureaucrats’ career trajectories, in the protection, support, and guidance 
that was offered to them by their patrons, and, then, in the bureaucrats’ interaction 
with his patron’s opponents.  
It is not possible to quantify these relationships. For instance, it would be 
misleading to claim that bureaucrats serving together in three separate places have a 
stronger relationship than bureaucrats who have served together in only two areas. 
This is because the strength or weakness of a relationship is not contingent on the 
number of appointments held together, but rather on the nature of particular ties. For 
elite PAS members, for instance, the socialisation that officers undergo during 
training, the appointments they hold in the early years of their career, and their record 
of crisis management (or policy and project implementation) is key to understanding 
their ties with bureaucratic colleagues and with political patrons. Amongst more 
precarious mid-tier and junior bureaucrats, it is an ability to navigate between political 
pressures and performance expectations that matters.  
The strength or diffusion of the patronage bond is a function of the motivation 
the appointed bureaucrat has to pursue the patron’s objective, and the method 
whereby he was appointed. Growing out of these two elements, the bond is a measure 
of the commitment with which an appointed bureaucrat works toward achieving his 
patron’s goals. Where the bond is strong, the appointed bureaucrat will pursue the 
target set by the patron with more determination than where the bond is diffuse. 
Again, the strength or diffusion of the bond is based on (i) the match between 
                                                 
46 Trust (and mentorship and reliance) are ‘founded on reputation and knowing who a particular person 
is’ (Mines 2014, 41). 
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appointment objectives and method, (ii) the sustainability of the bond, and (iii) its 
vulnerability to various spoilers.  
 
Figure 2: Patron Objectives and Appointment Methods for  
Strong Bonds and Successful Outcomes 
 
 
The reason that legal appointments are likely to produce stronger bureaucratic 
efficiency outcomes is due to the match between particular objectives and the 
appointment method – resulting in a strong bond. These legal appointments are made 
for the ‘delivery of competence’ and the bureaucrat will typically be asked to ‘deliver’ 
within the ambit of his formal job description (policy implementation, district or 
department management, and project delivery). In contrast, illegal appointments are a 
poor choice for improving bureaucratic efficiency due to their inherent risks – 
scrutiny and reversal. In fact, I could find no examples of an illegal appointment made 
to achieve a bureaucratic efficiency outcome.  
Where extra-legal appointments are made with the expectation of improving 
bureaucratic efficiency, however, outcomes are usually delivered. They are delivered 
because, where patrons expend some effort to have bureaucrats appointed to particular 
posts, the expectation is that (reciprocally) the appointee will expend some effort to 
achieve the patron’s expected efficiency outcome. The appointee, for example, will be 
expected to cut a few corners to achieve the target set by the patron in return for his 
extra-legal (rule-bending) appointment, and this element of exchange makes the 
bonds between patrons and appointees not only stronger, but in many cases also more 
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sustainable than in cases of legal appointments. Furthermore, though patrons provide 
support to legal appointees when necessary for the achievement of expected 
outcomes, the level of support and protection provided to extra-legal appointees is 
often greater.  
Electoral gain outcomes are also more likely to be achieved when the method 
of appointment is extra-legal.  A patron seeking electoral gain will rely on his 
professional network to find a bureaucrat who is not just willing to accept an 
appointment that bends the rules, but who, once appointed, will be ready to 
reciprocate. This reciprocity would involve going beyond his formal duties and acting 
in ways that may not be entirely in accordance with regulations, in order to enable his 
patron to achieve his electoral objectives – for instance, the provision of government 
jobs for the patron’s voters, supporters, and loyalists. It is the reciprocal exchange 
inherent in extra-legal appointments that often produces strong bonds of patronage 
rooted in professional networks between individual patrons and bureaucrats – both 
sides gain from the relationship. 
Illegal appointments made for electoral gain outcomes, on the other hand, tend 
to produce diffuse bonds. Though these bonds may be based on political loyalty or 
even kinship, it is often (though not always) difficult for patrons to ensure that their 
objectives are achieved. Once an illegal appointment is made, the patron has no way 
of enforcing the appointed bureaucrat’s compliance with his electoral gain outcome. It 
is, in fact, quite likely that the appointee will not continue to support the patron 
electorally once he has acquired the (illegal) appointment he wanted. The patron, in 
turn, cannot compel the bureaucrat, or the bureaucrat’s family, to vote for him, and if 
the patron tries to report the illegal appointment, he implicates himself in wrong 
doing. Therefore, illegal appointments made in pursuit of electoral gains can tip the 
balance in favour of the appointed bureaucrat, potentially leaving the patron at a 
disadvantage with regard to the outcome he is seeking. 
Electoral gain outcomes can also be achieved by making bulk extra-legal or 
illegal appointments to benefit voters and loyalists, but again these appointments do 
not establish one-to-one relationships between a patron and an appointee. Here again, 
the bond is diffuse – the patron is not usually in a position to call upon one of the bulk 
appointees to ensure they fulfil their side of the bargain; instead, patrons must trust 
that the appointee will continue to vote for him.  
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Similarly, where electoral gain and personal enrichment or protection 
outcomes are sought through legal appointments, ‘delivery’ requires appointees to 
exceed the requirements of their job description. However, since patrons do not have 
to go out of their way to (legally) appoint a bureaucrat, they have relatively little 
leverage to force appointees to ‘deliver’ (should they chose not to do so). 
Furthermore, in these situations, the bureaucrat always has alternative (legal) avenues 
open to him, should his patron become too demanding. As such, legal methods are 
quite unlikely to result in electoral gain outcomes and will only rarely – and at best 
temporarily – result in personal enrichment or protection outcomes. 
Outcomes of personal gain and protection are well-served by extra-legal 
appointments too. Bonds in these cases are strong. Both parties seek to benefit over a 
period of time and, thus, a sustainable strong bond is needed to achieve the expected 
personal gain or protection outcome. Conventionally, illegal appointments are also 
believed to be very effective in achieving personal gain and protection outcomes. 
However, where money and employment are the desired outcomes, the story is more 
complex. Where money is involved, illegal appointments tend to produce bonds that 
are transactional but short lived: money is exchanged for the appointment and the 
relationship comes to an end. The bond in these cases is diffuse since it is not a 
sustainable one that brings long-term gains. Where an illegal appointment is made so 
that jobs can become available to the patron’s family/friends/cronies (a longer-term 
outcome), it can produce strong bonds, typically based on kinship. However, the 
enterprise is inherently risky. One of the parties in the relationship of patronage may 
renege, for instance, and the risk of discovery is high. If discovered, the illegal 
appointment will be reversed by the relevant department or court, and the personal 
gain outcome will fail. 
 
The connections between objectives, bonds, and outcomes laid out above 
allow us to understand how bureaucratic appointments are used to produce particular 
outcomes. However, as the following chapters clearly reveal, these patterns are also 
shaped by a recent centralisation of power within the Punjab provincial government. 
Increasingly, patrons who are closely connected to the Chief Minister are more likely 
to be able to make legal and extra-legal appointments (and less commonly, illegal 
appointments). Mid-tier bureaucrats (while excluded from the CM’s kitchen cabinet) 
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have sufficient officially mandated powers to be able to make (in limited cases) legal 
and extra-legal appointments. However, politicians without access to the centre find 
that avenues of legal and extra-legal appointment are typically closed. They have no 
official standing to make bureaucratic appointments, and without the CM’s backing 
and intervention, they do not have the power to bend the rules to make extra-legal 
appointments either. Therefore, for instance, a politician outside the CM’s kitchen 
cabinet will not be able to make legal or extra-legal appointments for electoral gain, 
or personal gain and protection outcomes. 
 





Of necessity, patrons lacking access to the CM’s inner circle must (a) form 
one-on-one transactional relationships that produce unsustainable bonds and limited 
or temporary outcomes, or (b) employ illegal methods of appointment. Even 
employing illegal methods of appointment, however, does not always produce desired 
outcomes. Where state resources (for example, a sewage line, telephone or electricity 
connection) are sought as personal-gain outcomes (but on a limited scale, e.g. a few 
households, a village at most), strong bonds based on kinship or political loyalties 
may allow the expected outcome to be achieved. This is because it is likely that the 
illegally appointed bureaucrat and/or his family/friends may benefit, themselves, from 
the provision of these resources. However, where personal financial gain is the 
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patron’s target, illegal appointments often produce diffuse, temporary, transactional 
bonds. The appointment is made on the understanding that money will be exchanged 
for it, but the risk of discovery is high. It is possible that one party will rat out the 
other, perhaps to the media or to a more senior bureaucrat, or that someone else will 
report the illegal appointment in exchange for cash. Therefore, personal financial gain 
outcomes are not typically achieved through illegal appointments amongst patrons 
without access to the CM’s inner circle.  
To sum up, this thesis contends that the interaction of objective, method, and 
bond determines whether or not a patron is likely to achieve intended outcomes when 
making a politicised bureaucratic appointment. Broadly speaking, bureaucratic 
efficiency outcomes are best served by making bureaucratic appointments through 
legal methods, and to some extent through extra-legal methods; electoral gain 
outcomes are most likely when extra-legal methods of appointment are used, and to a 
rather limited extent, illegal methods; personal enrichment and protection outcomes 
are most likely when illegal methods are used, and to some extent extra-legal ones. 
However, these patterns are significantly impacted by the patron’s connections to the 
CM and his kitchen cabinet. Politicians standing outside the CM’s inner circle have 
little recourse to legal or extra-legal methods of appointment, and so must depend on 
illegal methods. Whilst these methods make electoral gain and personal enrichment 
and protection outcomes achievable (though with substantial risks and potential 
setbacks), they are not at all useful for bureaucratic efficiency outcomes. For 
bureaucrats lacking access to the CM and his inner circle, it may still be possible to 
make legal and extra-legal appointments in pursuit of bureaucratic efficiency 
outcomes simply due to the legal powers that rest with them. However, these 
bureaucrats must rely on illegal methods for personal enrichment and protection. 
In order to illuminate these patterns (see Figures 2 and 3 above), all three 
empirical chapters in this thesis are divided into two main sections: Section A deals 
with the CM and patrons (politicians and bureaucrats) with access to him; Section B 
deals with patrons (politicians and bureaucrats) who lack this type of access to the 





Briefly, before concluding, it is important to say just a few words about my 
research methods and how I collected my data. This thesis is based on qualitative 
research in Punjabi, Urdu, and English – interviews and semi-participatory 
ethnography (conducted between September 2014 and September 2015, as well as 
some follow-up interviews in December 2015 and August 2016), in addition to data-
mining from the archives of English-language daily newspapers and court 
judgements. 
In all, I conducted 159 interviews – bureaucrats (serving and retired), 
politicians, journalists, academics, and political observers. My respondents varied 
immensely in their age, status, and personality. Politicians were most likely to speak 
either in whispers or in indirect terms – ‘aap ko pata hi ho ga’ (you must already 
know) – always wary of being overheard by the media or voters. Amongst 
bureaucrats, generally, the older they were the more forthcoming I found them to be 
in terms of sketching out the realities of politician-bureaucrat, and bureaucrat-
bureaucrat interaction. Being retired, or close to retirement, gives bureaucrats at all 
levels (from those occupying large air-conditioned offices to those sitting in small 
rooms surrounded by files) a certain daring. Though they will rarely admit their own 
fault in an incident, they will give you an accurate picture of the complexities of the 
bureaucratic career (see, for example, Interviews 7, 8, 20, 23, 43, 44, 76, and 118). 
Those who go on leave, quit the service, or are made OSD make interesting 
interlocutors as well. Their distance from the service allows them to be more 
introspective and critical – again, such interviews were crucial to this thesis 
(Interviews 77, 16, and 75 – all PAS officers). 
PAS bureaucrats at the height of their career tend to be much more reserved – 
even when they trusted me enough to admit a certain ‘political economy of 
bureaucratic appointments’, they did so with a lack of detail to ensured they could not 
be implicated in any wrongdoing. Some mid-tier bureaucrats were similarly reserved, 
wary of my intentions, and afraid for their jobs. Others seemed to find relief in telling 
me about the extra-legal and illegal activities of their peers and seniors, even if they 
did so in whispers behind closed doors. Street-level bureaucrats were the most 
forthcoming. It was at this level that intimidation by politicians and members of the 
armed forces was openly talked about. However, these conversations also took place 
59 
 
behind closed doors, and only after I had provided extensive reassurances regarding 
my research, intentions, and confidentiality guarantees.  
Though the bulk of my interviews took place in Lahore, I also conducted 
interviews in Islamabad, Rawalpindi, Gujranwala, Faisalabad, Narowal, Hafizabad, 
and Sargodha. I had very limited contacts amongst my target respondents when I 
started my fieldwork, so many of my interviews were the result of cold calls to 
bureaucrats and politicians. Once I got an interview, I used the ‘snowball’ technique 
to get more, asking one interviewee to refer me to another. Most of my respondents 
were immensely generous with their time and knowledge, patiently answering my 
questions about their work and experiences while referring me to colleagues past and 
present. The interview guides I developed before starting my fieldwork are provided 
in Appendix 3. I began by conducting some test interviews – interviews with 
bureaucrats in the training academies who I had not identified as being essential to my 
research. After these test interviews, I refined my list of questions to make them more 
targeted. As a result, some questions from the interview guide were condensed or 
dropped, or only asked where circumstances allowed. For instance, I dropped 
questions on policy development within political parties as well as questions on the 
detailed bureaucratic processes involved in conducting elections. Furthermore, though 
I initially asked bureaucrats open-ended questions about their responsibilities, I soon 
switched to asking more targeted questions about specific tasks – for example, what is 
the criteria for determining whether or not a transfer request made by a school teacher 
will be granted and who determines it? Or who is responsible for checking water 
outlets from irrigation canals and ensuring they are properly maintained?  
My fieldwork revealed that structured interviews were less effective than 
semi-structured interviews and semi-participant observation (i.e. observation in which 
I was an evident presence, but played no direct part). There are a couple of reasons for 
this. The first is that most of my interviews were constantly interrupted – by the 
telephone, by the interviewee’s staff, and by ordinary citizens. That meant that not 
only did my interviewees lose the thread of my questions while they dealt with a work 
crisis or a sifarish, my interviewee also lost the thread of their answer. Furthermore, 
the interruptions were often interesting in themselves and offered their own line of 
questioning that I would often pursue. For instance, my interview with the Secretary 
Higher Education (Interview 42) was interrupted by two men with a sifarish (see 
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Chapter 5). As I watched the request being made, and the bureaucrat’s response, I 
changed the tack of my questioning to address what had just happened. 
I also found that tactics or strategies I used in interviewing one politician or 
bureaucrat did not work with another. Some were more willing to accept me and my 
questions (for example, Interview 17, 41, 45, 89), others required more reassurance 
(Interview 66, 133, 53). Some would question me before they allowed me to question 
them (Interview 27, 38). Some were more willing to tell me personal stories 
(Interview 9, 14, 18, 30, 39, 47, 49, 100), others clammed up without saying much 
(Interview 3, 37, 50, 52, 88, 128).47 Finally, I gained the most through my observation 
of the comings and goings in the offices of bureaucrats and politicians. The 
proceedings I observed (or expected but did not observe, e.g. the absence of money 
changing hands in return for favours, as well as the general absence of biraderi 
relationships in establishing relationships amongst higher-level bureaucrats) helped 
me to verify/triangulate what I had read and what I had been told in other interviews.  
There were two main sites for my fieldwork – the offices of the Punjab School 
Education Department and the Punjab Irrigation Department in both Lahore and 
Rawalpindi, Gujranwala, Faisalabad, Narowal, Hafizabad, and Sargodha. These 
offices varied immensely in type (size, style, comfort, staff) depending on the status 
of the occupant. The Irrigation Department’s Secretariat in Lahore is a new building, 
cool and quiet inside with a number of large halls containing desks for junior officials 
or stacks for files. Offices in the building for more senior officials (PAS and specialist 
officers) are large and comfortable. In the other districts, however, Irrigation 
Department offices are in poor condition, with mismatched furniture, an irregular 
supply of electricity, dusty stacks of paper on every surface, and paint peeling from 
the walls. The School Education Department’s Secretariat in Lahore is not like the 
Irrigation Department’s Secretariat. It is a shabby old building in a complex with 
other departmental offices. The largest office is occupied by the Secretary. Other 
offices, with a large desk and a few chairs, are functional rather than luxurious – there 
is too much traffic for time or money to be wasted in decorating them. In each of the 
other districts, attempts have been made to set up an ‘education complex’ 
consolidating all of the education-related offices in one area. Though the buildings 
seem new, many offices inside are dark and dingy.   
                                                 
47 Details of these interviewees are available in Appendix 1. 
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Interviews with senior (PAS) bureaucrats were generally conducted in the 
comfort of air-conditioned/heated, marble-floored offices with massive desks, and 
numerous staff members available to carry out their boss’s every request. Interview 
89, for example, was conducted in the Secretary Irrigation’s enormous, beautifully 
appointed office. Mid-tier bureaucrats have offices that are far less luxurious – there is 
no marble, the furniture is mismatched and unpolished, and the office and their staff 
(if they have any) are often shared between a number of officials. For example, 
Interview 49, a Section Officer in the School Education Department, shared a tiny, 
dusty office with another Section Officer; their office was filled with mismatched 
chairs and piles of paperwork, sharing a tea boy and other staff with all of the other 
offices on the floor. My meetings with junior and street-level bureaucrats were often 
conducted in meeting rooms or in large halls where they shared desks, and files, 
papers, and computers and printers jostled for space with the human beings. Interview 
154, an SDO in Sargodha, spoke to me in a meeting room crowded with his 
colleagues, and Interview 159 (a Section Officer in the Irrigation Department) was 
forced to lower his voice while speaking to me since only a flimsy partition separated 
his desk from several others in a large hall. Visits to the smaller districts like Narowal 
and Hafizabad involved visiting offices that were smaller, more decrepit, and often 
without electricity for hours on end.  
The School Education Department is responsible for primary and secondary 
education provision and, to that end, employs roughly 400,000 people across the 
province, including teachers, head teachers, administrative staff, and Class IV 
employees (peons, guards, etc.). As the largest employer in the province, handling the 
largest number of appointments, this department was crucial for my research. The 
sheer number of posts available within the department at any given time make it a 
primary site for politicised appointments, and the department’s spread makes 
monitoring difficult. Furthermore, teaching staff often take on responsibilities beyond 
the school room – they are typically frontline staff during the census and delimitation 
exercises, and polling staff during elections. This makes appointments in this 
department even more critical. In recent years, numerous reforms have been 
introduced, funded by donors such as DFID and under the close monitoring of the 
CM, to improve access, efficiency, and quality of education provision, including a 
specific focus on improving appointment processes – making the department an 
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indispensable source of material for this thesis. If my account helps to illuminate the 
working of the School Education Department, it goes some way towards illuminating 
the politics of bureaucratic appointments overall. 
However, to generalise, I had to move beyond the School Education 
Department. The Irrigation Department receives far less attention from an urban-
focused CM, despite being responsible for the maintenance of the colonial era 
irrigation network that supplies the agricultural heartland. Indeed, the Irrigation 
Department could be described as the department that sustains the provincial 
economy (and, by extension, many of its landowning politicians). Like the School 
Education Department, then, but for a different reason, I felt that an understanding of 
the Irrigation Department was indispensable. Indeed, if my account of politicised 
bureaucratic appointments could accommodate both the School Education and 
Irrigation Departments, I felt that I would be able to make a significant contribution to 
our understanding of politicised appointments overall. I interviewed bureaucrats from 
elsewhere as well, including DCOs, officers from the Services & General 
Administration and Higher Education Departments; however, further research is 
required to expose whether all of the patterns I describe in this thesis extend to these 
other departments – not only in Punjab, but throughout the bureaucracy of Pakistan.  
Though comprised of thousands of employees across the province, the 
Irrigation Department has a different ethos to that of the School Education 
Department. Most of its mid-tier and senior staff are qualified engineers, or have 
specific skills required for their jobs. As a result, they see themselves as being set 
apart from other, generalist government employees, and hark back to the exclusivity 
and elite nature of Irrigation Department jobs in the colonial period. For this reason, 
Irrigation Department bureaucrats resent the appointment of a generalist PAS officer 
as their Secretary. When the PAS officer arrives, he knows nothing about the 
irrigation sector, and many make no effort to learn. The result is that senior Irrigation 
Department employees spend their time educating their superior (only to have him be 
transferred out) or trying to guide his decision making.  
I found that retired bureaucrats – PAS, PMS, School Education, and Irrigation 
officials – were particularly helpful since they were usually more willing to be honest 
and engage with the more political aspects of the bureaucracy. Interviews with 
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journalists and political observers provided a more neutral view of bureaucratic and 
political behaviour.  
And of course, I spoke to a number of politicians, particularly MPAs who tend 
to be overlooked in recent political science research. Some of these interviews were 
conducted in politicians’ homes, in rooms that they would typically use to meet party 
members, party workers, or media personnel (i.e. deras, see Nelson 2011). Other 
interviews were conducted in constituency or party offices, often overseen by large-
scale photos of their respective party leaders past and present. These are offices with 
few frills but a great deal of traffic – this is where citizens come to request favours 
from their politicians. Conducting some of my interviews with politicians in the 
Punjab Assembly while the house was in session was also instructive. I got to observe 
the comings and goings of provincial politicians (e.g. the Deputy Speaker of the 
house, Sher Ali Gorchani), the conversations that took place in the library, hallways 
and lobbies of the building, and the activities of officials working for the Deputy 
Speaker, the heads of committees, and the leaders of the opposition parties (e.g. the 
PTI’s Mian Mehmood ur Rasheed and PMLQ’s Aamir Sultan Cheema).  
A number of my interviews were brief conversations, useful mainly in judging 
the responsibilities and duties of staff at various levels of the bureaucratic hierarchy 
(and, if I was lucky, their attitudes toward their work and their juniors and superiors). 
However, several of the interviews were more extensive and often involved an 
element of what I like to refer to as ‘accidental ethnography’. Whilst waiting in 
bureaucratic and political party offices, politicians’ homes, and constituency offices, 
as well as the provincial assembly, court rooms and hallways, in schools, and even in 
the elite Gymkhana Club of Lahore, listening as bureaucrats and politicians spoke to 
others (in person or on the phone) and went about their day-to-day routine, I gained 
invaluable insight into the workings of Pakistan’s bureaucratic and political system. I 
recorded my observations in a detailed catalogue of field notes, organised by location, 
date, subject (named, then anonymised), topic of conversation, and relevance to the 
argument in my thesis. 
Much of my understanding of appointment procedures (extra-legal ones in 
particular) emerged from the time I spent observing proceedings in the offices of 
bureaucrats and politicians, and in the Punjab Services Tribunal. In departmental and 
constituency offices, bureaucrats and politicians would be approached with a request 
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for a specific post. From that point on, the discussion tended to cover what the 
regulations said, how they could be circumvented (if necessary), and what the 
repercussions may be. In case of a dispute between an employee and their department, 
the Punjab Services Tribunal, ‘deemed to be a civil court’ (Article 5, The Punjab 
Services Tribunal Act), has ‘exclusive jurisdiction’ (Article 3, The Punjab Services 
Tribunal Act) and is thus the only court of appeal. The Tribunal, however, is often 
non-functional – the term of the judges appointed to it expire and the Services & 
General Administration Department forgets to renew them or appoint someone else. 
When this happens, cases simply remain pending. They cannot proceed to the 
ordinary civil courts since the Tribunal has ‘exclusive jurisdiction’ over all service 
matters (Article 212, Constitution of Pakistan 1973).48 As it happened, the Tribunal 
was functional during my fieldwork and I was able to sit in to hear proceedings on a 
number of different cases. Some were cases that had been filed recently; others had 
been pending for many years. An elementary school teacher, for instance, had filed a 
case against her transfer order; an EDO-Education from Hafizabad appealed (in 2014) 
against the withdrawal of her increment (as a penalty for her transfer of another 
teacher); and several teachers from Bhakkar who had not been promoted since 2012 
had filed a case against the district EDO. 
A Tribunal judge has dozens of hearings scheduled every day in his tiny, 
crowded courtroom, and lawyers and petitioners crowd around the bench. Many 
hearings last only a few minutes – documentation is missing, the department’s 
representative is missing, and, sometimes, the case is quickly resolved by referring it 
back to a department’s internal disciplinary mechanisms. In a number of cases though, 
judges spent considerable time hearing the facts of the case. Those appealing to the 
Tribunal for relief come from across the spectrum of departments – Irrigation, 
Communication & Works, Police, Higher Education, etc. – but the issues are broadly 
similar: increments withheld, delayed promotions and transfers, unjust penalties, and 
so forth. What was most useful about observing these proceedings was an 
understanding not just of procedure but where the line is drawn between acts that 
contravene the regulations and acts that strategically bend them.  
A few points regarding my positionality as a researcher in Punjab’s political 
and bureaucratic environment are also in order. First, I should note that I was an 
                                                 
48 Again, this helps to explain why this thesis does not focus, in any depth, on the judiciary. Cases in 
the High Court are filed by external parties – for instance, a concerned citizen. 
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outsider to this domain. Many interviewees asked me who I was – in other words, are 
my parents (or other close relatives) bureaucrats or politicians? They are not. Possibly 
as a result, many were suspicious, even paranoid, as to whether I was an intelligence 
officer, a journalist bent on exposing them, or even a spy sent to check on their work. 
This air of paranoia was in itself interesting in terms of how centralised power and 
decision-making has become in Punjab, and the extent to which asking too many 
questions is regarded as threatening.  
Second, there were some obvious markers of my upper-middle-class status – 
my clothing and my language, for instance. Amongst elite bureaucrats and many 
politicians, this was not an issue because they are from, or have often risen to, the 
same or a higher class; in fact, with them, the power balance was often with the 
interviewee. However, amongst mid-tier and street-level bureaucrats, I was a woman 
who was clearly better off and better educated. In many cases, this meant that people 
opened up to me in the hopes that I would be able to help illuminate their plight, or 
even assist directly (for example, a number of interviewees asked me to find jobs for 
their children). In the smaller districts (Hafizabad and Narowal), it often meant that I 
was treated in a more privileged fashion than others waiting to see a bureaucrat – I 
was asked to walk in past the queue of citizens waiting in the heat to sit in the 
bureaucrat’s air conditioned office (even though he was still in another meeting). 
Third, I was often the only woman in the room, and this made for some 
interesting observations. On the one hand, being a woman allowed me a number of 
advantages – I found it useful to have men assume my ignorance on basic points and 
‘mansplain’ to me; I found respondents sometimes wanting to help me out and going 
out of their way to do so. On the other hand, I was also aware that, had I been a man 
(or even an insider), I may well have received very different responses to my 
questions. Furthermore, had I been a man, the business of an office would invariably 
have carried on as usual when I walked into a room. This was not always the case for 
me – at times, conversation would cease or become stilted until the men would 
eventually forget I was there and resume their regular routine.  
That said, my outsider status, and my identity as a woman, also meant that I 
was often considered non-threatening. This meant that, though some bureaucrats and 
politicians remained wary, a number ignored my presence and went about their 
business till they were ready to speak to me. A prominent example was a district-level 
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School Education Department official who conducted a frank discussion with his 
colleagues on the district’s dengue prevention campaign, taking an hour to notice (and 
then panic at) my presence next to his desk. Also, I found that, as a woman, some of 
my richest interviews were with women bureaucrats – there was less showboating, 
less sticking to the party line, and more honesty and nuance.  
My desk research involved searching through newspaper reports and court 
judgements on the activities of bureaucrats and politicians, highlighting incidents and 
cases that had been flagged as being of interest during my interviews and 
ethnography. In this manner, I tried to verify what I had been told during interviews, 
but also used the material gleaned from newspapers to inform my interviews. I 
focused mainly on the English-language press because these reports were more likely 
to have been investigated and substantiated before being printed than the more 
salacious reports in the Urdu press. Furthermore, during my data mining, I realised 
that the English press was often drawing on reports in the Urdu press, or on television, 
and verifying them. Therefore, these reports were the most thorough ones available on 
the activities of politicians and bureaucrats. 
A word on anonymisation – where I refer to events recounted in newspapers, I 
have made no effort to anonymise bureaucrats, politicians, or other actors. However, I 




In this chapter, I have introduced the key elements on which the rest of this 
thesis will rest. I argue that (a) the objectives of bureaucrats and politicians who have 
the ability to influence bureaucratic appointments and (b) the methods of bureaucratic 
appointment (which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 2) come together to 
form what I describe, filling key gaps in the existing political science literature, as 
strategic and transactional ‘bonds’ between patrons and appointees. The strength or 
diffusion of these patronage bonds, underpinned by informal professional, school, and 
kin networks, determine whether or not a patron’s desired outcome is achieved. A 
deeper understanding of the factors underpinning these patterns of bureaucratic 




In discussing the objectives of senior politicians and senior and mid-tier 
bureaucrats seeking to influence bureaucratic appointments, I distinguish between 
official objectives and personal and political ones. All politicians have constituency 
demands that must be taken care of if they hope to hold onto their seats. The burden is 
greater, however, for holders of senior offices; they are responsible not only for 
keeping their constituents happy, but also for ensuring that the image of their party 
remains untainted in the eyes of the voting public. Officially, the job of a bureaucrat is 
to ensure the implementation of policy in accordance with the intention behind its 
formulation. Though bureaucrats are supposed to be politically neutral, they rarely 
are. Like every other actor, they have a variety of personal and even political 
motivations for influencing bureaucratic appointments. Bureaucrats’ acceptance of 
politicised appointments is, in turn, related to their desire for what I describe as 
‘stability’.   
To sum up, I seek to illuminate permutations of governance in Punjab by 
complicating the idea of a ‘politicised’ bureaucracy. Politicisation is not an activity 
that only politicians indulge in. Bureaucrats, military officers, and others are also 
involved. Not all politicised appointments are made using illegal means. In fact, this 
thesis argues that illegal appointments to senior and mid-tier bureaucratic posts are in 
many cases the least effective means of ‘delivering’ desired results. In certain 
situations, legal appointments are more effective in achieving objectives. And in 
almost every case, extra-legal methods that exploit existing loopholes in the formal 
rules are the most effective method of all. In Punjab, politicians and bureaucrats who 
build a reputation for ‘getting things done’ need not break existing rules. They often 
simply bend them. In the following chapter, I present the historical, political, and 
legal backdrop within which the empirical chapters of this thesis are set.   
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CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND  
 
This thesis seeks to answer the following question – When do politicians and 
bureaucrats achieve their desired outcomes? This chapter is divided into four parts. 
The first section presents the history of Pakistan’s bureaucracy, particularly its 
relationship with both civilian and military leaders, from the perspective of 
institutional and political change and continuity. I identify turning points in the 
relationship between politicians and bureaucrats, highlight the role military rulers 
have played in entrenching networks of patronage, provide a brief overview of the 
structure of the bureaucracy, and explain the persistent insecurity of the political class 
in the country which underpins the drivers for centralisation under the provincial CM.  
 The second section briefly outlines the significance of the drive to ‘deliver’ 
amongst both politicians and bureaucrats in Punjab, linking it to the larger questions 
explored in this thesis, before moving on to identify the varying ability that politicians 
and bureaucrats have to influence bureaucratic appointments. And the third section 
provides an account of regular appointment practices (recruitment, seniority, 
promotion, transfer, and CM Directives) and irregular appointments (ad hoc 
appointments, acting charge, additional/current charge, contract appointment, OSD, 
post upgradation, and OPS) at different levels of the bureaucratic hierarchy. It 
concludes with an account of illegal methods of appointment. This discussion sets the 
stage for the discussion of legal, extra-legal, and illegal appointments, before the 
empirical chapters to follow (linking specific patterns of appointment to specific 
patterns of delivering crucial outcomes). 
 
Institutional & Political Change and Continuity in Pakistan 
 
The Indian Civil Service and the Post-Independence Period 
The creation and management of the All India Civil Service was arguably one 
of the British Raj’s greatest achievements. The service was the means through which 
the British ruled the heterogeneous subcontinent for over 100 years. 
The All India Civil Service was based on ‘cadres’ tied to regional 
classifications (federal and provincial) and occupation (police, health, education, etc.) 
[see Kennedy 1987 for details on development of the cadre system during British 
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rule]. The establishment of cadres allowed the British (and subsequently the 
Government of Pakistan) to create specialist groups while maintaining an elite cadre 
of federal and provincial generalists. This structure created a clear hierarchy, with the 
elite cadre considered the most capable and the best educated, with a higher social 
status than the others.  
Under the British, the All India Services were under the control of the British 
Government. Near the end of British rule, administrative departments were gradually 
shifted from the All India Services to the Central Services (under the Government of 
India). By 1947, only two services were still under the control of the British 
Government – the Indian Civil Service (ICS) and the Indian Police Service (Kennedy 
1987, 31). Pakistan, following the same structure, formed the Civil Service of 
Pakistan (CSP) and the Police Service of Pakistan (PSP).49  
The British set up a clear administrative structure all the way down to the 
district level and ensured that district-level administrators formed close bonds with 
local power holders in the area - zamindaars, jaagirdaars, tribal chiefs, and religious 
heads. Colonial rule was a bureaucratic, extractive, and ‘deeply clientelistic’ 
(Wilkinson 2014, 262) exercise.50 Though such relationships no doubt existed prior to 
the arrival of the British - between traditional power holders and representatives of the 
Mughal Empire, for example - the ties established during British rule have remained 
in place in some form for 70 years (see also Gilmartin 1988; and Shafqat 2011). When 
we study present-day patron-clientage in former colonies, we must acknowledge these 
roots in the colonial period.  
The institutional continuity of patron-clientage can be linked to the relative 
continuity of bureaucratic structures between the late-colonial period and the post-
independence period. Immediately after partition, Pakistan continued to use colonial 
era laws and regulations.51 Kennedy (1987, 29) provides a number of reasons for the 
retention of the civil service structure established by the British. On the one hand, it 
was seen as a system that was functioning well, having evolved gradually to meet the 
                                                 
49 In addition, there were 13 other services that made up the Central Superior Services, including the 
Pakistan Foreign Service and Pakistan Taxation Service. 
50 The British have a long history of patronage appointments in their own civil service, including the 
appointment of a ‘patronage secretary’ whose duty it was to ensure that politicised appointees to the 
bureaucracy ‘helped increase party discipline and construct party loyalties’ (Grindle 2012, 53).  
51 Though numerous changes were brought to the structure of the civil service during the British period 
(see Kennedy 1987 for a detailed account), when the subcontinent was partitioned, Pakistan did not 
make any substantive changes to the inherited bureaucratic set up. 
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needs of the Raj. On the other hand, even if there had been the will to change the 
system, the new state was too weak to make drastic changes. Because Muslims were 
only a small proportion of the colonial services, Pakistan simply lacked the officials 
needed to staff its new bureaucracy. This favoured a small class of elite civil servants 
who had ‘very sanguine career prospects’ and resisted suggestions for reform 
(Kennedy 1987, 31).  
While Pakistan’s political leadership was weak and fragmented, it was these 
bureaucrats, with their thorough grasp of the system and its processes, who ensured 
that the business of the state continued. In fact, Pakistan’s fragmented political 
leadership was increasingly sidelined by the only two institutions that experienced 
any continuity - the military and the bureaucracy.  
In Alavi’s (1972) opinion, the early years of Pakistan’s existence were marked 
by the development and dominance of a military-bureaucracy oligarchy. I will not 
expand on this period, as others have done so extensively (Alavi 1972, Jalal 1995, 
Jaffrelot 2014). I will instead focus on five subsequent political periods – that of PM 
Bhutto (1970-77), General Zia (1977-1988), the democratic interlude (1988 to 1999), 
General Musharraf (1999-2008), and the post-Musharraf era (2008-2016). In doing 
so, I will highlight various civil service reforms, commission reports, and changes to 
the division of administrative power. A deeper understanding of reform, I maintain, 
will help to understand the politicisation of the bureaucracy and its impact on 
governance over time.52  
 
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s Administrative Reforms 
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was elected in 1970 on an “Islamic socialist” and reformist 
platform. Not only was he the first popularly elected leader of West Pakistan, he also 
came into power after the loss of East Pakistan (as Bangladesh) in 1971. It was 
therefore, a receptive period for change.  
Bhutto was responsible for the formulation of Pakistan’s third constitution - 
the Constitution of 1973. This Constitution marked the beginning of a new chapter for 
Pakistan after the loss of half the country, and it remains in force today despite being 
                                                 
52 Shafqat (2011, 4) points out that the commissions formed over the years to reform the civil service 
pay no attention to the relationship of bureaucrats to politicians. In his words, the commissions suggest 
‘both in perception and reality’ power rests with the civil service (Shafqat 2011, 4). Naturally, my 
focus on the politicisation of bureaucratic appointments disagrees with this assessment. 
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temporarily suspended by two martial law administrators (Zia and Musharraf). It has 
seen a number of amendments over the years, the most comprehensive of which is the 
2010 18th Amendment. As the primary source of legal authority, the Constitution of 
1973 empowers the Majlis-e-Shura (Parliament/National Assembly) and the 
provincial assemblies to formulate rules of service and govern appointments to the 
federal and provincial services, respectively (Art. 240).  
Amongst the most prominent reforms introduced during Bhutto’s time in 
office were the Administrative Reforms introduced on 20 August 1973. Kennedy 
(1987) highlights four aspects of these reforms, namely: (1) the abolition of the 
service cadres (e.g. CSP, PSP) and the establishment of ‘occupational groups’ 
(District Management, Income Tax, Police, etc.); (2) an end to the practice of 
reserving central secretariat posts for those in the elite Civil Service of Pakistan; (3) 
changes to the training of bureaucrats with the establishment of an Academy for 
Administrative Training (and the introduction of the Common Training Program); 
and, (4) the introduction of ‘lateral recruitment’ to the bureaucracy. In addition, 
Bhutto introduced evaluations for serving officers (Shafqat 2013, 104), and removed 
1300 members of the civil service (Shafqat 2013, 102).  
Bhutto’s reforms took a particular sequence (Kennedy 1987, 89-90). First, 
‘listed posts’ (i.e. posts earmarked for officers belonging to a particular cadre, usually 
the CSP, which could briefly be occupied by officers from other cadres) were 
abolished. It was also decreed that if an officer had taken a listed post, he then became 
a part of the service in which he held that post, giving up his previous service. 
Second, the CSP and PSP were dissolved and their officials were made a part of the 
All Pakistan Unified Grade (APUG), which replaced the All Pakistan Services (APS). 
Whereas the APS had been made up primarily of CSP and PSP officers, the APUG 
also included officers from outside these two elite services. 
Third, the APUG was divided into four occupational groups – the Tribal Areas 
group (TAG), the District Management Group (DMG), the Police Group (PG) and the 
Secretariat group (SG). The DMG was comprised of officials occupying district 
administration posts in non-tribal areas. Kennedy (1987, 92) notes that, by 1976, most 
of the officers in the DMG were formerly of the CSP or had been directly recruited 
post-reforms. Only a few came from the Provincial Civil Services (PCS). The SG was 
formed in 1975 as an occupational group for officers holding the posts of Deputy 
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Secretary and above in both the Federal and Provincial Secretariats (Kennedy 1987, 
93). There was no entry into the SG except through ‘lateral recruitment…, promotion 
and/or horizontal movement from other cadres’ (Kennedy 1987, 93-95). Again, most 
of the members of the SG in 1976 were from the CSP, though they were outnumbered 
by lateral recruits (Kennedy 1987, 94).  
The thrust of the reforms introduced by Bhutto was their egalitarian nature. He 
reduced the size of the elite CSP and brought them level with their civil service 
colleagues from other cadres in everything from training to posting. In doing so, Jalal 
(1995, 82) believes he won support. However, Jalal (1995, 82) also notes that despite 
these changes, ‘CSP officers continued to wield wide-ranging powers in sensitive 
spots across the length and breadth of the state administration’. This could be 
attributed to the fact that although the reforms were wide ranging on paper, they did 
not translate well in practice. In Kennedy’s (1987, 14) words, Bhutto’s reforms had a 
two-fold impact – they ‘weakened the dominance of the CSP’ and ‘increased the level 
of [centralized] political influence’. Though the objective of bringing the bureaucracy 
under political control was achieved, Shafqat (2013, 102) argues that good 
governance (i.e. ensuring policy implementation to deliver services) was not the goal.  
Under Bhutto, the reform of the civil service was an exercise not in improving 
the lot of ordinary people, but of strengthening the grip of whoever was in power - 
civil (partisan) or military (Jaffrelot 2014). The drive toward centralisation under the 
PMLN in Punjab, in other words, is not unique. Bhutto’s reforms were, of course, 
hugely controversial. In addition to the damage done to the services via the ‘dismissal 
of civil servants without due legal process, [and] unwarranted political interference in 
postings and transfers’ (Shafqat 2011, 5), there was also a great deal of resistance 
from within the bureaucracy itself, especially owing to (a) the abolition of the elite 
CSP and its reserved posts; (b) lateral recruitment (seen as bringing the service under 
political control); and (c) the rampant dismissal of officers. Regardless, a new set of 
power relations were created.  
 
Zia ul Haq’s Reforms 
In 1977, General Zia ul Haq imposed martial law, highlighting the misdeeds of 
the Bhutto government through a series of White Papers. In February 1978, the Civil 
Services Reform Commission was set up under Chief Justice Anwar ul Haq. The 
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commission recommended a number of wide ranging reforms, including an end to 
lateral recruitment, the reinstatement of constitutional protection against removal from 
service, the dissolution of occupational groups, and the formation of a District 
Management Branch (merging the DMG and Tribal Areas Group). Unlike Bhutto’s 
reforms, which focused exclusively on the federal level with only passing reference to 
local government, however, the Anwar ul Haq Commission dealt with all levels – 
federal, provincial and local.   
Zia chose not to implement all of the changes recommended by Anwar ul Haq. 
He dissolved the TAG and moved its members to the DMG, and, more importantly, 
he stopped lateral recruitment to the CSS (i.e. the Office Management Group). Even 
as Zia abolished lateral recruitment, however, he also increased the number of places 
reserved for military officials, giving these inductees seniority over officers who had 
joined through direct (merit-based) competition (Shafqat 1999, 1003). The policy of 
inducting military officials wholesale and in an institutionalised manner differentiated 
the Zia regime from that of pre-war military dictators like Ayub or Yahya Khan (Jalal 
1995, 105). As a result, there was considerable resentment amongst the federal 
bureaucracy (Jalal 1995, 104).  
In addition, Zia (like previous and subsequent military rulers) used a 
devolution program focused on non-party district governments (selected through non-
party elections) as a means of establishing local control while sidelining provincial 
political forces. According to a former deputy commissioner who served in the Punjab 
during the 1980s, “It was during Zia’s period that officers from the DMG and PSP, in 
particular, became the power base for [non-party] local politicians at the district level” 
(ICG 2010, 7; see also Jaffrelot 2014). The reason for this was that the non-party 
nature of local government elections, as well as the 1985 general election, encouraged 
politicians who had no party loyalties because they did not need them to win.53 
Electability in the 1985 election depended solely on providing voters with what they 
wanted - electricity, sewage, a phone connection, protection/impunity, etc. In fact, by 
the time elections were held in 1988, the leaders of the contesting parties had come to 
believe that they did not have a hope without a team of loyal bureaucrats on their side. 
Political leaders were also aware that the key to winning an election was not to appeal 
to voters on ideological grounds, but to provide them with ‘access’ to state resources 
                                                 
53 See Mufti 2011; Waseem 1989, 1994; and Jalal 1995. 
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or impunity. This amounted to what was effectively a reset of political realities in 
Pakistan – though the 1970 elections suggested a shift toward a more party-based 
polity (at least in urban areas), Zia’s policies meant that direct links between 
politicians and bureaucrats were paramount (Jalal 1995, 105). Zia’s reforms can 
therefore be considered a break from the institutional set up under Bhutto in two 
ways, namely: (1) the inclusion of military officers in the bureaucracy in a systematic 
fashion; and (2) the re-fashioning of local ties between (non-party) politicians and 
bureaucrats.  
 Even when Zia’s non-party local government system was suspended in the 
early 1990s54, the bureaucrats who had served under Zia as Commissioners and 
Deputy Commissioners remained in the bureaucracy, moving to more senior posts. At 
the same time, local politicians also rose, perhaps to provincial or federal ministries. 
This further entrenched the patronage relations that had been formed during Zia’s 
local government years, taking them to the highest levels.  
By and large, Pakistan’s bureaucratic structures have remained unchanged 
since Zia reversed the changes wrought by Bhutto. As noted above, the Civil Services 
of Pakistan are divided into three groups: the All Pakistan Unified Grade, the Federal 
Civil Service, and the Provincial Civil Service.  
The All Pakistan Unified Grade (APUG) consists of officers who may be 
assigned to either the Federal or Provincial governments. It consists of three groups: 
the Secretariat Group (Basic Pay Scale/BPS 19-22), the Pakistan Administrative 
Service55 (BPS 17-22), and the Police Service of Pakistan (BPS 17-22). (Officials 
within the APUG are appointed to the provinces on the basis of a quota, though the 
majority of APUG posts in Punjab go to the PAS.)  
Recruitment to the Federal Civil Service is on the basis of a quota set 
according to province and region.56 This branch of the service consists of three sub-
groups, namely (a) Cadre services (including the Pakistan Foreign Service, Audit and 
Accounts Group, Income Tax Group, Customs and Excise Group)57, (b) Ex-cadre 
                                                 
54 The timing of this varied by province. In Punjab, the system ended in 1993, in Sindh in 1992. 
55 Formerly referred to as the District Management Group or DMG  
56 For BPS 17 and above, hiring is conducted by the Federal Public Service Commission (FPSC). For 
BPS 1-16, recruitment takes place through ministry, division and department recruiting committees 
57 Also, Railways Group, Postal Group, Commerce and Trade Group, Information Group, Economists 
and Planners Group, Military Lands and Cantonment Group, and the Office Management Group. The 
last two groups are to be abolished and recruitment for them has been halted.  
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officers – senior specialists in a particular field (BPS 17 or above) and, finally, (c) 
Subordinate services – (BPS1 to 16).  
Finally, all provincial civil servants fall under the umbrella of the Provincial 
Unified Grades. However, once again, the provincial service was divided into three 
branches, namely (a) the Provincial Civil Services (PCS BPS-17 and above) (itself 
divided into (1) the Executive Branch (PCS-EB) with field postings like Assistant 
Commissioner; (2) the Secretariat Branch (PCS-SB) with Secretariat posts like 
Section Officers; and (3) the Judiciary Branch (PCS-JB) appointed as magistrates58) 
as well as (b) Technical or Professional Services Cadres (BPS 16 and above), 
including those serving in School Education, Higher Education, Irrigation, Revenue, 
Excise & Taxation, and Health, etc. and, once again, (c) various Subordinate 
Employees (BPS 1 to 15). 
 
The Democratic Interlude 
In 1988, Zia ul Haq was killed in a plane crash. In the 1988 election, Nawaz 
Sharif, who had been Punjab’s Finance Minister in the early 1980s (then CM Punjab 
in 1985 under Zia’s patronage), contested as part of the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI). 
He won in Punjab, becoming Chief Minister, but the PPP (led by Benazir Bhutto) did 
well in other provinces and eventually took power at the centre.  
For the next decade, power alternated between short-lived governments led by 
Benazir Bhutto and the Nawaz Sharif. With each change in government, however, the 
country witnessed ‘large scale postings and transfers of civil servants both at the 
policy-making level as well as at the district administration level’ (Shafqat 1999, 
1008-1009). “Bhutto and Sharif both had their own ‘team’ of civil servants who were 
patronised and promoted not on merit but on perceived loyalty to their respective 
political masters”, notes an ICG (2010, 7) report quoting a retired federal secretary 
who served during the 1990s. At the same time, the administrative machinery 
remained beholden to non-elected state actors (often referred to somewhat obliquely 
as ‘the Establishment’).  
                                                 
58 In 2004, the Government of Punjab decided to merge the Executive and Secretariat branches of the 
Provincial Civil Services into the Provincial Management Service (BPS 17 and above). The idea was 
that all officers should have exposure to both field and secretariat postings. This merger took place 
soon after the implementation of the 2001 Local Government Plan.  
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The first of Benazir’s governments (1988-1990), accused of massive 
corruption and legislative sclerosis, was constantly in a battle with the Nawaz 
Sharif59-led Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI) government in the Punjab (Jalal 1995, 
110).60 The IJI, an alliance created and backed by ‘the Establishment’, had an 
immense advantage over Benazir’s beleaguered national government. This backing 
was useful in winning support in Punjab. In fact, during the run up to the 1990 
election, the bureaucracy worked as it never had before, ‘galvanized to undertake the 
most rapid road-building, sanitation and electrification exercises ever witnessed in the 
rural localities, [with] select voters treated with jobs and notes to pull the tricks out of 
the ballot box’ (Jalal 1995, 110-111).   
In the 1990 elections, the IJI won and Nawaz Sharif became PM (1990-93). 
However, Sharif (like Benazir) soon came up against the will and power of the 
military and the Presidency when he attempted to exercise control over Pakistan’s 
economy, particularly with regard to defense contracts (Jalal 1995, 113). The 1993 
election was closely contested, with the PPP and PMLN separated by just sixteen 
seats in the National Assembly. However, Benazir Bhutto eventually succeeded in 
cobbling together a ruling coalition (1993-96), aided in great part by the PPP’s win in 
Punjab’s provincial elections.61 This was the only election since 1988 that a non-PML 
faction won in Punjab. However, Bhutto’s government was dismissed by her once 
ally, President Leghari, in 1996, and fresh elections were held in 1997.  
Both the Sharif and Bhutto governments set up commissions with the 
objective of reducing the state’s wage bill. Sharif established the Economy 
Commission in 1991 (headed first by Brigadier (r) A. Qayum Khan and then by 
Senator Raja Zafar ul Haq); Bhutto established the Chattha Commission under Hamid 
Nasir Chattha in 1995. Though both commissions recommended a reduction in 
departments and other right-sizing proposals, it was not until 1996 that any action was 
taken. Under the caretaker government of President Farooq Leghari, the process of 
downsizing through ‘abolition, liquidation and privatization’ (NCGR Report, p. 3) 
began, but this process was never completed. 
                                                 
59 Nawaz Sharif was appointed Punjab’s Finance Minister in 1981 and became CM Punjab following 
the party-less election of 1985. 
60 In 1989, Benazir’s government created a Services Reform Commission under Justice Dorab Patel, 
but a full report was never produced. Justice Patel provided his recommendations in 1991, by which 
point the PPP was no longer in power. 
61 At the time, national and provincial elections were held on separate days (6 and 9 October 1993). 
This is no longer the case. 
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The 1997 elections were won by PML (Nawaz) in a landslide, with Nawaz 
becoming PM and his brother Shahbaz CM Punjab. It was during the 1997-1999 term 
that the Sharifs developed key alliances and patronage networks in bureaucratic 
circles, particularly amongst the DMG/PAS. Two new commissions were set up to 
reform the bureaucracy. The first was formed under Dr. Hafiz Pasha with the same 
objective as the Economy and Chattha Commissions. (Its proposals, once again, were 
far reaching but never implemented.) The second was the Commission on 
Administrative Restructuring under Fakhar Imam. However, this commission’s 
suggestions were deeply problematic. For example, though it recommended a 
devolution of administrative power to the provinces, it restricted this to certain 
subjects while emphasising the need for the centre to retain control of provincial 
activities.62 The recommendations of Fakhar Imam became a moot point, however, 
when Nawaz Sharif’s government was dismissed by General Pervez Musharraf in 
1999 (at which point both the Sharifs and Bhutto went into exile).  
Throughout the 1990s,63 as political power fluctuated between the PPP and the 
PMLN (independently or in coalition) and attempts at civil service reform stalled, the 
bureaucracy took sides. Lists of favoured and unfavoured bureaucrats were said to 
emerge within each party when they won an election, with a slew of transfers taking 
place after they took office. Bureaucrats in Punjab say that bureaucratic recruitment to 
provincial departments (teachers, doctors, etc.) were completely politicised 
throughout the 1990s – lists of names would arrive from political offices, and 
appointments would be made without any questions being asked. Considering the 
instability of governments in Pakistan during the 1990s – the result of a tendency 
within the Presidency, the judiciary, and the military to intervene in political affairs – 
it was hardly surprising that governments sought to surround themselves with trusted 
bureaucrats the minute they entered office. In fact, many MPAs and MNAs lobby the 
government even today to avoid opening investigations into bureaucratic 
appointments made during these years.  
  
                                                 
62 Devolution of power to the provinces did not take place till the 18th Amendment to the Constitution 
of 1973 was passed in 2010. 
63 For more detail on this period, see Jaffrelot 2014. 
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Musharraf’s Coup and Local Government Reforms 
When Musharraf took over in a coup in 1999, most of the PAS officers who 
had worked closely with the Sharifs were repatriated to the federal government – 
some were made OSD, others were given insignificant posts. Some realigned 
themselves to new political realities. Like Ayub Khan and Zia ul Haq, Musharraf also 
increased military recruitment into the bureaucracy – bringing junior military officers 
in to supervise and evaluate senior civil servants (ICG 2010, 9). He also introduced 
local government reforms. However, unlike Zia’s local government plan, Musharraf 
actually handed substantive administrative powers to locally elected officials, taking 
them away from the DMG. Apart from criticism that non-partisan nazims (mayors) 
were introduced to (once again) reduce the power of provincial political parties, there 
was the belief that the military was ‘colluding with officials in occupational groups 
such as the police and [the] income tax group to cut the powerful DMG down to size’ 
(ICG 2010, 8).  
When Musharraf passed the Local Government Ordinance in 2001, however, 
the first few batches of Z. A. Bhutto’s Common Training Program (now quite senior) 
teamed up with junior DMG officers to oppose the LGO. In fact, even though the 
LGO was implemented, its unintended consequence was the unification of DMG 
officers to resist the reduction in their power, seeking support from politicians to do 
so (Shafqat 2013, 111; Jaffrelot 2014, 347)! This latter point is critical to our 
discussion regarding politicised appointments – effectively, Musharraf’s devolution 
program encouraged (senior) bureaucrats to seek out political patrons.  
 
Post Musharraf Democracy 
In 2007, Ishrat Hussain reported on the findings of a National Commission on 
Government Reform (NCGR). The commission had been constituted by Musharraf 
but very few of its recommendations have been implemented. By the time the report 
was released, Musharraf was cornered by public protests, including an enormous 
Lawyer’s Movement in support of deposed Supreme Court Chief Justice Iftikhar 
Chaudhry.  
President Musharraf called for fresh elections which were held in 2008. 
Notwithstanding the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, the PPP was able to form a 
coalition government. The PMLN, however, won Punjab and Shahbaz Sharif returned 
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as CM Punjab – a post he has since retained, barring a short period of Governor’s 
Rule in 2008-2009 and the caretaker government in 2013. The local government 
system was wrapped up in 2009, but powers had already been taken away from 
nazims and shifted to bureaucrats appointed to the district immediately after the new 
government took over in 2008. 
Within the PMLN, the run up to the 2008 election was spent trying to find 
suitable candidates, judged primarily on whether or not they had remained loyal to the 
party in the years of military rule. It is perhaps arguable that the Sharifs found the 
bureaucrats to be more loyal than many politicians. Of the politicians who had once 
been close to the Sharifs, many of the old guard had jumped ship, to join Musharraf’s 
party of PMLN defectors (i.e. PMLQ). The bureaucracy, on the other hand, was well 
aware of the political realities. In fact, most bureaucrats believe that even though the 
leaders of the PMLN indulge in corruption (favouring certain contractors and certain 
project bids) or tamper with budgets, and so on, they do at least attempt to deliver 
something to the people. This is in contrast to their very poor image of the PPP, partly 
due to Bhutto’s 1973 reforms and partly due to petty bribery and corruption (slicing a 
percentage off all kinds of contracts).  
The general consensus is that, within Pakistan, the PPP government’s biggest 
achievement between 2008 and 2013 was the passing of the 18th Amendment (2010).  
The product of a multi-party consensus, this amendment altered a number of 
constitutional articles. Above all, it removed Article 58(2)b, which had allowed the 
President to dismiss the government, as well as the condition that politicians must 
have a Bachelor’s degree to be eligible for election. In addition, it (a) empowered 
each provincial government to ‘make rules for the allocation and transaction of its 
business’ (Art 46, Amendment to Art 139 of the Constitution), and (b) inserted Art. 
140A, mandating that all provinces must introduce local government systems to 
devolve ‘political, administrative and financial responsibility and authority’ (Art 
48).64  
The 18th Amendment was a constitutional landmark, but its implementation 
left much to be desired. In particular, the provinces struggled to take over the powers 
                                                 
64 Though the 18th Amendment was a landmark in cross party cooperation, the implementation of its 




devolved to them, in part due to resistance from the centre65, and in part due to lack of 
capacity within the provinces. A major concern has been the centre’s hesitation to 
devolve finances to the provinces, and the struggle of the latter to raise their own 
funds through taxation. In addition, bureaucratic resistance led to slow progress in the 
dissolution of federal ministries and the creation of provincial ones (Waseem 2011a). 
These factors combined ensured that the provinces remained beholden to the centre 
for the years following the 18th Amendment. 
With reference to provincial bureaucratic appointment patterns, the 18th 
Amendment promised to raise the stakes for decision making at a provincial level – 
suggesting, in particular that politicised bureaucratic appointments could be useful in 
ensuring provincial bureaucratic performance (e.g. in increasing tax revenues or 
improving education provision in Punjab, Chapters 3 and 4). In fact, devolution as 
envisioned in the 18th Amendment is first and foremost a bureaucratic exercise – 
departments existing at the federal level must be wrapped up and new ones must be 
formed in each province. While the former was gradually carried out (despite 
resistance within the bureaucracy), a lack of capacity within the Provincial Civil 
Services meant that the devolved provincial departments ended up – yet again – in the 
hands of elite, federal (PAS) bureaucrats (Waseem 2015). This was not entirely 
surprising – the amendment itself did not make any changes to constitutional articles 
related to the civil services. In fact, the onus to bring about reform was on politicians 
and elite bureaucrats who stood to lose significant power if reforms were introduced. 
As a result, key civil services reforms that might relate more directly to the focus of 
this thesis have been stalled. Even today, the Secretaries of the majority of 
government departments in Punjab are PAS officers; few provincial service officers 
rise to top-ranking posts or pay scales. Though the appointment of favoured PAS 
bureaucrats to head the Punjab government’s departments may enhance efficiency and 
speed up ‘delivery’, it undermines the spirit of devolution promised in the 18th 
Amendment, systematically undercutting the power, professionalism, and morale of 
the Provincial Civil Services. 
Furthermore, when the local government system introduced by Musharraf was 
dissolved in 2009, no elected alternative was introduced till 2016/17. Therefore, the 
influence over appointments briefly held by Musharraf’s elected nazims (2002-2008) 
                                                 
65 Cheema, A. Whither local self-government? May 24, 2015. DAWN. Available at: 
<https://www.dawn.com/news/1183822> [Accessed 23 November 2017]. 
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simply reverted back to senior politicians and the senior echelons of the bureaucracy. 
Initially, the DCO post that Musharraf’s local government scheme created in 2002 to 
replace the Deputy Commissioner post was envisioned as a coordinator working 
under and reporting to the elected nazim. But, after Musharraf’s preferred party, the 
PMLQ, lost the 2008 election (indeed, even before the relevant nazims had officially 
left office), the DCO post had become, de facto, very nearly the equivalent of its 
predecessor, the Deputy Commissioner – answerable to no one but the CM’s Office. 
In Punjab, PAS officers occupying DCO/DC posts have long reigned supreme, 
in alliance with the ruling party leadership, encroaching on powers that, 
constitutionally, should lie with elected local governments.66 The 18th Amendment 
may have shifted certain departments and decision-making powers to the provinces, 
but it has had little impact on how those powers are exercised within each province. In 
the absence of civil service reform, it is perhaps not surprising that the 18th 
Amendment has only reinforced the centralisation of bureaucratic appointments, often 
in the name of bureaucratic ‘performance’ and the ‘public interest’. 
Though the PMLN has dominated Punjab since 2008, the central government 
has changed hands – PPP (2008-2013), and PMLN (2013-present) – broadly affecting 
the relationship between the federation and the province. Under the PMLQ 
government (2002-2008, when they held the centre and Punjab, supervised by 
Musharraf), there was a marked rise in military involvement in the administration of 
the state, with the bureaucracy playing second fiddle. This period is briefly addressed 
in Chapter 4 – I focus on the appointment of Hafeez Randhawa– and in the discussion 
of periods of military rule in Pakistan’s history in Chapter 2. I do not, however, spend 
a great deal of time on the impact of military intervention on bureaucratic 
appointments for a few reasons. First, though Musharraf (and other martial law 
administrators) inserted serving and retired military officers to lead various 
departments or laterally recruited them into the civil service (ostensibly to reduce 
corruption and enhance efficiency), patterns of appointment for the majority of posts 
within the bureaucracy remained the same as those outlined in this thesis – for 
example, Interview 77’s appointment as DCO Jhang in 2008 was made by his senior 
recommending him for the post (see Chapter 4). Second, one military ruler’s attempt 
to co-opt the civil administration was not un-like another’s – Ayub, Yahya, Zia, and 
                                                 
66 For more on Pakistan’s experiments with local government, see Cheema, Khan and Myerson 2010, 
and Cheema, Khwaja,and Qadir 2006. 
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Musharraf had similar policies in some ways and these have been covered in detail 
elsewhere (Kennedy 1987, Shafqat 1999, Chengappa 1999, Rizvi 2000, and Wilder 
2010). Third, by 2014/15, when I did my fieldwork, the slate had been wiped clean – 
most military officials had been removed from the civil services and those who 
remained were retired military officers who had to compete for posts with civilian 
officers on a more level playing field. Consequently, though my interviews, 
observations, and newspaper archives provide some evidence for appointments during 
this period, I was not in a position to collect data with the same richness as the data I 
collected for subsequent periods.  
Following the departure of General Musharraf, the 2008-2013 central 
government led by the PPP was marked by significant tension over political control of 
Punjab, including the trajectory of bureaucratic appointments within it. Punjab is the 
province with the most National Assembly seats, and therefore, control over it is 
generally seen as a path to electoral success. The imposition of Governor’s Rule in 
2009 (recounted at the beginning of this thesis) was an attempt by the central PPP 
government to re-establish its party in the Punjab. When Governor Taseer (PPP) took 
over in 2009, he replaced bureaucrats friendly with the PMLN with bureaucrats who 
favoured the PPP. And, when Governor’s Rule ended and Shahbaz Sharif returned as 
CM, this process was exactly reversed.67 
This was a situation not unlike that which existed throughout the 1990s – 
political instability and the threat of a military or judicial coup led to the PPP and the 
PMLN maintaining lists of bureaucrats who favoured them. When they won an 
election, one set of bureaucrats would be swept out and replaced by another. In fact, 
while the PPP and PMLN faced off, PAS bureaucrats were divided into two camps: 
those who sided with the PPP and sought posts with the centre in Islamabad, and 
those with the PMLN and sought provincial posts in Lahore. Though each set of 
bureaucrats had significant powers within their respective domains, their 
appointments could be checked (at least potentially) by politicians or colleagues from 
the opposing camp. For example, a senior PAS bureaucrat favoured by the PMLN and 
serving in the Punjab, seeking a federal secretary post, was dependent on the 
Establishment Division and PPP-held PM’s Office to appoint him. The PPP-led 
                                                 
67 The period of Governor’s Rule lasted for just one month (see Chapter 1) and therefore, its 
implications for bureaucratic appointments are necessarily limited. It does, however, reinforce my 
argument that government’s, and specifically the CM, assemble a team around them who they trust to 
‘deliver’, and it reveals the ubiquity of party preferences amongst senior bureaucrats.  
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Establishment Division, or the PM’s Office, could recall a PAS officer favoured by 
the PMLN posted in Punjab. However, PPP governments rarely succeeded when they 
tried such tactics (see, for instance, the case of Anwar Zahid in Chapter 3). And, as I 
explain, the PMLN’s control over bureaucratic appointments in Punjab meant not 
only that the PPP government’s ability to make bureaucratic appointments extended 
only to Sindh and Islamabad (not choice postings in Punjab), but also that the PPP 
government was hamstrung in the Punjab as well. In fact, the PPP’s PMs (Yousaf 
Raza Gilani of Multan and Raja Pervaiz Ashraf of Rawalpindi) were often on the back 
foot when it came to regulating provincial bureaucratic appointments in their home 
districts within the Punjab itself. In one instance, in 2011, Prime Minister Gilani of 
the PPP tried to transfer an accountability officer, but the leader of the opposition 
Chaudhry Nisar (PMLN) countered by threatening to transfer the PM’s chosen 
bureaucrats from his home district in the Punjab, Multan (see Chapter 5).68 
Often, the biggest problem with bureaucratic appointments by the PPP 
government in Islamabad between 2008 and 2013 was that the bureaucrats favoured 
by them indulged in the kind of petty corruption that gave both the party and the 
bureaucrats a bad reputation and showed them up as incompetent – not just with 
opposition parties and an activist Supreme Court, but amongst their own colleagues 
(see Chapter 5). With the expansion of the media sector during the Musharraf years, 
and the activism of Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry, appointments that may have been 
overlooked or perceived as the norm (‘everyone does it’) during the 1990s were 
actively reported on by the press and, then, reversed by the courts through petitions 
filed by bureaucrats themselves or through suo moto actions. Chapter 5 discusses one 
example – the illegal appointment of then-PM Raja Pervaiz Ashraf’s son-in-law to the 
World Bank. In 2010, the Supreme Court also reversed PPP PM Yousaf Raza Gilani’s 
promotion of 54 bureaucrats to BPS 22, made in violation of seniority rules.69 In 
2013, the Supreme Court again ordered the government to reverse the promotion of 
eighty bureaucrats made during PPP PM Raja Pervez Ashraf’s tenure (the Orya 
Maqbool Abbasi case discussed in Chapter 5). Another example was the PPP’s pick 
for Chairman WAPDA, who was alleged to have diverted funds between projects ‘at 
                                                 
68 Gilani, Nisar fight ‘war of cops’. October 22, 2011. The News. Available at: 
<https://www.thenews.com.pk/archive/print/617529-gilani,-nisar-fight-%E2%80%98war-of-
cops%E2%80%99> [Accessed 17 November 2017]. 
69 Ghumman, K. SC verdict creates bad blood among bureaucrats. May 10, 2010. DAWN. Available at: 
< https://www.dawn.com/news/535020> [Accessed 27 November 2017]. 
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personal whim’, made nepotistic appointments within the organisation, and caused 
delays in various power projects.70 
The PPP’s attempts to protect its leaders from corruption investigations by 
transferring accountability officers also led to clashes with the Supreme Court (see the 
Hajj scam case discussed in Chapter 4) and provided the fuel for the now-famous 
Anita Turab case71, where a civil servant appealed to the Supreme Court to prevent 
politicised bureaucratic appointments. As a result, the PPP’s choice of bureaucrats 
and patterns of appointments may well have lined a few pockets, but they did not 
provide the party with any traction vis-à-vis bureaucrats or voters. In fact, amongst 
bureaucrats, the PPP’s tenure (2008-2013) left an open field for the PMLN in the 
2013 election – not just amongst voters, but amongst bureaucrats as well. 
 
The Sharifs’ Punjab 
Punjab’s contemporary electoral history is in many ways the history of the 
modern day PMLN, and to some extent, the Sharif family itself. It is impossible to 
discuss Punjab’s politics or bureaucracy without considering the motivations and 
actions of the Sharif brothers, Nawaz and especially Shahbaz, and through them the 
party and its factions.  
 
Table 3: Electoral Dominance (Seats) 1988 To 2013 













PMLN PMLN PMLQ PMLN PMLN 
 
By the time the 2013 election arrived, the PMLN and the Sharif brothers were 
in a much stronger position than they had been in 2008. The election brought the 
PMLN another victory with a parliamentary majority, allowing Nawaz to become PM 
while Shahbaz continued as CM Punjab. It was the first time in Pakistan’s history that 
                                                 
70 Hasnain, K. and Ghumman, K. Former Secretary to head Wapda. April 18, 2014. DAWN. Available 
at: <https://www.dawn.com/news/1100658> [Accessed 25 November 2017]. 




power passed directly from one party, which had completed its full term, to another 
via elections.  
 
Table 4: Distribution of general seats in elections for Punjab’s main parties 
 1988 1990 1993 1997 2002* 2008 2013 








86 18 62 95 33 
PMLQ (2002 onward) - - - - 77 41 2 
PTI - - - - 1 -** 28 
Table adapted from ‘The First 10 General Elections of Pakistan’ report by PILDAT, May 2013. 
*does not include January 2003 by-election results 
** The PTI boycotted the 2008 election 
 
Once the PMLN won both the centre and Punjab in 2013, any barriers to 
bureaucratic appointments of the party leadership’s choosing were removed. The 
PMLN now controlled the Establishment Division and the PM Office at the centre as 
well as the CM Secretariat in Punjab. Furthermore, where it had previously been 
possible for bureaucrats to pick a political party – either the PPP or the PMLN – the 
latter was now the only party worth picking. Central civil service bureaucrats were 
well aware that if they did not toe the PMLN leadership’s line, they would be 
transferred to one of the other provinces, shunted aside (for example, to an 
ombudsman position – as was the case with the Salman Farooqi, a bureaucrat 
favoured by Zardari), or made OSD. Subsequently, favoured PAS bureaucrats rose to 
immense power and prominence at both the centre and in Punjab during this time. 
Most notable are bureaucrats who are given a free hand to make decisions on behalf 
of their political bosses – for example, I was often told during my fieldwork (and 
reports in the press reflect this) that the PM Office was being run entirely, including 
decisions on bureaucratic appointments of PAS officers across the country, by Fawad 
Hasan Fawad, a senior PAS bureaucrat, rather than by the PM.72  
                                                 
72 Bureaucracy rubbishes almost 400 directives of prime minister. November 21, 2016.The Daily 
Times. Available at: < https://dailytimes.com.pk/44922/bureaucracy-rubbishes-almost-400-directives-
of-prime-minister/> [Accessed 17 November 2017]; Fawad’s wings clipped. August 20, 2017.The 
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And in Punjab, now serving his third term as CM, Shahbaz Sharif developed a 
symbiotic relationship with the bureaucracy to the exclusion of all but his most senior 
political advisers. Bureaucrats whom he trusts implicitly are given charge of multiple 
posts, allowing the CM Secretariat to consolidate the power of multiple offices into 
the hands of one bureaucrat (see, for instance, the cases of Ahad Cheema and 
Jehanzeb Khan addressed in Chapter 3). Most PAS officers I spoke to (from a variety 
of batches) saw Shahbaz Sharif as an honorary bureaucrat, someone who has a 
mandarin’s mind.  
As we go down the bureaucratic hierarchy, though, the tone shifts to one of 
awe inspired by fear (of a crackdown, of a removal from a post over trivialities) or 
resentment (on the basis of exclusion from favoured elite cadres).  
The co-optation of the bureaucracy, particularly the elite PAS, has been seen 
as a persistent problem of the PMLN’s style of doing business. Newspapers often 
refer to specific bureaucrats as the Sharif brothers’ ‘favourite’ or ‘blue-eyed boy’. An 
opposition parliamentarian in the Punjab Assembly (PTI, Interview 25) says, ‘The 
party [PMLN] functions through [favoured bureaucrats], they don’t use party workers. 
They use bureaucrats, DCOs as party workers but are not accessible to their own 
MPAs, MNAs.’ A number of bureaucrats who worked closely with the Sharifs 
between 1997 and 1999, and with Nawaz Sharif between 1988 and 1993 went on to 
become key players when the Sharifs returned to power in 2008. Some of these 
appointments to ‘the team’ were legal, and I will discuss them in Chapter 3. Others 
were not, and I will discuss them in Chapters 4 and 5. I contend that through all three 
of these methods, the PMLN’s leadership extends its ties to mid-tier bureaucrats 
(serving in senior district-level posts) via senior bureaucrats who belong to the PAS. 
And, at a meta-level, it does so in an effort to ‘deliver’ in ways that might ward off 
both military and political challengers.   
While the post-2013 political scene allowed the PMLN a great deal of room to 
indulge in patronage appointments, it also created immense pressure on the party to 
‘deliver’ – particularly with the devolution of departments to the provinces post-18th 
Amendment. Interviewee 14 (a PAS bureaucrat in a senior post in the Services & 
General Administration Department) revealed that in early 2014, the CM called a 
meeting and said, ‘This is my sixth year in office, but I feel that delivery is not 
                                                                                                                                            




reaching the grass roots level. What is the failure?’ It seems that the CM and his staff 
had analysed the failure as being one of poor project implementation, poor 
monitoring, and interference in governance by politicians (even the party’s own). 
Their response was to centralise power and patronage while micro-managing every 
aspect of the government’s business. A committee was formed to tackle cases of 
political interference in the work of bureaucrats (Interview 89, a PAS officer holding 
a Secretary post in Punjab). In fact, the CM now has an involvement in everything 
from ensuring motorcyclists wear helmets to the transfer of teachers. Such 
involvement and monitoring obviously requires that the CM rely on senior 
bureaucrats to assist him and keep him informed, whilst simultaneously closing off 
access to politicians demanding extra-legal or illegal favours. He remains surrounded 
by his favourite PAS officers, including Dr Tauqeer Shah, Javed Mehmood, Fawad 
Hasan Fawad, and Ahad Cheema. The result is close-knit relationships between the 
CM, his senior allies within his party, and elite bureaucrats – the Chief Secretary, the 
CM’s personal staff, departmental secretaries, and secretariat staff.  
 
Image 1: Cartoon by Jawed Iqbal printed in an unidentified Urdu newspaper73 
 
This cartoon depicts bureaucrats in the Civil Secretariat celebrating while the Chief Minister 
Shahbaz Sharif is away on an official trip. The caption reads: ‘CM leaves for 6 day trip to 
China’. The CM’s absence is depicted by the ‘closed’ video link to the left. The CM is well-
known for monitoring bureaucrats and their progress via video link. 
 
 
                                                 
73 CM Shehbaz reacts to funny cartoon, sends ‘ultimatum’ from China. 16 May, 2017. Dunya News 
TV. Available at: <http://dunyanews.tv/en/Pakistan/388634-CM-Shehbaz-reacts-to-funny-cartoon-
sends-ultimat> [Accessed on 29 May 2017]. 
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As a result of the unity of purpose of the political leadership and the elite 
bureaucracy, calls for reform of the civil services remain cosmetic – even after the 
introduction of the 18th Amendment. For instance, in 2014, the PMLN’s Minister for 
Planning and Reform, Ahsan Iqbal, called a national consultative meeting to propose 
civil service reforms. Despite a great deal of fanfare, there was no substantive 
movement to adopt any of the suggested reforms. The most significant institutional 
change since 2013 has undoubtedly been the introduction of elected local 
governments. Debates over devolution as envisioned by the 18th Amendment, 
however, became much less contentious after the PMLN formed the government in 
both Punjab and the centre. Still, disputes over the devolution of some departments 
and the release of funds and data by the federation to the provinces remain.74 In 
Punjab, the main dispute has been characterised by repeated accusations from 
opposition parties that the PMLN sought to engineer a new local government system 
to extend its provincial control.  
It was not until 2016 and 2017 that new elected local governments were 
introduced by each province. Though the advent of this new local government system 
in Punjab occurred after my fieldwork – and, as such, I do not discuss its impact on 
politicised appointments – a few observations may be helpful. Punjab passed the 
Punjab Local Government Act (PLGA) in 2013, and elections to the new local bodies 
were held in stages between 2015 and December 2016. The PMLN government, 
however, used key aspects of the local government system to concentrate power in the 
hands of the provincial government, including (a) the process for electing local 
government representatives75; (b) the creation of authorities for education, health, etc. 
headed by appointees (politicians and bureaucrats) of the provincial government76; (c) 
                                                 
74 Punjab hints at taking devolution issues to CCI meeting. July 13, 2016. The Nation. Available at: 
<http://nation.com.pk/newspaper-picks/13-Jul-2016/punjab-hints-at-taking-devolution-issues-to-cci-
meeting> [Accessed 20 September 2016]. 
75 Ghauri, I. Local government elections: Punjab ‘smartly’ changes poll rules. The Express Tribune. 
Available at: <http://tribune.com.pk/story/926563/local-government-elections-punjab-smartly-changes-
poll-rules/> [Accessed 20 September 2016]. Bangash, F. PA passes Local Govt Amendment Bill. 
October 8, 2015. The News. Available at: <http://www.thenews.com.pk/print/66542-pa-passes-local-
govt-amendment-bill> [Accessed 20 September 2016]. 
76 Adnan, I. Local government: District administration structure finalised. August 11, 2016. The 
Express Tribune. Available at: <http://tribune.com.pk/story/1159759/local-government-district-
administration-structure-finalised/> [Accessed 20 September 2016]. Ahmed, S. I. No authority for local 
government in Punjab. August 16, 2015. The News on Sunday. Available at: < 
http://tns.thenews.com.pk/no-authority-for-local-government/#.V0R2u_krKUm> [Accessed 20 
September 2016]. Yasin, A. Education authorities formed to replace old system. December 30, 2015. 
DAWN. Available at: <http://www.dawn.com/news/1229534> [Accessed 20 September 2016]. 
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the retention of the commissionerate system (Commissioners appointed at the division 
level by provincial government)77  and Deputy Commissioners (at the district level) 
answerable only to the Chief Secretary78; (d) little headway in financial devolution to 
the district level79; and, (e) the power of the provincial government to remove local 
government representatives or dissolve elected local bodies entirely. The design of 
this new (post-18th Amendment) Punjab local government system makes it even more 
important to identify and understand patterns of bureaucratic appointment if we wish 
to understand patterns of governance.   
In an op-ed80, Hassan Javid argues that the form of the Punjab Local 
Government Act will drive the rational person to vote for the provincial ruling party, 
since it was clear that only those with provincial backing would have any power to 
‘deliver’.81 Indeed, this rational calculus led to a massive victory for the PMLN in 
Punjab’s local government elections. In Punjab’s ‘new’ local government system, the 
balance of power still lies, as it did before, with the provincial government and its 
closest bureaucratic allies.  
 
Ability to Appoint 
My investigation into bureaucratic appointments is underpinned by notions of 
‘delivery’. To understand this notion, I begin with a hypothetical actor – a politician 
or a bureaucrat – who wants to achieve something and looks for a means to do this. I 
include both politicians and bureaucrats as the ‘actors’ in this project because both are 
(a) motivated to influence appointments and (b) capable of doing so. As mentioned in 
Chapter 1, both sets of actors have various motivations and methods to achieve their 
‘delivery’ goals. However, bureaucratic appointments are a critical step – in fact, the 
critical step in this thesis – toward actually ‘delivering’. Without the right bureaucrat 
in the right post, delivery may be impossible.   
                                                 
77 Ahmed, S. I. No authority for local government in Punjab. August 16, 2015. The News on Sunday. 
Available at: < http://tns.thenews.com.pk/no-authority-for-local-government/#.V0R2u_krKUm> 
[Accessed 20 September 2016].  
78 Ibid. The DPO will answer to the IGP.  
79 Yasin, A. and Dhakku, N. A. LG polls: Devolving to Takht-i-Lahore. November 19, 2015. DAWN. 
Available at: <http://www.dawn.com/news/1220703/lg-polls-devolving-to-takht-i-lahore> [Accessed 
20 September 2016]. 
80 Javid, H. Explaining the local government election. November 8, 2015. The Nation. Available at: 
<http://nation.com.pk/columns/08-Nov-2015/explaining-the-local-government-elections> [Accessed 20 
September 2016]. 
81 Ibid.  
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In what follows, I examine two questions. First, amongst those with an 
objective for influencing appointments, which politicians and bureaucrats have the 
ability to do so? And second, what are the legal, extra-legal, and illegal means 
through which bureaucratic appointments can be made? 
 
 




Amongst those with the objective to influence bureaucratic appointments, the 
following section differentiates those with the ability to do so from those without. If a 
motivated actor does not have the ability to influence the appointment process, then 
that actor must look for alternative means to achieve his goals. This decision path lies 
outside the scope of my thesis. The last section of this chapter goes on to outline the 
methods – first regular and irregular, then legal, extra-legal, and illegal – available to 
those who shape bureaucratic appointments. In subsequent chapters, I link these 
aspects of the politicisation process – objectives, ability, and methods –to provide a 
characterisation of the bonds formed between the actors involved, and the possibility 
of success (or not) in achieving desired ‘outcomes’.  
Not all politicians and bureaucrats enjoy the same powers (legally, extra-
legally, or illegally), even when they are in the same formal positions. For example, of 
two bureaucrats recruited to the same cadre, one may be favoured by his colleagues. 
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Similarly, within a party, one politician may be favoured by party leaders (and 
bureaucrats). There are three factors that determine where an actor lies on the 
spectrum of ability, namely: (a) seniority, (b) proximity to the political and 
bureaucratic centre, and (c) perceived career prospects.  
 
Seniority 
This is a very simple means of judging the extent of an actor’s ability: what 
hierarchical position does he occupy? Most bureaucrats will be able to influence the 
appointment of people to lower-level posts. (Again, it is useful to remember that both 
senior and mid-tier bureaucrats have the ability to influence bureaucratic 
appointments.)  
However, even in informal settings, political seniority is also an advantage. 
For instance, party heavyweights are able to influence appointments (using legal, 
extra-legal, or illegal methods) to the middle tier of the district bureaucracy due to 
their reputation as being close to the CM. These mid-tier bureaucrats are, in turn, 
responsible for appointing junior bureaucrats, and it is through them that politicians 
exercise control over junior appointments in the area. However, junior politicians (e.g. 
first-time winners) do not carry as much weight as their senior colleagues and may 
struggle to have even a patwari of their choice appointed.  
 
The Centralisation of Politicised Appointments 
Apart from seniority, both bureaucrats and politicians have noted that, during 
the last few years, the ability of a politician or a bureaucrat to influence appointments 
above the lowest bureaucratic tiers has become dependent on direct support from the 
centre of the provincial government.82 Arguably, this can be traced back to the 
PMLN’s return to electoral politics as General Pervez Musharraf’s power began to 
wane in 2007. The party won the subsequent provincial election and sought to 
centralise control over bureaucratic appointments in Punjab. By making strategic 
                                                 
82 There are a number of factors that have created this new dynamic – the resurrection of the PMLN 
post-Musharraf and its dominance in the Punjab, an activist and demanding CM, the rise of a viable 
opposition in the PTI, the mushrooming of the media, and the influx of donor money for specific 
projects, such as the Punjab Education Sector Reform Program. 
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appointments to various senior posts (e.g. DCOs and departmental secretaries)83, the 
party leadership worked to cement its popularity amongst the citizenry by 
emphasising service delivery. These methods also allowed the party to counter nearly 
a decade of military interference in governance.  
Using centralized bureaucratic appointments to push forward both policy and, 
in due course, electoral objectives, however, the upper echelons of the PMLN 
leadership loosened ties with the lower tiers of its party membership (who previously 
enjoyed more influence over lower-tier bureaucratic appointments). While party 
leaders argue that they are ensuring service delivery to citizens, party workers and 
junior politicians accuse the leadership of ignoring their concerns. This state of affairs 
has led to considerable resentment amongst constituency politicians in Punjab. 
Though some have come to accept it as part of the Chief Minister’s reform program 
(seeking to improve the functioning of the bureaucracy by making supposedly ‘merit-
based’ bureaucratic appointments), those who are relatively new (e.g. first or second 
time winners), find it more difficult to accept this change. Having made promises to 
supporters, they now have to settle for being seen to be trying to exercise influence 
(e.g. being seen to be well received in the office of a key bureaucrat), regardless of 
whether favours are granted.  
The consequences of this centralisation are three-fold.  The first is that 
politicians are much more influential with regard to bureaucratic appointments 
(junior, mid-tier, or senior) if they are: (a) also holding an important political post 
(e.g. Home Minister) or (b) a senior member of the party with close ties to the 
leadership. The second is that, due to its nexus with a party that has ruled the province 
for the last two terms and is likely to do so for the foreseeable future, the bureaucracy 
will ensure that appointment demands made by politicians at the centre are the first to 
be fulfilled. The third is that the party leadership tends to side with elite bureaucrats 
over their own junior politicians. In such circumstances, the conventional patron-
client bond between local politicians and bureaucrats is weakened (or reversed). The 
local politician is, in some cases, powerless compared to a bureaucrat appointed by 
the party leadership. In other words, local politicians may become a client of the party 
                                                 
83 Senior provincial posts are typically held by PAS bureaucrats, and bureaucrats holding them are 
legally entitled to make appointments to various junior posts in their district or department. 
93 
 
leadership and the DCO or the department secretary. ‘Appointment politics’, in other 
words, have become more centralised.84  
 
Career Prospects  
Apart from seniority and recent trends pushing in the direction of greater 
centralisation, the ability of politicians and bureaucrats to influence bureaucratic 
appointments can also vary on the basis of others’ perception of their career prospects.  
Again, the ultimate arbiter of success for politicians is their access to the 
centre of provincial power, and, come election time, how ‘electable’ they are. Access 
is a matter of party membership and, to some extent, seniority. Even though party 
labels often mean little when it comes to casting votes in Punjab, party membership 
does increasingly matter when it comes to delivering services. Members of the ruling 
party have greater influence over resources, decision making, and, of course, 
bureaucratic appointments than the members of other parties (or independents). 
Furthermore, when it comes to service delivery (of the kind required to retain voter 
support – electricity connections, sewage lines, roads, etc.), support from the 
provincial government is crucial. For this reason, even independent candidates who 
win a seat will typically join the ruling party after the election; they know that they 
will not be able to ‘deliver’ effectively (via bureaucratic appointments) without doing 
so.85  
Usually, a politician is ‘electable’ if he: (i) won by a good margin in the 
previous election; (ii) has enough money to run an active campaign; (iii) has a block 
of supporters who will vote for him (through a ‘vote bank’, i.e. supporters who 
coordinate and determine the reliability of the politician’s patronage/protection and 
therefore his electoral success – see Bjorkman 2014 and Mohmand 2011); and, (iv) 
has maintained good relations with the ruling party. Of course bureaucrats are well 
aware of a politician’s reputation, with regard to ‘access’ and ‘electability’. Some 
politicians who attempt to influence bureaucratic appointments will, therefore, get 
                                                 
84 It is not that political fixers such as those described by Berenschot (2014) no longer exist. They have 
become part and parcel of the team that surrounds senior politicians – personal secretary or assistant 
are terms used to describe these people. Those outside the political party’s sphere of senior politicians 
have become, I would argue, less influential as far as appointment politics is concerned.  
85 An exception may arise where a politician who is hard to dislodge from his constituency (due to a 
substantial personal vote bank) may have influence over local bureaucrats even if he is not a member of 




short shrift simply because bureaucrats know there are few rewards to be gained from 
a political “one-hit wonder”.  
Amongst bureaucrats, career prospects are a function of informal ties to 
‘electable’ politicians with ‘access’ to the centre, as well as what cadre he or she 
belongs to. By far the most successful bureaucrats are those recruited to the elite 
Pakistan Administrative Services (PAS). These officials will, without fail, rise to the 
highest ranks of the bureaucracy and will exercise great influence on appointments 
and decision-making, not only over the bureaucratic hierarchy, but also over less 
‘central’ politicians.  
The Provincial Management Service (PMS), designed as the provincial 
companion to the federal PAS, does not enjoy the same chances of success. The 
dominance of the PAS and their occupation of posts that PMS officers were supposed 
to hold means that the average PMS officer is less likely to secure coveted 
appointments. As a result, he does not have the same kind of influence over 
bureaucratic appointments as a PAS officer.  
Mid-tier bureaucrats (not PMS officers) are posted mainly at the district level 
(though they can rise to posts in the provincial capital late in their careers). For 
example, a school teacher can rise to become a district-level School Education 
Department bureaucrat, such as a Deputy District Education Officer or Executive 
District Officer (Education).86 Though these officials are in charge of making 
appointments to the lower end of the bureaucratic hierarchy within their department, 
they are limited by regulations and monitoring from the provincial secretariat. Still, 
the ability of mid-tier bureaucrats to keep the work of the department moving, their 
distance from the provincial capital, and the sheer volume of paperwork and activity 
in district offices means that mid-tier bureaucrats can often be given quite a bit of 
independence to manage as they see fit.87 Consequently, mid-tier posts are absolutely 
central for a politician or bureaucrat seeking to influence outcomes.  
 
                                                 
86 See Appendix 2 for department organogram. 
87 These officials rise through the ranks from junior posts (for example, teachers or engineers) to mid-
tier posts that are mainly administrative. They typically have little training in administration and will 




The essential element underpinning the repeated breaches of procedure [in Italian civil service 
appointments] were excessively detailed regulations. Because they were inherently 
unimplementable as written, at least in large measure, they effectively permitted nearly 
complete discretion. 
 
- Golden 2003, 203 
 
So far, I have been referring to a number of activities using the blanket term 
‘appointments’. When legal documents to do with the bureaucracy use the term 
‘appointment’, they are referring to a variety of legal practices which are classed as 
either regular or irregular appointments. Both types are legal in that the law – 
formulated by the federal and provincial governments over the years based on the 
1973 Constitution - provides for the circumstances in which they can be made, and 
guidelines for the process itself.88  
The law on bureaucratic appointments is interpreted and regulated by the 
Establishment Division at the federal level and the Services & General Administration 
Department (S&GAD) at the provincial level through the issuance of memoranda, 
letters, forms, and notifications (collected as the Civil Establishment Code or 
ESTACODE for the former, and the Rules of Business for the latter). The law cannot 
account for every circumstance – for instance, the paperwork and procedure for 
extending an additional charge appointment, or the exact qualifications required for 
each post in a department’s hierarchy – and this allows these bodies considerable 
discretion (which is to be exercised in the ‘public interest’)89 when it comes to civil 
servants’ appointments. It is the Establishment Division or the provincial Services & 
General Administration Departments (S&GADs) that is responsible for clarifying 
regulations, establishing precedent, and providing a framework for ministries and 
departments to issue their own case-specific rules. Consequently, the Secretaries of 
                                                 
88 Under Article 240, the Majlis-e-Shura passed, amongst others, the Civil Servants Act 1973, Civil 
Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules 1973, the Government Services (Efficiency and 
Discipline) Rules 1973 (which expand on the Government Servants (Conduct) Rules 1964), and the 
Occupational Groups and Services (Probation, Training and Seniority) Rules 1990. The Provincial 
Assembly of the Punjab passed, amongst others, the Punjab Civil Servants Act 1974 (which enforces 
the Civil Service Rules (Punjab) which had come into force in 1941), The Punjab Civil Servants 
(Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules 1974, Punjab Civil Servants (Change in Nomenclature 
of Services and Abolition of Classes) Rules 1974, and the Punjab Government Rules of Business 2011 
(which repealed the Punjab Government Rules of Business 1974). 
89
 The Supreme Court of Pakistan ruled in 2012 (Constitutional Petition 23/2012) that such discretion 
must be exercised in a reasonable, fair, and consistent manner. 
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the Establishment Division and the provincial S&GADs are important posts to fill for 
any government. In cases where a decision on appointments involves a change in 
government expenditure, the Establishment Division must consult the Finance 
Division, and the S&GAD must consult the provincial Finance Department, before 
making a decision. This is for the simple reason that the government’s wage bill must 
remain in line with federal and provincial budgets. 
In many respects, federal and provincial laws are similar if not the same. 
(Provincial laws have been drawn up using the federal rules, and with the guidance of 
the Establishment Division.) Departments at both the federal and provincial levels are 
required to follow both the Establishment Division’s and S&GADs’ interpretation of 
the law, and seek their guidance, when drawing up their own rules for appointments 
(all the way down to district markaz level). However, there are some differences, and 
I will point them out along the way.  
Though the term ‘appointment’ suggests the initial recruitment and first 
posting of a bureaucrat, it is, in fact, a term that can refer to a variety of practices at 
any point in a bureaucrat’s career – transfers, promotions, additional charge, etc. 
Conventionally, discussions of bureaucratic politicisation in the literature centre on 
initial recruitment – a politician dispenses patronage by getting his voter a 
government job, for instance. The focus here is, instead, on the politicised transfer, 
promotion, and irregular appointment of bureaucrats, and thus the ‘delivery’ of 
outcomes, at various points in a bureaucratic career. The rest of this chapter will 
explore regular and irregular bureaucratic appointments – briefly highlighting along 
the way the loopholes, excessive discretion, and misuse that lead to extra-legal 
methods of appointment – before turning to illegal methods at the end. 
 
Regular Bureaucratic Appointments 
Recruitment  
Recruitment to the bureaucracy takes places at three different levels – federal, 
provincial, and local/departmental. This section will provide a brief overview of the 
recruitment process at these levels and the laws and rules that regulate it. In doing so, 
I will highlight areas where legal provisions provide a loophole for actors to exploit.     
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Despite the intense competition over jobs,90 initial recruitment is the least 
contested/controversial aspect of appointment. Recruitment to the federal bureaucracy 
is regulated by the Civil Servants’ (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 
1973, and a series of letters and office memorandums in the ESTACODE. The 
Federal Public Service Commission is in charge of recruitment to posts in BPS 16 and 
above, including the PAS. Recruitment to the PAS varies from year to year, between 
20 and 40, depending on the requirement for fresh blood and of course, on the 
candidates available. An examination for the Civil Superior Services is held every 
year, and candidates who pass the written, oral and medical tests are sorted according 
to merit amongst the different cadres of the federal bureaucracy. Usually, those at the 
top of the merit list will opt for the PAS or the Police Service.  
The Punjab Public Service Commission is responsible for conducting 
examinations for initial recruitment to provincial posts91 in BPS 16 and above (and in 
BPS 11 to 15 that are ‘notified by the Government’).92 Appointments to all other posts 
are to be made by advertising in newspapers and through examinations by the relevant 
committee or board.93 Though there are multiple stories of institutional weakness and 
failure regarding recruitment at these levels, by and large the process is seen to be 
fair; the accusations that flow easily in other domains of the political system – that 
there is political interference, nepotism, and favouritism - are surprisingly rare. This is 
particularly true with the CSS examination; though thousands apply and only a small 
percentage are admitted to the Central Superior Services, disaffection with the FPSC 
and its examinations is remarkably limited. Provincial Public Service Commissions 
have a more mixed reputation, but even against them rebellion is uncommon.  
Where the narrative of clean recruitment begins to fall apart is amongst 
officials who were not recruited by a public service commission examination but 
through a departmental process. These officials are employed by a department to fulfil 
that department’s staffing needs – teachers, mid-tier administrators in the School 
                                                 
90 Junior government jobs are coveted and fought over just as much as posts at a higher pay scale. All 
government posts come with security of tenure and a pension, and it is almost unheard of for an official 
to be dismissed from service, no matter how egregious his crimes. Once appointed, a government 
servant holds the lien to the post - no one else can occupy it while he is performing his duties. 
91 These are posts that can only serve in their respective provinces, including the Provincial 
Management Service and Technical or Professional Services Cadre  
92 Art 16, The Punjab Civil Servants (Appointments and Conditions of Service) Rules 1974. These are 
usually posts that involve the handling of public funds or involve public security, for example, naib 
tehsildar, Sub-Engineer, Police Inspector, etc. 
93 Art 17, ibid. 
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Education Department, or engineers in the Irrigation Department, for example. For 
such employees, ministries and departments are expected to develop their own rules 
and carry out the recruitment process themselves, with the guidance and assent of the 
Establishment Division or the S&GAD.94 This is a critical point for the forthcoming 
chapters of this thesis: not only is room to manoeuvre substantively greater at this 
level, but rules can be either improperly framed, not framed at all, or changed at the 
discretion of senior department staff (something that can become particularly 
problematic in cases where the departmental secretary or other senior staff changes 
frequently).  
In an office memorandum dated 14/3/198195, the Establishment Division noted 
that there was confusion amongst departments, ministries, and divisions in carrying 
out initial recruitment since officials were being recruited in an ad hoc fashion. Not 
only would this cause controversy at the time, it also jeopardised the promotion and 
transfer of these new recruits since their starting point in the service was unclear. New 
guidelines were issued to clarify the procedure, but two years later, the Establishment 
Division issued an Office Memorandum96 that seems to suggest the guidelines had 
borne little fruit: the rules being framed by departments were ‘an increasingly 
mechanical exercise…now reduced to simply inserting uniform standards (of 
educational requirements, experience, age limits, etc.) for equivalent posts in various 
departments’. The rules did not take into account the particular post and its 
requirements, nor did they account for the future career of the new recruits. For 
example, the rules did not specify what percentage of posts should be filled through 
direct recruitment as opposed to promotion. This meant that the officials in charge 
could exercise their discretion and either refuse to recruit new people or refuse to 
promote junior officers as it suited them.  
The problem with recruitment rules in general, and particularly with those 
framed by departments themselves, was clearly identified in the Recruitment Policy 
for the Federal Services/Autonomous Bodies/Corporations issued by the 
Establishment Division in 1992: too much discretion. In order to make recruitment at 
the federal level better regulated and monitored, and to emphasise merit, the policy 
                                                 
94 Estt. Div.’s O.M. No.11/1/81-R.5, dated 20-8-1981 
95 Estt. Division O.M.No.2/9/76.D.III 
96 No. 9/1/73-R.5, dated 22-8-1984 
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increased the powers of the FPSC and introduced oversight of recruitment procedures 
via Parliamentary Committees for each Ministry.  
Though a similar debate is not to be found in the Government of Punjab Rules 
of Business, the development of a comprehensive new Recruitment Policy in 2004 
seems to suggest that the same problem - excessive discretion - plagued provincial 
recruitment as well. As a solution, the 2004 policy provides extensive regulations for 
recruitment – whether regular or contractual. Regular recruitment to key departments 
such as the S&GAD, Finance, Revenue, and Police was placed in the hands of central 
authorities rather than individual departments. For instance, new recruits to posts in 
BPS 11 to 15 (and selected other posts including Sub-Engineers in the Irrigation 
Department) were to be appointed on the recommendation of the highly centralised 
Punjab Public Service Commission (PPSC) rather than their respective departments.  
 
Seniority  
Once an official is recruited, trained, and confirmed, her future in the service 
is determined by her seniority. The seniority of provincial civil servants is determined 
on the same principles as federal officials and where an official stands on a seniority 
list determines if and when she gets a promotion. 
In 1973, when the services were re-structured, the system for determining 
seniority had to be overhauled to reflect the new system of grades, now known as BPS 
or Basic Pay Scales. The Civil Servants Act of 1973 Article 8 remarks that seniority is 
a matter relative to the officer’s peers in a service or cadre. There are two kinds of 
seniority. The first is seniority within grades or pay scales within a cadre or 
occupational group, and the second is seniority within a batch of recruits.  
After sitting all required examinations, new recruits are placed on the seniority 
list on the basis of their cumulative score on the CSS examination, the training 
programs, and the final passing out examination.97 Seniority for the purposes of 
promotion is determined by when the official was appointed to a post in a specific 
grade. For example, if A was appointed to a BPS 19 post on 31 May 2014 and B was 
appointed on 2 April 2014, the more senior official would be B.98 However, despite 
                                                 
97 The Occupational Groups and Services (Probation, Training and Seniority) Rules, 1990 (Art. 7) 
98
 Where two officials are appointed to the same pay scale on the same date, the person who is older in 
age will be given the senior rank, provided that he was not junior to the younger person in their 
previous pay scale.  
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promotion in this fashion, the official will retain his seniority ranking within his batch 
(those who were recruited at the same time as he was) as before.  Where a post is 
open to both direct recruitment and promotion (according to a specific percentage 
division, for example 70% by direct recruitment and 30% by promotion), a 1970 
memorandum establishes that those promoted to the post in question from a lower 
post will be considered senior to officials recruited directly at the same time.99 
Though there has clearly been an attempt to establish regulations for any 
eventuality with regard to seniority, the fact is that a bureaucrat’s place on the 
seniority list is a contested issue. The primary reason for this is that determination of 
seniority depends on documentation, making lists, and accurate dates for an official’s 
birth and appointments. Of course bureaucrats fudge seniority lists, adding names in 
the top ten on the request of a patron or because they have been bribed to do so. At the 
same time, more everyday practices can also impact seniority. One of the most 
common practices amongst officials is entering an incorrect birth date when they 
apply for the service, or at some later date. Another means of interfering with the 
determination of seniority is to delay someone’s file, thereby delaying their 
appointment. These practices may seem trivial, but they can impact appointments and, 
thus, ‘delivery’.  
 
Promotion  
Promotion prospects vary immensely within the civil service – between 
cadres, services, posts, and departments. At every pay scale, there are posts reserved 
for initial recruitment and for promotion. PAS officers are the only bureaucrats who 
are promoted more or less regardless of performance, as a matter of form. Unless they 
themselves choose to remain on leave and work outside of the hierarchy, all PAS 
officers will rise through the ranks to BPS 22 and the posts of federal secretaries. 
These are not necessarily illegal or even extra-legal promotions. They are often 
perfectly legal, but the fact is that the PAS cadre is the one where the rules for 
promotion as they are laid out are likely to be followed.  
A 1964 memorandum100 establishes a division amongst posts to which 
promotion is possible – selection posts and non-selection posts. Non-selection posts 
                                                 
99 Estt. Division O.M.No.1/9/74-ARC,dated 12-9-1974 
100 Estt. Division O.M.No.18/4/64-F.II, dated 25-7-1964 
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are those to which promotion is determined on the basis of seniority (‘subject to 
fitness’)101. A selection post is one (as a demi-official letter from the Establishment 
Secretary102 defines it) ‘which no officer can claim as of right’. Departmental 
Promotion Committees or Selection Boards determine promotion to these posts on the 
basis of merit only.103 Seniority amongst aspirants to the post becomes relevant only 
when two or more of them are indistinguishable on merit.104  
In 1982, a Promotion Policy was issued to deal with specific aspects of 
promotion by ‘selection’ processes, perhaps the most problematic being the 
Performance Evaluation Report (formerly the Annual Confidential Report – ACR). 
While the Establishment Division goes to great lengths to quantify a PER, it is a 
complicated procedure that most bureaucrats will not have the time to master. 
Therefore, PERs were and still are often filled out solely on the discretion of the 
supervising officer. In 1985, however, a letter from the Establishment Secretary105 
raises the concern of “‘Inflated” [sic] reporting’. The division expresses its awareness 
that ACR’s are not a reflection of true performance, but are overly ‘generous’ due to 
pressure exerted in one form or another on the assessing officer. In order to counter 
these problems, the Division revised the marks given to different assessments on the 
ACR (reducing the portion allocated to those areas where ‘pressure’ was suspected). 
Regardless, the problem of manufactured reports remains. Most bureaucrats have no 
qualms in revealing that *everyone’s* reports, their own included, are 
unrepresentative of their true skills, capabilities, and work.  
In 2007, the Promotion Policy was revised on the basis of the 
recommendations of a Committee charged with making promotions better regulated 
and fairer. The 2007 policy does not change the length of time in service required for 
promotion.106 However, it tries to remove a loophole in the promotion process 
introduced by a notification107 issued in 1975 by the Establishment Division. The 
                                                 
101 Also referred to as ‘seniority-cum-fitness’ in various memorandums 
102 No.F.2(36)/60-EIX, dated 24-4-1968 
103 As noted by the Supreme Court in the Tariq Aziz ud Din case (2010 SCMR 1301) 
http://www.supremecourt.gov.pk/web/user_files/file/hr8340of2010.pdf  
104 Estt. Division O.M.No.18/4/64-F.II, dated 25-7-1964 
105 d.o. Letter No.10(10)/85-CP-1 dated 15-5-1985 
106 Establishment Division memorandum (O.M.No.1/9/80-R.2 dated 2-6-1983) specifies: 
For Grade 18   5 years in Grade 17 
For Grade 19   12 years in Grade 17 and above 
For Grade 20   17 years in Grade 17 and above 
For Grade 21   22 years in Grade 17 and above 
107 No.1/21/75-D.II. dated 9-7-1975 
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notification emphasised that the completion of the required length of time in service 
does not mean that an official has the right to promotion. It is simply one of the 
conditions for promotion. Even if an official fulfills the required years in service, the 
promotion will not automatically be his as long as there is an official who is senior to 
him who has not completed the required years in service. Effectively, this created a 
loophole in the determination of promotions for bureaucrats – the officer in charge of 
approving promotions had the discretion to overlook the more senior bureaucrat and 
promote a junior who has spent the required number of years in service. In an attempt 
to plug the loophole, the 2007 Promotion Policy (Para 4) develops a quantified 
measure – the ‘Comprehensive Efficiency Index’.108 However, the index suffers from 
the same problems as PERs – bureaucrats usually do not have the time or the 
motivation to master its implementation.  
The Provincial Management Service’s promotion prospects are much less rosy 
than that of the PAS. In fact, over the last few years, there has been simmering 
resentment on the part of PMS officers (and other provincial officers in general) 
against the PAS. PMS officers believe that the PAS, and DMG before them, are 
usurping posts meant for their service. As a result, PMS officials reach retirement age 
before reaching the highest pay scales because there are simply no vacancies in the 
most senior posts.  
For the Provincial Management Service, promotions are determined by the 
Provincial Selection Board and handled by the S&GAD. In 2010, the Punjab 
government felt that the 1974 Rules needed more substantiation, and issued a detailed 
Promotion Policy which is in many ways similar to the Establishment Division’s. 
However, there are some differences. Of particular interest is the distinction between 
three types of promotion: (a) regular, (b) on acting-charge basis, and (c) on officiating 
basis.  
These terms are of interest for this thesis because they are used in the courts 
and the media for PAS officers serving in Punjab as well as provincial employees. A 
regular promotion is one made when there is a ‘clear vacancy’ to be filled (p.2, 
Promotion Policy 2010). An acting-charge promotion is made when an official who 
might otherwise be qualified for the promotion has not completed the required time in 
                                                 
108 The Central Selection or Departmental Promotion Committee (d.o. letter No.1/9/73-F.IV, dated 22-
10-1973) and Establishment Division (Letter No. 26/1/80-DV, dated 12-10-1980) must ensure that 
those recommended for promotion meet the minimum required score.  
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service (see section on Acting Charge Appointments for more details). An officiating 
promotion (what the Establishment Division refers to as a temporary promotion109) is 
an appointment made when a post is vacant because a suitable candidate cannot be 
found for a transfer, an official defers promotion, or the incumbent has been posted 
away or is on leave, suspension or deputation. In these circumstances, the post can be 
filled by promoting an officer who has the requisite qualifications and length in 
service. However, an officiating promotion does not imply a regular promotion. Once 
a suitable candidate becomes available for the post, the official on officiating 
promotion will revert back to his previous pay scale. 
The Promotion Policy 2010 provides a detailed list of conditions that must be 
met by an official looking for a promotion. Aside from the conditions laid down by 
the Establishment Division (see above), the provincial requirements specifically point 
to the person’s position on the seniority list, any penalties that involve a bar on 
promotion, and the completion of the probationary period. Furthermore, the policy 
allows for the relevant department to put in place particular requirements related to 
the job in question. The example the policy provides is that of ‘teachers, whose 
[students’] results are compared with the results of the Boards/Universities’ (p. 4, 
Promotion Policy 2010).  
Unlike federal posts, all provincial posts in BPS 19 (and above) are selection 
posts with promotion to them determined by the Provincial Selection Board on the 
basis of merit determined by an Efficiency Index Score. In addition, the policy 
suggests that for promotions to posts in BPS 19 and above, Selection Boards consider 
‘emotional maturity’ and ‘breadth of vision’ in addition to the regular performance 
measures (p. 6-7, Promotion Policy 2010). Unquantifiable and certainly not 
determinable through the PER, the presence or absence of these qualities in a 
candidate is solely the judgment of the Provincial Selection Board and, potentially, 
how well the members of the Board know the official. In other words, the granting of 
such promotions is a discretionary exercise.  
Posts in BPS 18 and below are all non-selection posts, with departments 
developing their own detailed policies (in line with the Punjab Civil Servants Rules 
1974 and Promotion Policy 2010). Unlike PAS and PMS officials, departments often 
                                                 
109 It is possible to be promoted to a post on a temporary basis, if the original occupant is on leave or on 
training for example. A 1997 memorandum (Estt. Div.’s O.M.No.30/2/90-CP-3, dated 18-2-1997) 
allows for such temporary promotions to be regularised. 
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do not have ‘time-scale’ promotion policies or, if they do, the time frames specified 
are not followed. What this means, as many bureaucrats pointed out to me, is that 
there are either no regulations regarding how much time an official can spend in a 
post before having the right to be promoted, or if regulations are present, they are 
completely ignored at the discretion of senior bureaucrats who promote favoured 
officers within their own professional networks. As a result, all mid-tier bureaucrats I 
spoke to complained of slow progress up the department’s hierarchy. In the Irrigation 
Department, for instance, a Sub-Engineer might spend ten or fifteen years without 
being promoted to Sub-Divisional Officer.110 Since the promotion process is in the 
hands of the department, officials suggest that members of the department close to the 




A transfer is when an official is moved from one post to another in the same 
pay scale (BPS). It may entail moving ‘from one functional unit to another’, moving 
from one province or district to another, or from the centre (Islamabad) to a province 
(Art 11, 1974 Punjab Civil Servant Rules). A transfer is meant to be an advancement, 
not in terms of a pay scale but in terms of financial remuneration, as per a 
Government of India Finance Division letter from 1st February 1928111 which is 
included in the Establishment Code and reproduced as a notification from the Punjab 
S&GAD.112).  
Transfers are by far the most problematic aspect of the bureaucratic set up. 
Most bureaucrats and politicians I spoke to claimed that recruitment had improved in 
the last few years and promotions were largely rule bound, but transfers were still a 
problem. There were no real explanations offered for this beyond saying that it was 
useful to be able to control transfers - between districts, between departments, and 
where PAS officers are concerned, between provinces and the federation.113 The 
implication is that those attempting to politicise the bureaucracy may not necessarily 
                                                 
110 See Appendix 2 for department organogram. 
111 No. F-452-R.I/27 
112 No. SORI (S&GAD)-9-36/81 dated 3/08/1988 
113 Transfers are not possible between groups or cadres. Where an official is appointed to a service or 
cadre other than his own, he is regarded as being on deputation and a separate set of rules apply.  
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care who is recruited (except at the lower level of the bureaucracy). They do, 
however, care who is posted to a particular office. For instance, Wade (1985) explores 
the sale of transfers from post to post in an irrigation department, highlighting the 
existence of an entire corruption eco-system that extends from national politicians to 
department field staff and voters. This suggests that the desire to politicise 
appointments is tied to particular posts and the official powers and unofficial 
influence associated with those posts. In other words, politicisation is not simply 
about getting some people jobs (as much of the literature seems to understand it). It is 
about putting certain people who are already serving as bureaucrats in certain jobs 
and, thereby, regulating bureaucratic performance, gaining electoral advantages, or 
ensuring personal enrichment. 
Though rules exist as to when transfers are permitted and when they are not, 
they are either (a) vaguer than those for promotion or (b) have simply not been 
formulated in any substantive fashion. The former means, for example, that the 
transfer or shuffling of bureaucrats that takes place prior to an election (by the 
caretaker government114) in order to mitigate their influence on the electoral process is 
often cosmetic. For example, moving the Lahore District Co-ordination Officer 
(DCO) to the post of DCO of nearby Faisalabad, both PMLN strongholds, before an 
election does not reduce the power of the bureaucrat to make promises of 
appointments to garner the votes a politician needs to win the election, neither does it 
impact the official’s power to target state services and resources to areas where a 
patron politician (a constituency politician or a party leader) needs some support, 
while shutting out the opposition. It simply changes the target (politician) recipients.  
The lack of substantive rules regarding transfers means that transfers often involve a 
quid pro quo – for instance, support during the election in exchange for a good 
posting afterwards. The only condition that the 1974 Punjab Rules lays down for 
transfers is that the official in question meet any qualifications and conditions set for 
the post he is being transferred to. Though transfers are dealt with in acts of 
parliament, rules of business, and in the ESTACODE, I have not been able to find any 
comprehensive policy that provides a blueprint to deal with transfer requests. Instead, 
transfer decisions are often made simply on tenure. At the provincial level, tenure is 
established by the Sixth Schedule of the Government of Punjab Rules of Business 
                                                 
114 A caretaker government is put in place for a few months after the end of the incumbent 
government’s term and is responsible for conducting free and fair elections.  
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(RoB) 2011. Where an official is to be promoted before the end of his tenure, or 
where it is necessary to extend the tenure of an official in a post, the 
(centralised/discretionary) approval of the S&GAD is required.115  
Tenure for all federal posts except technical ones is established in a demi-
official letter from the Establishment Secretary116 which specifies that, typically, an 
official should remain in a post for three years, and no more than five years. However, 
in an office memorandum from 1994117, the Establishment Division notes that 
ministries and departments are not obeying the rules allowing officials to serve for 
long periods. The memorandum therefore introduces the requirement that any 
extension in tenure must be approved by the competent authority. In cases where a 
transfer is being made before the end of the official’s tenure, the Establishment 
Division must be consulted.118  
For PAS officers, transfers can take place at three levels – district, department, 
or province/federation. In 2000, a letter from the Establishment Division119 
established that a PAS officer must serve in a minimum of two provinces of the 
federation, in addition to serving the federal government at the centre. Interestingly, 
however, the letter also provides that the preference of an official be taken into 
account when appointing him to a province, alongside of course the posts available in 
that province. At the same time, the appointment of these officials (to/from Islamabad 
or a province) is often influenced by politicians and other bureaucrats with the 
intention of achieving specific outcomes. Within provinces, and particularly Punjab, 
the appointments of PAS officers to secretariat posts (in the CM Secretariat), 
department posts (Secretary of a department, for instance) or as the DCO of a district 
are also political decisions on the part of both the politicians and the bureaucrats 
concerned.120  
The determination of rotational postings (transfers between provinces and the 
federation), the letter121 states, is to be made by the Establishment Secretaries and the 
Chief Secretaries of the provinces. However, in many cases, PAS officials use their 
                                                 
115 GoP RoB 2011, Part D, Para 23 
116 Nos.27/370-F.1, dated 4-11-1970 and 30-6-1971 
117 No.10/10/94-R.2, dated 22-3-1994 
118 Or if the post in question is in a semi-autonomous or autonomous organisation, by its parent 
ministry 
119 No.F.9/1/2000-CP-7, dated 22-7-2000 
120 See Chapters 4 and 5 
121 No.F.9/1/2000-CP-7, dated 22-7-2000 
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links with senior politicians and bureaucrats to ensure that they are not posted outside 
Punjab, or if they are, that they are soon transferred back. Of course, this practice 
means that the objective of the rotation policy – to give PAS officers as varied a 
career trajectory as possible, so that they serve in the centre as well as the provinces – 
is rarely met.  
In practice, the lines of authority on transfers are opaque. In line with the trend 
toward centralisation, decisions on transfers are made in consultation with (or on the 
advice of) the department secretary, the Chief Secretary, and the CM and his advisers, 
regardless of who has the official authority to do so. In fact, the relationship between 
the secretaries of the major provincial departments and the CM Secretariat is 
symbiotic. 
 
CM Directive  
It is the legal prerogative of the Chief Minister to issue a directive to a 
department at any time asking that a policy being implemented be temporarily 
suspended. Ideally, the power to issue such a directive should be used sparingly and in 
exceptional circumstances. However, given the pattern of centralisation mentioned 
earlier, CM Directives are issued frequently with regard to bureaucratic appointments 
and often for trivial tasks (e.g. allowing a teacher to be transferred while a transfer 
ban is in place).  
 
Irregular Appointments 
An irregular appointment is not an illegal appointment or even necessarily an 
extra-legal appointment. The law and the rules for bureaucrats at federal, provincial, 
and departmental levels allow for appointments to be made in circumstances that are 
different from the usual recruitment, promotion, and transfer options. Usually, 
irregular appointments involve a temporary assignment of some kind, but there are 
other types as well. 
 
Ad hoc Appointments  
According to Part IV of the 1973 (federal) Rules and 1974 Punjab Rules, an ad 
hoc appointment is made where the appointing authority (e.g. the Secretary of a 
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Ministry or Division) believes it to be detrimental to the public interest to leave a post 
vacant while awaiting the selection authority’s (FPSC or PPSC) due process and 
recommendation. In such cases, the appointing authority can appoint an official to the 
post for no longer than six months (one year for provincial appointments as per a 
notification issued in 1982122). Once the selection authority nominates a candidate for 
the post, the ad hoc appointee reverts back to his prior position with regard to 
seniority and BPS.  
As far back as 1962, however, the Establishment Division showed concern 
that ad hoc appointments were fraught with favouritism and nepotism123, and 
subsequently, that the standard procedure of advertising, short listing, and assessment 
was not being followed.124 A pre-prepared short list of candidates would be 
considered for the post or the names of favoured candidates added to an existing list, 
typically due to the influence of political or bureaucratic patrons. Furthermore, ad hoc 
appointments were extended repeatedly, because (exploiting a loophole in the 
regulations) departments and offices would delay placing a requisition for fresh 
recruitment to the post in question with the FPSC.125 As a result, finding someone 
suitable for the post took time, and the ad-hoc appointee received extensions beyond 
his initial 6-month term.  
The Recruitment Policy enforced in 1992 made ad hoc appointments illegal 
unless approved by the Prime Minister, but that decision was reversed in 2000.126 The 
Establishment Division permitted ad-hoc appointments provided that a requisition had 
been placed with the FPSC and (discretionary) clearance acquired from them. By 
2002, however, the nomenclature ‘ad-hoc’ seemed to fall out of use and, to bypass 
these requirements, was replaced by the rather vague concept of a ‘temporary 
transfer/posting’ made ‘in the public interest’.127 
 
 
                                                 
122 Notification No. SOR.III-1-39/78 dated 14.06.1982 
123 D.O. letter No.2/2/62-D.I, dated 15-2-1962 
124 Estt. Division’s O.M. No. 2/23/78-D.III, dated 17-4-1978 and Estt. Division’s O.M.No.D-268/74-
D.V., dated 29-6-1974 
125 Estt. Division’s O.M.No.2/9/76-D-III, dated 4-6-1976; Estt. Division’s D.O.letter No.9/2/74-D.V., 
dated 8-6-1977; Estt Division’s circular No.2/60/87-CP-5 dated 29-9-1987; Estt. Secretary's D.O. letter 
No.2/7/77-D.III, dated 15-10-1977 
126 S.R.O. No.122(I)/2000, dated 15-3-2000 
127 OM No. 9/2/2002-R.5, dated 28th October, 2002 
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Acting Charge Appointments  
Acting charge appointments were given legal cover when the 1973 Rules were 
amended in January 1981128 to add Rule 8-A and B. Rule 8-A mandates that 
promotion would only be allowed if the required length of service, qualifications, and 
training needs were met. Where officials did not meet these requirements, acting 
charge appointments were permitted under Rule 8-B. At the provincial level, an 
S&GAD Notification129 also allowed acting charge appointments.  
Again, acting charge appointments are made at the discretion of the appointing 
authority where he considers that it would be against the public interest to leave the 
post vacant (Rule 8-B(1), 1973 Rules). In the 1974 Punjab Rules, there is 
specification as to the qualifications the acting charge appointee must have – ‘at least 
three fourth [sic]’ of the time in service or experience required for the post, and 
eligibility ‘for promotion except for the prescribed length of service and the 
experience’ (Para 10-A(2)). If a suitable candidate cannot be found for a post of BPS 
17 or above, the senior-most officer in the group or department can be given an acting 
charge appointment (Rule 8-B(3) of the 1973 Rules). However, acting charge 
appointments do not constitute a promotion, nor do they confer seniority on the 
appointee (Rule 8-B(6-7)).  
In 1988, however, the Establishment Division issued a memorandum130 noting 
that ministries, departments, divisions, and provincial governments were not 
following their instructions with regard to the procedure for the irregular (but legal) 
appointment of federal employees to posts in the higher grades. This disregard for 
procedure came to light when junior officials appointed to senior posts without due 
procedure demanded the salary and allowances tied to the senior post, usually by 
appealing to the Federal Services Tribunal or the Supreme Court, even though they 
had not been officially promoted. Interestingly, the memorandum (dated 2/5/1988) 
itself notes the flimsiness of the typical excuse offered for the violation of relevant 




                                                 
128 Establishment Division Notification No.S.R.O.41(I)/81, dated 12th January, 1981 
129 No. SOR.III-1-14/75 dated 26.02.1983 
130 O.M.No.14/4/86-R.I, dated 2-5-1988 
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Additional/Current Charge Appointments  
There seems to be no clear distinction between ‘current’ charge and 
‘additional’ charge appointments in the ESTACODE. In places, the terms are used 
interchangeably, while in others they are used to suggest two separate practices 
without distinguishing them. After a close reading of the memorandums, I have 
decided to consider them one and the same. My reason is that, in amendments made 
in 2005 to memoranda regarding remuneration for additional131 and current charge 
posts132, the same rate is set for both kinds of appointments. I use the term ‘additional 
charge’ to refer to both current and additional charge appointments, because this is the 
term that is actually used by bureaucrats on a day-to-day basis. 
‘Additional charge’ appointments are stop-gap appointments when an officer 
retires, goes on leave or is otherwise unavailable. It is meant as a temporary substitute 
till the formal process can be carried out to find a replacement officer. A 
memorandum dated 18/6/1980133 provides for additional charge appointments made 
to posts that would otherwise remain vacant for no more than 2 months, hindering the 
work of the department. The senior-most official in the relevant departmental unit or 
district134 will be eligible for an additional charge appointment provided he meets any 
requirements for the post and for promotion (except length of time in service). The 
appointment may be to an identical post to the one the official is holding, or it may be 
in a higher BPS.  
Since officials with an additional charge appointment are responsible for two 
posts at the same time, they can throw an entire department into disarray. The officer 
who has additional charge continues to sit in his office of primary charge, but is 
responsible for the work of another department as well. Therefore, he must divide his 
time between the two, leading to backlogs, missing files, and much running back and 
forth by junior officers. There are restrictions on how long these appointments can last 
- between one and three months, extendable by another 3 months; any extension 
beyond six months would have to be approved (as a matter of discretion) by the 
Finance Division.135 In a move toward centralising bureaucratic appointments, 
                                                 
131 Finance Division’s O.M. No. F.2(9)-R-3/85, dated 18-3-1987 
132 Finance Division’s O.M. No. F.2(9)-R.3/85, dated 15-3-1987 
133 Estt. Division O.M.No.1/21/76-AR.I/R-II, as amended vide O.M. of even number dated 10-4-1981 
134 as per Estt. Division O.M. No. 1/21/76-AR-I/R.ll, dated 14-3-1981 
135 Estab. Div.’s O.M No. 1/17/2000-R-2, dated 21st Nov., 2000 
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however, a 2005 memorandum136 hands the power to make all additional charge 
appointments in BPS 17 - 20 to Secretaries. Initial extensions for a further 3 months 
must be approved by the Establishment Secretary and any extensions beyond 6 
months to the Prime Minister. Just as with Acting Charge Appointments, then, 
bureaucratic and politicised discretion is used to make Additional Charge 
Appointments frequently and for extended periods, often in posts that deal with 
paperwork or projects. 
Unlike the federal rules, the 1974 Punjab Rules do not use the term additional 
charge at all, though the Civil Service Rules issued by the provincial Finance 
Department refer to both current and additional charge appointments (seemingly 
interchangeably) with respect to pay. As per Para 10-B(1) of the 1974 Punjab Rules, a 
‘current charge’ (read additional charge) appointment is made where a post is likely to 
be vacant for less than a year and the relevant authority does not think it useful to 
make an ad hoc appointment to the post, i.e. does not think it necessary to go through 
the process of advertising and short listing candidates, etc. Again, the appointment 
will go to the senior-most official whom the relevant authority considers (as a matter 
of discretion) eligible for promotion. 
 
Contract Appointments  
Contract appointments have been in vogue with the Pakistan government for 
some years, and with the Punjab government in particular in recent years. In a 
presentation to the National Commission on Government Reform (NCGR) in January 
2007, the Government of Punjab revealed that it was prioritising contract 
appointments over regular ones. The NCGR report (p. 344) notes that the Chief 
Secretary of Punjab stressed ‘increased absenteeism, poor service delivery, [the] non-
existence of [a] rational performance management system[,] and the increasing 
pension bill for the regular employees’ as the reasons behind this shift.  
 The Punjab government’s 2004 Recruitment Policy137 (Para 7 i and ii) states 
that a Contract Appointment Regulation Committee will determine which posts 
should be filled on a contract basis, though departments can request to have a 
contract-based appointment made where they wish to offer a different salary than the 
                                                 
136 Estt. Div.’s O.M NO. 3/89/2004-R-2, dated 01-01-2005 
137 See the Recruitment section above. 
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one mandated for the post in question by the BPS  Whereas the Punjab government 
barred retired civil servants from being employed on contracts, however, the federal 
government did not. In fact, the federal memorandum ends with the following clause: 
3. The Chief Executive may allow contract appointment of a retired civil servant or a retired 
officer of the Armed Forces or a retired Judge of a superior court or any other person on MP 
pay package in the public interest and merit. 
 
At the time, this clause allowed Musharraf to make practically any 
appointment he wanted within the federal service. Following the reinstatement of 
democratic rule, this power now lies with the PM. It is still used to appoint advisers at 
the highest level of government. 
 
Officer on Special Duty (OSD)  
Officer on Special Duty (tongue-in-cheek referred to as Officer in Search of 
Duty) is a categorisation that in theory carries no stigma. It simply means that the 
officer is available to the federal or provincial government to be appointed wherever 
they might wish. In effect, it is paid leave.  
In a memorandum dated 19/9/1968138, the Establishment Division ponders 
whether it is necessary to determine a procedure for Officer on Special Duty (OSD) 
postings and, if so, how an OSD appointment is to be made. Deciding that such 
appointments are necessary, the memorandum records that OSD posts may be created 
in circumstances where an officer is awaiting a posting; on deputation or training; 
assigned a special duty; or ‘for overcoming technical difficulties’. No matter what the 
reason for doing so, the memorandum specifies that an OSD post cannot be created 
without the agreement of the Ministry of Finance (or the relevant financial adviser). 
Though the Punjab rules do not mention OSD, it is likely that the same rules apply. 
For example, Interviewee 4 gave the example of an official returning from a course 
abroad – he will be made OSD till a suitable post is found for him. In such 
circumstances, putting an official on ‘Special Duty’ is a reasonable and legal step. 
However, the fact is that OSD postings are frequently made for punitive reasons – to 
shunt a noncompliant bureaucrat to the sidelines and make way for a more 
accommodating officer at the discretion of senior officers. As Hull (2012, 158) puts it, 
                                                 
138 Estt. Division O. M. No. 5 (I) / 8 / 6 7 - DV, dated 19-9-1968 
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an OSD appointment means the officer has been ‘prematurely transferred out of his 
office without a new assignment’. 
 
Post Upgradation 
In 1981, the Establishment Division issued a memorandum139 regarding 
appointments made outside the regular channels. Repeating an earlier memo140, the 
memorandum notes that the appointment of junior officers to senior posts without due 
process must cease, and that where it was essential to appoint a junior officer to a 
senior post, the post itself must be downgraded to the officer’s grade after seeking 
permission from the Establishment Division.141  
However, upgrading posts was given legal cover again in a memorandum in 
1992142 with the requirement that the PM, Establishment Division, and Finance 
Division approve the upgradation. In a memorandum dated 20/1/2001143 the 
Establishment Division outlined the circumstances in which upgradation would be 
permitted – mainly when the responsibilities of a post had increased significantly – 
and outlined the (centralised) process for it.  
Though posts were often upgraded during Musharraf’s tenure, bureaucrats told 
me that this is not a common practice any longer. Though junior officers continue to 
be appointed to senior posts, this is through other methods such as Own Pay Scale 
(OPS) appointments (see below).  
 
Own Pay Scale 
Unlike additional charge appointments, there is no legal provision whatsoever 
for appointments made on an Own Pay Scale (OPS) basis. However, it is an often-
used irregular method of appointment and the abbreviation ‘OPS’ appears on official 
documents such as seniority lists. The practice involves giving an officer a senior post 
without promoting him to the required (higher) BPS, and has become such an open 
                                                 
139 O.M.No. 5(1)/81-D.II-R/4, dated 12-12-1981 
140 O.M.No.2/25/69-C.I., dated July 31, 1979 
141
 In a 1967 memorandum, the Establishment Division (O.M.No.5(1)/67-DV, dated 16-10-1967) 
explains that upgrading a post means first abolishing it and creating a new one in a higher BPS.  




and common practice that what should be an extra-legal practice has come to be 
considered merely as an irregular method of appointment. 
 
Illegal Appointments 
Illegal appointments involve a range of methods. In some cases, the 
appointing bureaucrat has to do very little to allow the appointment to go through – 
for instance, he simply has to (a) ignore the fact that a candidate has a fake degree or 
(b) overlook a poor Annual Confidential Report/Performance Evaluation Report. In 
other cases, more effort (and, at times, risk-taking) is required – for example, having 
names inserted into merit lists or requesting an interviewer to give someone a few 
extra marks in an interview.  
 
Fudging Lists  
A common illegal practice is to add or subtract names from merit, seniority, 
recruitment, or other lists. Typically, this is done by senior politicians who do not 
wish to engage with the legal process and do not need to cover their tracks using 
extra-legal means. They already exert enough influence to simply issue an order 
regarding appointments to particular posts, expecting it to be obeyed. This behaviour 
can be observed amongst senior public office holders (for example, the provincial 
assembly speaker or deputy speaker) and ministerial offices of all stripes. Little pieces 
of paper will be handed around the offices of the official’s administrative staff with 
names and posts written in Urdu. These chits are compiled and added to a list by one 
of the staff. Another practice is to insert officers’ names into the seniority list for 
promotion.  
 
Faking Signatures  
Despite a great deal of talk about digitisation and the use of technology 
(particularly cell phones and applications), most bureaucratic work is still done on 
paper. Though official documents are typed in English, comments on them are made 
by hand, in Urdu, starting from the department’s Section Officers all the way up to the 
Secretary. At each stage, the official must sign off on the document and put down any 
comments for the record. 
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There are multiple means through which fake signatures are used to impact 
bureaucratic appointments. The simplest way, employed by clerks in various 
government departments, is to ‘lose’ the page which has the signature of the official 
in charge. This is a common practice when bureaucrats submit transfer requests. 
Another practice is the use of signatures that are easy to fake. These come in handy 
when a senior official wishes to disown a document that he did actually sign – a 
transfer or promotion document perhaps. He accuses a junior official (or the person 
who applied for the transfer or promotion) of faking his signature. 
 
Bribery and the Sale of Appointments  
Though bribes are used to aid in achieving all the other methods of 
appointment listed above, it is quite common for appointments to be made simply on 
the basis of cash changing hands. The practice continues in the subcontinent today, 
though it is limited to lower tiers of the bureaucracy.  
 
Violence, Threats, and Intimidation  
Illegal appointments can also involve harassment, violence, or intimidation by 
the police, revenue officials, intelligence agencies, and even the media. In order to 
free up a particular post for a crony, an actor may threaten or actually attack the 
sitting official so that he applies for a transfer. Alternatively, this tactic may be used 
simply to send a message to the higher authorities so that they undertake the desired 
transfer. Equally, these methods may be used to get an official to perform a particular 
task (such as the transfer of a junior officer).  
In recent years, apart from actual physical violence and the threat of it, there 
are two methods used to force an officer to do something. One involves influencing 
an intelligence official who will then begin an ‘investigation’ into the bureaucrat 
being targeted. This involves letting the bureaucrat know that he is being monitored 
because he has not been ‘compliant’. The other is to use the media to print salacious 
stories about the bureaucrat. A number of bureaucrats I interviewed mentioned the use 
of these methods (both male and female officers and at different tiers of the 
bureaucratic hierarchy), typically those who refuse to give in to political pressure (e.g. 




The purpose of this chapter was to provide the historical and political 
background, as well as the political, legal and administrative structures, that figure in 
the subsequent empirical chapters of this thesis.  
In the first part of this chapter, I discussed changes in the institutional structure 
of the bureaucracy in light of political changes since independence. Much of the 
discussion focused on attempts by military dictators to sideline party-based forces 
through the establishment of entrenched networks of non-partisan patronage at the 
district level. These efforts were also designed to dilute bureaucratic power by 
appointing military officials to bureaucratic posts while sidelining powerful cadres of 
the bureaucracy. However, somewhat ironically, these efforts actually ended up 
having the opposite effect and furthermore, tied elite senior bureaucrats more closely 
to political patrons. Consequently, when politicians were in power, they saw 
politicising the bureaucracy as a means of pushing back the military and holding onto 
power. At the same time, bureaucrats saw politicians as patrons who could help them 
retain their hold on power and prevent military infiltration. 
Although patrons seek to appoint bureaucrats to ‘deliver’ specific outcomes, 
not all of them have the ability to do so. Seniority, the centralisation of political and 
bureaucratic power in Punjab, and specific career prospects mean that some 
politicians and some bureaucrats are more influential than others when it comes to 
making appointments. This section lays the groundwork for the claim I make in the 
empirical chapters of this thesis - that senior politicians and bureaucrats (those with 
close ties to the party leadership, and in particular the CM) are the ones who are most 
likely to be able to make bureaucratic appointments that suit their objectives.  
The last section of the chapter details the rules and regulations in place at both 
the federal and provincial (Punjab) level for making legal appointments – regular and 
irregular. I draw special attention to various concerns, warnings and criticisms 
periodically issued by the Establishment Division and the Punjab S&GAD as these 
rules and regulations were introduced. These notifications are indicators of the 
loopholes in the rules regarding appointments, as well as the discretion bureaucrats 
have, in defining the ‘public interest’ and bending the rules where necessary to make 
extra-legal appointments. In tracing attempts to reduce this discretion and plug the 
loopholes in the rules and regulations, I highlight the increasing centralisation of 
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power over bureaucratic appointments in the hands of provincial Secretaries and the 
CM office. The final part of this chapter explored how patrons break the rules to make 
illegal appointments to the bureaucracy. 
In what follows, I draw on the legal provisions outlined in this chapter, and 
their violation, to link politicised bureaucratic appointments to the pursuit of 
particular objectives (bureaucratic efficiency; electoral gain; and personal enrichment 
and protection). In establishing this link, I argue that patterns of bureaucratic 
politicisation help us to understand patterns of ‘delivery’ and governance.  
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CHAPTER 3: LEGAL METHODS OF APPOINTMENT 
 
This thesis seeks to understand the underpinnings of governance by untangling 
patterns of bureaucratic appointment. In this chapter, I begin to apply my analytical 
framework (Chapter 1) to my findings from the ‘field’ in order to show how legal 
appointments underpin ‘delivery’ outcomes.  
This chapter, and the two subsequent ones, will be structured around five 
variables: the patron and his ability or power to make an appointment, the objective of 
the patron in making the appointment (bureaucratic efficiency, electoral gain, and 
personal enrichment/protection,), the method of appointment (legal, illegal, or extra-
legal), the resultant bonds (strong or diffuse) formed between patron and appointee, 
and the ‘delivery’ outcome the patron wants to achieve by appointing a specific 
bureaucrat in a specific post (in practical terms, these may include policy 
implementation, gaining votes / side-lining opponents for an upcoming election, and 
avoiding or delaying enquiries or disciplinary proceedings).  
 
 









Figure 2: Patron Objectives and Appointment Methods for  








Legal appointments are most effective, I argue, when the objective of a patron 
politician or bureaucrat is to enhance bureaucratic efficiency in order to achieve 
specific policy outcomes, project targets, patterns of service monitoring, or the 
maintenance of law and order. In the Pakistani context, many political observers 
would argue that there are no situations where politicians and bureaucrats would 
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completely share such an objective, and the reality is that bureaucrats have been 
simply co-opted by politicians. These observers would argue that the politician’s 
primary interest lies in electoral or personal gains whereas the bureaucrat’s primary 
interest lies in his own career advancement. I argue that this view is overly simplistic. 
  
Legalised Patronage 
In its most basic form, politicisation involves the appointment of favoured 
bureaucrats to favoured posts to reward one’s self, one’s party, or one’s cronies. The 
term has a negative connotation to it – the suggestion is that something illegal or at 
least extra-legal has been done to manage such an appointment. I argue, however, that 
politicised appointments can be legal as well.  
A bureaucrat appointed legally usually (though not always) has a reputation 
for respecting rules and procedures, resisting political and bureaucratic pressure to 
violate those rules and procedures, being honest, and (perhaps consequently) having 
an interest in bureaucratic reform and enhancing the efficiency of his department or 
section. Particularly in some high profile posts or cases, or at key points in time, such 
bureaucrats are regarded as key advisers by their superiors (political or bureaucratic). 
As a result, legal appointments are made keeping in mind the reputation of the 
bureaucrat.  
Legal appointments may be the ideal choice in certain circumstances - for 
instance when patrons want no cracks visible in the department façade for 
bureaucratic colleagues or external actors (such as politicians or other influentials) to 
exploit (when a party returns to power after some time in opposition or exile, or when 
donor pressure is significant). However, such appointments are not common. This is 
because, regardless of the desired ‘delivery’ outcome’, patrons usually want to 
appoint a bureaucrat (a) they will have some leverage over (to exert pressure on him 
at key moments), and (b) who will cut a few corners, when necessary, in pursuit of the 
desired ‘delivery’ outcome. The patron’s ability to push a bureaucrat to bend or break 
the rules comes from an exchange between the two parties – the patron goes out of his 
way to have the bureaucrat appointed (typically extra-legally) and the bureaucrat, in 
return, bends the rules to ‘deliver’ the outcome. 
Why should a patron bother with making a legal appointment at all when he 
could potentially make an extra-legal or even an illegal one – particularly considering 
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the difficulty of enforcement (noted above)? There are distinct risks associated with 
illegal, and even extra-legal, appointment methods. The knowledge that a bureaucrat 
has been appointed in violation of the rules, even a minor violation, spreads fast in 
departments. Though those serving in junior posts may not directly disobey an officer 
appointed extra-legally to a senior post, there will certainly be resentment and a lack 
of respect. It may not be expressed openly, but references to it will be made in oblique 
comments regarding the bureaucrat’s connections and work, or anonymously to the 
media, and cases may be filed with service tribunals or the courts. These disputes can 
escalate to open rebellion - for instance, the extra-legal appointment of Fawad Hasan 
Fawad as Secretary Services Punjab in 2008 (assigned to reduce the government wage 
bill and determine the appointments of other bureaucrats), led to protests by his 
seniors across the province. He was transferred after just 6 months in the post (see 
Chapter 4).  
Politicians will also take advantage of extra-legal and illegal appointments to 
forward their own ends – bureaucrats repeatedly told me that politicians interfere 
more when they are aware that a bureaucrat has benefitted himself from bending or 
breaking the rules, or has assisted others in doing so. Such knowledge may lead to a 
mutually beneficial quid pro quo, leaving the bureaucrat on the back foot in the face 
of demands made by the politician.  
Though it may be possible to make an extra-legal or illegal appointment, 
therefore, a patron may choose to make a legal one to better his chances of achieving 
a stable ‘delivery’ outcome - gaining electorally (for instance, wooing voters by 
successfully and swiftly constructing a road connecting a village to a market town), 
personally (channelling government funds for personal use or facilitating impunity 
from prosecution) or professionally (enjoying an enhanced reputation following the 
efficient implementation of a donor funded project).  
Just because the bureaucrat actually meets the legal requirements does not 
preclude a relationship of patronage or exchange between him and a patron formed on 
the basis of professional networks (or other informal ties). The understanding between 
them involves not only an agreed-upon outcome, but a post that is suitable and 
desirable for the appointee and promises future choice postings. However, though an 
exchange may exist between the patron and a legally appointed bureaucrat (‘I will 
only make this legal appointment if you do x, y, z for me. If you don’t, I will withhold 
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this legal appointment or make an extra-legal/illegal one’), it is an exchange that is 
difficult for the patron to enforce where the expected outcome is not in the 
appointee’s job description. The lack of leverage on the part of the patron is what 
makes the bond between him and the appointed bureaucrat diffuse whenever a legal 
appointment is made for any outcome other than bureaucratic efficiency. Consider a 
hypothetical example. A bureaucrat is promoted legally (by the department Secretary) 
to the post of Principal in a pilot school funded by an important international donor. 
Within the job description, he is expected to run the school to a high standard of 
efficiency. A local politician lobbied successfully for the (legal) promotion of the 
bureaucrat on the recommendation of a trusted bureaucrat (who claimed that the 
bureaucrat knew how to deal with donors). The politician reached an agreement with 
the bureaucrat that he would favour the politician’s party workers in distributing 
school canteen and furniture contracts, thereby diverting donor money into the 
politician’s supporters’ hands (and, particularly, his own). However, because the 
appointment has the law on its side, political leverage over the bureaucrat is reduced. 
Once (legally) appointed, the bureaucrat can renege, or fail to deliver, on the terms of 
the exchange with the political patron at little personal cost. For example, the 
bureaucrat could ‘deliver’ on running the school and keeping the donor happy 
(outcomes he is expected to deliver as part of his job description), but avoid helping 
the politician in advancing his electoral prospects or personal gains. Furthermore, the 
bureaucrat has recourse to the courts or service tribunals, the media, and potentially 
other patrons should his original patron try and enforce the terms of the exchange. 
Therefore, patrons seeking electoral or personal ‘delivery’ outcomes will be careful 
when appointing bureaucrats with whom their bond is diffuse and whose behaviour 
they cannot then regulate.  
The greater efficacy of legal appointments in achieving bureaucratic efficiency 
outcomes is explained by Grindle (2012, 55) who suggests that, historically, countries 
did not eliminate patronage as their career bureaucracies emerged, but rather ensured 
that ‘patronage was adapted to competence’. This is in contrast to Golden’s (2003, 
208-209) view that the purpose of a patronage appointment is always to allow 
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political corruption (defined by Golden as kickbacks for businesses and contractors 
facilitated by politicians and enabled by bureaucrats).144  
‘Patronage as competence’ is of particular value in specific political 
circumstances. Though the Sharif brothers co-opted Punjab’s bureaucracy during the 
1990s, it was their return from exile in 2008 that marked a real shift toward 
bureaucratic appointments made to achieve bureaucratic efficiency outcomes, 
particularly in the aftermath of the 18th Amendment and the devolution of powers to 
the provinces. In some cases, these appointments were legal (due to donor pressure 
and scrutiny or simply because an eligible and desirable bureaucrat was available to 
appoint legally). In other cases, they were extra-legal or illegal - I will discuss these in 
Chapters 4 and 5. Across all these methods, however, I contend that PMLN leaders in 
Punjab extend their ties to mid-tier bureaucrats (serving in senior district level posts) 
via senior bureaucrats who belong to the PAS, while side-lining local political 
players. It does this to ward off military and political challengers, centralising 
discretionary appointments from localities to Lahore. With legal appointments in 
particular, I argue that political leaders are most successful when they push for 
bureaucratic efficiency outcomes – the ‘delivery’ of competence, if you will – rather 
than electoral or personal gain.  
The power to make bureaucratic appointments legally, at various tiers of the 
bureaucratic hierarchy, lies with the Chief Minister (CM), the Chief Secretary, 
Secretary Services, Departmental Secretaries, DCOs, and EDOs. My discussion of 
legal appointments is, therefore, limited to appointments made by these actors. For 
this reason, the bulk of the chapter deals with the activities of political leaders (for 
example, the CM) and their cronies (i.e. senior party politicians, advisors, and senior 
bureaucrats such as Chief Secretaries, department Secretaries, and DCOs). In 
subsequent chapters, this balance between appointments made by the CM and his 
kitchen cabinet, on the one hand, and junior politicians (or those new to the party) and 
bureaucrats without access to the leadership, on the other, will shift to the lower end 
of the bureaucratic ladder.  
 
                                                 
144 Golden (2003, 208) differentiates political corruption from bureaucratic corruption - money 
bureaucrats demand from citizens for performing tasks that are in their job description. 
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Political Leaders and their Cronies 
Bureaucratic Efficiency 
Interests related to bureaucratic efficiency are easiest to understand by 
matching them to different levels of the government/bureaucratic hierarchy since the 
desired ‘delivery’ outcomes vary at each level. The only politician who can legally 
engage in provincial bureaucratic management is the CM (and in the federal 
government, the PM). Though provincial and federal ministers are expected to 
provide direction and improve performance, they have little de facto control or 
influence over the bureaucrats in their department. It is the Secretary of the 
department who holds the reins. This section of the chapter is therefore divided into 
two parts: (i) the CM Secretariat; and (ii) the Provincial Civil Secretariat.  
 
The Chief Minister’s Secretariat  
There are circumstances in which the Chief Minister finds that he needs the 
system of governance to function as it should, without interference, to achieve the 
outcomes he desires. This happens when the CM starts thinking of his party’s 
electoral success in the province as a whole, rather than thinking of constituency 
politics in a piecemeal fashion.145 The outcomes the CM seeks in such circumstances 
will generally involve particular policies or projects in which his party (and therefore, 
he himself as a party leader) has a stake. Therefore, his purpose/objective in making 
related bureaucratic appointments will be to ensure that the policy or project of his 
choice is properly developed, implemented, and monitored. At the same time, such 
appointments ensure that the CM centralises power in his own office, entrenching his 
own person further in the fabric of the bureaucratic governance system. 
The process of making (legal) appointments to key posts begins when a new 
government takes office. Reshuffles by new governments are, according to Iyer and 
Mani (2012, 1) writing about the Indian Administrative Service, ‘a hitherto 
unexplored mechanism’ politicians use to regulate governance. The literature on 
Pakistan considers such reshuffles only in so far as they reflect attempts by rulers 
(elected or otherwise) to establish control, not as phenomena of ‘governance’ to be 
                                                 
145 Of course, this requires that he balance the demands of his fellow party members - MNAs and 
MPAs – with the needs of the electorate. 
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considered in and of itself.146 In Punjab’s case, a ‘new’ government (i.e. a change in 
the party that was ruling) came in 1985 (IJI), 1993 (PPP), 1997 (PMLN), under 
Musharraf in 2002, and in 2008 when Shahbaz Sharif returned to power.  
 
Table 3: Electoral Dominance (Seats) 1988 To 2013 













PMLN PMLN PMLQ PMLN PMLN 
 
At each of these points, considerable time was spent in determining who to 
appoint to key posts such as Chief Secretary and Secretaries of key departments such 
as (the) S&GAD, Finance, Planning & Development, etc. Some of the appointments 
made at these junctures were extra-legal. Others involved an agreement between a 
patron and a bureaucrat as to a desired ‘delivery’ outcome and were, thus, based on 
patronage but made in accordance with the rules. 
The first appointment of consequence by any provincial administration is the 
Chief Secretary. The role of the Chief Secretary is perhaps the most crucial in a 
province, even more so than the CM, in ensuring bureaucratic efficiency. It is a key 
post that shapes the administration of the entire province, manages the appointment of 
bureaucrats in the province, and handles the policy agenda of the government. The 
CM relies on the Chief Secretary to aid him in formulating and implementing policy 
and ensuring that the CM and his party are not made to look bad.  
The appointment of each provincial Chief Secretary is made by the federal 
Establishment Division with the approval of the PM, after consultation with the CM 
of the relevant province. The CM’s opinion on the appointment is key – while it is 
theoretically possible to make a CS appointment against the CM’s advice, such tactics 
have always backfired.147 Because the CS is one of the CM’s main advisors in terms 
of bureaucratic appointments within the province, to appoint him in violation of the 
rules would not only undermine his authority amongst junior bureaucrats, but could 
                                                 
146 Wade (1982; 1985) provides a much more complex exploration of bureaucratic transfers in 
irrigation departments in India 
147 See below for discussion on problematic CS appointments by the PPP in the 1990s.  
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cause factionalisation within the PAS and lead to the Chief Secretary losing some of 
his clout within the bureaucracy.148 The Chief Secretary is regarded as a mentor and a 
father figure by bureaucrats in the province, particularly by elite cadre bureaucrats 
such as the PAS and Secretariat officers who are likely to occupy the vast majority of 
Secretary and DCO posts. Therefore, for both the person appointed to the post of 
Chief Secretary and for the CM, making a legal appointment is important (but by no 
means essential – extra-legal appointments have been made at times, though they 
have proven controversial and divisive for the bureaucracy – for example, as 
discussed in Chapter 4, the appointment of Javed Mahmood as Chief Secretary Punjab 
in 2008).  
Since the stakes are so high for the politician, it is not unusual for a CS 
appointee to have worked with the CM before (in the Sharif brothers’ case, with one 
of the brothers). For instance, Javed Mahmood was Principal Secretary to CM 
Shahbaz Sharif in his 1997-1999 term, and went on to become Chief Secretary in 
Sharif’s subsequent term as CM (2008-). The bureaucrat’s time in the CM Secretariat 
during the late 1990s allowed him to work closely with the CM, establishing a 
relationship between the politician and bureaucrat. This prior relationship, formed 
through a professional/work network, underpins their trust and reliance on each other, 
forming the basis of a strong bond between them. The CM trusts the bureaucrat and 
relies on him to help achieve the policy goals of his government; the CS, in turn, 
understands the CM’s priorities and methods. Both parties are aware that they would 
lose, professionally and politically, if they were at odds, and that the province (and its 
constituents) would suffer.  
One such strong bond between CM and CS was initiated when Nawaz Sharif 
became Punjab CM for the first time after the 1985 non-partisan elections under Zia-
ul-Haq. Anwar Zahid, in turn, became Chief Secretary in 1986.149 When Sharif was 
elected in the 1988 party-based elections, however, the circumstances had changed. 
Zia was dead and the PPP had won at the centre. Benazir Bhutto tried throughout her 
short-lived term to destabilise Nawaz’s government in Punjab. Therefore, Nawaz 
needed a Chief Secretary who would help him manage the provincial bureaucracy 
effectively and make the province an example of ‘good governance’ so that the hostile 
                                                 
148 As it did in the case of Javed Mahmood, see next chapter. 




federal government would see its opportunities to interfere reduced. Zahid and 
Sharif’s familiarity, arising out of prior work networks, created a strong bond of trust 
and reliance. Most importantly, the bond between the two parties meant that the CM 
believed Zahid had his (and his government’s) best interests at heart, so much so that 
Nawaz Sharif’s governance priorities were actually transformed by Zahid - a talented, 
legally appointed bureaucrat. The conventional understanding of politics in Punjab 
would dictate that someone in Nawaz’s situation use extra-legal bureaucratic 
appointments to dispense patronage to MPAs (and through them, party workers) to 
keep them loyal. However, Interviewee 7 (then a Deputy Commissioner) recalls that 
although many MPAs were unhappy with key bureaucrats, the officials would retain 
their posts. Though Nawaz needed every single MPA of his party to remain on his 
side due to the PPP’s attempts to poach them, Interviewee 7 maintains that CS Anwar 
Zahid convinced Nawaz that ‘good officers are assets and, if they are in the field, it 
brings a good name to the administration.’  
The significance of Zahid’s advice that the CM prioritise ‘good governance’ 
(via legal appointments) over short-term electoral concerns (via extra-legal 
appointments as a form of political patronage) is cemented by the fact that PM 
Benazir Bhutto tried to have Zahid removed from his post150 – once again suggesting 
strong pressures for extra-legal appointments. CM Nawaz Sharif, knowing that his 
political opponent was trying to destabilise his government, ordered the legally 
appointed Zahid (a federal PAS bureaucrat) to refuse to obey the orders of the federal 
government. In fact, Benazir Bhutto’s focus on Zahid, and the latter’s support of the 
CM in the face of the federation’s orders, only strengthened the bond (based on 
professional history) between Nawaz and his CS. Consequently, Nawaz’s government 
in Punjab weathered the storm, and it was the PPP’s government at the centre that fell 
in 1990. The subsequent election brought Nawaz to power both in Punjab and at the 
centre. Zahid went on to become Principal Secretary to PM Nawaz Sharif in 1990151 
(and, in 1997, after he had retired, Special Assistant to PM Nawaz Sharif152).  
                                                 
150 Sethi, N. Punjab Potpouri. July 20, 1995. Editorial, The Friday Times. Available at: 
<http://www.najamsethi.com/punjab-potpouri/> [Accessed 27 April 2017]. See also Chaudhry 2011 
151 PM appoints ‘friend’ to probe newsgate. 8 November 2016. Daily Times. Available at:  
<http://dailytimes.com.pk/islamabad/08-Nov-16/pm-appoints-friend-to-probe-newsgate> [Accessed 27 
April 2017].  
152 Nawaz inducts top bureaucrat instead of law minister. August 28, 2013. The News. Available at: 
<https://www.thenews.com.pk/archive/print/632675-nawaz-inducts-top-bureaucrat-instead-of-law-
minister> [Accessed 28 September 2016].  
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Legal appointments to senior posts such as that of CS are particularly critical 
in the wake of controversies involving the person of the CS himself. In appointing a 
new CS, the CM is looking to distance himself and his government from the 
controversy. The search for a new CM after CS Javed Mahmood’s car was involved 
in a hit-and-run accident that led to the death of a retired army officer is a recent 
example. After Javed Mahmood’s removal from the post of CS, the CM sought to 
appoint a bureaucrat with whom he not only had a prior relationship via work 
networks, but who was also uncontroversial153. His choice was Nasir Mehmood 
Khosa, a well-connected154 DMG/PAS officer. Khosa had been Deputy 
Commissioner Lahore between 1997 and 1999 when Shahbaz Sharif was CM, and 
this was likely the point when a strong professional bond based on mutual trust and 
reliance was formed. 
Khosa had a reputation for resisting pressure. Interviewee 9 (a PAS officer 
working in the S&GAD Punjab) notes that he ‘used to take a stand and not budge’. 
Not only was he, therefore, an acceptable appointee for the PPP’s PM Yousaf Raza 
Gilani, but also for CM Shahbaz Sharif who, in light of a PPP government at the 
centre (and a period of Governor Rule by the PPP’s Salman Taseer in 2009), was 
looking to run a tight ship where good governance was prioritised and political 
pressures (most of all from his own party’s MPAs) were side-lined. Khosa was legally 
appointed and remained CS for a full 3-year term till a caretaker government took 
over prior to the 2013 election, helping the CM manage ‘delivery’ in the province. 
The success of Khosa’s strong bond with the CM in terms of achieving ‘delivery’ 
outcomes was proven by the PMLN’s resounding success in Punjab during the 2013 
election (on a ‘development’ platform) despite challenges from the rising PTI.  
Though Khosa’s term as CS came to an end in 2013 when he was just four 
months short of retirement, Shahbaz Sharif suggested his name to Nawaz Sharif for 
the post of Principal Secretary to the PM, a post responsible for determining the 
appointment of All Pakistan Unified Grade bureaucrats (including the PAS, Police, 
                                                 
153 An article from 2014 quotes senior bureaucrats as saying that the main criterion for appointing a 
Chief Secretary is “‘A grade 22 DMG officer with good PR [public relations]’” – Lobbying for chief 
secretary slot starts. December 4, 2014. The Nation. Available at: <http://nation.com.pk/lahore/04-Dec-
2014/lobbying-for-chief-secretary-slot-starts> [Accessed 28 September 2016].  
154 One of his brothers was head of the FIA and the other a judge of the Supreme Court, Asif Khosa, 
the author of the dissenting judgement in the Panama Case judgement in April 2016. He belongs to the 
Khosa tribe – same as Zulfikar Khosa who was senior adviser to CM Shahbaz Sharif when Nasir 
Mehmood Khosa was serving as CS Punjab, and the PPP’s Latif Khosa. 
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and Secretariat Group). As the PMLN formed a new government in 2013, a 
bureaucratic reshuffle was initiated. These reshuffles are carried out by all new 
governments, placing provincial and federal bureaucrats perceived as sympathetic to 
the ruling party in positions of influence while (legally) transferring or (extra-legally) 
suspending those who were sympathetic to the previous government. With the PMLN 
replacing the PPP, it was Principal Secretary to the PM (i.e. Khosa) who was directly 
in charge of this bureaucratic reshuffle.155 Consequently, a number of bureaucrats 
who had previously worked with the PMLN (in Punjab or at the centre) returned to 
significant postings. Khosa retired in September 2013 and was appointed an executive 
director of the World Bank – a post much sought after by senior and retired 
bureaucrats. 
As Interviewee 20 (a retired PAS officer and former federal secretary) 
acknowledges, the CS post has become more accommodating of the needs of the CM 
over the years (compromising on extra-legal political interference). Interviewee 20 
called it ‘the debasement of the post of the Chief Secretary over the last 10-15 years’, 
stating that the CM’s office has taken on the role of the Chief Secretary’s office. He 
saw this development as something CS appointees have bought into. Though their 
appointments are legal, the relationship between the CM and CS has become 
symbiotic, and the case is no different in the relationship between the PM and his 
principal secretary. In effect, politicisation during the Shahbaz Sharif era has taken a 
particular form – limiting avenues for interference from MPAs and MNAs but 
centralising power in ways that allow the CM and his allies to ‘politicise’ legal 
bureaucratic appointments through strong bonds of work-related trust and reliance. 
This politicisation was enhanced after the PMLN’s success in the 2013 election. For 
one, the election results showed that the methods employed by the Punjab CM to 
‘deliver’ had worked and won the PMLN a major victory. These methods were 
therefore extended to the central government, just as they had been when the PMLN 
held both the centre and Punjab from 1997 to 1999. Second, the Establishment 
Division was now in the PMLN’s hands and any hurdles that may have been put in 
place to hinder the legal appointment of particular bureaucrats in particular posts 
while the PPP had been in charge were gone. Objections raised against the PMLN’s 
consolidating power in the hands of a select few bureaucrats were shrugged aside or 
                                                 




dismissed on the grounds that the government was acting in the ‘public interest’. As 
the ties between the PMLN’s leadership and the elite bureaucracy grew stronger, their 
dominance extended to Islamabad as well. 
In opposition to this model of trust-based appointments to the post of CS, 
however, there are also times when it has been necessary to appoint bureaucrats 
without particular loyalties to a ruling party or the CM, particularly when the desired 
outcome is visible ‘neutrality’ and a break from the way things were being run before. 
For example, when General Musharraf overthrew the PMLN government in 1999, he 
appointed military officers at various posts in the bureaucracy. Seeking to break the 
PMLN’s, and particularly the Sharif brothers’, hold over administrative matters, and 
cut the PAS down to size, Musharraf sought someone who did not have any close ties 
to the Sharifs for the post of Punjab CS. Hafeez Akhtar Randhawa was (legally) 
appointed in 1999. The fact that Randhawa had been made OSD when the PMLN 
took over in 1997156 suggested that he had no loyalty toward the party or the Sharif 
brothers, and this made him the ideal candidate to ‘clean up’ the party’s provincial 
stronghold on behalf of the martial law administrator. In this case, the bond between 
the patron and the bureaucrat was not formed through a work network. Still it was 
formed on the basis of the bureaucrat’s employment history with (and neutrality 
toward) the patron’s political opponents. Musharraf relied on Randhawa to ‘deliver’ 
bureaucratic management in Punjab without political interference from the remnants 
of the PMLN and its favoured bureaucrats in the province.157  
 
The Provincial Civil Secretariat  
One way of enhancing bureaucratic efficiency is to make legal appointments 
to key posts with regard to a specific project or initiative. Legally, appointments at 
this level are the decision of either the CM (usually on the advice of the CS) or the 
Secretary of the relevant department or authority.  
                                                 
156 Hanif, I. Punjab chief secretary refuses service extension. December 15, 2003. DAWN. Available 
at: <http://www.dawn.com/news/129603/punjab-chief-secretary-refuses-service-extension> [Accessed 
5 March 2016]. 
157 Randhawa fought to protect the structure of the DMG (now PAS) from the changes proposed by the 
National Reconstruction Bureau under Lt Gen Tanvir Naqvi, and his views were respected by then 
President Musharraf – Hanif, I. Punjab chief secretary refuses service extemsion. December 15, 2003. 
DAWN. Available at: <http://www.dawn.com/news/129603/punjab-chief-secretary-refuses-service-
extension> [Accessed 5 March 2016]. 
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The CM’s interest in a particular project or initiative frames the objective for 
making politicised appointments – the bureaucrat chosen for the post must (a) 
understand the aims of the project and agree with its methods and priorities, (b) 
deliver results despite multiple pressures (official, political, and otherwise), (c) 
motivate and guide junior bureaucrats in their work, (d) work efficiently with donors 
and other stakeholders, and (e) represent and protect the broader interests of the 
government (and particularly the CM) in his work.   
Impressing the CM means that the bureaucrat will be set up for choice 
postings for the rest of his career (unless he later crosses the CM). If he gains a 
reputation for being a good project manager, for example, he will continue to be 
posted to similar posts. These projects are often funded by international donors (for 
example, the Punjab Education Sector Reform Program, which I will discuss in more 
detail below), meaning not just a lucrative pay package but also the opportunity to 
work with donor organisations on future (even more lucrative) projects. However, the 
CM’s attention and donor involvement also brings with it a great deal of scrutiny from 
opposition parties, the media, and civil society groups. Therefore, bureaucrats 
appointed to ‘deliver’ these projects will invariably become part of the news story.  
The consequences of failure in high-profile initiatives are very real – the 
media will report on it in detail, the opposition will criticise not just the government’s 
failure but also question its overall ability to govern, accountability investigations and 
litigation may be initiated, and the rewards the initiative was meant to bring to voters 
will not materialise. Well aware of these realities, the CM and CS will be inclined to 
make a legal appointment to avoid their chosen bureaucrat being tainted by 
allegations of corrupt appointment practices. Not only does this matter in terms of 
donors, media, and opposition parties, but also for other, junior bureaucrats working 
under the legal appointee. The kind of intense pressure senior bureaucrats impose on 
juniors to deliver in high-profile projects is only viable if the former has the respect of 
his juniors. Otherwise, leaks to the media, lost documents, delays, and petty 
corruption will plague the project. Legal appointments of this kind do not preclude 
extra-legal or illegal behaviour in the implementation of the project. No project of any 
significance is free of scandal. In legally appointing a bureaucrat to head the project, 
however, the CM and Chief Secretary seek to dodge one key plank of potential 




CM Shahbaz Sharif and Reform in the Punjab School Education Department  
In 2011, CM Shahbaz Sharif launched a School Reforms Roadmap aimed at 
enrolling all children of school-going age and providing them with a quality 
education. The emphasis on education was the result of the introduction of Article 25 
to the Constitution of 1973 guaranteeing every citizen the right to a free education by 
the state, and the devolution of education to the provinces, both under the 18th 
Amendment (2010). All donor-funded programs for education in Punjab were brought 
under the Punjab Education Sector Reform Program (PESRP) which had originally 
been launched under CM Pervaiz Elahi’s government.  
The PESRP’s implementation in the School Education Department is an 
interesting case of how bureaucratic appointments play out. From the initiation of the 
reform program till May 2017158, the Punjab School Education Department had just 
two secretaries (an admirable achievement considering that some previous secretaries 
served for less than a year). Though both were appointed legally by the CM to 
enhance bureaucratic performance, the outcomes they were expected to deliver, 
though still within the category of bureaucratic efficiency, were quite different (and 
required different skills). These differing expectations were associated with strong but 
distinct bonds between each of these men and the CM. In one case, the bond’s 
strength was based on the professional skills and education-specific experience of the 
bureaucrat; in the other, the strength of the bond was based on the bureaucrat’s 
willingness to sideline local political actors and work closely with the CM Secretariat 
in past postings.  
When the Roadmap was being developed, the Secretary of the School 
Education Department was Mohammad Aslam Kamboh, appointed (legally) in 2010. 
He remained in office till June 2013, when Shahbaz Sharif returned to office for his 
third term as CM. Kamboh’s appointment as the department’s Secretary shows 
forethought on the part of the CM and the CS. They needed a stable presence in the 
department while the reform program was developed and launched, someone who had 
experience with donor-funded projects, an intimate understanding of how provincial 
school education functioned, and where the gaps were. The CM and CS were also 
                                                 
158 Malik, M. Two secretaries made OSDs, one transferred. 13 May 2017. DAWN. Available at: < 
https://www.dawn.com/news/1332824> [Accessed 6 June 2017].  
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aware that anything but the legal appointment of a capable bureaucrat would result in 
donor, media, and judicial scrutiny and result in the delay of a high-profile project. 
Originally a government school teacher, Kamboh took the CSS exam and joined the 
DMG/PAS. After a number of different postings in KP (then NWFP), he spent five 
years as Project Director for the donor-funded Girls Primary Education Project in 
Punjab (2000-2005), then three years as the Project Director for Canada Basic 
Education Project in Lahore. In 2008, he was appointed Programme Director of the 
Directorate of Staff Development in the School Education Department Punjab. Unlike 
the appointments to the post of CS discussed above, Kamboh had not worked with 
Shahbaz Sharif all that closely, having been posted mainly in KP.159 Therefore, the 
strong bond of trust and reliance formed between him, the CM and the CS (Nasir 
Mehmood Khosa) was different in comparison to the ones discussed above. It was 
based not on informal work networks, but solely on Kamboh’s formal work 
experience with the education system and with donors. In other words, Kamboh’s was 
the ideal bureaucratic appointment: a very rare thing indeed. 
By the time Kamboh’s term as Secretary came to an end, the Roadmap was 
well on its way. When I visited the department in 2014, bureaucrats at every level of 
the hierarchy spoke of the changes wrought in the rules and procedures of the 
department over the last couple of years. Most prominent were the changes in 
recruitment procedures for junior teaching staff, the introduction of a ban on teacher 
transfers during the school year, and the extensive monitoring carried out by the 
Programme Monitoring and Implementation Unit (PMIU). Evidently, Kamboh had 
achieved the bureaucratic efficiency outcome he had been set – developing and 
initiating the reform program.  
The career of the present secretary of the School Education Department 
presents an interesting contrast to that of Mr. Kamboh. Appointed in 2013, Abdul 
Jabbar Shaheen served an uninterrupted four-year term. Unlike Kamboh, Shaheen had 
no prior experience with the School Education Department or any donor organisation. 
Instead, he was very familiar to the CM through his various appointments in Punjab. 
Shaheen was Additional Director of the Anti-Corruption Establishment in Faisalabad 
in 2006 and then Additional Secretary S&GAD before being appointed DCO Kasur in 
2008 on the recommendation of CS Javed Mahmood. It was Shaheen’s year and a half 
                                                 
159 His posting as DCO Okara was when Elahi was CM. 
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as DCO Kasur that brought him to the CM’s attention (Interviewee 6, a PAS officer 
who had worked under Shaheen). Though he gained the trust of the CM by managing 
the district in difficult circumstances, the enemies he made amongst the junior 
politicians of the area – particularly PMLN politicians – resulted in his transfer in 
2009 (Interviewee 6).160  
Once upon a time, bureaucrats who were at the centre of such a fraught 
situation may have been made OSD or transferred to a low-profile post in one of the 
less relevant districts. But with his reputation for ‘following the rules’ (to the 
frustration of junior PMLN politicians), Shaheen’s next two postings were made – 
legally – to prominent posts in Lahore, proving the strength of his bond with the CM. 
His first posting was as Director General of the Lahore Parks and Horticulture 
Authority (PHA) in 2010. In 2011, the Lahore Development Authority, another 
significant organisation in terms of development work in Lahore, became embroiled 
in a corruption scandal that implicated its Director General. The incumbent was 
removed and additional charge of the post was given to Shaheen.161 He retained both 
posts till 2012 when he was appointed Commissioner Gujranwala.162 When Shahbaz 
Sharif took over as CM in 2013, Shaheen’s name was being considered for Lahore 
Commissioner. However, when it came to appointing a new Secretary for the School 
Education Department, Shahbaz Sharif needed a bureaucrat who could handle the 
pressure every Secretary of the department is subjected to over the appointment, 
transfer, and promotion of its thousands of employees (teachers, head teachers, 
administrative staff, peons, cleaners, guards, etc.). The CM knew that his MPAs and 
MNAs in Punjab would be looking to dispense patronage to their voters through 
government jobs in the education department. This would damage the reform program 
instituted (by Kamboh) during the PMLN’s previous term and signal to donors that 
the government was not serious about the Roadmap. It was therefore important to give 
the helm of the School Education Department to someone who would be able to resist 
junior politicians’ pressure. In addition, it was important that the new Secretary be 
someone who was willing to work closely with the CM Secretariat and acquiesce to 
                                                 
160 See below for more detail on Shaheen’s time as DCO Kasur. 
161 Note that Shaheen was the candidate chosen to stabilise the LDA after a scandal shook up the 
authority. 
162 Commissioners are the executive heads of divisions (smaller than a province, larger than a district), 
responsible for administration, development, revenue, local government matters, and delimitation 
within their division, and reports directly to the CM. 
135 
 
pressure from the CM. In this way, patronage dispensed through the education 
department could be controlled directly by the CM Secretariat.  
Shaheen was the ideal candidate for implementing the Roadmap in the 
particular political circumstances in Punjab. He had a strong informal bond with the 
CM and the Secretariat staff owing to his previous postings in Punjab. He was 
expected to ‘deliver’ by continuing to implement the Roadmap while shutting off all 
avenues of junior political interference in the department’s functioning other than 
those approved/sanctioned by the CM Secretariat. This much was evident not just 
from speaking to bureaucrats serving in the School Education Department as well as 
teachers and members of the Punjab Teachers’ Union, but also from observing the 
activity in the department’s offices. Invariably, bureaucrats would tell me that 
although detailed policies had been developed for the recruitment and transfer of 
junior staff in order to prevent recruitment and transfers via parchis and sifarish, 
orders from the CM Secretariat or the Secretary were often used to bypass them.163 
Meanwhile, MPAs and MNAs outside the CM’s inner circle were frustrated by their 
inability to influence even the appointment of a teacher in their constituency. They 
told me that the Secretary simply would not listen, and the CM never had time to meet 
them. The result is a department that is now run with a degree of efficiency, but is 
subject to the whims of the Secretary and the CM’s office.  
 
Senior District Appointments  
Perhaps even more critical than departmental appointments in Lahore are 
appointments to the post of District Coordination Officer (DCO). The district is the 
main administrative unit in the province, headed by a DCO, with each district 
containing a variable number of constituencies.  
Iyer and Mani (2012) found that where politicians at the district level are from 
the same party as the CM of the state, bureaucratic transfers at the district level are 
less likely. What this suggests is that for the CM, a loyal local politician is just as 
useful as a loyal district bureaucrat (Iyer and Mani 2012, 4). In Punjab, however, I 
found the converse to be true – without a loyal district bureaucrat, a loyal junior 
politician was hamstrung. For that reason, the CM’s bonds with and reliance on 
                                                 
163 Typically, through CM Directives or a sifarish that is made directly to the Secretary rather than to 
the official actually in charge of making the appointment in question.  
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bureaucrats are often more important than with politicians from his own party (even 
in districts where constituencies were won by his own party).164  
The appointment of DCOs (and departmental secretaries) – posts that are 
almost exclusively the domain of the PAS – are legally the responsibility of the CM. 
Though he may consult some of his close allies in his party or take their advice 
regarding bureaucratic appointments in their districts, he will rarely bypass the 
bureaucrat to deal solely with the politician on the day-to-day management of the 
district (or department). Instead, the bureaucrat will typically maintain close ties 
directly with the CM Secretariat, keeping the CM and CS posted on all aspects of his 
district’s performance.  
While the CM will of course have his own preferences and ideas, however, the 
CS can play a crucial role in DCO appointments. Beyond shortlisting interviewed 
candidates, he can cherry pick bureaucrats to serve in significant posts. Well aware of 
these realities, PAS bureaucrats maintain close ties with key figures such as the CS 
and the Secretary Services in a province, and with senior bureaucrats within their 
cadre, to ensure that they can access vacant posts of their choice. Often belonging to 
well-connected families, kinship ties may come in handy for individual PAS officers, 
but it is the socialisation they receive during their specialised bureaucratic training 
that forms the basis of their networks. PAS officers are taught to look out for the 
interests of fellow cadre members. PAS officers occupying senior posts such as CS, 
DCO, or departmental Secretary are regarded as father figures by those junior to 
them. Junior PAS officers are careful to cultivate informal ties to their seniors, 
particularly because it is through these informal relationships that they develop ties 
with senior politicians as well. Especially when the PMLN has held the centre and 
Punjab, favoured PAS bureaucrats in the PM Office, Establishment Division, and CM 
Secretariat are able to assist their colleagues far more than if the centre is held by a 
different party.165 Strong bonds, rooted in work networks and related 
                                                 
164 That said, Iyer and Mani’s original finding that there are fewer bureaucratic transfers in districts 
where ruling party politicians have won seats may well be true of Punjab, Pakistan as well. This is not 
because the CM does not rely on bureaucrats in these districts, but because the initial appointment of 
bureaucrats is either made in consultation with closely allied politicians or is non-negotiable by 
politicians lacking close ties with the CM. 
165 While the PPP was in power at the centre, it was only able to assist with appointments at the centre 
and in Sindh. Since they often made these appointments in pursuit of personal outcomes that brought 
them the wrong kind of attention from the media, opposition parties, and the courts, junior colleagues 
looked elsewhere for peer mentors. When the PPP was in power in Sindh alone, prospects for 
mentorship and assistance with appointments from bureaucrats favoured by them were bleak – the only 
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recommendations are evidenced by their career trajectories and their success in 
achieving set targets (with support from the CM Secretariat) in the face of local 
political opposition.  
In Kasur, a poorly developed district neighbouring Lahore that is home to a 
number of political heavyweights (former foreign ministers Khurshid Mehmood 
Kasuri and Sardar Assef Ahmed Ali, for example), a new DCO had to be appointed 
when the PMLN provincial government took over in 2008.  The CM wanted to 
appoint a DCO who would be able to limit various demands, particularly from PMLN 
legislators, without compromising on the bureaucratic efficiency of the district. Just as 
the Sharif brothers recommend bureaucrats to each other, PAS bureaucrats do too. 
Each recommendation is the result of a bond formed between two bureaucrats who 
have trained or worked together and come to trust and rely on each other. The officer 
making the recommendation considers the other bureaucrat to be ‘sound’, to have the 
right motivations, values, and beliefs. In the search for an officer to appoint as DCO 
Kasur, the CS recommended a familiar officer he had worked closely with in the 
S&GAD - Abdul Jabbar Shaheen (then an Additional Secretary).166 Their work ties 
became the basis of a strong bond of mentorship which was exemplified by the close 
contact Shaheen maintained with the CM Secretariat for support and guidance in the 
face of political pressures throughout his tenure as DCO Kasur. He would refuse to 
listen to demands made by junior politicians and would, instead, directly call up the 
CS to report the politicians. At the time, Shahbaz Sharif’s priority was governance. 
Shaheen’s attitude toward the demands made by junior politicians was exactly what 
the CM was looking for.  
Two incidents highlight the nature of the bond Shaheen had with the CM and 
his CS. The first involved the Prisons Minister (and former CM) Dost Muhammad 
Khosa.167 The Daily Times168 reports: ‘"The Kasur DCO phoned the chief secretary 
                                                                                                                                            
really attractive posts they could offer were in Karachi and even those would typically require the 
consent of the MQM. The PMLQ’s time in power (2002-2007) was marked by discontent amongst the 
elite bureaucracy – they resented the induction of military officers into the bureaucracy and being 
placed under the nazims under Musharraf’s local government system. This discontent brought the elite 
bureaucracy together during this time, strengthening bonds of mentorship and support within the PAS 
cadre. 
166 Shaheen is also discussed above with regard to his posting as Secretary School Education 
167 Son of adviser to CM Shahbaz Sharif, Zulfikar Khosa. He served briefly as CM Punjab in 2008. 
168 DCOs directed not to succumb to political pressure. 12 June 2008. Daily Times. Available at: 
<http://archives.dailytimes.com.pk/national/12-Jun-2008/dcos-directed-not-to-succumb-to-political-
pressure> [Accessed 10 September 2015]. 
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and informed him about the embarrassing situation, over which the secretary 'toned 
down' the Prisons minister on the phone, after which the minister 'apologised' to the 
DCO for his attitude," they (sources) said.’ In other words, Shaheen’s close ties to the 
CS and, through him, the CM, helped him ‘manage’ even a senior politician like 
Khosa.  
In the second incident, in 2009, DCO Shaheen became involved in a row with 
a PMLN MNA over encroachments, dividing the district into a pro-DCO camp (PPP, 
PMLQ workers) and an anti-DCO camp (the MNA and traders who owned the 
encroaching shops). It was some time before the CM Secretariat stepped in to transfer 
Shaheen out, despite the charged atmosphere. It seemed that the CM office was 
willing to compromise on electoral politics to advance the development of the district, 
perhaps suggesting a belief (at least in this case) in long-term electoral returns from 
development activity. In late 2009, the CM Secretariat gave Shaheen a dignified exit 
by sending him for a training course rather than merely transferring him. He went on 
to hold senior posts in Lahore.  
The incidents recounted above, and Shaheen’s career trajectory after his time 
as DCO Kasur, speak to the strength of the bond that Shaheen had with the CM and 
CS. Their trust in Shaheen was such that they were willing to back him over the ruling 
party’s own politicians, on the understanding that he would deliver what they asked of 
him (regarding ‘development’ and the bureaucratic efficiency required to deliver it), 
which he did. Kasur benefitted from Shaheen’s tenure as DCO – when he was 
transferred, the community demanded his return as DCO.169  
In the case discussed above, and in other cases of DCO appointments, legally 
appointed bureaucrats are expected to ‘deliver’. What is to be delivered can be 
specific – initiate development work in a district – or more general – enforce existing 
rules in the face of pressure. Regardless, both the patron bureaucrat (the CS or the 
Secretary Services) and the legally appointed bureaucrat are aware that performing 
the required tasks, ‘delivering’, will have consequences and will produce backlash. A 
strong bond between the two parties allows the bureaucrat to be secure in the 
knowledge that, though local politicians will complain about her to the CM and to the 
CS, she will be protected (at least in part by her ‘legal’ status). Where the pressure 
from politicians reaches critical mass (‘Either he goes or I go’ situation, as per 
                                                 
169 Power players playing on project funds. 18 December, 2009. DAWN. Available at: 
<https://www.dawn.com/news/894636> [Accessed 31 May 2017].  
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Interviewee 30), the bureaucrat knows that the CS and CM will not let her be the loser 
for it – she will get an equally good or better posting if she has to be transferred under 
pressure. This dynamic also tells us something about the way the PMLN conducted 
itself in Punjab while the PPP was leading a fragile coalition government at the centre 
– it sought to establish itself as the party that would ‘deliver’ to voters by subsuming 
political interests, in sharp contrast to the ‘corrupt’, hamstrung, and beleaguered PPP. 
 
Departmental Employees  
Just like the CS, departmental secretaries are often called upon by politicians 
or other influentials to appoint particular people in particular posts since they are the 
appointing or approving authority for most (mid-tier) department employees. 
However, when the secretary’s priority is to advance the work of the department, 
legal appointments are often preferred.  
When a bureaucrat takes over as Secretary of a department, he will often want 
to assemble his own team around him, just as politicians do when they form a new 
government. For instance, when Abdul Jabbar Shaheen became Secretary School 
Education, he asked a junior bureaucrat from the Provincial Management Service 
(PMS) – one who had worked with him while he was in the S&GAD – to join his 
team, appointing him a Deputy Secretary in the School Education department.170 
Having worked together previously, the two had a relationship of mentorship and 
mutual trust. The PMS officer knew that as long as he met the expectations of the 
Secretary, he would have a stable posting in Lahore, protected by the Secretary in the 
face of complaints by politicians and bureaucrats alike (while progressing further up 
the bureaucratic hierarchy on the PAS officer’s coat tails). Senior appointments not 
supported by such strong informal bonds are, as noted above, extremely rare. 
When observing the Deputy Secretary in his office on multiple occasions, I 
realized that he acted almost as the assistant to the Secretary when it came to handling 
sifarish for teacher appointments – he vetted them before taking them to the Secretary 
and handled the paperwork for sifarish that had been approved. This enterprise, which 
I observed in the Deputy Secretary’s office (and the wary but accepting attitude of 
other senior and junior bureaucrats), points not only to the bond that existed between 
                                                 
170 Such mentorship is common amongst bureaucrats across cadre lines but is much less consistent as 
compared to the PAS’ internal network. 
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the Secretary and his mentee, but also to the growing centralisation of patronage and 
bureaucratic discretion.  
The Deputy Secretary’s office was a small square room. Chairs lined the walls 
on three sides and the fourth was taken by a large desk. No sunlight entered the room 
so it was lit at all hours of the day by a fluorescent tube light. Unlike the Secretary, 
the Deputy Secretary’s office seemed to have a revolving door – there were constantly 
people coming in with requests of various kinds. The door was never closed; no one 
was stopped from walking in. However, I noticed that he differentiated between the 
sifarish that crossed his desk. Though he was always unfailingly polite, some of the 
parchis were crumpled up and tossed under his desk, while some were added to a pile 
on his desk. A third category was a more sophisticated parchi, a full page, often letter 
headed, rather than the usual small square of paper. It was this third category that got 
the most attention and was most likely to be fulfilled. The ones that were tossed away 
were never even going to be acknowledged, while the small parchis that had been 
saved must be acknowledged even if later rejected. Establishing this hierarchy of 
discretion, implemented by legally appointed bureaucrats enjoying strong work-based 
bonds, allows bureaucrats and departments to ‘deliver’ higher levels of bureaucratic 
efficiency while still ensuring that the ‘right kind’ of (highly centralised) sifarish – for 
instance, from a well-connected politician, mandated by the CM office and conveyed 
via the department secretary – is catered to.  
Secretaries can also deliberately make legal but problematic appointments to 
stymie departmental initiatives they do not entirely support. An instructive example is 
provided by appointments made to the (three) posts of General Manager (GM) in the 
Punjab Irrigation and Drainage Authority (PIDA), appointed by the Managing 
Director of the Authority – the Secretary Irrigation. When the Authority was formed 
in 1997, the Secretary Irrigation Suleman Ghani genuinely believed in the model the 
authority follows – devolving control of irrigation water to farmers’ organisations at 
the local level. Therefore, he legally appointed General Managers who were likely to 
aid in forwarding the Authority’s program. However, since 2008, PIDA’s work has 
come to a virtual standstill. Employees (Interviews 68, 69, and 70) believe this is 
largely because the last few Secretaries do not believe in the PIDA model and are 
looking for ways to dissolve the Authority (and the farmers’ organisations it set up). 
In the meantime, they try to limit the Authority’s efficacy by legally appointing GMs 
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who are just a few months from retirement. These appointees have no motivation to 
understand the work PIDA does or push it forward. Instead, they are parked in the 
Authority till retirement. Both the Secretary and the bureaucrat are well aware that the 
appointment is designed to prevent the Authority from functioning properly, and 
therefore, they could be considered to have a strong bond based not just on familiarity 
through work networks, but on an exchange. The Secretary relies on the bureaucrat to 
do nothing, and the bureaucrat relies on the Secretary to sign his retirement paperwork 
promptly so he can get his pension.  
 
Electoral Gain 
Electoral gain is conventionally taken to mean gaining votes for an election (or 
money for campaigning purposes). The use of state resources to do so makes it an 
illegal act. However, the outcome sought need not involve overtly illegal acts. In fact, 
Taylor (2004, 215) and Hopkin (2006) both note that, despite a politician’s charisma 
and the exchange of ‘votes-for-goods’, she may find it difficult to form sustainable 
ties with the citizenry on her own. Here, electoral gain in perhaps its most basic form 
involves making politicised appointments to key posts throughout the electoral term 
to gain ‘access’ to voters via key bureaucratic actors.  
Where a bureaucrat is appointed legally with the patron expending no 
significant effort to get him the post, however, the bond between patron and appointee 
is diffuse. As such, legal appointments are not the most effective way to achieve 
electoral benefits. In fact, legally appointed bureaucrats face very weak incentives to 
go out of their way to support their patrons in achieving electoral benefits because the 
patron has very little leverage. The following examples will illustrate this dilemma. 
 
Manzoor Wattoo in Punjab  
Unlike the PMLN’s experience in subsequent years, when Benazir Bhutto 
cobbled together a fragile coalition to form governments in the centre and in Punjab in 
1993, key bureaucratic posts in the province became the centre of a battle to gain or 
retain an electoral foothold. In order to win, Benazir Bhutto had to gain the 
cooperation of a number of key players in the province, including Manzoor Wattoo 
and Hamid Nasir Chattha (both members of the PML-Junejo party).  
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Wattoo had been a crucial actor in the fall of Nawaz Sharif’s government in 
1993. He took over as CM by displacing Ghulam Haider Wyne (right after the Sharif 
government was reinstated by the Supreme Court) and, then, he dissolved the Punjab 
government. When Bhutto formed her government in 1993, Wattoo returned as CM 
Punjab. Though technically the PPP was in power at the centre and in Punjab, PM 
Benazir Bhutto saw Wattoo’s Punjab as a threat to her fragile government. Bhutto 
tried to assert herself by appointing PPP MNA Faisal Saleh Hayat as advisor to 
Wattoo. In his new position, Hayat insisted on appointing bureaucrats of his choice to 
the post of Secretary in the S&GAD and Home departments, but he made the mistake 
of allowing Wattoo to choose the CS (Javed Qureshi) and the Finance Secretary, the 
two most significant posts in the provincial bureaucracy. As a result, Hayat’s 
appointments to the S&GAD and Home Departments were hamstrung and Wattoo 
was able to veto any moves on his part.171  
Wattoo’s choice of bureaucrats for the posts of CS and, after Hayat’s 
departure, the Secretaries of the S&GAD and Home departments, were legal. Had 
they not been, the PM could easily have overturned his selection. However, his 
objective in appointing these officers was not bureaucratic efficiency. Instead, Wattoo 
was looking to cement his own electoral position by setting himself up in opposition 
to Benazir Bhutto. His bonds with the bureaucrats he appointed were based on their 
attitudes towards his political opponents. The PAS did not appreciate Bhutto’s 
attempts to control them through political appointees like Faisal Saleh Hayat. 
To some extent the bonds Wattoo established with bureaucrats in Punjab 
‘delivered’ in an electoral sense – Wattoo remained in power from 1993 to 1995. 
However, the problem was that his objective of cementing his political position was 
never shared by the PAS bureaucrats. These men knew that, even if Wattoo was their 
current patron, they were finally responsible to the (federal) Establishment Division 
(controlled by Bhutto’s PPP), meaning that Wattoo had limited leverage over the 
bureaucrats he had legally appointed. Again, his bonds with them were weak, and he 
had underestimated their ties to the federal Establishment Division. Amidst 
considerable confusion, bureaucrats wondered ‘whose orders to follow’ (Wattoo’s or 
the PM’s representatives’ – Hayat and later Makhdoom Altaf), and fought off 
                                                 
171 As Najam Sethi puts it, Wattoo ‘was bound to emerge as the chief power-broker in the province’. 
Sethi, N. Punjab Potpouri. July 20, 1995. Editorial, The Friday Times. Available at: 
<http://www.najamsethi.com/punjab-potpouri/> [Accessed 28 September 2016]. 
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instability by seeking out patrons in a stronger position than Wattoo. Wattoo’s bond 
with the bureaucrats he appointed was diffuse and the outcome he had expected from 
them was never ‘delivered’. In September 1995, Wattoo was ousted by a vote in the 
Punjab Assembly amidst accusations of corruption. 
 
The Chief Secretary with Political Aspirations  
Geddes (1994, 13) claims that in addition to re-election, politicians are also 
seeking power within their own party. This is certainly true for Pakistani politicians, 
where the creation of factions and forward blocs within parties is common. However, 
the following example shows how bureaucrats seek power within parties to which 
they are loyal. It is difficult to locate publicly verifiable cases of bureaucrats making 
appointments for the purpose of acquiring electoral gains. The case recounted below 
is a rare one involving a senior bureaucrat using his position to make a legal 
appointment to forward his own electoral ambitions.   
Earlier in this chapter, I mentioned the legal appointment of Abdul Jabbar 
Shaheen as DCO Kasur in 2008. As I explained, in part this appointment was made 
because he was thought to be an officer who could handle the multiple demands that 
would be made on him in a politically charged district where political interference 
was high. However, there were other ulterior motives to the CS’s recommendation of 
Shaheen for this post. CS Javed Mahmood was himself from Kasur and was very 
aware of the underdevelopment of the district. Having worked with Shaheen before, 
when the latter was Additional Secretary Administration in the S&GAD, Mahmood 
was familiar with Shaheen and his work. Therefore, he appointed Shaheen legally and 
entrusted him with the responsibility of developing Kasur.  
During Shaheen’s tenure, Kasur saw a massive influx of development funds. 
The reason for the CS’s focus on his own village, Roshan Bhela, and the district in 
general, were his electoral ambitions. In 2009, DAWN172 reported: 
Local political analysts believe that the chief secretary or somebody from his family would 
contest election from the area under the PML-N banner and that is why the top official is so 
much concerned about development of his area. 
                                                 
172 Power players playing on project funds. December 18, 2009. DAWN. Available at: 
<http://nation.com.pk/national/24-Feb-2016/sole-kasur-park-falls-victim-to-official-apathy> [Accessed 
26 November 2016] and Mehar, M. A. Sole Kasur park falls victim to official apathy. February 24, 
2016. The Nation. Available at: <http://www.dawn.com/news/894636/power-players-playing-on-




However, though Shaheen and the CS had formed a relationship based on 
work ties that ‘delivered’ when it came to resisting political pressure, it did not do so 
in aiding the CS’s political ambitions for a number of reasons. For one, the DCO’s 
diligence and the ease with which he was pumping money into just one district caught 
the attention of local media. Though this may not have been enough to damage 
Mahmood’s electoral prospects, it was enough to raise a series of questions, 
particularly amongst the political incumbent and other aspirants to the seat.  
More crucially, Shaheen’s relationship with the CS paled in comparison as the 
CM emerged as a credible alternative patron. Though recommended for the job by the 
CS, it was with the CM that Shaheen developed a working relationship of trust in 
ensuring development ‘delivery’ (in the face of political pressure). Therefore, despite 
having worked closely together in the past, Shaheen had little incentive to aid the CS 
in advancing the CS’s personal political objectives in Kasur. Over time, Shaheen’s 
clashes with PMLN representatives in Kasur escalated to the point where he had to be 
transferred out. His next posting was a step up - the head of an authority in Lahore – 
and Shaheen has since continued to work closely with the CM.  
Though Kasur certainly gained in terms of development spending, the CS’s 
objective of making himself or his family members electable was not achieved. In 
fact, Shaheen’s refusal to bow to political pressure by PMLN representatives caused 
the CS’s prospects harm. The CM did not publicly comment on Shaheen’s activities, 
leaving the CS to bear the brunt of criticism for Shaheen’s aggressive bureaucratic 
behaviour with politicians. The CS’s perceived close connection to the DCO 
endangered his or his relatives’ hopes of getting a PMLN ticket since party workers in 
the district would never support him. As it happened, CS Javed Mahmood never got a 
chance to test his electoral cache. In 2010, Mr Mahmood’s car hit and killed a retired 
army officer. The scandal forced him out of the CS’s office and he remained OSD for 
a year, his political plans derailed. 
 
Personal Enrichment and Protection 
Legal appointments are rarely employed when the patron’s desired outcome is 
to enrich himself and his family or protect himself from prosecution. Since both 
outcomes would generally require operating outside, or at least tangential to, the law, 
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a legally appointed bureaucrat is unlikely to want to indulge in such practices. Though 
such a bureaucrat may have an understanding with the patron, he is under no 
compulsion to operate in anything but a legal fashion, unlike a bureaucrat appointed 
through bending or breaking the law who has something to hide and has a 
transactional relationship with a patron. It is, however, possible to find some 
examples of legal appointments made to protect patrons from prosecution, usually for 
corruption. It is intriguing to note that these appointments tend not to fully achieve the 
outcomes desired by the patron, other than providing some temporary relief.  
 
The Bank of Punjab Scandal  
Many bureaucrats claimed that the PMLQ government in Punjab under CM 
Chaudhry Pervaiz Elahi (and General Musharraf) was inefficient with no real interest 
in development. However, a few bureaucrats claimed the opposite – Elahi was deeply 
concerned about improving Punjab and delegated authority to senior (PAS) 
bureaucrats to make critical decisions on development works. The truth is likely a 
mixture of these two claims. While Elahi did delegate to senior bureaucrats, he 
expected them not only to improve bureaucratic efficiency but to make his personal 
enrichment possible. The Bank of Punjab is a case (one of many) of such delegation 
of power to senior bureaucrats. The Bank of Punjab scandal, which centres on 
millions of rupees granted in fraudulent loans, serves as an example of both personal 
enrichment and protection as the outcome legally appointed bureaucrats were 
expected to deliver for CM Elahi.  
When the Bank of Punjab first began approving non-performing loans, the 
bank’s chairman was CS Kamran Rasool. Rasool’s professional ties to the Chaudhries 
of Gujrat were no secret - he took two years’ leave during the period of military rule 
under Musharraf and worked at one of Chaudhry Pervaiz Elahi’s business concerns.173 
When the 2002 elections were held, and Elahi became CM, Rasool returned to the 
civil service and was legally appointed as CS Punjab and Chairman of the Bank of 
Punjab (when the incumbent retired in 2003).  
                                                 
173 New chief secretary assumes charge. December 27, 2003. DAWN. Available at: 




However, when the investigation into the Bank of Punjab scandal began, it 
became evident that Elahi and Rasool’s work ties were based on a strong bond that 
could enrich themselves while in office. The investigation revealed that it was Rasool 
who had appointed Hamesh Khan, a man he met while working at Elahi’s factory, as 
Managing Director of the Bank of Punjab.174 Not only did Rasool appoint Hamesh 
Khan in the face of resistance from the State Bank of Pakistan175, the rules of the BoP 
were then amended to designate Khan as President and COO of the bank, centralising 
power in his hands. Hamesh Khan went on to approve non-performing loans adding 
up to roughly Rs 76.178 billion.176  
The process by which Hamesh Khan became the most powerful person in the 
Bank of Punjab, and his activities during his time there, suggest that CS Rasool and 
CM Elahi were complicit in activities designed to enrich themselves and their cronies. 
In one case, Fareed Mughees Sheikh, the head of a business organisation known as 
the Colony Group, was appointed as a member of the board of directors by CM 
Elahi.177 During Sheikh’s tenure, the Colony Group was given Rs 5.492 billion in 
credit facilities by the BoP. According to an investigative report instituted by a 
Supreme Court commission in 2011, much of this money was then used to acquire the 
Phalia Sugar Mills, which belonged to the family of CM Elahi.178 Since no action was 
taken at the time, it would be reasonable to assume that Hamesh Khan approved these 
loans with at least the knowledge of CS and bank chairman Rasool, and, through that 
channel, the acquiescence (and benefit) of the CM.  
The bond between Rasool and the CM ‘delivered’ on personal enrichment for 
some time. However, illegal activity (even when carried out by a legal appointee) is 
fraught with risk. In 2005, CS Rasool was implicated in a controversy over a contract 
                                                 
174 Manzoor, U. The catalyst of the PPP deal with Q-League. May 1, 2011. Geo News Online. 
Available at: <http://www.geo.tv/latest/22363-the-catalyst-of-the-ppp-deal-with-q-league> [Accessed 
17 October 2015]. 
175 Spotlight on Elahi in Rs 9b BoP loan scam. January 11, 2012. The Express Tribune. Available at: 
<http://tribune.com.pk/story/319575/spotlight-on-elahi-in-rs9b-bop-loan-scam/> [Accessed 17 October 
2015]. 
176 Manzoor, U. The catalyst of the PPP deal with Q-League. May 1, 2011. Geo News Online. 
Available at: <http://www.geo.tv/latest/22363-the-catalyst-of-the-ppp-deal-with-q-league> [Accessed 
17 October 2015]. 
177 Over Rs 17bn more loans revealed by Hamesh Khan. May 26, 2010. The News. Available at: 
<https://www.thenews.com.pk/archive/print/671358-over-rs-17bn-more-loans-revealed-by-hamesh-
khan> [Accessed 17 October 2015]. 
178 Hamesh seeks pardon to reveal all secrets. June 18, 2010. The News. Available at: 
<https://www.thenews.com.pk/archive/print/671799-hamesh-seeks-pardon-to-reveal-all-secrets> 
[Accessed 17 October 2015]. 
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with a Malaysian firm and lost his post as CS and Chairman BoP to CS Salman 
Siddique and a chairman from the private sector, Shahzad Malik.179 In October 2007, 
however, Malik was swiftly replaced as BoP Chairman – the media reported a 
massive scam in the dealings of the BoP180 and Malik had been pushing for an 
investigation into allegations of loan fraud.181 For his troubles, he received a letter 
from the CM Secretariat, signed by the CM’s Principal Secretary, dismissing him182 – 
evidence that the CM Secretariat had a personal stake in covering up illegal activity in 
the Bank of Punjab. Malik was replaced by CS Salman Siddique.  
Having served in various senior positions (including Finance Secretary), 
Siddique had developed a close working relationship with CM Elahi. Furthermore, as 
a director of the BoP prior to his elevation as Chairman, he was familiar with the 
activities of the bank. In addition to an understanding with the CM (to protect him 
from the fall out of the BoP’s fraudulent loans), Siddique had a personal interest in 
ensuring that the bank’s dealings were not investigated – his father had been given a 
loan by the bank while he was a director of the bank. This was in violation of the 
bank’s own regulations, which stated that the relatives of directors were not eligible 
for loans.183 By March 2008, Siddique had rescheduled all the loans that Shahzad 
Malik had flagged as fraudulent and deserving of investigation.  
Again, the bond between Siddique and the CM worked for a time - protecting 
the CM from the fallout of his murky dealings with the BoP. However, after fresh 
elections in April 2008, the new PMLN government dismissed Siddique and the 
                                                 
179 Salman made Punjab chief secretary. October 5, 2005. DAWN. Available at: 
<http://www.dawn.com/news/159693/salman-made-punjab-chief-secretary> [Accessed 17 October 
2015]. 
180 Massive scandal to hit Bank of Punjab. June 21, 2007. The News. Available at: 
<https://www.thenews.com.pk/archive/print/651006-massive-scandal-to-hit-bank-of-punjab> 
[Accessed 17 October 2015]. 
181 Ex-BoP chairman jumps in with solid evidence. May 28, 2010. The News. Available at: 
<https://www.thenews.com.pk/archive/print/671409-ex-bop-chairman-jumps-in-with-solid-evidence> 
[Accessed 17 October 2015].  
182 Ibid. 
183 As Hamesh sings in jail, top Baboo becomes first casualty. May 24, 2010. The News. Available at: 
<https://www.thenews.com.pk/archive/print/671308-as-hamesh-sings-in-jail,-top-baboo-becomes-first-
casualty> [Accessed 17 October 2015]. 
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directors of the BoP, alleging massive irregularities in the bank’s business.184 The 
investigation that Siddique had succeeded in delaying finally took place.185 
 
Politicians and Bureaucrats Lacking Access to the Centre 
Bureaucratic Efficiency 
Politicians and bureaucrats who lack access to the centre of power in Lahore 
have a very different experience of attempting to achieve bureaucratic efficiency 
outcomes when compared to those in or close to the CM’s kitchen cabinet. Whereas 
those at the centre can achieve a great deal in terms of project implementation through 
the legal appointment of bureaucrats to key posts, bureaucrats in the lower tiers of the 




The centralisation of discretion in the CM Secretariat has meant that local 
politicians feel increasingly alienated from the heart of the ruling party. During my 
fieldwork, this sentiment was echoed by Punjab MNAs and MPAs from the ruling 
party (Interviews 59, 61, 78, 81, 82, 83, 90, 93, 106, 138, 139, and 140) and reiterated 
by opposition party members (Interviews 24, 25, 46, 48, 60, 79, 80, and 109): the 
PMLN operates not through party workers and members, but through bureaucrats, I 
was told. These ties between politicians and bureaucrats only expanded after the 2013 
                                                 
184 BoP takes a turn for the better. July 10, 2008. The News. Available at: 
<https://www.thenews.com.pk/archive/print/658246-bop-takes-a-turn-for-the-better> [Accessed 17 
October 2015]. 
185 In 2011, a commission formed by the Supreme Court alleged that the board of directors appointed 
by then CM Elahi had used their position to have credit facilities and loans approved for themselves, 
their families, or their businesses. (FBR chief figures in scam report. April 8, 2011. DAWN. Available 
at: <http://www.dawn.com/news/619207/fbr-chief-figures-in-scam-report> [Accessed 17 October 
2015] and Javed, A. 40 senior BoP officers sacked. May 8, 2008. The Nation. Available at: 
<http://nation.com.pk/politics/08-May-2008/40-senior-BoP-officers-sacked> [Accessed 17 October 
2015].) But the report absolves the CM, Siddique, and others of any criminal activity, pinning the 
blame on Hamesh Khan and those who had engaged in defrauding the bank.  
However, since the 2013 election which the PMLN won, NAB and the FIA (FIA initiates probe against 
Chaudhrys for bank fraud. August 8, 2014. The News. Available at: 
<https://www.thenews.com.pk/archive/print/639643-fia-initiates-probe-against-chaudhrys-for-bank-
fraud> [Accessed 17 October 2015]) once again expressed their intent to investigate Elahi’s role in the 
BoP scam. In other words, despite attempts to use work networks to form bonds with bureaucrats to 
enrich himself, and then protect him from discovery and prosecution for that enrichment, Pervaiz Elahi 
has only been temporarily successful in achieving his objectives. He has still not been able to entirely 
shrug off allegations of involvement in the BoP scam. 
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election – when the PMLN was in control of both the centre and Punjab, and seeking 
to cement its position for the future. The ‘delivery’ demanded of bureaucrats by both 
PM Nawaz Sharif and CM Shahbaz Sharif, and the timelines set for it, were only 
achievable through the placement of select bureaucrats to key posts – both at the 
centre and in Punjab. Not only lines of authority, but lines of communication also ran 
through these bureaucrats. The consequence of such tactics by the PMLN leadership 
is that local politicians are sidelined even when they are attempting to improve 
bureaucratic efficiency. For instance, a PMLN MPA from Gujranwala (Interview 106) 
told me that water theft is a big issue amongst his voters. He claimed that it was 
usually carried out by officials of the Irrigation Department, and that he had tried to 
have the corrupt officials removed and more honest ones appointed by speaking to 
local Irrigation Department officials, Special Branch, DCO, the Secretary Irrigation, 
and the CM office.  However, he had absolutely no success. As a parliamentarian who 
is new to the party and a first-time election winner, the MPA lacks the (historical) 
networks (and thus, strong bonds) within both the PMLN and the bureaucracy that 
would allow him to influence appointments to ‘deliver’ improved bureaucratic 
performance.  
The classic case of a politician lacking access but seeking bureaucratic 
efficiency is an opposition party member. Opposition party politicians who win MPA 
seats face a political and administrative machinery that is calibrated to serve the ruling 
party (only). A PTI MNA from Lahore (Interview 24) was visibly frustrated as he told 
me that, although bureaucrats from departments such as WAPDA or the Town 
Municipal Authorities (TMA) were invariably polite, they were of little practical help 
when it came to issues faced by the politician’s constituents. As a result, efforts by 
opposition party politicians to improve bureaucratic efficiency are often stymied 
either due to bureaucratic disinterest or due to direct intervention from the ruling party 
leadership. For instance, Liaquat Baloch of the JI was elected in Lahore during the 
early 1990s and wanted Interviewee 8 (a now retired member of the School Education 
Department) to lead a pilot school funded by donors in his constituency. Interview 8 
had a reputation for honesty and efficiency, and Baloch knew he would run the school 
well and keep the donors happy (potentially bringing more donor money to the 
constituency). Baloch therefore lobbied for Interviewee 8’s legal transfer to the post 
of principal of the pilot school. However, Baloch ran into problems when he came up 
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against Shahbaz Sharif (then an MNA), who wanted to give the post to a supporter 
who had once been his son, Hamza’s, teacher. Interviewee 8 lost out even though both 
Baloch and the department Secretary supported him. In other words, a politician 
lacking access to the centre will be overruled, even if his desired outcome is to 
improve bureaucratic performance and he has a bond with the relevant bureaucrats. 
 
Bureaucrats  
The only bureaucrats concerned with bureaucratic efficiency and able to make 
legal appointments, but lacking access to the political and bureaucratic elite of the 
province, are ‘peripheral’ bureaucrats within a department’s district offices. In the 
School Education Department, for instance, these include Executive District Officers 
– Education or EDO-Es. EDOs are mid-tier bureaucrats who have risen through the 
ranks of the department, starting out as teachers and rising to the post of head teacher 
or principal. During this time, they establish their own professional networks to meet 
departmental targets in schools and district offices. When they reach the post of EDO, 
they may legally appoint members of their network to posts under their charge – for 
instance Assistant Education Officers (AEOs) – or recommend those they have 
worked with in the past for more senior district-level posts such as District Education 
Officer (DEO). In theory, amongst appointments made by EDO-Es at the tehsil and 
markaz level, one might expect a pattern of mentorship similar to that of Secretaries 
and department employees in the secretariat. However, the reality is that EDO-Es face 
so much pressure from politicians and bureaucrats regarding who to appoint to these 
junior posts (most significantly from the School Education department itself in 
Lahore, which is where decisions are made) that legal appointments are actually quite 
rare. Furthermore, the EDO-E may not be able to afford to make legal appointments – 
he may need to make extra-legal appointments to set up a transactional relationship 
which he can rely on to achieve the targets he has been set by the department (or 
protect himself from investigations). Senior School Education Department employees 
are perhaps the only exception – near the end of their careers, they are in a position to 
stand in the face of political interference and defend the bureaucrats they legally 
appoint to junior posts. For instance, Interviewee 23 (a now retired School Education 
Department bureaucrat) refused to give in to pressure on appointments to junior posts 
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from Rana Sanaullah in Faisalabad and, therefore, inspired other department 
employees in the district.    
 
Electoral Gain 
Moving away from legal appointments, junior politicians with little access to 
the political leadership, and thus to the bureaucracy, must find alternative methods to 
make bureaucratic appointment that advance their electoral prospects. Some junior 
politicians are better entrenched in their own constituencies than others – a politician 
who has been re-elected, for instance, is in a stronger position than a first-time 
winner, even if both are unable to reach the CM.186 Still, these junior politicians are 
often aware that their attempts to meet the CM to request specific bureaucratic 
appointments will be fruitless, and their visits to senior bureaucratic offices for 
assistance with bureaucratic appointments will be rebuffed on the grounds of 
appointment policies instituted by the CM.  
So, how have these junior politicians dealt with constituent demands then? 
Only two options exist: illegal methods such as bribery and violence (discussed in 
Chapter 5) or legal methods. Though it may seem counter-intuitive, junior politicians 
can at times use legal methods to their advantage, even when they are shut out by the 
CM Secretariat and the bureaucracy. For bureaucratic posts within the district – 
teachers and district administrative officials (e.g. Assistant Education Officers) – 
junior politicians can assist their constituents, party workers, and supporters in legally 
applying for jobs in two ways. The first is that politicians tend to receive a measure of 
respect from bureaucrats that ordinary voters do not. It is for this reason that 
applicants approach politicians to make a phone call or get a note of support to attach 
to their application. In the offices of politicians who are not in the CM’s ambit, the 
politician will make it clear that the decision lies with the bureaucrat. In other words, 
the politician will have sufficient connections to help supporters get a hearing for a 
job – no more and no less. 
The second form of assistance involves a politician helping supporters get a 
government job legally by helping them through the application process – checking 
                                                 
186 Some established politicians are disadvantaged by scandals which lead to the political leadership 
distancing itself from them. For instance, a conviction for gas theft led to a Lahore MNA losing his 
ministerial post and being sidelined by the party leadership, driving him to focus on ‘delivering’ locally 
(sewage lines, etc.) for his constituents. 
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documentation, helping them with attestation, etc. A PMLQ MPA from Sargodha 
(Interview 109) said that he stationed people at his dera to guide people with their 
application for government jobs. They tell applicants that they must fulfil the 
requirements for the jobs to which they are applying and encourage them to acquire 
the required skills.  
Politicians deal with hundreds of constituents applying for government jobs. 
Of course, not all of them get the jobs they apply for. However, those who do get 
them may well be grateful to the politician for the support he provided, creating a 
bond of loyalty. This means that politicians are well aware that they must aid as many 
constituents as possible in order to get a few favoured individuals in key posts – even 
through legal methods of appointment. These bonds of loyalty may, at times, bring 
long-term benefits for politicians, in particular where teaching posts are involved. At 
election time, it is teachers who serve as polling agents. In other words, politicians 
may call in favours from someone he helped appoint when the election comes around 
and polling stations need to be manned. However, this method of advancing electoral 
prospects is hardly fool proof. There is no guarantee that the politician’s constituent 
will be appointed to the right polling stations. Moreover, appointees who are aware 
they met the merit requirements for a job are under no compulsion to obey a politician 
who played only a tangential role (if that) in getting them their job (unless he offers 
some further incentive).  
 
Personal Enrichment and Protection 
In general, it is unusual for legal methods of bureaucratic appointment to be 
deployed to produce personal enrichment or protection outcomes. However, as 
Schmidt (1974, 429) notes, a bureaucrat at the local level is likely to maintain 
‘clientelist relations with his “constituency”’. In making teacher transfers within 
districts, for instance District Education Officers (BPS 19, responsible for appointing 
teaching staff in BPS 9 to 16) may have worked in the same school with more senior 
teachers (BPS 14-16) they are responsible for transferring. But he will be significantly 
senior to those in BPS 9, making professional networks unlikely. This is where kin or 
biraderi networks may come into play to provide a stable job and a guaranteed 
pension to a relative. Similarly, EDOs may prioritise biraderi connections when 
transferring junior teachers (BPS 1-10). When two teachers are equally qualified, the 
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EDO can give one priority over the other only because they are from the same 
biraderi. Since the appointments themselves are legal, it is more difficult to challenge 
such decisions. No legal wrong has been done; the EDO simply used his discretion to 
make a (legal) allocation.  
That said, legal appointments made by those without access to the political 
and bureaucratic leadership can be quite problematic in terms of actually achieving 
expected personal gains (or protection outcomes). As with legal appointments made 
for electoral gain, it is difficult to regulate the behaviour of legally appointed 
bureaucrats unless the bond between patron and bureaucrat is formed on the basis of 
family or biraderi ties. Often, the best that politicians and bureaucrats without access 
to the leadership can do is help constituents get jobs at lower levels of the 
bureaucracy. Most posts at the local level have few merit requirements – for instance, 
the post of baildaar or patwari in the Irrigation Department do not require a degree 
qualification – which means that it is possible for politicians to help local supporters 
(for instance, frequenters of their dera) apply for them. While this situation may allow 
the bureaucrat to stay under the radar as a legal appointee, it is a tenuous means of 
achieving personal enrichment outcomes because, as noted above, the patron has little 
leverage. Therefore, there is actually more incentive for patrons to fill these posts 
through extra-legal or illegal methods of appointment. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have applied the analytical architecture I developed in 
Chapter 1 to circumstances where bureaucrats are legally appointed by political or 
bureaucratic patrons. In circumstances where a well-connected patron seeks an 
improvement in bureaucratic efficiency or performance, legal appointments often 
produce sustainable results, as for instance in the Punjab School Education 
Department. Legal appointments are common amongst senior bureaucratic posts in 
Punjab and reflect a pattern of centralisation of power on the part of the ruling PMLN 
and CM Shahbaz Sharif. In the past few years, Sharif (and before him, his opponents), 
his advisors, and his allies have effectively used legal appointments to the 
bureaucracy to promote competence, particularly where international donors are 
involved. With a PMLN government at both the centre and in Punjab since 2013, 
there is little check on such activities. However, patterns of centralised discretion and 
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patronage in Punjab have also meant that avenues of legal appointment are closed to 
those without connections to the CM and his inner circle. As elections near, it is from 
this avenue – MNAs and MPAs excluded from the CM’s largesse – that pressure will 
be exerted to accommodate a more diverse set of demands. 
Once the objectives become more personal (electoral gain, enrichment, or 
protection), legal methods of appointment are no longer as effective in getting even 
well-connected patrons the outcomes they want. This is because of the diffuse bonds 
that are formed between a legal appointee and a patron who has expended little or no 
effort in making the appointment. There is little incentive for appointees to take that 
extra step to achieve the objective they have been set. If it is achieved on the way to 
bureaucratic targets, excellent, but if not, the bureaucrat will not pursue it separately. 
In these circumstances, patrons also find it difficult to push the appointee to any 
meaningful extent – a legally appointed bureaucrat has other (legal) avenues open to 
him should he wish to avoid the patron’s demands. This is particularly true in 
situations where patrons are well-connected enough to influence PAS appointments. 
Elite PAS bureaucrats have sufficient connections and career stability to be able to 
discard a patron who becomes too damaging or difficult. For those without access to 
the CM and his kitchen cabinet, however, avenues of legal appointment are often 
closed, and so their attempts to achieve their objectives are stymied.  
In the following chapters, I will continue to illuminate the analytical 
architecture I laid out in Chapter 1, turning to circumstances where appointments 




CHAPTER 4: EXTRA-LEGAL METHODS OF APPOINTMENT 
 
Civil servants like saying, “Hum kia karein? Parliamentarian, wazir kharab hai, hum too 
seedhay chalney waale hain” (What can we do? Parliamentarians and ministers are bad, we 
[civil servants] walk on the straight and narrow path). It is the best excuse officials have. 
 
 – Interview 14, PAS officer in a senior post in the S&GAD Punjab 
 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I considered the outcomes achieved when a patron 
makes a legal appointment. In this chapter, I investigate outcomes achieved when 
patrons use extra-legal methods to appoint bureaucrats. As discussed in Chapter 1, 
and again in Chapter 2, extra-legal methods do not dismiss the law entirely or attempt 
to demolish it. They take some element of a rule and twist, bend, or flex it to suit their 
own purpose. Extra-legal methods give you a way around cumbersome legal rules 
while still retaining a space for those rules when they work in your favour. The 
ambiguity of extra-legal methods is what makes them so effective as patronage 
resources underpinning the delivery of outcomes for politicians and bureaucrats. The 
confusion over what exactly the rules say, what they cover and what they don’t, where 
they can be applied and where they can’t make these methods less likely to draw 
attention. Where they do draw some interest, the discussion gets bogged down by the 
intricacy of the law. For an ordinary citizen, extra-legal methods are often the least 
interesting option (as compared to overtly illegal methods such as force, intimidation 
or bribery). For this reason, extra-legal methods are the most commonly used for 
making bureaucratic appointments; they attract much less attention.  
I show that the chances of extra-legal appointments producing expected 
outcomes (whether bureaucratic efficiency, electoral gain, or personal protection or 
enrichment) are higher than with either legal or illegal appointment methods, at least 
amongst those with access to, and strong bonds with, the CM and his kitchen cabinet. 
Amongst those without access to the CM’s inner circle, extra-legal methods are much 




Political Leaders and their Cronies 
Bureaucratic Efficiency  
Not all bureaucrats are equal, and this inequality goes beyond their place in the 
bureaucratic hierarchy or their qualifications. Bureaucrats with project management 
skills, those able to keep up with the CM and his demands, those willing to cut a few 
corners here and there to get the job done faster, are automatically more valued than 
those without. For this reason, governments go out of their way to keep certain 
bureaucrats in certain posts, and empower them, while removing others who have 
stood in their way. These valued bureaucrats are transferred from one important 
department or project to another – sometimes serving only a few months or a year in a 
post till a crisis has passed or a project has been implemented. In many of these cases, 
the government uses extra-legal means to get their ‘blue-eyed’ bureaucrats into 
particular posts.  
The PMLN’s years in power since 2008 have been marked by a preference for 
such bureaucrats. Appointed to posts for which they are too junior, and put in charge 
of high-visibility policies and projects, these bureaucrats are often marked by a brash, 
no-nonsense attitude that endears them to few amongst their colleagues. Most of them 
are from the elite PAS; very few are from the Provincial Civil Services. The 
preference of PAS officers for postings in urban Punjab makes them natural allies of a 
CM interested in promoting rapid growth in Punjab’s cities, most notably Lahore, 
Faisalabad, Rawalpindi, and Gujranwala. As a result, any attempt by the PPP to reign 
in these postings between 2008-2013 (via the central government-controlled 
Establishment Division) would have been fruitless. A federal government that was 
frequently in turmoil due to coalition politics and corruption allegations was up 
against two strong lobbies united as one: the main opposition party and the PAS. And 
once the PMLN controlled both Punjab and the centre after 2013, any chances of 
objections or challenges to the postings of these bureaucrats from the Establishment 
Division or PM Office was removed. 
In many ways, the men favoured by the PMLN are ideal bureaucrats similar to 
those discussed in the previous chapter – they have an excellent grasp on the law and 
government procedure, they are organised and efficient, they push their juniors to 
work, are goal oriented, and typically see eye-to-eye with the CM Secretariat on what 
‘good governance’ means. However, the difference between bureaucrats appointed 
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legally to improve bureaucratic performance (see previous chapter) and bureaucrats 
appointed extra-legally is the willingness of the latter to do all of these things while at 
the same time bending the rules and exerting extra pressure where needed to get the 
patron what he wants. In the rest of this section, I connect instances of bureaucrats 
appointed extra-legally (i.e. by bending the rules) ‘delivering’ targeted and enhanced 
bureaucratic performance. In doing so, I highlight the creation of a small coterie of 
individuals who, due to their closeness to the CM and his inner circle, are responsible 
for most major policies and projects in Punjab, and effectively run the province 
alongside the CM as trusted advisers and managers.  
 
PAS Officers and the CM Secretariat  
Delivery-oriented bureaucrats at the senior level (PAS officers) are frequent 
beneficiaries of three extra-legal appointment practices. The first is frequent transfers 
from one department or project to another.187 The second is additional charge 
appointments where an officer holds more than one bureaucratic post for an extended 
period of time (see Chapter 2). The third, and most problematic, is the appointment of 
junior officers to posts meant for more senior officers – for instance, a BPS 18 officer 
appointed to a BPS 20 post. This practice became common in Punjab during Shahbaz 
Sharif’s first government after his return from exile in 2008, when Javed Mahmood 
was Chief Secretary, most likely due to the CM’s desire to form a team of loyalists to 
forward his policy agenda. As I explained in Chapter 2, however, acting promotions 
are legally permitted only where the senior-most eligible bureaucrat has yet to 
complete the required time in service to be appointed to a post. In other words, a 
junior official cannot be given an acting promotion if there are other more senior 
eligible officers available to fill the post.  
With bureaucratic efficiency outcomes in mind, the bonds between patrons 
and bureaucrats appointed extra-legally are immensely strong. The relationship 
originates in professional networks – the patron and bureaucrat will have worked or 
trained together in the past, or been recommended to the patron by a trusted colleague. 
It is this familiarity which breeds the trust required for extra-legal appointments. 
However, with extra-legal appointments, this trust is backed by an explicit reciprocity 
                                                 
187 For lower tiers of the bureaucracy, frequent transfers are rarely beneficial since they place the 
financial and organisational burden of moving on the bureaucrat.  
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– an understanding that since the patron bent the rules to appoint the bureaucrat, the 
bureaucrat will, in turn and in exchange, bend the rules to deliver the outcome the 
patron wants. Consequently, extra-legal appointments, made with the objective of 
bureaucratic efficiency, result in even stronger bonds than legal appointments made 
for the same objectives.  
In addition to matching the careers of bureaucrats and patrons, another 
indicator of strong bonds amongst senior bureaucrats (with access to the CM and his 
kitchen cabinet) extra-legally appointed to achieve efficiency outcomes lies in efforts 
by the CM Secretariat to protect appointees from (a) the repercussions of their extra-
legal appointment, and (b) the consequences of the methods they use to achieve 
expected outcomes. As always, the task of these bureaucrats is to deliver outcomes, 
but in this case they do cut corners, and at times they get caught up in controversies. 
This is where the patron’s role comes in – in exchange for delivering outcomes, the 
CM and CS act as the bureaucrats’ mentors and protectors; advising them, vetoing 
inquiries, ignoring court orders, and defending them against politicians who might 
find them unhelpful. Such protection and patronage allows the bureaucrat to continue 
serving the ‘public interest’ by ‘delivering’ in a succession of posts.  
 
The Original ‘Honorary Politician’ Bureaucrat  
The bureaucrat who set the tone for the PMLN’s bonds with extra-legally 
appointed senior bureaucrats in Punjab in 2008 was Javed Mahmood. In March 2008, 
when Mahmood’s name was put forward as CS, he was in BPS 21. His appointment 
was heavily criticised since not only had he never held the post of a head of 
department before, but more importantly, he was considered too junior for the CS 
post. There were ‘at least 14 DMG [PAS] officers’ serving in Punjab at the time who 
were senior to Mahmood in terms of batch - for instance, the Secretary Services at the 
time, Farkhanda Waseem Afzal, was from the 5th Common Training Program, senior 
to Mahmood who was from the 7th Common, though both were in BPS 21.188 
Therefore, Mahmood’s appointment bent the rules by exploiting a loophole in the 
                                                 
188 Services secretary declines to work under junior chief secretary. April 2, 2008. Daily Times. 
Available at: <http://archives.dailytimes.com.pk/lahore/02-Apr-2008/services-secretary-declines-to-
work-under-junior-chief-secretary> [Accessed 12 October 2015]. 
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regulations regarding promotions that allowed junior bureaucrats to be discretionarily 
elevated above their seniors (see Chapter 2 for more details).  
When Mahmood was appointed at the CM’s discretion, Afzal and a number of 
other officers who had been serving in Punjab sought repatriation to the PPP-held 
centre to avoid working under a junior officer, including Salman Siddique and 
Suleman Ghani189 (the two men usually held responsible for any successes of the 
PMLQ government in Punjab). Not only did Mahmood extra-legally leap frog over 
his seniors to the post of CS, his appointment factionalised the PAS. Whereas the 
more senior officers in the cadre considered Mahmood an upstart, juniors who worked 
in Punjab at the time saw him as a mentor and a father figure. 
In ‘Logged On: Smart Government Solutions from South Asia’, published by 
the World Bank, Mahmood is mentioned specifically as an officer who ‘understood 
the importance of reaching out to citizens’ and who ‘sat for hours a day outside his 
office for several weeks during 2008 to receive complaints from citizens’ (2015, 58-
59). The book quotes Mahmood as saying, “Accessibility is the most important thing. 
Enabling easy access is half the job done” (2015, 58). Mahmood’s no nonsense 
attitude toward service delivery gelled particularly well with Shahbaz Sharif’s vision 
of his time as a Khadim-e-Aala (servant in chief) to the people of Punjab. This attitude 
was likely the product of Mahmood’s close working relationship with the Sharifs in 
the formative period of his career. Mahmood had worked as Deputy Secretary to CM 
Nawaz Sharif from 1988-90, then Deputy Commissioner Lahore, and then Principal 
Secretary to CM Shahbaz Sharif during the 1990s.190 The strong bond Mahmood 
formed with Shahbaz Sharif shaped his understanding of the role of a bureaucrat. 
Consequently, Shahbaz Sharif’s patronage of Mahmood was based on a bond of trust 
and mentorship, and in (extra-legally) appointing him as Chief Secretary when the 
PMLN returned to power in Punjab after their period in exile, CM Shahbaz Sharif 
strengthened that bond. Mahmood was expected to reciprocate and ‘deliver’.  
Mahmood was tasked with managing the bureaucracy and the province so as 
to ensure that the CM’s agenda was pursued aggressively and delivery of services was 
                                                 
189 Senior officers to leave Punjab if Javed Mahmood becomes CS. March 29, 2008. Daily Times. 
Available at: <http://archives.dailytimes.com.pk/national/29-Mar-2008/senior-officers-to-leave-punjab-
if-javed-mahmood-becomes-cs> [Accessed 12 October 2015]. 
190 Warrarich, A. Selection of Punjab bureaucratic team an uphill task for Sharifs. March 08, 2008. 
Daily Times. Available at: <http://archives.dailytimes.com.pk/lahore/08-Mar-2008/selection-of-
punjab-bureaucratic-team-an-uphill-task-for-sharifs> [Accessed 12 October 2015]. 
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ensured to citizens. The 2008 election was immediately followed by a flurry of 
activity that was designed to displace the PMLQ and its loyalist bureaucrats and assert 
the PMLN’s (especially the Sharif brothers’) power. Bureaucratic control over the 
province was established through the widespread extra-legal appointments of loyal 
bureaucrats to posts for which they were too junior – for example, see the case of 
Fawad Hasan Fawad below. By (extra-legally) appointing handpicked bureaucrats 
who saw ‘accessibility’ as a measure of ‘good governance’, Shahbaz Sharif and Javed 
Mahmood sought to create a responsive government. Key early initiatives included 
the launch of a petition cell, a food stamp scheme, and the streamlining of the 
provincial bureaucracy through an emphasis on ‘merit’ in recruitment of junior 
bureaucrats.  
Strong bonds between accessible bureaucrats like Mahmood and bureaucratic 
politicians like Shahbaz Sharif blur the lines between politician and bureaucrat to 
form hybrids – Shahbaz Sharif is an honorary bureaucrat; the bureaucrats he appoints 
(extra-legally) to achieve official goals are honorary party members. Appointed in 
violation of seniority to the post of CS of Punjab (at the discretion of a CM who, at 
the time, was in a strong-enough position to overrule any objection by the PPP-led 
federal government), Mahmood enjoyed not just the perks and privileges associated 
with the post, but a great deal of discretionary power (for instance, the allocation of 
development funds and the appointment of bureaucrats across the province). At the 
same time, he ensured that the PMLN government kept a tight control over Punjab 
amidst turbulence in national politics (as the PPP fought to hold together a coalition at 
the centre). He laid the foundations (particularly through his mentorship of junior 
bureaucrats) for the PMLN’s forthcoming bureaucratic and electoral dominance of 
Punjab. 
 
The Firefighter  
Fawad Hasan Fawad, a PAS bureaucrat, is referred to by his colleagues as a 
fire fighter – a tough bureaucrat, abrasive but efficient (Interview 75). He was 
appointed Principal Staff Officer (PSO) to the Principal Secretary to PM Nawaz 
Sharif in 1997. About nine months later, he was posted as Principal Staff Officer to 
the CS Punjab, AZK Sherdil. Javed Mahmood (discussed above) was Principal 
Secretary to the CM at the time. It was at this time, during his formative years as a 
161 
 
bureaucrat, that Fawad would have come into the Sharifs’ orbit since Sherdil was a 
close confidant of the Sharif brothers. Unlike a number of other bureaucrats who 
served with the Sharifs, Fawad was not made OSD or repatriated to the centre when 
Musharraf took over. Instead, he was posted abroad and was thus never ‘tainted’ by 
association with the military regime or its PMLQ government.  
Between April 2008 and June 2013, Fawad held 6 different posts, all of them 
for less than 18 months. In all of these posts, Fawad was extra-legally appointed in 
discretionary violation of (a) tenure rules for these posts as established by the Sixth 
Schedule of the Government of Punjab Rules of Business 2011 (see Chapter 2) and, 
(b) seniority rules (see Chapter 2), as he was a BPS 19 officer bypassing those more 
senior to him in the PAS to BPS 20 and 21 posts. These extra-legal postings were 
justified by the CM Secretariat as being ‘in the public interest’ (a practice the 
Establishment Division itself has criticised – see Chapter 2) on the grounds that 
Fawad was the best man for the job. Fawad was assigned a particular objective (with 
regard to the department’s efficiency and performance) for each post– reduce the 
wage bill, tackle corrupt practices, improve service delivery, etc. In each post, 
Fawad’s discretionary extra-legal appointments (made in violation of tenure rules or 
to posts for which he was too junior) created a strong bond between him and his 
patrons (the CM and the CS). In exchange for these choice postings, Fawad (the 
‘blue-eyed’ bureaucrat) was expected do whatever was necessary to achieve the target 
– perform tasks that other bureaucrats would find at best daunting and at worst 
impossible, and at a rapid-fire pace. In turn, the CM Secretariat provided him with the 
support he needed (protection from political pressure, his pick of appointees to his 
department, etc.) to achieve the set target.  
For instance, when he was appointed Secretary Services in April 2008, Fawad 
was assigned the unenviable and unpopular task of shrinking the size of the Punjab 
bureaucracy - reducing the wage bill and freeing up posts for selected officials to be 
promoted and transferred, while ensuring that all the right people remained in the 
right places to push the CM’s policy agenda forward.191 Fawad’s task was made 
immensely more contentious by the fact that, as he was too junior for the post of 
                                                 
191 He was working under the guidance and mentorship of then CS, Javed Mahmood, who was 
determined to remove bureaucrats, army, and police officials who had been re-employed on contract by 
Musharraf and his PMLQ government. Allegedly, these contracts were issued by the previous (PMLQ) 
government without the consent of the Re-Employment Board and its chairman, the chief secretary.  
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Secretary Services, he was deciding the fate of officers senior to him.192 
Unsurprisingly, this led to ‘a dispute with senior officers’193 and eventually to 
Fawad’s transfer after six months in the posting.  
Fawad’s transfer was unexpected because observers thought that the 
government would ignore complaints against a bureaucrat as powerful and well-
connected as he was.194 But Fawad had achieved the target he was set – he did lower 
the province’s wage bill. As one news report notes, during Fawad’s short tenure as 
Secretary Services, ‘hundreds of contract or re-employed officials were removed from 
service and hundreds of others of all ranks were transferred, creating a stir in the 
administrative system in the province.’195 Consequently, the CM Secretariat made 
sure that Fawad’s career did not suffer, posting him to a succession of departmental 
Secretary posts (for which he was too junior and, thus, bypassing his senior 
colleagues) with specific expected outcomes for each.  
Next, Fawad was extra-legally appointed to the post of Secretary 
Communication and Works. He was still too junior for the post of Secretary, but his 
extra-legal appointment allowed the CM and CS to make the most of Fawad’s talent 
for making decisions that were necessary but would be contentious and unpopular. 
They tasked him to ‘accelerate the pace of work and purge the department of corrupt 
officials and contractors’196 by dismantling the parallel economy of kickbacks in 
contracts for construction projects that involved all levels of department staff, 
politicians, and independent contractors (see Wade 1982 for more on corruption in 
works projects). Fawad’s actions against allegedly corrupt officials soon had the 
Communication & Works Department up in arms. Employees and contractors were 
                                                 
192 Until December 2011, he continued to hold posts that are typically for BPS 20 and above – 
Bureaucracy reshuffled. December 30, 2011. Pakistan Today. Available at: 
<http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2011/12/30/national/bureaucracy-reshuffled/> [Accessed 5 
February 2016]. 
193 Sumra, A. Tax secy removed, faces corruption charge. July 24, 2011. The Express Tribune. 
Available at: <http://tribune.com.pk/story/216144/tax-secy-removed-faces-corruption-charge/> 
[Accessed 5 February 2016]. 
194 Two key officers among 10 reshuffled. November 14, 2008. DAWN. Available at: 
<http://www.dawn.com/news/329899/two-key-officers-among-10-reshuffled> [Accessed 5 February 
2016]. 
195 Doctors ‘make merry’ It’s all over for Fawad as health secretary. April 23, 2011. DAWN. Available 
at: <http://www.dawn.com/news/623451/doctors-make-merry-its-all-over-for-fawad-as-health-
secretary> [Accessed 5 February 2016]. 
196 Heavyweights knock out blue-eyed bureaucrat. 17 July 2011. DAWN. Available at 
<http://www.dawn.com/news/945654/heavyweights-knock-out-blue-eyed-bureaucrat> [Accessed 30 
May 2016]  
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soon protesting against Fawad on Lahore’s Mall Road197 and going on strike.198 Fawad 
was also allegedly under pressure from disgruntled MPAs whose favoured contractors 
were facing difficulties in getting government works contracts.199 In 2009, matters 
came to a head when Fawad ruffled the feathers of a senior minister of the PMLN 
(allegedly from Dera Ghazi Khan200) when he suspended employees on allegations of 
corruption.201 The senior minister told the CM that Fawad had allegedly claimed 
without proof that the corrupt officials were the minister’s appointees and that, 
“Either we or the secretary will have to go”.202 However, even this ultimatum resulted 
only in Fawad being sent on leave for six weeks, probably because the CM Secretariat 
realised that the situation in the department was untenable and was attracting far too 
much untoward media attention. At the end of six weeks, Fawad returned to the same 
post at the discretion of the CM, remaining Secretary C&W for a total of a year and a 
half despite the complaints of contractors, politicians, and employees. 
In July 2011, Fawad was (extra-legally) posted Secretary Excise and Taxation 
and tasked with increasing tax revenues. Again, he was only in BPS 19 at the time of 
his appointment while the post was for bureaucrats in BPS 20 and above. This time, 
the extra-legal appointment came in the wake of the removal of the incumbent 
Secretary under a cloud of corruption allegations, particularly disobeying the 
instructions of the CM to initiate a third party audit of various projects in Punjab and 
controversy over a deal worth Rs 550 million.203 At the same time, there was a 
country-wide push to increase tax revenues mostly due to pressure from donor 
agencies. Fawad was tasked with ensuring that tax revenues showed a substantive 
                                                 
197 Ibid. 
198 C&W secretary alleges ‘corrupt’ staging protest. 14 December 2008. DAWN. Available at 
<http://www.dawn.com/news/334128/c-w-secretary-alleges-corrupt-staging-protest> [Accessed 31 
May 2017].  
199 Heavyweights knock out blue-eyed bureaucrat. 17 July 2011. DAWN. Available at 
<http://www.dawn.com/news/945654/heavyweights-knock-out-blue-eyed-bureaucrat> [Accessed 30 
May 2016]   
200 Additional charges belie govt’s good governance claims. 11 Augist 2009. Daily Times. Available at: 
<http://archives.dailytimes.com.pk/lahore/11-Aug-2009/additional-charges-belie-govt-s-good-
governance-claims> [Accessed 22 May 2016] 
201 Heavyweights knock out blue-eyed bureaucrat. 17 July 2011. DAWN. Available at 
<http://www.dawn.com/news/945654/heavyweights-knock-out-blue-eyed-bureaucrat> [Accessed 30 
May 2016]  
202 Ibid. 
203 Sumra, A. Tax secy removed, faces corruption charge. 24 July 2011. The Express Tribune. 
Available at: <http://tribune.com.pk/story/216144/tax-secy-removed-faces-corruption-charge/> 
[Accessed 31 May 2017]. 
164 
 
increase. Piracha and Moore (2016, 1784) found that property tax collection, for 
instance, increased as a consequence of the Secretary’s desire ‘to make his mark’. 
According to a newspaper report, the Secretary ‘managed to increase tax revenue by 
20% in the province without introduction of any new tax or increase in base rates.’ 204 
The reason that the Sharif brothers trust Fawad implicitly, and have done so 
since their return to power in 2008 despite numerous controversies, is their familiarity 
with him and his methods. Like the brothers, Fawad believes in assembling around 
him a team of junior bureaucrats he trusts (Interviewee 41, a provincial services 
officer who had worked under Fawad). This pattern grows out of Fawad’s close 
working relationship with the Sharif brothers and their bureaucratic allies in the past 
(e.g. Sherdil and Mahmood). These relationships underpinned the strong bond of trust 
between CM Shahbaz Sharif and Fawad. But of course, this bond was catalysed by 
the extra-legal appointment methods used by the CM Secretariat to achieve targeted 
bureaucratic efficiency objectives. In appointing him extra-legally, the patron helps to 
ensure that Fawad will ‘deliver’ expected-but-difficult-to-achieve efficiency outcomes 
(e.g. increases in tax revenue, reductions in the government’s wage bill, increased 
checks on C&W contracts, etc.), despite the knowledge that the measures he takes to 
achieve them will cause controversy and embroil the government in damage control. 
In exchange, Fawad trusts that the patron will protect his interests in exchange for 
‘delivering’ these outcomes. The patronage extended to Fawad was such that when he 
was posted as the Secretary of the Public Prosecution Department in 2011, he ‘refused 
to take up the job’ and when the CM was asked about the refusal, he (remarkably) 
commented: “What can I do if Fawad does not join [the department]?”205 Therefore, 
Fawad’s career is a classic instance of a bureaucrat who is regarded as an equal, an 
honourary party member by the CM and senior party leadership in Punjab – so much 
so that his posting to the PM Office (as Secretary to the PM) led Nawaz Sharif to 
assign his administrative responsibilities to Fawad.206 
                                                 
204 Fawad Hasan Fawad made secretary to PM. 21 November 2015. The News. Available at: 
<http://www.thenews.com.pk/print/15776-fawad-hasan-fawad-made-secretary-to-pm> [Accessed 31 
May 2017]. 
205 Sumra, A. Tax secy removed, faces corruption charge. 24 July 2011. The Express Tribune. 
Available at: <http://tribune.com.pk/story/216144/tax-secy-removed-faces-corruption-charge/> 
[Accessed 31 May 2017]. 
206 Bureaucracy rubbishes almost 400 directives of prime minister. November 21, 2016.The Daily 
Times. Available at: < https://dailytimes.com.pk/44922/bureaucracy-rubbishes-almost-400-directives-
of-prime-minister/> [Accessed 17 November 2017]; Fawad’s wings clipped. August 20, 2017.The 
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The Project Managers  
Many bureaucrats favoured by the PMLN administration over the last few 
years self-style as project managers, inspired by the CM’s priorities and the New 
Public Management (NPM) approach favoured by the PAS. The value these 
bureaucrats have to the government is evidenced by the lengths to which the 
provincial establishment goes to protect them from repercussions for extra-legal 
appointments and controversial decision making. 
One such bureaucrat is Ahad Cheema. Cheema worked closely with the CS’s 
office early in his career while posted as Additional Secretary Welfare (S&GAD). 
However, he brought himself to the attention of the CS and the CM when he (a BPS 
18 officer) was given additional charge of, and soon after regularly posted to the BPS 
20 post of Secretary Higher Education Punjab. This type of extra-legal appointment 
exploits a loophole in the regulations on promotion that allows for discretionary 
appointments of junior bureaucrats to senior posts, bypassing their more senior 
colleagues (see Chapter 2). Discretionary extra-legal appointments (made in the name 
of ‘public interest’ – see Chapter 2) further strengthen the strong bonds that 
familiarity through professional networks engender, giving patrons the leverage to 
demand that bureaucrats deliver outcomes that are difficult to achieve. When Cheema 
took additional charge of the post of Secretary Higher Education, the post had 
remained vacant for some time after the two previous secretaries had been transferred 
due to disputes over lecturer transfers with the Minister for Education.207 In 
appointing Cheema, the CM Secretariat dug in its heels against the Minister - Cheema 
refused to give in to the politician’s demands for lecturer transfers and implemented a 
‘closed-door policy’ (where department officials were ordered to lock their office 
doors) to stymie those seeking out-of-turn transfers.208  
In October 2010, a citizen filed a petition against Cheema’s appointment as 
Secretary Higher Education on the grounds that he was occupying a post above his 
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pay scale.209 Cheema was swiftly transferred and appointed DCO Lahore the same 
month. Cheema’s immediate appointment to a senior and much coveted post, the 
occupant of which must work closely with the CM Secretariat since the capital city is 
not only the base of the provincial government but also the Sharifs’ home city, is 
evidence of the CM Secretariat’s willingness to protect a bureaucrat who had 
‘delivered’. PAS bureaucrats often described such protection as a valuable security 
net that cements the ties of the PAS network, allowing bureaucrats to act against even 
those who are politically well connected (Interviews 4, 6, 9, 30, 77 – all current or 
former PAS bureaucrats). For the CM Secretariat, these discretionary extra-legal 
transfers (made by exploiting the ‘public interest’ loophole in tenure rules) are used to 
move bureaucrats like Cheema or Fawad to posts where they are needed most.  
Cheema’s tenure as DCO Lahore was just eighteen months. During this time, 
he impressed the CM with his ability to drive his juniors to improve their 
performance, even in the face of pressure. For instance, in a ‘“grand operation” 
against encroachments’ and a drive against city’s drug trade, Cheema refused to give 
in to political pressure and insisted on pushing his juniors to do the same.210 However, 
like his posting as Secretary Higher Education, Cheema’s posting as DCO was also 
extra-legal – posts of DCO in the larger districts are for officers in at least BPS 20 and 
preferably BPS 21211 while Cheema was in BPS 18 (though he claimed to be ‘acting 
BPS 19’212) and was challenged in the court.213 In December 2011, despite vociferous 
opposition in the Punjab Assembly, an amendment was made to the Punjab Local 
Government Ordinance (2001) removing the requirement that DCO posts be held by 
officers in BPS 20, thus providing legislative cover to extra-legal appointments like 
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Cheema’s.214 However, since the amendment did not apply retroactively, Cheema had 
to be transferred.  
In 2012, Cheema, now in BPS 19, was extra-legally appointed through the 
discretionary violation of seniority rules (in the ‘public interest’) to the BPS 20 post of 
Director General (DG) of the Lahore Development Authority (LDA), the body 
responsible for all planning and development activity in Punjab’s capital city. The 
timing of Cheema’s appointment as DG LDA in March 2012 was not coincidental. In 
February 2012, the Lahore Metro Bus project was initiated. This project, set up with 
the assistance of the Turkish government, was the first state-owned, large-scale public 
transport project in the country (Sajjad 2014, 10) and the CM’s flagship project going 
into the May 2013 election. Therefore, the CM needed a trusted bureaucrat to 
streamline the design phase, land acquisition, and construction of the Bus Rapid 
Transit (BRT) system. As DCO Lahore, Cheema had been actively involved in the 
conceptualisation of the project and was therefore the ideal choice to take the project 
forward. By 2012, Cheema had a well-established working relationship with the CM. 
Handpicked (and extra-legally appointed) by the CM215 to ‘deliver’ the Lahore Metro 
Bus within a year,216 Cheema ensured that the project was complete by February 2013 
(nothing short of a miracle) at a cost of Rs 30 billion, four times the annual provincial 
development budget for public transport (Sajjad 2014, 10). The success of the project, 
and the speed of its completion, is credited almost entirely to him – the CM referred 
to Cheema as the ‘hero of the Metro Bus’217 and awarded him the Tamgha-e-Imtiaz.218 
However, Cheema could not have achieved this outcome without some assistance 
from the CM Secretariat. For instance, the speed with which the financing (from 
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provincial funds made available by the 7th National Finance Commission Award) 
came through, the diversion of the majority of available funds for the development of 
the province to the development of Lahore219, and the lack of external oversight 
(including, for instance, an Environmental Protection Agency assessment) was the 
result of the CM’s desire to get the bus system up and running in advance of the May 
2013 election220. In other words, the CM Secretariat and the CM himself ensured that 
Cheema had everything he required to ensure the expected outcome was achieved.  
Ahad Cheema’s reputation as project manager was now well established, and 
in July 2015, he was appointed Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the private Quaid-e-
Azam Thermal Power Pvt. Limited while retaining additional charge of DG LDA221, 
drawing a private sector salary as CEO in addition to the perks and privileges 
(housing, transport, etc.) he enjoyed as a PAS officer. Additional charge appointments 
such as these are the easiest, most convenient and least problematic means of putting 
the right people in the right posts as it allows a bureaucrat to control two key posts at 
the same time. During Cheema’s additional charge posting as DG LDA, for instance, 
the LDA was handling two major projects in the city, both of which were extremely 
contentious and involved extensive litigation – the Orange Line Metro Train initiated 
in May 2014 (with an expected completion date of late 2019) and the Signal Free 
Corridor which was completed in December 2015.  
Additional charge appointments are a perfectly legal, though temporary, 
solution to the problem of a vacant seat – according to the rules, additional charge 
appointments are permitted for 3 months, and can be extended for a further 3 months. 
However, most additional charge appointments last for many more months (such as 
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Cheema’s) or even years - for instance, Irfan Elahi held an additional charge as 
Project Director of the Punjab Land Record Management Information System for 7 
years (in addition to his postings as Secretary Food and Irrigation and Chairman of the 
Planning and Development Board).222  
In some cases, the use of additional charge appointments may be a matter of 
negligence and convenience: it’s just easier to hand a post as additional charge to a 
vetted officer (for example, Cheema’s retention of the post of DG LDA on additional 
charge), and perhaps even to someone serving in the same department. Section 
Officers working on additional charge appointments are not infrequent in departments 
like School Education or Irrigation. Though this overburdens an already overworked 
official, it allows a lot of things to slip through the cracks because there is not time for 
the officer to pursue them (providing a convenient excuse for lost paperwork and 
delays in the business of the department).  
However, additional charge appointments become a great deal more 
problematic when they allow the lines of authority to converge in the hands of one 
person, consolidating a number of responsibilities and shortening the time taken for 
project approval and implementation. Appointments of this kind have become 
increasingly common under the PMLN, particularly since they won both the centre 
and Punjab in 2013. Any checks that could have been placed on such appointments 
were removed once the Establishment Division and PM Office were both in PMLN 
hands. 
Jehanzeb Khan’s additional charge of the post of Additional Chief Secretary 
Energy for 3 years and counting while being posted regularly as Secretary Finance223 
and then Chairman of the Planning and Development Board is a prime example of 
this. Effectively, the lines of authority for the development, approval, and financing of 
energy projects converged in the person of Jehanzeb Khan. 
Khan is considered an ally of the CM, having worked closely with him since 
the PMLN’s return to power in Punjab in 2008. Unlike ‘honourary politician’ 
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bureaucrats like Fawad or Mahmood, however, Khan had not spent the formative 
years of his career working with the Sharifs. He had spent some time posted in what 
was then NWFP, and was then posted abroad for most of the Musharraf era. It was not 
till he became Secretary Livestock and Dairy Development that Khan got to work 
closely with the CM. During his tenure, he ‘delivered’ in a department that was not 
considered all that important by expanding its scope from primarily an ‘animal health 
department’ to a livestock development and policy department.224 Khan’s work in the 
department led to international investments being made in the sector to improve 
facilities, quality control, and marketing to prepare meat for export, as well as 
improvements in breeding practices.225  
This performance led to Khan being entrusted with more high profile postings. 
In 2011, he was posted as Secretary Health, taking over the department after Fawad 
Hasan Fawad’s controversial tenure which left the entire department up in arms. 
Khan’s mandate was to calm the unhappy employees of one of the largest 
departments in the province and deal with an ongoing dispute involving the Young 
Doctors’ Association.226 Just as the department settled down with a less abrasive 
Secretary, Punjab suffered an outbreak of dengue fever.227 By October, the outbreak 
was brought under control through initiatives led by the CM personally and a team of 
trusted bureaucrats (including Khan).228 In 2012, however, the CM made Khan 
Officer on Special Duty (OSD) following the death of numerous patients due to 
spurious medication provided for free at the Punjab Institute of Cardiology in 
Lahore.229  
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Khan’s value to the CM as a bureaucrat who could ‘deliver’, however, became 
evident when just a couple of months later, he was appointed Secretary Energy, 
replacing an official who had failed to meet the CM’s expectations with regard to the 
initiation of new power projects.230 With energy being the key priority going into the 
2018 election cycle (after an anti-PPP wave in the 2013 general election was read as a 
criticism of the PPP’s inability to handle Pakistan’s energy crisis), CM Shahbaz 
Sharif began with the re-structuring of the energy department and the upgradation and 
re-designation of the post of Secretary Energy to Additional Chief Secretary Energy 
(ACS-E, BPS 21).231 Khan was the Secretary Finance and would have had 
considerable input in this process as per the ESTACODE. In fact, he himself was 
given additional charge of the ACS-E post once it was set up, despite the fact that he 
had not yet been promoted to BPS 21, and was thus too junior for the post. He has 
held that additional charge ever since (3 years and counting, again a discretionary 
violation of tenure rules – see Chapter 2). As a news report notes, the Energy 
Department did not even request an extension of the additional charge appointment 
beyond the permitted 3 months.232  
The CM’s experience of working closely with Khan on projects and crises 
created a strong bond between the patron and the bureaucrat. Khan’s appointments 
since 2013, encompassing some of the most senior posts in Punjab, point to the CM 
and his advisors’ design in consolidating a number of responsibilities in the hands of 
one person, thus shortening the time taken for project approval and implementation. 
Enabled by having the PMLN in charge at the centre as well as in Punjab, the success 
of this design, and the level of ‘delivery’ in terms of bureaucratic efficiency is 
clear.233 Public-private partnerships set up through the Punjab Power Development 
Board have resulted in the establishment of the Quaid-e-Azam Thermal, Solar, and 
Hydel Power companies. With Chinese investment, the first solar power plant became 
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operational in September 2015234 while work continues on various other projects 
across the province. 
Though Khan’s extended additional charge of the ACS-E post was extra-legal, 
the collection of the powers, responsibilities, and checks and balances of two separate 
senior bureaucratic posts into one bureaucrat has been remarkably successful in 
achieving the outcomes expected by the CM. The bond, however, combined with the 
method of appointment, cultivated forms of patronage that were strong enough to 
offset any challenges to Khan’s lack of transparency. 
 
Electoral Gain 
“Where everyone is eating, so what if this man eats too? Give him a turn, others are eating as 
it is.” 
 
- Interview 30, a PAS officer, on how politicians try to convince her to transfer a 
bureaucrat so that he too can get a cut of state resources. 
 
The fact that politicians use bureaucratic appointments to get ahead in 
electoral terms will not be news to anyone. However, many find it hard to describe 
politicisation precisely in terms of objectives/methods/bonds. A prominent Jhang 
politician was an exception; unlike other politicians I spoke to, he did not deny the 
charge of making politicised appointments. In fact, he saw his behaviour as a public 
service – ‘There is an inequality in the system. This is where the politician plays a 
role. The politician fights for those who elected him. They expect the politician to 
fight for their rights.’ For a politician, helping out people is not simply a matter of 
winning the votes of the bureaucrat and his/her family; it is about winning good will 
and a reputation for doing the right thing that will travel and bring in far more votes 
than that of one person and his family.  
Appointments made with the intent to gain an electoral advantage are less 
easily examined than those tied to bureaucratic efficiency. In the latter, there are 
instructions issued to the appointed bureaucrat as to what is expected of him. In the 
former, though, exchanges are less public and more inferential. Many cases involve 
removing someone who is unhelpful – through an extra-legal transfer or appointment 
as Officer on Special Duty (OSD) – in order to appoint a loyalist. Though much of my 
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fieldwork involved tracking the former part of the equation, this section explicates the 
motivations of patrons (with access to the CM) and the ‘loyal’ bureaucrats they extra-
legally appoint in pursuit of electoral gain outcomes. 
 
Political DCOs and Commissioners  
The posts of DCO and Commissioner are some of the most powerful and most 
coveted in the bureaucratic set up, particularly in the absence of elected local 
governments. Most bureaucrats divide Commissioner and DCO postings into 
significant and insignificant – large urban divisions or districts with complex political 
scenarios like Lahore, Rawalpindi, and Faisalabad are significant ones; appointments 
in these divisions/districts are a sign of trust by the political leadership (Interview 77, 
a former PAS officer). They can make a career, bringing an officer into the ambit of 
the provincial and party leadership (forming lasting bonds between them). 
Appointments to a Commissioner or DCO post in less significant divisions or districts 
are still valuable, but do not necessarily suggest a closeness with the political and 
bureaucratic leadership. However, Commissioner and DCO appointments are rarely 
made without the consent of prominent party figures (those in the CM’s inner circle) 
in the area (Interview 77).  
During Musharraf’s PMLQ government, a bureaucrat perceived as being 
unreceptive to military/political demands was liable to be removed. In Jhang, for 
instance, it became necessary to replace the DCO just days before a caretaker 
government took over to prepare for the 2008 elections because he had had a very 
public disagreement with the munshi of MNA Faisal Saleh Hayat, a prominent 
member of the ruling party. Hayat told CM Elahi that either the DCO be removed or 
he would quit the party. When the new pick for the DCO post was introduced to CM 
Elahi as a young man from Gujrat (Elahi’s own district), the CM commented, ‘Oh 
yes, boys from the ‘pind’ [village] are the best, he will keep my MPAs happy’ 
(Interview 77). 
Under the PMLN, carefully chosen bureaucrats appointed as DCOs are less 
likely to be transferred for disagreements with politicians, provided the politicians are 
not part of the CM’s kitchen cabinet. After the 2008 election and the dismantling of 
Musharraf’s local government system, the PPP government at the centre tried to 
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convince the PMLN not to revert to a system where bureaucrats controlled districts.235 
Instead, the PPP wanted local MPAs and MNAs to be in charge of the administration 
of the districts, and for bureaucrats to report to them – a system that would retain the 
best elements of Musharraf’s local government system but through democratically 
elected, partisan parliamentarians. The PMLN originally seemed to consider this 
request, but by mid-2009, it had decided that bureaucrats remain in charge of affairs at 
the district and sub-district levels.236 The Punjab government establishes its own ties 
with the bureaucrats it appoints to various districts and consolidates multiple lines of 
authority in the hands of one person, thus ensuring that a great deal of power rests in 
the hands of these officials.  
A number of DCO posts in large districts are given (extra-legally) to officers 
who have worked closely with the CM in the past – for instance, Azmat Mehmood 
was Personal Staff Officer to the CM before he became DCO Gujranwala – even 
when more senior officers are available.237 With there being no elected local 
government setup after 2008 (until 2016/17, i.e. after my fieldwork was completed), 
the CM’s bonds with bureaucrats posted as DCOs were used to direct service delivery 
to particular areas or projects, but they could also have more overtly electoral 
purposes. Interview 77, for instance, revealed that at times, the CM issues directions 
to bureaucrats, telling them to embarrass/harangue certain MPAs (those who may be 
junior or less favoured) while helping others (those in the CM’s inner circle): look 
after this one, not that one, etc. It is likely that such directions lead to junior 
politicians filing privilege motions (their only recourse) against bureaucrats in 
parliament, such as the one filed by Toba Tek Singh PMLN MPA Amjad Ali Javed 
against DCO Waqas Alam for damaging his private property and threatening him.238  
Prioritising relationships with bureaucrats over those with junior politicians 
allows the party leadership (specifically the CM) to exert itself at the district level so 
that local politicians remain indebted to the party for development activity (delivered 
by the CM’s favoured bureaucrats) in their constituency. But an even more significant 
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consequence is that it is a tactic to keep local politicians under check and establish 
centralised control in areas where the party is factionalised. In Faisalabad, Noor ul 
Amin Mengal was DCO for three years – an extraordinarily long term for a DCO. 
Mengal is from Balochistan and therefore, arguably less prone to political pressure in 
Punjab. However, he has worked closely with CM Shahbaz Sharif throughout his 
career, starting with a posting as Special Secretary to the CM, where he was in charge 
of developing the pilot for the much-praised Public Feedback Model239 (an anti-
corruption initiative). Mengal therefore not only saw eye-to-eye with the CM on 
reducing corruption – particularly corruption by local, junior politicians and 
bureaucrats – he was also someone the CM worked with and trusted to ‘deliver’ 
expected outcomes. This trust led to Mengal’s (extra-legal) appointment as DCO 
Lahore after Ahad Cheema’s somewhat controversial tenure ended in 2012:240 Mengal 
was in BPS 19 on an officiating basis at the time of his appointment,241 but according 
to the Punjab government’s 2010 Promotion Policy, promotions on officiating basis 
are permitted (temporarily) only where a suitable official cannot be found. Mengal’s 
appointment to DCO Lahore did not meet these requirements.242  
After the 2013 election, however, Mengal was posted as DCO Faisalabad. He 
was again too junior for the post since there is no record of his being promoted 
regularly to BPS 19. Soon after, he was also given additional charge of the Director 
General of the Faisalabad Development Authority, essentially giving him absolute 
control over development activity in the city.243 The appointment of a trusted 
bureaucrat as DCO Faisalabad was critical at this juncture for two (related) reasons. 
The first was that, although Faisalabad was electorally dominated by the PMLN, there 
were deep and longstanding divisions amongst party members in the district. The 
main fault line is between factions of the party led by MPA Rana Sanaullah (Punjab 
Law Minister) on the one hand, and Chaudhry Sher Ali and his son MNA Abid Sher 
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240 Mengal made DCO, Cheema gets LDA. March 19, 2012. DAWN. Available at: 
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Policy-2010-Punjab-Govt.pdf> [Accessed 23 September 2015]. 
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Ali (State Minister for Water and Power) on the other (Interview 30, a PAS officer 
who had previously been posted in Faisalabad). Sanaullah is a close advisor of 
Shahbaz Sharif while Abid Sher Ali is the Sharif brothers’ nephew.244 The factions 
have existed, with district MPAs, MNAs, and party workers taking sides, since the 
early 2000s, when Sanaullah advised against giving Abid Sher Ali a ticket for the 
2002 election because of Chaudhry Sher Ali’s imprisonment on corruption charges.245 
Attempts by the PMLN leadership to intervene and defuse the situation were 
unsuccessful246 and tensions remained high, with exchanges of gun fire and open 
clashes between the party factions.247 The consequence of party factionalisation in the 
district was that space opened up for the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf and put a dent in 
the PMLN vote. In a by-election in October 2013 for a provincial seat the PMLN had 
considered safe, less than six months after the general election, the PTI won.248  
In these circumstances, the CM had to hold together the PMLN’s vote bank 
and stave off the PTI’s electoral challenge through DCO Mengal. The strong bond the 
two men had from working together closely in the past was further strengthened by 
Mengal’s extra-legal appointment to a post for which he was too junior. This gave the 
CM enough leverage to demand that Mengal not only ‘deliver development’ in 
Faisalabad, but also that he play a more political role by helping manage the PMLN’s 
factions and retaining the party’s vote. Mengal’s reputation as a ‘man of integrity’ 
who rooted out corruption and worked on improving the district and, most 
importantly, his closeness to the CM meant that, regardless of what local PMLN 
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leaders did, the party’s overall image was protected.249 But when Sanaullah and Sher 
Ali (and their loyalists) were in a confrontation, it was up to Mengal to defuse the 
situation (by negotiating with both sides) before it escalated into violence. For 
instance, when one faction registered an FIR against the other for violating the 
election code of conduct, the DCO office had the FIR sealed to prevent a further 
‘trade of accusation [sic]’.250 If the DCO favoured one faction over another at any 
point, the CM (as the DCO’s boss) would be seen as playing favourites, causing a rift 
within the party.  
Commissioners are in charge of multiple districts (comprising a division) and 
they act as a liaison between the DCOs of each of those districts and the provincial 
government. Since the Commissioner is responsible for projects, revenue, and law and 
order, his post is key to politicians in the division. Rawalpindi’s Commissioners are 
generally difficult to appoint because politicians have very clear preferences as to 
whom they want in the position. In 2012, the CM was hamstrung for a month by a 
senior politician from Rawalpindi (most likely Chaudhry Nisar, then leader of the 
PMLN opposition at the centre) pressuring him to appoint a specific official.251 The 
CM interviewed four short-listed officials, but it was the most junior of them, 
Imdadullah Bosal, who was appointed.252  
Bosal had never headed a department but had been DCO Rawalpindi from 
2008 to 2011, when the PMLN had formed the provincial government and won six 
out of seven MNA seats in Rawalpindi. All seven towns in the district, however, were 
ruled by PMLQ-backed nazims under the local government system. Bosal’s posting 
was extra-legal (he was too junior for the post since he was in BPS 19 at the time and 
the post was for officers in BPS 20 or 21), but in due course he played a key role in 
dismantling the power of the PMLQ-backed nazims by withholding development 
funds and stopping work on initiatives that had been taken by the PMLQ 
                                                 
249 Zia, S. Leadership remains careful to save party’s image. 28 February 2014. The Nation. Available 
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government.253 These work ties formed the basis of a strong bond between Bosal and 
senior PMLN politicians, a bond that was enhanced by Bosal’s extra-legal 
appointment as Commissioner. The strength of this bond made him the right 
bureaucrat for the post in 2012 in the lead up to the 2013 election (when the PMLN 
was under pressure from the PTI, particularly in Rawalpindi where the PMLN’s 
politicians were apprehensive about their prospects, and Imran Khan [the leader of the 
PTI] was contesting himself). Between April 2012 and March 2013 (when the 
caretaker government made Bosal an Officer on Special Duty [OSD]), Rawalpindi 
saw the accelerated initiation and completion of a number of high visibility 
development projects, including a flyover, an underpass, and various road widening 
projects.254 In addition, Bosal ensured that the performance of the revenue department 
was improved, not just in terms of collection but also with regard to assisting citizens 
with their complaints (see Nelson 2011).255 Though Bosal held the post for just a year 
– till March 2013 – the PMLN managed to fend off the substantive electoral challenge 
by the PTI and win four out of seven MNA seats in Rawalpindi.  
 
Politicised Appointments in Bulk  
In many cases, extra-legal bureaucratic appointments are made with the simple 
objective of rewarding those loyal to the party leadership and those who voted for (or 
might vote for) the party. Every single elite, mid-level, and street-level bureaucrat I 
spoke to acknowledged interference by senior politicians in appointments and there 
are, of course, numerous accounts of officials being transferred on the sifarish of 
MPAs and MNAs. Appointments made for these purposes are usually made in bulk, 
dozens at a time and are quite effective in gaining votes and rewarding supporters. 
Though such tactics do not involve developing close individual bonds with appointed 
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bureaucrats, they are timed and designed to create a general sense amongst voters of 
munificence on the part of the politician. 
 




There are methods of making such appointments in patent violations of the 
rules – these are discussed in Chapter 5. The methods of bulk appointment discussed 
here are extra-legal – attempts to make appointments under some form of (debateable) 
legal cover, without drawing too much media or court attention. 
 
Contracts and Regularisation for Junior Bureaucrats  
At the level of middle-tier or street-level bureaucrats (teachers, lady health 
workers, etc.), contract appointments are a means of dispensing patronage amongst 
those left out of government jobs due to a lack of qualifications. At the same time, 
such appointments allow governments to bypass the rules regarding bureaucratic 
appointments to place particular people in particular posts. A news report on contract 
hiring in the public-sector Punjab University, quoting a member of the university 
syndicate, provides a succinct account of how these appointments can be made:256 
a person, who does not fulfill the criteria for a certain post, is first hired on contractual basis. 
Later, an advertisement is given in the newspapers and those already working on the contract 
at the university are given preference by the Selection Board and are hired permanently. 
 
                                                 
256 Ahmed, H. PU ‘unlawfully’ hires 300 people on contract on BS-17 to 21. September 5, 2015. 
Pakistan Today. Available at: <http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2015/09/05/city/lahore/pu-
unlawfully-hires-300-people-on-contract-on-bs-17-to-21/> [Accessed 10 December 2015].  
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Regardless of the concept of a contract, those who take up these government 
positions believe they will be regularised, entitling them to the same perks and 
privileges as a regular employee – security of tenure, promotion, and a pension. With 
protests from contract employees in a variety of departments (health, education, 
communications and works, population and welfare) at various times over the last few 
years257, there has been substantive pressure on the government to give in to these 
regularisation demands.  
Regularising employees means adding to a department’s wage and pension bill 
and therefore, the only person with the (extra-legal, discretionary) power to order the 
regularisation of contract employees is the CM. However, regularisation does have 
electoral cache, as CM Shahbaz Sharif noted when he issued CM Directives (at his 
discretion and ‘in the public interest’) to regularise employees (first contracted by the 
PMLQ government) in 2009258 and 2010259. Similarly, in the run up to the 2013 
election, a CM Directive ordered the regularisation of all employees in BPS 1-16 
(roughly 100,000 people)260, a decision that the Election Commission of Pakistan 
regarded as ‘pre-poll rigging’.261  
The scale of these appointments is crucial – regularisation means permanent 
pension-linked jobs for thousands of people. The CM does not have one-on-one bonds 
with them but regularisation is ordered with the hope that at least some of them will 
be grateful enough to support him and his party electorally. This is why the political 
context of regularisation decisions is important – in July 2014 for example, there were 
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protests in Multan with one of the threats being that protestors would join the PTI’s 
upcoming protests if they were not regularised.262 
It is important to note, though, that for all the flexibility of extra-legal 
appointments, and the advantages of making them in bulk, the circumstances in which 
they are made are critical to achieving a successful electoral outcome. Extra-legal 
bulk appointments (no matter how big the scale) will not result in electoral gain 
outcomes if the patron has not maintained a close relationship with the PAS 
bureaucrats (DCOs, Secretaries) and mid-tier bureaucrats (EDOs) who are actually in 
charge of appointing (or approving the appointment of) lower-tier staff. For instance, 
when the PMLN formed the government in Punjab in 2008, it accused the PMLQ 
(and specifically the CM Chaudhry Pervaiz Elahi) of making hundreds of 
appointments in 2007 to the ‘police, revenue, education and other departments to 
“secure and promote his financial and political interest and rig the Feb 18 [2008] 
elections”’.263 Many of these were allegedly cases of civil servants who were either 
retired or due to retire.264 However, the PMLQ’s attempt to ‘rig’ the 2008 election via 
extra-legal appointments was stymied by two institutional barriers. The first was the 
caretaker government, which would have transferred at least some of these officials, 
thus reducing the impact of any attempt to rig the election. The second and more 
significant barrier was set up by Musharraf and the PMLQ themselves – they 
alienated the powerful PAS cadre in the implementation of the local government 
system by handing the administrative reigns to elected local representatives (rather 
than bureaucrats), by posting military officials to senior bureaucratic posts, and 
blocking available bureaucratic posts with retired officials – thus slowing down 
promotions for everyone else. As an example of these power dynamics, and the 
resentments of PAS officers, Interviewee 6 (a PAS officer) recounted her experience 
of trying to get a field posting when the local government system was in operation 
and the PMLQ was in power: 
After making a fuss for a field posting, I was finally issued orders for Sahiwal [by the 
S&GAD]. Then I got a call saying, ‘No [you can’t go to Sahiwal because] the CM Secretariat 
has cancelled the posting. Though the DCO there has completed his three-year tenure, the 
                                                 
262 Contract government employees protest, demand regularisation. July 7, 2014. The Express Tribune. 
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regularisation/> [Accessed 10 December 2015]. 
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nazim doesn’t want to let him go.’ I then suggested Khushab, where the DCO had served for 4 
years. Again the nazim said ‘No, I can’t spare him; we don’t know this lady and don’t want 
her here.’  
 
In such circumstances, the PMLQ succeeded in making the PMLN (with its 
reputation for establishing close ties with the bureaucracy) seem more and more 
attractive to PAS and mid-tier bureaucrats. These officials knew that a PMLN 
government would mean more power in their hands – and so it was in Punjab from 
2008 to 2013, and in Punjab and the centre from 2013 to the present. Bureaucrats like 
Interviewee 6, therefore, had little incentive to aid the PMLQ in rigging the election 
(unless the party had individual biraderi ties with them or paid individual bribes). In 
the 2008 provincial election, the PMLQ placed third after both the PMLN and the 
PPP.  
 
Line Departments and Bureaucrats  
Ordinarily, mid-tier bureaucrats do not have close working relationships with 
the CM or senior politicians in his inner circle. The onus of developing a bond with a 
politician is therefore on the bureaucrat. It is for this reason that many district officials 
will make it a point to attend a prominent politician’s dera every day after work – 
usually with a gift (fruit, for example) in hand (Interview 8, a retired School 
Education Department bureaucrat). It is this practice that makes these bureaucrats 
familiar to prominent politicians and provides the necessary relationship on which to 
build strong bonds. 
 
The School Education Department  
Aside from extra-legal bulk appointments made to gather voters and reward 
party workers, appointments to forward electoral objectives are also made to 
particular posts. In the district-level School Education Department, for instance, these 
posts are the managerial/administrative ones: EDO, DEO, Deputy DEO, AEO, and 
school principals. These posts are coveted because they place teachers in positions of 
relative power and privilege as administrators at the district, tehsil, or markaz level. 
EDOs control the operation of the department throughout the district and interact with 
provincial bureaucratic elites (the Secretary, DCOs, and even the CM Secretariat 
staff). DEOs are the appointing authority for teachers (elementary and secondary) 
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recruited in BPS 9 to 16.265 However, there is an inherent precarity to these postings. 
For instance, only teachers promoted to the post of principal can be considered for 
EDO roles, and EDOs can always be transferred back to a principal post. The perks of 
the EDO position mean that all teachers aspire to EDO posts and those occupying 
them do not wish to be transferred back into schools. For this reason, EDOs involve 
themselves in patronage relationships in order to keep their post.  
Why do senior politicians need an EDO or DEO or Deputy DEO of their 
choice appointed in their district? The simplest answer lies in the appointment and 
transfer of teachers.266 The department has over 400,000 employees and is therefore 
one of the largest public-sector employers in the province. Across the board, officials 
in the department agreed that though recruitment to these posts have recently become 
‘merit-based’, transfers are entirely political. Interview 39 revealed that while she was 
DCO, an MPA approached her to ask that she have all transfer lists checked and 
approved by his office. In this instance, the DCO was able to refuse because the MPA 
was not close enough to the CM to cause problems for her. Furthermore, EDOs are 
the ones who recruit Class IV staff for schools – guards, peons, sweepers. These are 
all government jobs and are invariably filled with political appointees.  
A prominent example of a bureaucrat appointed to aid politicians in making 
extra-legal appointments for electoral gain is Pervaiz Akhtar. Favoured by Hamza 
Shahbaz Sharif and Rana Mashood (Minister School Education), Pervaiz Akhtar was 
recruited as a Senior Subject Specialist Geography but has never actually taught the 
subject (Interview 8, a School Education Department bureaucrat who retired as 
Director of Public Instruction). Akhtar’s name appears in a list of corrupt education 
department officials drawn up by Interviewee 8 in the late 1990s, focusing on 
kickbacks from contracts and making fake appointments. These allegations were not 
pursued, and Interviewee 8 recounts that Akhtar was (extra-legally) appointed EDO-E 
Kasur and then EDO-E Lahore in early 2011, bypassing his seniors. The EDO-E post 
is a critical means of distributing patronage through appointments to primary and 
secondary schools and financial malfeasance in budgets and contracts. A Section 
Officer (Interview 49) with the School Education department waited for the Section 
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Officers). September 9, 2016. Government of the Punjab, School Education Department. Available at: 
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Officer who shared his office to step out before he lowered his voice and commented 
that Akhtar was outside the department’s and even the Secretary’s jurisdiction due to 
his political connections. Attempts to transfer him from the post of EDO-E Lahore 
invariably failed as senior politicians would start calling immediately to demand that 
he remains in his post (Interview 8; 49). The fact that Akhtar retained the post of 
EDO-E Lahore for such a long period of time (in discretionary violation of tenure 
rules), despite his poor reputation within the School Education department and the 
various investigations launched into his alleged corruption267, suggest that his strong 
bonds with prominent PMLN politicians were further strengthened through his extra-
legal appointment. These bonds ensured that he worked to achieve electoral gain 
outcomes for his patrons.268 
 
Centralisation of Discretion: From Localities to Lahore  
Though it is difficult to tease out the exact exchange between politicians and 
bureaucrats where the outcome desired is electoral gain, the postings and behaviour of 
an EDO-E can often indicate their electoral value to a politician in the CM’s inner 
circle. Mazhar, EDO-E Rawalpindi for six years and counting (in violation of tenure 
rules), was somewhat coy to begin with, but soon admitted that although recruitment 
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268  Barring a short period as EDO-E Faisalabad under the caretaker government in 2013, Akhtar 
remained in that post till May 2016 (5 years), when he finally fell out of favour with the CM. (EDO, 
DEO education suspended. May 4, 2016. The News. Available at: 




and promotion are rule-bound, transfers are political (including his own). When the 
caretaker government took over in 2013, Mazhar was moved to the post of EDO-E 
Mianwali. However, after the election, Mazhar was back to the post of EDO-E 
Rawalpindi. Soon after, the CM ordered his transfer when he failed to provide 
adequate dengue prevention measures in schools. However, the CM was ‘convinced’ 
by members of his inner circle – allegedly Chaudhry Nisar and Shahid Khaqan 
Abbasi, both prominent PMLN politicians in Rawalpindi (Interview 8) – to reverse 
his orders. Mazhar’s return to Rawalpindi and his longevity in the EDO-E post (he 
personally told me what a difficult district Rawalpindi is to work in, stressing the 
short tenure of most bureaucratic officers there) suggest that the strong bonds he had 
with influential politicians in Rawalpindi were enhanced by his extra-legal 
appointment. He made himself indispensable to the achievement of his patrons’ 
electoral objectives by ensuring that their party workers, loyalists and voters were 
provided with the teaching jobs and posts they wanted.  
The only reason Mazhar was willing to give me a few minutes for an interview 
was my reference to a prominent retired Education Department official when 
introducing myself to his staff. The waiting area was tiny, and a few people had 
clearly been waiting some time to see the EDO. While I sat across from him in his 
office, a small, white-washed room dominated by the desk behind which he sat, 
Mazhar only occasionally looked up from his paperwork as a constant stream of 
officials went in and out, and the phones – the office landline, and the two cell phones 
he had on the desk in front of him – rang incessantly.  
Mazhar’s Deputy DEO later called him remarkably ‘flexible’, a term that 
carries a wealth of meaning amongst bureaucrats. This ‘flexibility’ became obvious 
after just a few minutes in his office as Mazhar chose which phone to answer, guiding 
select callers to seek political intervention to achieve their desired outcomes. The first 
phone call Mazhar answered was from someone who was requesting a favour. 
Mazhar’s response was simple:  
It is a political issue…I don’t have that kind of understanding with those with power…Army 
people don’t do [i.e. help] as much. Speak to the person who you want to vote for, he will 
have weight. Otherwise it will become very difficult...Ok, let’s see, we will do something 
[about it] this evening. 
 
The last comment references a common practice amongst bureaucrats at this 
level of the hierarchy – visiting politicians’ deras after they leave work, usually with 
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some fruit or other small gift to offer. In this case, Mazhar seemed to be offering to 
accompany the caller to a politician’s dera to request some type of sifarish.  
Once the call ended, Mazhar turned to me again. In response to a question, 
Mazhar claimed that he had never ‘done a favour’ for anyone and that ‘one is silly if 
he does’. However, it didn’t take long for his actions to contradict his words – one of 
his cell phones rang moments later, and this time, the call was from the representative 
of a politician who was trying to track down the progress on a favour. Mazhar said:  
 
You didn’t follow up. I have the file. DCO sahab has just forgotten, just remind him…We 
have the file ready. Rana sahab wasn’t under much compulsion so he didn’t follow up. 
 
Though I asked, he wouldn’t tell me what the politician’s representative was 
calling about. For all his flexibility, Mazhar has a healthy sense of self-preservation. 
He told me that, when the CM Secretariat calls, he has the jurat (daring) to always ask 
for instructions in writing – a CM Directive, for instance. And, when asked about a 
cell allegedly formed at the CM Secretariat for the express purpose of facilitating 
teacher transfers in 2011, he told a reporter: “We issue transfer orders on the orders of 
the education secretary”.269 At the district level, Mazhar did admit to me that,  
[T]here is no one who does not pressure us to go against the policy – additional secretary, 
deputy secretary, section officer, PSO to CM. The CM doesn’t talk to us directly. I got a call 
from the CM Secretariat just a while ago. I said this is not in rules. They said this has to be 
done…I receive ten calls a day from the CM Secretariat, and the Education Department 
doesn’t even let me sleep at night.  
 
When a certain kind of sifarish comes across their desk, phone calls like the 
ones Mazhar complains about are made to EDO-E offices across the province by 
officials in the CM Secretariat, the School Education Minister’s office, and the School 
Education Department in Lahore. For example, a Deputy Secretary would initially 
respond to requests for out-of-turn (and thus extra-legal) transfers by saying that if the 
EDO had said no, nothing could be done. However, when the names of political 
connections started to flow, specifically those of politicians in the CM’s kitchen 
cabinet, the Deputy Secretary would change his tack – ‘Let me discuss it with the 
EDO, he is new. Or we will look for another solution’.  
At the district level, receiving instructions from Lahore on how to bend or 
circumvent the law regarding education-sector appointments and transfers seems to be 
                                                 
269 It is easy if you have political connections! June 22, 2011. The News. Available at: 
<https://www.thenews.com.pk/archive/print/307919-it-is-easy-if-you-have-political-connections> 
[Accessed 5 January 2017]. 
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an everyday practice, indicating the distortion of the EDO’s discretion through 
centralisation (supposedly ‘in the public interest’). Since the development of detailed 
policies for the recruitment, transfer, and promotion of staff in the School Education 
Department, regulating (politicised) appointments by issuing instructions to EDOs 
from Lahore has become the method of choice for distributing patronage, all the while 
claiming that corruption is being eradicated at the lowest (‘most corrupt’) tiers of the 
bureaucracy. Mazhar’s experiences and comments, echoed by senior bureaucrats 
including one serving as Secretary Services, point to the way power is distributed and 
maintained, and how key patronage appointments now seem to work, in Punjab. 
While instructions to bend the law on teacher appointments now come from the 
centre, Mazhar is the guardian/gatekeeper of the district-level department, the bouncer 
outside the club acting on instructions from the top as to who can be appointed 
(admitted) and who cannot.  
 
Personal Enrichment and Protection 
Though many people I interviewed were willing to speak about the methods 
used in making appointments, few were willing to divulge the personal motivations 
behind those appointments. The response would almost unfailingly be an 
uncomfortable laugh and the comment that I must know the answer already. 
Therefore, where personal advantage (enrichment and protection) are involved, I had 
to rely on media accounts or ascribe motivations based on my conversations with 
bureaucrats.  
Senior Bureaucrats  
One of the benefits of a senior political or bureaucratic post is the ability to 
help not just one’s self, but one’s family, friends, and cronies. Such personal 
advantages can be seen through extra-legal bureaucratic appointments from the lowest 
to the highest tiers of the bureaucracy. Amongst PAS bureaucrats, these appointments 
reflect the socialisation of the cadre. Trained together at the PAS Academy and 
residing in close proximity in Government Official Residences (GOR) throughout 
their careers, PAS officers are close knit and will always look out for each other. In 
doing so, a PAS bureaucrat is not only helping a fellow officer but ensuring that he 
will have favours and support should he ever need them in the future.  
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In some cases, bonds between PAS bureaucrats do not ‘deliver’ personal 
advantage outcomes but do make the path toward them significantly easier. For 
instance, Interview 47, a PAS officer in the Punjab Home Department, suddenly 
remembered a phone he had to make in the middle of our interview. While I sat across 
from him at his desk, he called up a senior bureaucrat serving as a department’s 
Secretary and requested that his batch mate, who wanted to move from Islamabad to 
Lahore, be put on the interview list for a post. He praised the woman he was 
recommending, providing a summary of her career, highlighting her strengths, and 
provided her contact details to the Secretary. The phone call did not hand the post to 
Interview 47’s batch mate; it did, however, improve her chances since she had a 
fellow bureaucrat vouching for her.  
In other cases, personal advantage outcomes are ‘delivered’ on the basis of 
strong bonds of patronage resulting from the socialisation of PAS bureaucrats and the 
making of extra-legal appointments. Javed Mahmood, CS Punjab 2008-2010, for 
instance, had a reputation for benefitting fellow batch mates. During his time as 
Personal Secretary to the CM in 1997-1999, he allegedly kept his fellow course mates 
‘happy’ with good postings.270 He kept up this practice when he became CS in 2008 – 
a news report notes that Mahmood’s:271  
7th common has been appointed at the province’s top civil administrative posts, replacing the 
pre-commoners, 1st and 2nd commoners which were considered the previous government’s 
‘elite’ in the bureaucracy. 
 
For instance, the post of Additional Chief Secretary was held by Javed Aslam 
from 2008 till the imposition of Governor’s Rule in 2009, then by Sami Saeed, both 
of whom are from the 7th Common. Between Mahmood and his batch mate Nargis 
Sethi, who was Principal Secretary to the PM at the time, members of the 7th CTP 
were in prominent positions in Punjab and the centre in 2009/2010. In other words, 
Mahmood made sure his fellow batch mates benefitted personally from his tenure as 
CS. When the PMLN’s favoured bureaucrats occupied the PM Office as well in 2013, 
                                                 
270 Selection of Punjab bureaucratic team an uphill task for Sharifs. March 8, 2008. Daily Times. 
Available at: <http://archives.dailytimes.com.pk/lahore/08-Mar-2008/selection-of-punjab-bureaucratic-
team-an-uphill-task-for-sharifs> [Accessed 20 September 2015]. 
271 Sumra, A. H. Civil Secretariat: Outgoing year proves strenuous for officers, shows improvement. 
January 01, 2009. Daily Times. Available at: <http://archives.dailytimes.com.pk/lahore/01-Jan-




similar accounts of favouritism by Secretary to the PM Fawad Hasan Fawad began 
circulating.272   
Most PAS bureaucrats would not consider Mahmood’s or Fawad’s favouring 
of his batch mates to be an instance of extra-legal appointment or, for that matter, 
personal enrichment or protection. Instead, they would likely justify it as discretionary 
and in the public interest – Mahmood and Fawad were appointing a team they trusted 
to work with them. However, most PAS bureaucrats frown upon attempts by fellow 
members of the cadre to benefit from individual appointments made for personal gain 
or protection and few indulge in such practices on a systematic, sustained, or one-to-
one basis with politicians or other bureaucrats. Nonetheless, PAS bureaucrats serving 
in line departments such as School Education find that, despite their disapproval and 
without their knowledge, their junior office staff leak information, fake documents, 
and even authorise appointments. Interview 30 (a PAS officer in the S&GAD Punjab), 
for instance, told me that a politician came to see her with a fully authorised document 
for a self-glorification project – the construction of a large gateway. Gesturing toward 
the door into the small outer room where her PA and a peon sat at a small desk, she 
told me that she believed this was only possible with the collusion of the junior staff 
in her office 
Gaining the loyalty of office staff is therefore key for a senior bureaucrat – not 
just to control his own office, but also to protect himself and his activities from 
disciplinary action or public exposure. The best method for doing this is by forming 
bonds of patronage, e.g. by accepting sifarish for junior appointments. These sifarish 
will typically be for the extra-legal appointment of staff members’ family, friends, 
neighbours, and acquaintances (though it is possible that staff members accept money 
from people to make the case for extra-legal appointments and use their influence, 
essentially acting as touts). In exchange for the PAS officer granting these extra-legal 
favours, members of office staff such as clerks, typists, peons, etc. guard the senior 
bureaucrat’s interests rather than subverting them. A betrayal of trust by the junior 
staff (clerks, for example) will mean the end of this patronage chain in the form of 
extra-legal appointments. Junior officers are able to help their friends and relations 
with extra-legal appointments, while senior bureaucrats achieve their outcome of 
protection from leaks and illicit activities taking place without their knowledge.  
                                                 
272 Fawad’s wings clipped. August 20, 2017. The Nation. Available at: < http://nation.com.pk/20-Aug-
2017/fawad-s-wings-clipped> [Accessed 17 November 2017]. 
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In many cases, such patronage by a PAS bureaucrat creates a situation where 
lower-tier staff (like clerks) feel confident enough to demand extra-legal 
appointments. This confidence is the result of two factors: the position and power of 
the PAS bureaucrat, and the strength of their bond with him. The more senior the PAS 
bureaucrat is (and the closer he is to the CM’s inner circle), the more legal and extra-
legal power he, and therefore his staff, wield over junior posts. And the stronger the 
bond between the PAS bureaucrat and his office staff, the more likely the PAS officer 
is to guide his subordinates on ways to bend the regulations without breaking them, in 
exchange for their loyalty and protection of their boss’ interests. Furthermore, these 
strong bonds are not a secret – everyone in the department will typically know that a 
request from a clerk is backed by his PAS boss. Refusing a favour requested by the 
clerk is tantamount to refusing a favour request by the PAS bureaucrat.  
An example will explicate these complex relationships. In the School 
Education Department, in a Deputy Secretary’s office, two men walked in somewhat 
cautiously, suggesting that they considered themselves in the presence of a superior. 
One of the men explained that he was there to request a transfer for a relative (before 
the end of her tenure). ‘It is the Government Girls Primary School in Sialkot. The 
school is 12 km away. The other school is close to the teacher’s house; it has two 
vacancies. A teacher who worked with her moved to a school close by, now she wants 
to move too.’ The Deputy Secretary replied that a transfer was not possible, to which 
the man responded by suggesting a temporary posting. The Deputy Secretary took the 
parchi the man handed him in silence; it was covered in Urdu script detailing the 
name of the teacher, her particular post and BPS, and the name of the schools. The 
Deputy Secretary sighed and nodded his head, and the men thanked him and left. The 
Deputy Secretary turned to me, ‘These men were from the staff of the Additional 
Secretary in the department. If I say no to them, they will say he is very ‘kameena’ 
(mean spirited), doesn’t listen to anyone.’ For the Deputy Secretary, the fact that these 
men worked for a more senior bureaucrat in the department robbed him of the choice 
to refuse to accommodate the extra-legal transfer request. For the men making the 
request, they knew that their working relationship with the Additional Secretary 
would be the key to achieving their expected outcome, even if the request was 
patently extra-legal and being made on the flimsiest of excuses. For personal 
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professional reasons, the Deputy Secretary simply could not say no to the staff of his 
superior officer.  
In another instance, the Deputy Secretary sought a more equitable exchange 
relationship. A teacher had repeatedly approached him seeking an out-of-turn transfer 
to Rawalpindi (while a transfer ban was in place) where there were no vacancies. 
After the Deputy Secretary’s repeated refusals to help him, the teacher asked a senior 
bureaucrat he was related to – the Personal Assistant to the Additional Chief Secretary 
– to approach the Deputy Secondary on his behalf. The Personal Assistant thus 
became a patron (one with a close link to the CM’s inner circle) seeking an extra-legal 
appointment to benefit his family member. Unlike the times the teacher had tried to 
get a transfer on his own (and unlike the others who had been making similar requests 
before the Personal Assistant to the Additional Chief Secretary arrived), the Deputy 
Secretary did not say ‘No’ to the request for a transfer. Instead, he offered the 
Personal Assistant ideas for how the transfer could be carried out without openly 
violating the law, suggesting that he ‘approach the Secretary directly’ to make the 
transfer, or that the teacher ‘take leave for four months, then fifteen days in to the 
leave, get the holiday cancelled, and he will then be at disposal for a fresh [extra-
legal] appointment’. The change in the Deputy Secretary’s attitude was in response to 
the presence of a senior bureaucrat who was close to the CM’s inner circle. In 
exchange for offering these suggestions and smoothing the path for the extra-legal 
appointment, the Deputy Secretary asked the Personal Assistant to get him a job with 
the procurement department of DFID or USAID. In other words, the Deputy Secretary 
was only willing to risk making an extra-legal appointment if he was offered 
something in exchange, with that transaction becoming the basis for a stronger bond 
between him and the Personal Assistant. The teacher had nothing to offer the Deputy 
Secretary, and no work or family ties, to sustain a bond between them. Once the 
Personal Assistant to the Additional Chief Secretary promised to do what he could for 
the Deputy Secretary’s search for a different job, the teacher’s move to Rawalpindi 
(after a period of leave) was settled. The Personal Assistant (the patron), achieved his 






Line Departments  
Influential politicians and bureaucrats can exercise an inordinate amount of 
power amongst the lower tiers of the bureaucracy. It is through appointments at this 
level that politicians achieve personal (not merely institutional or party) outcomes. 
Interviewees 8 (retired School Education Department bureaucrat) and 30 (PAS officer 
serving in the S&GAD Punjab) explained that appointing loyal officers at mid-tier 
posts is about much more than making appointments to teaching positions or Class IV 
posts (guards, cleaning staff, peons, etc.). Though appointments can be a valuable 
electoral lever, mid-tier bureaucrats (EDOs and DEOs in the School Education 
Department and Executive Engineers [EXEN] in the Irrigation Department, for 
instance) are also in charge of government buildings (e.g. schools and rest houses), 
contracting out work on government infrastructure (canals and distributaries), and the 
provision of government goods and services (furniture, stationery, and canteens in 
schools).273 For politicians and senior bureaucrats in the CM’s kitchen cabinet, 
therefore, appointing a loyal EDO, DEO, head teacher, Sub-Divisional Officer, or 
EXEN can be critical to benefitting financially from these contracts.  
 
Irrigation  
In the Irrigation Department, budgets and contracts for irrigation work are the 
preoccupation of senior and mid-tier officials in the department – the Chief Engineer, 
Superintendent Engineers, and Executive Engineers in a division. Extra-legal 
appointments are often made to benefit from kickbacks and skimming, as Wade 
(1984) also records for India. A former Minister for Irrigation, Interviewee 109, told 
me that transfers and postings were a huge issue during his time in office: 
There was a lot of political pressure to appoint particular people in particular places…Posts on 
barrages and quarries [stone is quarried and transported for use in building flood banks] are 
particularly in demand.  
 
The mention of barrages and quarries specifically is important because of the 
substantial contracts involved. The Irrigation department contracts out work for the 
construction and maintenance of infrastructure – canals, dams, barrages, etc. – and 
these contracts run up to millions of rupees. Depending on the amount of money 
                                                 
273 Instead of being structured around districts, the Punjab Irrigation Department is structured around 




involved, control of this money falls with senior members of a division’s bureaucracy 
– the Executive Engineer (EXEN), Superintendent Engineer, and Chief Engineer. 
Therefore, making appointments to these senior posts, and strong bonds with those 
appointed, are important wherever well-connected patrons wish to benefit financially 
from government contracts. For instance, a Superintendent Engineer posted in Lahore 
(Interview 123) shared his seniority list with me, pointing out that an officer had been 
(extra-legally) ‘inserted’ into the list at number six even though he had been promoted 
to BPS 19 just a week before the issuance of the list and should have been placed 
much lower. Two others had been (extra-legally) posted to Chief Engineer posts in 
their Own Pay Scale, meaning that they were too junior for the posts. According to 
the Superintendent Engineer and other senior officials in the department, such actions 
are taken to appoint bureaucrats with influential patrons to posts in charge of projects, 
allowing them to skim from the budget and benefit the (well-connected) patrons who 
appointed them.  
An example from the Irrigation Department is useful in understanding how 
bureaucrats achieve both personal gain and protection outcomes. In 2014, a canal in 
Faisalabad division breached its banks, leading to a shortage of water for local 
farmers.274 The canal had undergone a recent rehabilitation program to increase its 
capacity, but since the breach had taken place well below the supposed improved 
capacity of the channel, an investigation was launched. The investigation report, 
published in 2015, revealed that Rs 2.1 billion had been paid out by the Faisalabad 
Division Chief Engineer Khawar Nazir for the defective work on the canal. Not only 
did this suggest that project funds had been misappropriated (i.e. pocketed by 
department officials and favoured contractors) but also that the monitoring of the 
project had been poor. The latter, in tandem with the posting decisions that Nazir 
made right after the breach, suggest that he had colluded with his subordinate officer, 
the Executive Engineer (EXEN), to embezzle project funds. At the time of the breach 
in 2014, the Chief Engineer blamed the serving Executive Engineer, Ashraf Shahid, 
and suspended him from service. But the Chief Engineer then requested the 
department Secretary to, in the ‘public interest’, fill the vacant post of Executive 
Engineer with the same man who had been serving at the post when the rehabilitation 
                                                 
274 Iqbal, J. Rs 2.1 billion scam in Irrigation Department. November 3, 2015. The Nation. Available at: 
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project had been carried out – Rashid Aziz. The return of Aziz to the post of EXEN 
suggests not only the Chief Engineer’s involvement in the embezzlement of 
government funds, but also his punitive and extra-legal use of his power to suspend an 
official so that a post could be vacated for a favoured officer. It also speaks to the 
strong bond between the two bureaucrats – Aziz returned to the post since the Chief 
Engineer trusted him, having worked with him before. In extra-legally vacating the 
post for him again, the Chief Engineer strengthened this bond further and set up a 
mutually beneficial (personal gain and protection) patronage relationship.  
However, when the investigation into the breach got underway, Rashid Aziz 
came under scrutiny. He was suspended from service after confessing to his 
involvement in embezzling project funds. Though implicated, the Chief Engineer 
Khawar Nazir did not face similar consequences.275 Absolving senior bureaucrats but 
punishing (albeit not very harshly) mid-tier ones is a common outcome of such 
accountability investigations. Though there is no clear evidence of this, it does 
suggest something important – that senior bureaucrats have more backing from 
influential, well-connected individuals in the bureaucracy and amongst politicians. As 
an example, Nazir, though tainted by corruption allegations, had sufficient support 
within the department, and particularly from the department Secretary, to be given a 
different post – General Manager of the Punjab Irrigation and Drainage Authority (a 
post typically reserved for officials who are about to retire or who need to be given a 
non-controversial job that keeps them out of the spot light).276  
 
School Education  
As I outlined above and as Interview 8 (retired School Education Department 
bureaucrat) pointed out for the School Education Department, there is an entire 
network within each department that benefits from kickbacks and skimming off of 
government budgets (see Wade 1984). If an EDO (or other mid-tier bureaucrat) is 
taking a cut out of contract profits, he is not doing so alone (Interview 8).  
In one instance, a headmistress, allegedly with political backing, was renting 
out the premises of a government school in Gulberg (Lahore) to nearby 
                                                 
275 Ibid.  
276 Iqbal, J. Fraud in Lower Chenab Canal rehab goes unnoticed. November 4, 2015. The Nation. 
Available at: <http://nation.com.pk/lahore/04-Nov-2015/fraud-in-lower-chenab-canal-rehab-goes-
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shopkeepers.277 She was found out by the Deputy District Education Officer (DDEO) 
and transferred to a different school in January 2011. However, the District Education 
Officer (DEO), though lacking the legal authority to do so, almost immediately (and 
extra-legally) returned the headmistress to her post, allegedly on the directions of the 
EDO Lahore, Pervaiz Akhtar, and a prominent local MPA. Though the DDEO had the 
requisite proof of wrong doing and even the DEO acknowledged that the school 
premises were being misused, the headmistress’s transaction-based bond (presumably 
formed with personal enrichment as the expected outcome) with the EDO and well-
connected local political figures, was strong enough to protect her from being held 
responsible and transferred away from the school. Remarkably, a few months later, 
the Deputy DEO who had originally discovered the misuse of the school premises 
was made an Officer on Special Duty (OSD) by the Secretary of the School Education 
Department. Not only does this suggest that the EDO and prominent local politicians 
were to be allowed to continue their enrichment activities (through junior 
bureaucrats); it also implies that either the Secretary himself or a well-connected 
politician was complicit in the misuse of government property. 
Interviewee 64, a District Monitoring Officer with the School Education 
Department, noted the political pressure placed on headmasters when issuing 
contracts for a school’s purchases. When a headmaster tried to hold an open auction 
for purchase contracts, politicians gave him a hard time until the DCO intervened to 
allow the auction to go ahead. Most contractors who take on government contracts are 
well connected to prominent politicians in the area – for instance, politicians or their 
family members may have a financial stake in the business or the contractor may be a 
party worker. These contractors rely on politicians with ties to the CM’s inner circle 
to help them ease the process of winning a government contract in exchange for a cut 
of the profits. For example, a frequent occurrence is that pressure from a politician 
forces the bureaucrat to hand out contracts without advertising them. In many cases, 
the contractor will then embezzle government funds – for example, use shoddier and 
cheaper materials for making furniture while pocketing the money left over from the 
budget. The profits for the politician from these contracts are used to finance not just 
deras and electoral campaigns, but also their lifestyles.  
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For example, when Sheikh Rasheed was an MNA in Rawalpindi and Minister 
for Overseas Pakistanis in the late 1990s, he had a stake in a contract for providing 
furniture to schools in the district. Interviewee 8 was (legally) appointed to a senior 
post in the School Education Department district hierarchy in Rawalpindi in 1999, 
just as the furniture was being delivered and payment was due, and soon became 
aware that Rasheed had interfered in the granting of the contract through district 
bureaucrats. Since Rasheed stood to gain from the payment himself, he pressured 
Interviewee 8 constantly to authorise payment to the contractor without any delay and 
without any investigation into the granting of the contract – in fact, at one point, 
Rasheed tried to bribe him as well (Interview 8, Interview 30). This incident suggests 
that the bureaucrat will ensure that a contract is granted to the business in which 
Sheikh Rasheed (a politician with close ties to the ruling party at the time) has a 
personal interest (the desired outcome), in exchange for his extra-legal appointment to 
the post, an extra-legal extension, or even a small cut of the profit. Rasheed’s 
expected outcome would have been achieved had it not been for Interviewee 8’s 
posting; Interviewee 8 refused to authorise the payment when he checked and found 
that the furniture was of poor quality. Sheikh Rasheed’s experience is not surprising; a 
transactional relationship with a district bureaucrat, though producing a strong bond, 
cannot guarantee that there will be no interference from higher levels of the 
bureaucracy. Therefore, senior politicians (who have a seat in the CM’s, or even 
PM’s, kitchen cabinet) will usually prefer to establish exchange relationships, and 
therefore bonds, with more senior bureaucrats to achieve desired personal gains.  
 
Precarity and the Structural Incentives Underpinning Extra-Legal Appointments 
for Personal Gain  
Why do mid-tier officials risk their careers to help patrons gain personally? 
The answer has to do with the structure of departments, which creates a need for 
patrons. In the School Education Department, district officials like the EDO and DEO 
work under two masters – the local DCO and the department’s Secretary. Often the 
local DCO will seize the EDO’s powers over appointments and demand that he be 
consulted before any decisions are made, particularly regarding the transfer of 
Primary School Teachers and other officials (Interview 8). But, of course the EDO 
still has to satisfy the department Secretary that he is meeting set targets (or at least 
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trying to).278 To counter the influence of the DCO and the demands made by the 
Secretary, and to secure his own position, the EDO will approach politicians or senior 
bureaucrats (who are close to the CM and the centre of power) for support and form 
bonds of patronage with them. 
In both the School Education and Irrigation Departments, bureaucrats at the 
mid-tier and junior levels are transferred frequently and promoted rarely, and often 
seek protection or assistance (respectively) from well-connected patrons. In both 
departments, the preferences of politicians and other influential landowners regarding 
who they want posted to mid-tier posts (such as EDO or Executive Engineer [EXEN]) 
mean that posts remain blocked – if there is no vacancy, there can be no promotion. 
This problem is particularly acute in the Irrigation Department. For instance, 
Interviewee 107 was serving as EXEN of the Lower Chenab Canal West when I met 
him. He had served as Sub-Divisional Officer (SDO) – the entry position into the 
department – for 24 years before being promoted! Interviewee 116 (EXEN Lahore) 
was SDO for 21 years before being promoted to EXEN. Slow promotions lead to 
Irrigation officials finding influential patrons who can get them a post at EXEN level 
– the level at which they finally acquire an office and staff of their own.  
In the School Education Department, assistance or protection from well-
connected patrons becomes even more necessary. It is possible that the DEO in a 
district is higher on the seniority list than the EDO. Furthermore, the posts of EDO 
and DEO (BPS 19) supervise and write PERs for principals and head teachers who are 
often in BPS 20. Interviewee 8 believes that this causes ‘heartburning’. ‘Seniors say 
he is junior, sifarishee aa kar baitha hua hai [He has only been posted here due to 
sifarish],’ Interview 8 told me, ‘Iss ki sifarish strong thi, humari kamzor thi [His 
sifarish was strong, ours was weak]’. Note that the default position is not there was no 
sifarish on one side and there was sifarish on the other, but that one sifarish (patron) 
was stronger than the other. 
Amongst junior staff such as teachers, Sub-Engineers, patwaris, and baildaars 
though, transfers are frequent, often punitive, and prone to interference from 
influential politicians, bureaucrats, and other players, despite the existence of a 
transfer policy that specifies tenure for various posts. For example, an EXEN told me 
that two MPAs had come to see him just that morning – one wanted him to suspend a 
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patwari; the other wanted him to restore a patwari who had been suspended. 
However, even street-level officials like the mate (gauge reader) and mistri are critical 
appointments – Interviewee 130 (Assistant EXEN Gujranwala) revealed that once the 
Secretary called the Executive Engineer to have him take back the transfer of a mate. 
As Interviewee 154 (SDO Sargodha) put it, ‘If you don’t listen to what the [well-
connected] politician has to say, bistar baandh kar rakhain [keep your belongings 
packed up]. You will get transferred because the politician will go to the Secretary. If 
your home is in Islamabad, they will post you to Rahim Yar Khan, and [vice versa] – 
as far as possible.’ His colleagues, seated in the Irrigation Department’s Sargodha 
office’s meeting room and listening to our conversation, nodded their heads in 
agreement and sympathy when he related an incident where he discovered water theft 
on land owned by a Secretary in one of the departments in Punjab and was transferred 
to Dera Ghazi Khan for his trouble. 
The result of such precarity is that bureaucrats at both mid- and lower tiers are 
seeking patrons (those close to the CM and his inner circle) who will help them 
navigate their careers. In exchange for assisting the patron in embezzling government 
funds or stealing water, the bureaucrat receives (extra-legal) stability of tenure or the 
promise of a desired transfer or promotion (Interview 116, EXEN Irrigation Lahore). 
These transactions set out clearly the expected (personal enrichment and protection) 
outcomes for both the patron and the bureaucrat.  
 
Politicians and Bureaucrats Lacking Access to the Centre 
Most mid-tier and junior bureaucrats will never have the chance to work 
closely with the CM or even with bureaucrats in the CM Secretariat. PAS bureaucrats 
(and arguably even the Punjab Provincial Management Service) have very stable 
careers compared to the tiers that comprise most bureaucrats – mid-tier and junior 
line-department employees. At this level of the bureaucracy, the competition for posts 
– promotions and transfers – is intense. Many wait years to move up a single pay 
scale, others spend years posted far away from their families. 
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Aside from members of the opposition parties, numerous junior PMLN office 
holders have complained to the press279, and many to me during fieldwork, that the 
CM is inaccessible and unavailable to them. However, these complaints are in stark 
contrast to repeated references to, for instance, CM Directives being used to make 
appointments to lower-tier posts. This discrepancy suggests that the CM has created a 
hierarchy of patronage – he acts to fulfil the lower-level sifarish of crony politicians 
and party workers but ignores politicians who are not as closely connected to him – in 
other words, a hierarchy of patronage within the ruling party. The CM’s office issues 
Directives for those who have stuck with the party for some years, who continue to 
win competitive districts, and who are party candidates that the party cannot afford to 
lose, but will shut out others from access to extra-legal appointments.   
 
Bureaucratic Efficiency 
As the Punjab government has centralised power in its own hands, it has also 
simultaneously emphasised the ‘delivery’ of services to citizens. In order to meet 
performance targets, district bureaucrats need to be able to trust the people they work 
with and therefore, look to appoint familiar faces to posts under their ambit. For 
example, when the post of Deputy District Education Officer in Rawalpindi became 
vacant, Mazhar (EDO-E) recommended a bureaucrat, Shafqat, for the post. Mazhar 
had worked with Shafqat while posted in Attock for some years prior to 2010 and 
knew him well. Shafqat (Interview 72, Deputy DEO Rawalpindi) sees Mazhar as a 
mentor, praising his wisdom and work ethic and the way he deals with the demands 
on his time. But Shafqat did not want to transfer from his post as Deputy DEO Attock 
to Deputy DEO Rawalpindi. He told me that he knew that the post would involve 
administering a very large and complex tehsil, where far too much pressure is exerted 
by influential parties, particularly from the military GHQ, on bureaucrats. After he 
had refused the posting a number of times, it was Mazhar who finally convinced 
Shafqat to take the post in 2015 when it became vacant, even though Shafqat’s tenure 
in Attock had not been completed (Interview 72). In effect, Shafqat’s posting was 
extra-legal. 
                                                 
279 Habib, Y. CM’s Secretariat opens doors to PML-N workers. January 26, 2012. Pakistan Today. 
Available at: <http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2012/01/26/national/cm%E2%80%99s-secretariat-
opens-doors-to-pml-n-workers/> [Accessed 14 September 2015]. 
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Mazhar’s interest in getting Shafqat to take the post of Deputy DEO (extra-
legally) was that he needed someone he could trust to head the tehsil of Rawalpindi. 
The tehsil is a large one, Shafqat told me, roughly the size of the entire district of 
Jhelum (Interview 72). Its administration is further complicated by the numerous 
pressures exerted on bureaucrats regarding the posting of teaching staff – from 
politicians to the President House to the GHQ. For the hour or so that I sat across 
from the Deputy DEO in a large room that he shared with more junior staff, there 
were constantly people coming in with requests of all kinds – some needed paperwork 
signed, one wanted to tell the Deputy DEO about plans for an event to be held that 
week, one wanted guidance with the primary school admissions process.  
The EDO-E is the approving authority for making appointments to elementary 
and primary school teaching posts, but the Deputy DEO is the officer who makes 
recommendations for his approval. The EDO-E does not have the time to investigate 
every single recommendation for a transfer. Particularly in an environment as 
complex as Rawalpindi, the EDO needs to be able to trust the decisions made by his 
Deputy DEO. Shafqat, like Mazhar, understands that there are times when it is 
important to go on the ‘back foot’ in the face of pressure from politicians, particularly 
senior ministers, while at other times, it is important to take a stand and resist pressure 
regarding appointments (Interview 72). The strong bond between Mazhar and 
Shafqat, based on the work ties they developed in Attock and further strengthened by 
Shafqat’s extra-legal appointment to Rawalpindi, allows Mazhar to achieve 
bureaucratic efficiency outcomes in a highly complex, difficult environment.  
In 2014, the School Education Department set a Universal Primary Education 
(UPE) enrolment target for EDOs in all of Punjab’s districts. When I visited 
department offices in different districts, this target was a primary concern for officials, 
particularly in large districts. In Rawalpindi, the government had decided that 120,000 
out-of-school children must enrol in government schools by October 31, 2014. To 
achieve this target, the department ordered EDOs to appoint Assistant Education 
Officers (AEOs) in all vacant posts in their district. These AEOs would be responsible 
for monitoring enrolment and would be held responsible for enrolment numbers in 
their markaz. At the time the campaign began, 35 out 50 AEO seats in Rawalpindi 
were vacant. The Rawalpindi EDO-E was the appointing authority for AEOs (BPS 
16), but when he tried to appoint the district’s teaching staff to these monitoring 
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positions, those eligible for the posts refused to take responsibility for the enrolment 
campaign. Their refusal was based on their understanding that they could never 
achieve the target the government had set (and would suffer when they could not do 
so). Note that it was the EDO’s peripheral status that made it possible for teaching 
staff to refuse to obey him. 
In the face of the deadline and the knowledge that he would be held 
responsible for any lack of up-to-date enrolment figures, then, the EDO had to find a 
means of filling the AEO posts. He decided to make extra-legal appointments to the 
vacant posts, appointing junior teachers to BPS 16 AEO posts so that the task of 
monitoring enrolment for the Universal Primary Education (UPE) campaign could be 
achieved. In May 2014, when the EDO was asked by a reporter how he had managed 
to fill the seats when the eligible teaching staff refused to take them, he admitted that 
the AEOs appointed did not have the requisite seniority for the post but that he had 
been desperate.280 The EDO’s desperation is a reflection of his peripheral status – he 
did not have the connections to the CM Secretariat required to air his grievances and 
have the deadline for monitoring enrolment moved. Instead, he had to make-do as 
best he could – in this case, via extra-legally appointing junior staff to senior posts.  
The EDO had an exchange relationship with the extra-legal appointees. Those 
who took on the AEO posts could enjoy the salary, perks, and privileges of a 
temporary and extra-legal promotion to an administrative post in exchange for 
‘delivering’ the data on enrolment required by the department. As it happened, the 
deadline for the UPE campaign was extended to May 2015, meaning that the extra-
legally appointed AEOs remained in their post for a year, if not more. More 
importantly for the EDO, the expected outcome was achieved – the monitoring 
required by the government was completed. 
 
Electoral Gain 
Officially, bureaucratic departments in Punjab emphasise that all appointments 
are to be made in line with department policy and bureaucrats are expected to turn 
away an ordinary citizen who shows up with a parchi from a politician or a 
bureaucrat. However, those appointed to key positions in the Secretariat and the 
                                                 
280 Abbasi, K. Education department in a fix over enrolment campaign. May 31, 2014. DAWN. 
Available at: <http://www.dawn.com/news/1109676> [Accessed 10 January 2017]. 
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district are expected to acquiesce to the right kind of sifarish – sifarish requested by 
the well-connected. This duality allows the image of ‘bureaucratic efficiency’ to 
remain intact as a key (albeit selective) talking point. 
Attempts by those outside the CM’s inner circle to make extra-legal 
appointments are rarely successful unless they can offer the mid-tier or senior 
bureaucrat enough incentive (for instance, a bribe) to overcome the risk of bending 
the rules. These incentives typically tip the scales, however, making the appointment 
illegal rather than extra-legal. By co-opting the senior bureaucracy, then, the central 
political leadership in Punjab has effectively shut out junior and opposition politicians 
from making extra-legal bureaucratic appointments for electoral gain.281 
 
The Powerless PM  
In 2011, a case was registered by the Rawalpindi office of the Anti-Corruption 
Establishment (ACE) against the industrial conglomerate Bahria Town, owned by the 
infamous property magnate (‘goonda’) Malik Riaz. Residents of villages near 
Rawalpindi complained that Riaz and his employees had had community land 
transferred to their own names using fake documents.282 Though attempts were made 
to quash the investigation, the Supreme Court ordered the Director General of the 
ACE Rawalpindi, Abid Javed, to present a report on the case. Prime Minister Gilani 
of the PPP stepped in and tried to transfer Javed to Balochistan under the Inter-
Provincial Rotation Policy. However, Javed had already served in that province for 15 
years and was thus outside of the remit of the policy.283  
In effect, Gilani sought to protect Malik Riaz, a supporter of PPP co-chairman 
Zardari and the PPP’s fragile coalition government, and his party’s and his own 
financial interests as well, since Riaz was likely a source of funds for electoral 
campaigns and personal enrichment. However, since Punjab was controlled by the 
PMLN, and Rawalpindi by PMLN stalwart Chaudhry Nisar, Gilani soon found 
                                                 
281 Politicians without access to the CM office have the most success in appointing supporters to Class 
IV posts (peons, guards, etc.) or at most to posts such as mistri, mate, patwari, and in some cases, 
elementary school teachers. However, occasional appointments to these posts are unlikely to make a 
significant difference to the politicians’ electoral prospects, even in the run up to an election.  
282 Asad, M. NAB gives clean chit to Riaz in land scam. February 10, 2013. DAWN. Available at: 
<http://www.dawn.com/news/784895/nab-gives-clean-chit-to-riaz-in-land-scam> [Accessed 14 
December 2015]. 
283 War over officers intensifies between PM, Chaudhry Nisar. November 5, 2011. The News. 
Available at: <https://www.thenews.com.pk/archive/print/330095-war-over-officers-intensifies-
between-pm-chaudhry-nisar> [Accessed 18 December 2015]. 
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himself on the back foot. As an opposition politician, he was outside the CM’s kitchen 
cabinet and lacked any working relationship with Javed – the sort of relationship that 
could have been used to establish a bond of patronage to achieve the outcome of 
protecting Bahria Town (Malik Riaz) from investigation. In response to Gilani’s 
attempt to transfer Javed, Chaudhry Nisar (PMLN) ‘threatened to transfer all the 
favourite police and administration officials’ that Gilani had had appointed (including 
the DCO, who was appointed in consultation with Gilani in Gilani’s home district of 
Multan) if Javed was moved.284 Gilani could not afford for that to happen – these 
favourite officials made it possible for Gilani and his family to dispense patronage to 
their voters and win their seats come election time. In other words, PM Gilani’s 
‘outsider’ status in Punjab – and the PMLN’s ability to check his power over the 
appointments of bureaucrats posted in Punjab – meant that he lacked the leverage 
needed to push through Javed’s election-enhancing extra-legal appointment without 
damaging repercussions. The investigation into Bahria Town’s activities continued.  
 
Personal Enrichment and Protection 
Personal gain and protection are outcomes that are difficult to accomplish 
unless a bureaucrat or politician has the right connections. This is made evident when 
demands for extra-legal appointments conflict. For instance, an Executive Engineer 
(EXEN) in the Irrigation Department told me that one morning, an MPA arrived to 
demand that a patwari be suspended or transferred for stealing water. A little later, 
another MPA arrived demanding that the same patwari be retained in his post so that 
he can continue his activities. Whichever action the EXEN takes in such a situation 
will involve a tacit endorsement of one or the other MPA, which means that the 
EXEN must weigh his options carefully. Typically, an EXEN will favour the MPA 
with connections to the CM and the Secretariat because this is the MPA who can 
come to the EXEN’s aid when he needs an extra-legal transfer or promotion (or 
protection from investigation). This transactional understanding – assisting the EXEN 
in his time of need in exchange for the EXEN looking the other way on an incident of 
water theft – will form the basis of a strong bond between the bureaucrat and the 
MPA. However, an MPA lacking connections to the centre of power in the province 
                                                 
284 Gilani, Nisar fight ‘war of cops’. October 22, 2011. The News. Available at: 
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(either because he is new to the ruling party and/or to politics, or because he is a 
member of the opposition) is of little use to an EXEN and is unlikely to get him to 
grant extra-legal appointments.285 In this instance, the EXEN decided to oblige the 
ruling party MPA and do nothing – the patwari retained his post. 
 
Government versus Judiciary  
Though we think of senior politicians as usually having the connections 
needed to protect themselves and their cronies from investigations, there are 
circumstances in which even the Prime Minister can find himself powerless and 
unable to make an extra-legal appointment without damaging personal consequences.  
In 2010, the government’s arrangements for Hajj were plagued by accusations 
of embezzlement (Rs 200 million). The scam implicated not just the federal minister 
for religious affairs and his departmental staff, but staff within the PM Secretariat, the 
(PPP) PM Yousaf Raza Gilani, and his son, Abdul Qadir Gilani (then a PPP MNA) as 
well. In April 2011, the government transferred the man in charge of the Hajj scam 
investigation, Hussain Asghar (Senior Director of the Federal Investigation Agency 
[FIA]) to Gilgit-Baltistan, in an effort to stall the investigation expanding into the PM 
Secretariat.286  
The Supreme Court, headed by activist Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad 
Chaudhry, initiated a suo moto case into the Hajj scam and, in a hearing held on 25 
July 2011, ordered the government to reinstate Hussain Asghar to the FIA 
immediately.287 When the Establishment Secretary, Sohail Ahmed, obeyed the court’s 
orders and issued the notification reinstating Asghar, he was removed from his post 
and made OSD.288 Though this was clearly an instance of the (extra-legal and 
discretionary) punitive use of the OSD designation by PM Gilani to protect himself 
and his cronies, he justified the decision by claiming that Ahmed had not consulted 
                                                 
285 One factor that could possibly disrupt this narrative is the presence of strong unions. 
286 FIA official investigating Haj scam transferred to Gilgit-Baltistan. 14 April 2011. DAWN. 
Available at: <https://www.dawn.com/news/620937/fia-official-investigating-haj-scam-transferred-to-
gilgit-baltistan> [Accessed 31 May 2017].   
287 SC orders reinstatement of Hajj probe chief. 26 July 2011. The Express Tribune. Available at: 
<https://tribune.com.pk/story/216917/hajj-scam-case-sc-orders-reinstatement-of-former-investigator/  
288 Establishment Secretary caught in crossfire. 26 July 2011. DAWN. Available at: 
<https://www.dawn.com/news/647225> [Accessed 31 May 2017] and Federal Secretary in trouble over 
notification. 26 July 2011. DAWN. Available at: <https://www.dawn.com/news/647114> [Accessed 31 
May 2017]. It was this incident that triggered a protest by the bureaucrat Anita Turab, who went on to 
file a case regarding political pressures on bureaucrats that led to a landmark judgement on 
bureaucratic appointments and performance by the Supreme Court in 2012.  
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the PM office in reinstating Asghar and had thus ‘undermined’ the PM’s authority.289 
In other words, the PM did not have the kind of professional or other ties with the 
Establishment Secretary that could form the basis of a strong bond (let alone one 
buttressed by an extra-legal appointment) leading the latter to protect the former. 
By this point, the Supreme Court was furious at what it considered contempt 
of court. On 28 July 2011, the court ruled that a civil servant could not be punished 
for obeying court orders, declared the notification making Sohail Ahmed OSD ‘null 
and void’, and ordered that he be reinstated as Establishment Secretary within a 
week.290 On 1 August, Ahmed was reinstated, but posted as Secretary Narcotics 
Control.291 The Supreme Court continued to pursue Hussain Asghar’s return to the 
FIA. Asghar returned to the FIA in 2012 and the investigation into the Hajj scam, 
including Gilani and his son’s involvement, continued into 2013.292  
The Hajj scam case was just one of many run-ins that PM Gilani had with the 
Supreme Court over bureaucratic appointments. His willingness to sacrifice a senior 
bureaucrat in pursuit of his own personal interest was resented by members of the 
PAS and led to a protest by a PAS officer working in the Ministry of the Interior, 
Anita Turab (Interview 18). The protest got picked up by media personnel and, soon, 
the Interior Minister Rehman Malik was calling Turab to demand an explanation. Not 
long after, Turab filed a case praying that the Supreme Court would order the 
government to follow its regulations and put an end to its wide discretion in making 
bureaucratic appointments. Though other PAS bureaucrats thought Turab foolhardy 
(even if they supported her in principle) – she has in fact suffered professionally after 
                                                 
289 Establishment Secretary undermined my authority: PM Gilani. 27 July 2011. The Express Tribune. 
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<https://www.dawn.com/news/1251412> [Accessed 31 May 2017]). 
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taking such a public stand – the judgment in this case became a touchstone for all 
future judgements regarding bureaucratic appointments.293  
 
Conclusion 
 This chapter began with cases of extra-legal appointments made to achieve 
bureaucratic efficiency: project or policy implementation, anti-corruption measures, 
cuts to government spending. However, unlike the previous chapter, outcomes in this 
chapter were achieved when extra-legal appointees cut a few corners or caused 
substantial dissension amongst their colleagues. In doing so, these bureaucrats 
received support and protection from the well-connected patrons who had appointed 
them. Amongst bureaucrats without access to the CM and his inner circle, extra-legal 
appointments are similarly used to achieve departmental targets.  
Extra-legal appointments made by well-connected patrons for electoral gain 
can take one of two forms – bulk appointments (reshuffles, contract appointments and 
regularization, CM Directives) or targeted appointments to key posts (Commissioner, 
DCO, EDO). In the first instance, the objective is to win good will amongst a large 
number of people either in advance of an election or soon after it. In the second, the 
objective is to deliver more targeted goods to voters and control the political narrative 
through ties formed on the basis of strong bonds and clear expectations with 
individual bureaucrats. Amongst politicians without access to the CM’s kitchen 
cabinet, the centralisation of patronage and discretion has made it very difficult to use 
extra-legal appointments for electoral gain.  
Personal outcomes are also well served by extra-legal methods where well-
connected patrons are concerned. Protection is crucial, not just in terms of 
accountability investigations and disciplinary enquiries, but also from punitive 
transfers and violence. Personal gain amongst elite bureaucrats may involve financial 
transactions, but these are often quite difficult to track. In some cases, however, 
personal gain is evident in patterns of appointment amongst senior PAS bureaucrats. 
Within line departments, appointments can gain a patron access to kickbacks from 
government budgets. Indeed, it is in the departments that regulate state resources that 
                                                 




true gains are to be made. In the Irrigation Department, for example, patrons make 
extra-legal appointments to acquire more than their fair share of water.   
With regard to personal outcomes, those without access to the CM and his 
inner circle are in a position not unlike the one they find themselves in with regard to 
electoral gain. Whereas mid-tier bureaucrats are able to make extra-legal 
appointments for personal gain and protection due to their familiarity with the rules 
and regulations (and their legal mandate to make appointments to junior posts), 
politicians excluded by the CM from his inner circle have no such opportunity. They 
are thus unable to make extra-legal appointments for personal benefit or to protect 
themselves or their cronies from investigation. 
In the next chapter, as I explore illegal methods of bureaucratic appointment 
not only does the focus shift to more personal objectives, but power also shifts from 





CHAPTER 5: ILLEGAL METHODS OF APPOINTMENT 
 
“Kuch log taaqatwar hain, kuch hum corrupt hain.” (To some extent, people are powerful, to 
some extent, we are corrupt). 
  
- Interviewee 152, a bureaucrat with the Irrigation Department, serving as Superintending 
Engineer in Lahore 
 
It is important to emphasise that illegal methods are not a residual category for 
everything that does not fit under legal or extra-legal. Just as with the methods 
discussed in earlier chapters, there is agency in choosing illegal methods, but also 
consequences. However, Pakistan’s accountability mechanisms are flawed. Many 
who do get caught do not get prosecuted. Those who are convicted are not always 
punished. Those who are punished might be pardoned. It could be argued therefore 
that there is little to stop an actor from employing illegal methods of appointment.  
However, if those aiming to politicise appointments hope to achieve specific 
outcomes, the risk to that outcome is much greater when using illegal methods. It is 
possible that the people involved will not get caught. It is possible that, if caught, the 
punishment will be minimal. But it is also possible that the media will find out; that 
they will be caught; that the CM will decide to act, and the illegal appointments will 
be reversed. Essentially, in terms of the outcome that the actor was trying to achieve, 
the risk of derailment is higher with illegal activity than with extra-legal or legal 
activity.  
The problem with exploring illegal activity is that there is a reporting bias. 
Typically, the only way of finding out about it is if those involved get caught. Even 
cases reported in the papers are sometimes inaccurate or contradictory. It is therefore 
foolish to deny that illegal activity can be successful. Many of those who fake 
documents and signatures, take bribes, or commit violence are never exposed, let 
alone caught. In many cases, departments and cadres will be rife with rumours, but 
there will be no proof. It is also difficult to trace the bonds and networks that enable 
and sustain even well-documented illegal appointments. Few admit to such 
connections, and not many reports make an effort to trace them. 
Furthermore, much of the illegal activity reported does not directly have to do 
with bureaucratic appointments. In fact, most academic work on corruption focuses 
on graft, bribery, and other forms of corruption in the delivery of services to citizens. 
The assumption is that officials already in the department are bribed to perform 
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particular tasks – distribution of contracts, aiding water theft, etc. Of course, 
corruption does take place in this fashion but this thesis is not concerned with 
corruption unless there is a direct link to bureaucratic appointments. What I have 
aimed to do throughout this thesis is to shift the focus to corruption in making 
appointments – the appointments that enable the kind of outcomes discussed in most 
of the corruption literature. 
A review of the newspapers soon reveals that most publicised illegal activity is 
that which takes place amongst the lower tiers of the bureaucracy – teachers, 
patwaris, etc. Those in the senior-most tier will sometimes get caught up in scams and 
embezzlement schemes with politicians – National Insurance Company Limited, 
Bahria Town, etc.294 But for the most part, mid-tier bureaucrats (Executive District 
Officers, District Education Officers or Executive Engineers) are not mentioned as 
much. In fact, mid-tier names come up most frequently as investigating officers. It is 
at this level, however, that I believe a lot of illegal activity gets overlooked, 
particularly bribery and problematic documentation. This is likely for two reasons. 
The first is the ability of mid-tier bureaucrats to dissociate themselves from corrupt 
practices by blaming clerks and other junior officials who were also complicit – for 
instance, by disavowing their signature on paperwork. The second is the bonds these 
mid-tier bureaucrats maintain with their department’s secretariat (Deputy Secretaries 
and Additional Secretaries, and the Secretaries). These bonds ensure that ‘valued’ 
mid-tier staff will be protected by the department while those lacking such protection 
will be implicated in corrupt practices…where necessary. 
 
The Precarity of Illegal Appointments  
There are three reasons more and more cases of illegal appointments are 
coming to light: recent improvements in appointment policy, increasing private media 
(and media interest in illegal appointments), and persistent resentment amongst 
bureaucratic colleagues. These three factors combine to produce circumstances that 
have made it increasingly difficult for illegal appointees to achieve, and sustain for the 
long term, the outcomes set for them by their patrons.  
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In August 2012, the School Education Department issued a notification to all 
of its administrative officials down to the AEO. Titled ‘Inter-District Transfers and 
Inter-Tehsil Transfers of PSTs Through Fake Orders’, the notification warns officials 
to be vigilant about fake documents. To counter the problem, the department 
mandates that all transfer requests be accompanied by a full set of original or attested 
documents (listed in the notification). If any teacher is appointed on the basis of fake 
documents, any salary she may have been paid would be ‘recovered from the DDO 
[Drawing and Disbursement Officer] concerned in person and concerned officials’ 
(Para 5).295  
These policy-based attempts at limiting illegal appointment mechanisms are 
aided by the media’s interest in illegal appointments. Since Musharraf opened the 
door for private media companies, there has been an explosion of print, television, and 
online media in Pakistan, alongside established names like the Jang Media Group and 
DAWN. The most prominent indicator of the media’s critical role in the lives of the 
bureaucrats was their fear that I was a journalist trying to covertly collect material for 
a newspaper or television expose. In addition, in Punjab, the CM’s desire to portray 
himself as the Khadim-e-Aala has not only generated media interest in his activities 
(and those of his political and bureaucratic cronies), but also led the CM’s 
government to use various media to broadcast its activities.  Certainly, there is a 
degree of media manipulation. For instance, it is an open secret that the new TV 
channel ‘Bol’ is funded by the military’s intelligence wing, and that the military’s 
dislike of Jang’s Geo News has led the channel to be banned from broadcasting in 
cantonment areas. However, competition between media groups has made it possible 
to find a variety of coverage and, often, to verify this or that accountStill, the 
bureaucrats I deal with in this chapter – mostly mid-tier and street-level bureaucrats – 
are not powerful enough to manipulate the media on their own behalf. In fact, many 
of them are more likely to be the ones held accountable for illegal activities and 
exposed in the media for those activities.   
Reports in the press create a great deal of pressure on the department to verify 
documents and investigate corruption more fully, and frequently result in the matter 
going to court, particularly in an environment where government jobs are in high 
                                                 
295 Transfer Policy 2013. 17 April 2013. School Education Department, Government of the Punjab. 
Official website. Available at: < http://www.schools.punjab.gov.pk/system/files/TransferPolicy-
2013.pdf> [Accessed 18 September 2015]. 
211 
 
demand and illegal appointees are portrayed as encroaching on the rights of those who 
deserve these jobs. The feeling amongst bureaucrats themselves that some of their 
peers are cheating others out of promotions and choice postings leads illegal 
appointees to be ratted out by their department colleagues. Extra-legal behaviour can 
still be justified, even if in a roundabout fashion, but bribery, faking documents, 
tampering with lists, etc. provides a short cut that creates resentment amongst others 
who worked hard for the same post, or who also tried but failed to get the post 
through sifarish. In other words, the problem with illegal behaviour is that the 
person’s colleagues are directly alienated by the practice. Therefore, illegal methods 
are often quite personal in their impact. While those directly involved in an illegal 
enterprise may benefit from it, it is difficult to share the spoils or the parties may be 
unwilling to do so.  
 
Political Leaders and their Cronies 
Bureaucratic Efficiency 
Unlike Chapters 3 & 4, this chapter focuses very little on efficiency outcomes. 
Efficiency outcomes, most often entrusted by patrons to senior bureaucrats belonging 
to the elite PAS, are poorly served by bureaucrats appointed illegally for the simple 
reason that such appointments may be found out, increasing the risk of derailment of 
the outcome.  
There are two avenues through which bureaucrats appointed illegally for 
achieving an efficiency outcome can be found out. First, holders of posts associated 
with projects and policies garner a great deal of scrutiny, media, political, and 
judicial. Extra-legal appointments do garner some attention, but it is possible for well-
connected politicians and bureaucrats to explain those away using the logic that the 
appointment is permitted under the powers and discretion of the CM or in the public 
interest. However, an illegal appointee would not be able to stand up to such scrutiny. 
Therefore, illegal appointments would endanger the ‘delivery’ of the project – an 
outcome the patron does not desire. This is not to say that there is no corruption in 
such projects – there may be. However, the bureaucrat chosen to ensure the project’s 




Second, though cadres like the PAS are considered tightly knit, there are often 
factions within them. Some of these factions are relatively trivial (those who drink 
alcohol and those who do not, for example), but at times, the divisions can become 
quite charged. For instance, factions can play off against each other by leaking 
information to journalists (most newspaper reports cite ‘official sources’) and, at 
times, filing court cases. In fact, disputes over who received a promotion and who did 
not are often placed before the court by disgruntled PAS bureaucrats, with the Orya 
Maqbool Abbasi case296 being one prominent example. The petitioner (Abbasi) 
argued that he and others had been skipped over by the PPP-led federal government to 
grant promotions (to BPS 22) to political favourites who were placed much lower 
than them on the seniority list.297 The case divided the bureaucracy into camps – those 
who had been favoured by the PPP in the grant of promotions in violation of seniority 
rules, those who had been overlooked (including the petitioners), and those who were 
already in BPS 22.298 A fourth camp could be identified as those who were aligned 
with the PMLN in Punjab.  Abbasi’s complaint was essentially one against the (extra-
legal) discretion allowed in determining promotions, and was thus not an instance of 
illegal appointments. However, the willingness of bureaucrats to go to court with such 
matters (even though they are well aware that other PAS bureaucrats may see it as a 
betrayal of the cadre), and thereby stall the work of any bureaucrat named in the case, 
is a clear incentive for patrons not to use illegal appointments when seeking to deliver 
bureaucratic efficiency outcomes. 
Aside from the risk of discovery and thus derailment, a senior illegal 
appointee within a department would also face resistance to his leadership. Extra-legal 
appointees to posts that regulate the activities and performance of junior bureaucrats 
(for example, posts in monitoring units) are rarely liked and there is resistance to 
reforms targeting department norms. For instance, the head of the monitoring unit in 
the Irrigation Department is not universally liked – in part because he is responsible 
for checking the performance of everyone else in the department and in part because 
there are rumours that he is too junior for his post. It would be reasonable to assume 
                                                 
296 Constitutional Petition 22 of 2013. Available at: 
<http://www.supremecourt.gov.pk/web/user_files/File/Const.P.22of2013.pdf> 
297 The court ruled in Abbasi’s favour and overturned the flagged promotions. 
298 Ghumman, K. SC verdict creates bad blood among bureaucrats. May 10, 2010. DAWN. Available 
at: <https://www.dawn.com/news/535020> [Accessed 27 November 2017].  
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that similar, perhaps even stronger, attitudes would result were he an illegal 
appointee.  
Why then are illegal appointments ever made for posts focusing on the 
delivery of services? I argue that such appointments are made for electoral gain or 
personal advantage or protection, but very rarely (if ever) for bureaucratic efficiency 
outcomes. For instance, the man who forcibly ousted an Executive Engineer and took 
over his post in Sheikhupura did not do so to improve the functioning of the Irrigation 
Department. He did it to benefit himself and his cronies. Rather than improve 
efficiency, such an appointee is more likely to become caught up in claims and 
counter claims regarding his appointment. Even where the objective is to thwart a 
project or policy, an illegal appointment is unnecessary when other (subtler) options 
are available.  
 
Electoral Gain  
Traditionally, illegal politicised appointments to the lowest tiers of the 
provincial bureaucracy, particularly Class IV employees (guards, peons, sweepers) 
and to street-level posts such as patwaris and teachers, have been made without a 
second thought. For politicians, the distribution of these jobs is a key means of 
winning votes. These are jobs that come with a pension and more job security than the 
private sector, and the posts are situated in the villages, tehsils, and towns where 
voters and party workers actually live. In terms of outcomes, the combination of 
electoral objectives and illegal method seem the most likely to produce the strong 
bonds and patronage-based reciprocity that sustain long-term outcomes.  
The problem is that applicants far outnumber jobs. Unemployment is the 
biggest issue amongst constituents, according to politicians, and it is likely to remain 
so considering Pakistan’s rapidly growing youth bulge. However, the government is 
not creating enough jobs to meet the demand as manufacturing has continued to 
decline, the private sector is too competitive for the vast majority, and government 
jobs are subject to hiring freezes. In this context, voters expect and demand that 
politicians provide them with jobs illegally. In making illegal appointments for 
electoral gain, politicians are forming a bond of patronage on the understanding that 
the voter (and his family) will remain electorally loyal once in the bureaucratic post of 
his choosing. Though this bond may be underpinned by loyalty and perhaps even a 
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biraderi relationship, it remains diffuse. The reason is that it is not in the politician’s 
power to ensure that the voter will continue to vote for him in the next election. 
Therefore, though the politician can hope that the outcome he expected – electoral 
gain – will be achieved through illegal appointments, he cannot guarantee it. 
 
The Centralisation of Sifarish  
Some politicians (Interview 61, a PMLN MPA, for example) contend that 
sifarish is sufficient to get their constituents what they want. This is true in some 
cases – typically where the politician has an established presence in a district, is well-
connected to the leadership of the ruling party, or has a pre-existing relationship with 
the appointing authority. For instance, Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan of the PMLN has 
won an MNA seat in Rawalpindi in every general election since 1988 and is a close 
ally of the Sharif brothers. He is therefore the most influential politician in the district. 
Every bureaucrat knows that no appointment in Rawalpindi can be made without 
Nisar’s blessing, and bureaucrats in mid-tier posts in the district were at pains to tell 
me how much they respected the MNA for his fairness and respect for the regulations 
regarding bureaucratic appointments. According to the Deputy District Education 
Officer (Interviewee 72), when Nisar sends in a note with a sifarish, he also writes 
that the regulations be checked and the sifarish fulfilled only if it is within the rules.  
In previous years, it was common practice for the ruling party to give its 
politicians a quota for fresh recruitment to government jobs – Class IV posts, clerks, 
patwaris, but, most crucially, teachers (Interviews 81, 82, both PMLN MPAs). 
Teaching jobs are important not just because there are so many jobs available, the 
work used to be unregulated, there were opportunities to shirk, and there was room to 
skim off school finances and contracts, but especially because of the additional 
responsibilities teachers are assigned at election time as polling agents. These 
additional responsibilities make the sifarish-based appointment of junior teaching 
staff a key route to achieve electoral gain outcomes.299  
                                                 
299 They also provide an explanation for the majority of government schools in the country are primary 
schools. The demands of voters for primary school teaching jobs outweigh the need for secondary and 
higher education for children. Abbasi, K. ‘81pc of all schools in Pakistan are primary’. May 25, 2016. 
DAWN. Available at: <http://www.dawn.com/news/1260547> [Accessed 17 December 2016]. 
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Though job quotas were declared illegal by the Supreme Court in 1993300, 
their use continued for many years as an open secret, providing legal cover for  what 
was essentially an illegal practice.  They have now been abolished for the most part 
(at least formally), according to PMLN MNAs and MPAs in Punjab (Interviews 62, 
81, 82, 106). Interviewee 61, a PMLN MPA in Lahore, told me that he had been able 
to appoint ‘only’ ten people to government posts (clerks and junior clerks) in the two 
years since his election in 2013. Though he was quick to reassure me that he believed 
in his CM’s merit-based policies, I had just walked past a long line of people waiting 
to see him to enter his small office, and it was hard to believe that they would be as 
easily reconciled to the need for merit in government recruitment. 
Now that quotas are less widespread, if not completely eliminated, the 
problem a politician faces in making illegal appointments is three-fold. The first is 
that illegal appointments are more visible. This is particularly true because politicians 
are public figures, and in Pakistan, as elsewhere, they are the subject of substantial 
media scrutiny. For this reason, the politicians I spoke to distinguished between ‘jaiz 
kaam’ (just or right thing to do) and ‘na-jaiz’ (unjust) or ‘ghalat kaam’ (wrong thing 
to do) (Interview 78, a PMLN MPA). The second is that, in making illegal 
appointments, no politician can accommodate everyone. There will be someone who 
is left out, disgruntled, perhaps because he couldn’t afford to bribe the politician, or 
because he made the request too late, or because the politician simply favoured 
someone else over him. This person may try to upstage not just the politician, but also 
all those he favoured. Third, the politician is in a position where he has to convince a 
bureaucrat to help him in appointing a bureaucrat illegally in the face of the PMLN 
government’s emphasis on merit and policy based appointments. 
Despite a stated interest in more meritocratic government by the PMLN over 
the last few years (thus the crackdown on quotas), Class IV posts remain heavily 
politicised and a great leveller amongst politicians with and without access to the CM 
and his kitchen cabinet. Most politicians I spoke to openly said they influenced these 
postings, using them to provide patronage to voters. Particularly after the closing 
down of avenues to politically appoint teaching staff (through the development of 
detailed appointment policies by the School Education Department), Class IV 
                                                 
300 Munawar Khan v. Niaz Muhammad and 7 others (1993 SCMR 1287) 
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appointments are hugely in demand. Though Class IV posts may have few prospects 
for advancement, they provide voters with a steady government salary and a pension.  
In most cases, Class IV appointments are the domain of departments’ district-
level bureaucrats such as Executive District Officers (EDOs) and Executive Engineers 
(EXENs). For instance, a PMLN MPA from Lahore (Interview 90) I spoke to 
mentioned approaching the EDO Health to ‘facilitate’ a voter in getting a post as a 
mid-wife. But such ‘facilitation’ may become problematic if it is brought to the 
attention of the press or higher authorities, by someone who was not amongst those 
favoured by the politician, or if the EDO refuses to accommodate the MPA’s 
demands, knowing that the MPA (being outside the CM’s kitchen cabinet) lacks the 
connections to penalise him or force the illegal appointment through. In such 
circumstances, the sifarish of a well-connected politician produces a far more certain 
outcome for both the voter and the politician.  
In the office of the Secretary Higher Education (Interview 42), two men 
walked in – a father and son. Once seated next to the Secretary’s desk, the father did 
all of the talking, but the job was for his son. The father had an application form for a 
security guard post in his hand, neatly filled out, with a small parchi attached to it. 
Security guard posts are usually the domain of a district’s EDO, not the Secretary. 
Handing the form to the Secretary, the father said ‘Malik Pervaiz sahab [a prominent 
PMLN MNA and party leader close to the Sharif brothers] sent us to you.’ In silence, 
the Secretary looked at the form with the parchi attached in the corner, wrote 
something on a separate piece of paper which he handed to the father to take to 
another office so that they could finalise the paperwork for the job. There were no 
questions asked, no rules mentioned, no objections raised regarding merit or 
recruitment lists – the Secretary simply accepted the politician’s sifarish. The 
implication of this incident is that, for those at the centre, appointments made 
completely outside the rules matter little at the Class IV level – the posts are not 
important to policy or even to the larger functioning of a department. This was 
reflected in conversations I had with other bureaucrats (PAS, mid-tier, and junior) and 
politicians (MPAs and MNAs) who were happy to concede that Class IV 
appointments are politicised. Senior bureaucrats are therefore happy to let well-
connected politicians dictate these appointments ‘100%’ as it takes the heat off other, 
more significant bureaucratic appointments. The politician benefits because his 
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constituent or party worker goes home not only with a government job, but also 
having been listened to and treated with respect by a ‘babu’ - if he was forced to 
respect the voter, then the bureaucrat must respect the politician too, and therefore, the 
politician is deserving of the voter’s support. 
In addition to buttressing my argument regarding the centralisation of 
patronage and discretion, it is evident from this example that by accepting influence 
over Class IV appointments himself, the Secretary is, by default, allowing his junior 
officers to engage with politicians in dispensing this type of patronage illegally. In 
cases where the right kind of sifarish (that is, sifarish from the well-connected) 
presents itself, the Secretary will look the other way as long as the district 
administration is able to keep the work of the department going and meet performance 
targets. At the same time, the Secretary also sees these appointments as a small 
concession to political patrons – to keep them happy so that they do not raise too 
much of a fuss over other, more senior appointments. Many bureaucrats showed some 
appreciation of the demands on a politician by the citizenry (Interview 16, a BPS 20 
PAS officer on leave from the civil service). As Interview 63 (a PAS officer serving 
as DCO Gujranwala), seated in his spacious, wood-panelled, tastefully furnished 
office, said, ‘Politicians are good people, it is their majboori. The DCO cannot 
understand that majboori of a man who has won 70 or 80 thousand votes. His dera 
works 24 hours, unlike bureaucratic offices’.  
 
Sifarish through Bureaucratic Intermediaries  
Martin (2016, 136) records that the electoral opponent of a prominent landlord 
believed that: 
by buying people’s votes Chowdri Abdullah was effectively carrying out a commercial 
transaction that absolved him of any future responsibility towards his voters…if anyone who 
had received money for their vote went to Chowdri Abdullah for patronage they would be told 
that they had already received money and be turned away. 
 
In my fieldwork, however, I found the converse to be true. Though money (or 
food or service) may well exchange hands in the lead up to voting day, the politicians 
I spoke to felt bound to deliver further patronage (here, jobs) to their voters. Though 
the popular perspective is that politicians are to blame for politicised appointments – 
they illegally appoint their constituents and workers to government jobs to benefit 
electorally or personally – many politicians mentioned the pressure they face from 
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their constituents to ‘deliver’. Interviewees 81 and 82, both PMLN MPAs in Punjab, 
for instance, said that when they left their homes in the morning, they were faced with 
people gathered outside waiting to see them (mostly to demand jobs).  
The difference between Martin’s view and mine may be due to a number of 
reasons – above all the fact that Martin’s fieldwork was conducted while the PMLQ 
was the king’s (and dictator’s) party with the entire state machinery on its side and 
little political opposition.301 My fieldwork was conducted in 2014-15 when the PMLN 
was serving its second term (consecutively) in Punjab and had also formed the 
government at the centre in 2013, and when the rise of the PTI as an opposition party, 
the increased viability of independent candidates, the judicial activism of the courts, 
and the rise of private media as an avenue for constituents to air their grievances 
against unhelpful politicians had all contributed to a much more competitive political 
environment. While there are similarities between the way the PMLQ and the PMLN 
conducted government business, one significant difference is the emphasis the PMLN 
and in particular CM Shahbaz Sharif has placed on ‘delivering’ ‘good governance’ 
(an emphasis that spread to the federal government as well post-2013). Driven by 
political competition, the consequence has been a further centralisation of power, 
patronage, and discretion in the CM’s hands and those of his inner circle (bureaucrats 
and politicians), particularly through bureaucratic appointments, and the demand that 
local politicians conform to the policies and practices of not just the CM but the 
bureaucrats his office appoints. 
The CM’s focus on ‘depoliticising’ recruitment, for example, has been a heavy 
blow to some (but not all) politicians. One of the major reasons for this is that the 
government has recently begun increasing access to the information underpinning 
recruitment (particularly merit lists). Therefore, when bureaucrats follow politicians’ 
instructions on who to recruit illegally, the recruitments are challenged by applicants 
themselves. In 2012, for instance, Kasur district saw protests by those who had 
applied for the post of SST (BPS 16) for Bio-Chemistry. These are senior positions 
amongst teaching staff, and the next step is often a head teacher position or a district 
management position like Deputy DEO. According to the disgruntled applicants, the 
district’s recruitment committee interviewed them and displayed a merit list of twelve 
                                                 
301 See also Nelson 2016.  
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selected candidates to fill nine posts.302 However, when the appointments were 
officially notified by the department, only two people from the merit list of twelve 
people were actually appointed. Those who were overlooked accused the EDO of 
filling the posts with those who had not made the merit list at all as a result of political 
pressure.303 Essentially, the final appointments were illegal in that they completely 
bypassed the rules and procedures that were not only in place, but had actually been 
followed. This implied that a political patron had intervened after the selection 
process to nominate his own people for the teaching posts.  
 




In cases like the one mentioned above, the outcomes sought by patrons are 
usually stymied by public protests, press attention, and most crucially, by the courts 
overturning politicised appointments. For example, in a case before the Lahore High 
Court (Bahawalpur Bench) in 2010, the petitioner contended that the Water and 
Power Development Authority (WAPDA) had advertised for various posts open to 
those resident in the jurisdiction of the Multan Electric Power Company (MEPCO). 
                                                 
302 Ashraf, W. Candidates for Kasur educators protest violation of merit. February 3, 2012. Pakistan 
Today. Available at: <http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2012/02/03/national/candidates-for-kasur-
educators-protest-violation-of-merit/> [Accessed 23 September 2016]. 
303 Ibid. 
304 Photo taken by the author in June 2015. 
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However, those appointed to the posts were ‘recommended’ by the WAPDA Minister 
and other politicians, and were not resident in the designated area.305 The court found 
that the department had not followed the rules and procedure laid down in their 
original advertisement and overturned the appointments made from outside the 
MEPCO jurisdiction. 
For politicians holding ministerial or other senior offices (and thus belonging 
to the CM’s kitchen cabinet), the drive to de-politicise the bureaucracy and curb 
illegal appointments necessitates a slight shift in the way patronage is dispensed. 
Senior politicians holding government office continue to make illegal appointments, 
but aware of increased scrutiny, they do so in a subtler manner than ministers did in 
the past. Rather than getting personally involved in making illegal appointments, 
politicians depute the task to favoured bureaucrats. These bureaucrats accept the lists 
with the awareness and blessing of the CM (explicitly expressed or implied), allowing 
the CM to regulate the distribution of patronage amongst his own party members 
(indirectly through the discretion of hand-picked bureaucrats) while the politician is 
able to keep his hands clean should there be any investigation by the courts or the 
media.  
The simplest way of making illegal appointments through intermediary 
bureaucrats is to tamper with lists of appointees. The ability to do so mandates a bond 
between the politician and the bureaucrats in charge of the list, either through the 
complicity of members of the department in the politician’s plan, or at least sufficient 
fear of the politician and his connections to do as he says (thus avoiding transfers or 
OSD appointments). Where there is complicity, it is quite likely that the well-
connected politician used extra-legal means to appoint bureaucrats who could illegally 
manipulate appointee lists for him. The politician may even have bribed the 
bureaucrat. However, fear of punitive transfers and appointments is simply the result 
of the knowledge that the politician has the ear of the CM or his inner circle.  
Regardless, tampering with lists is a method typically used to make 
appointments in bulk. There is no unique bond between the illegal appointees and the 
politician because there is no one-to-one relationship between them. Instead, a 
bureaucrat appointed illegally as part of a list is one of many whose support the 
                                                 
305 Judgment sheet Writ Petition Nos. 701/2010, 703/2010, 705/2010. Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur 
bench, Bahawalpur. Judicial Department, Lahore High Court official website. Available at: 
<http://sys.lhc.gov.pk/appjudgments/2010LHC1771.pdf> [Accessed 28 April 2017]. 
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politician hopes to retain. Even the outcome that is specified by the patron – electoral 
support – is unenforceable and somewhat vague. Therefore, since there is a lack of a 
specific, tangible, and enforceable outcome for the patron in exchange for the 
appointment, the bond between the patron and the bureaucrat is diffuse. 
An incident of list tampering that I personally witnessed was in the office of 
the Personal Assistant to the Deputy Speaker of the Punjab Assembly. This was a 
large room situated right next to the Deputy Speaker’s office, housing all of his staff. 
There was a sofa and a few chairs in one corner, but the rest of the room comprised of 
desks covered either with files and papers or computers. As I waited to see the Deputy 
Speaker, a man walked in and out a couple of times, each time with a few slips of 
paper in his hands. Each time he handed the slips to a man sitting in front of a 
computer in one corner of the room. The second time, the man stood behind the typist 
and as they spoke, I realised that they were drawing up a list of names of people who 
had asked the Deputy Speaker for government jobs. These were people who had 
visited the Deputy Speaker (an MPA) at his dera, in South Punjab. When the MPA 
returned to Lahore, he brought all the slips of paper with the details of his voters who 
were seeking jobs or transfers or promotions, handed them over to his staff who made 
up lists to send to the relevant departments. Again, tampering with lists, adding names 
to merit lists, is a means of electoral gain by helping voters.  
In the case of the Deputy Speaker, lists of names were being sent out from his 
office, thus blurring the lines between the formal and the informal power he holds. 
The bureaucrats receiving the lists may well have been extra-legally appointed or 
even bribed – the well-oiled machine that was collating and dispatching the lists of 
names to the relevant departments seemed to hint at a set of receptive bureaucrats at 
the other end. However, even where the bureaucrats receiving the lists are not 
complicit, the fact that the list is coming from the Deputy Speaker’s office will be 
sufficient incentive to add the names to the merit list. It is his central position as 
Deputy Speaker of the Punjab Assembly that clinches the deal – to refuse him would 
put the career of any bureaucrat in jeopardy. 
I observed a slightly different approach being adopted by a provincial minister 
who is close to the Sharif brothers. Rather than conducting the distribution of 
patronage himself, the minister outsourced it to junior bureaucrats in his ministerial 
office. It is not uncommon for the minister to visit his office infrequently at best. In 
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his absence, PAs and clerks become quite influential.306 This is in sharp contrast to the 
offices of constituency politicians where politicians themselves (or their relatives or 
munshis) made phone calls to bureaucrats with requests on behalf of their 
constituents. Though both these practices seem counter to the trend toward 
centralisation I have highlighted, they are actually extensions of the same process. 
Phone calls made to bureaucrats from the offices of constituency politicians who lack 
access to the CM’s inner circle may have no force at all. In the case of the minister 
outsourcing the distribution of patronage to his staff, a politician with access to the 
CM’s inner circle is simply extending his powers to junior bureaucrats he trusts. 
There are numerous advantages to this tactic – the minister is not tied to his 
office dealing with an endless stream of supplicants, does not risk being caught 
making illegal appointments, can disassociate himself from any appointment 
decisions that are called into question, and is able to present himself as an advocate of 
merit-based policy making while still ensuring that illegal appointments are extended 
to voters. 
This elaborate set-up is only possible if there is a strong bond between the 
Minister and the PA, but the PA is not, himself, typically an illegal appointment 
(though he may be an extra-legal one). However, the sifarish he authorises may 
involve illegal appointments. Clerks are in charge of the office’s documentation – 
typing up documents, assembling files and lists, and ferrying them back and forth (see 
Hull 2012), but the PA has control over what and who the Minister sees and when. 
The PA has access to all the resources that would ordinarily be available to the 
minister, and can drop the minister’s name wherever necessary with the knowledge 
and blessing of the minister himself.  In fact, it is quite likely that some of the parchis 
reaching the PA are signed by the minister himself, handed to him by a voter at his 
dera – as was the case for the parchis collated by the staff in the Deputy Speaker’s 
office (above). It is also quite likely that the minister encourages the PA to entertain 
certain sifarish over others (for example, those of government politicians over 
opposition politicians, senior party leaders over newer PMLN members, and favoured 
                                                 
306 In the offices of senior bureaucrats, though the bureaucrat is more present, junior bureaucrats are no 
less influential. Thus appointments to these posts can become controversial - in Sheikhupura, a dispute 
between two PMLN factions led to a controversy over the transfer of a Personal Assistant in the DCO’s 




bureaucrats over others) reflecting the hierarchy of patronage that exists within parties 
and within the bureaucracy. 
The office of the PA to the provincial minister in the Punjab Civil Secretariat 
is connected by a closed door to the Minister’s office. It is impossible to get to the 
Minister without seeing the PA first. The PA’s office was a long rectangular room 
with one side taken up completely by desks lined up to support a string of computer 
terminals. When I entered, my first impression was of a mass of cables hanging off 
the desk, papers stacked on every surface between the desktop computers, and a 
crowd of people. The PA himself, standing behind a desk that sat right in front of the 
Minister’s closed door, was the centre of attention. There were a couple of people 
waiting to speak to the PA, their faces showing their anxiety, and one or two had just 
left before I entered. I was there for about fifteen minutes and in that time, the PA 
dealt with three or four people, all sifarishees who produced small square pieces of 
paper with writing on them and asked the PA to help them. The sifarishee did not 
explain the problem – the PA would look at the slip they handed him which detailed 
the necessary information and bore the signature of the influential politician (who 
must be the ‘right kind’ of politician – ruling party, ally of the CM, etc.). The PA 
would ask a question: was there a seat vacant at the school the person wanted to be 
transferred to, or why the transfer was necessary. A typical response was that the 
teacher’s current school was too far away and the request was to transfer him or her to 
a nearer one. But these were all cases where not only had the teacher not completed 
his or her tenure in a post, and a transfer ban was in place, but the transfer was being 
requested where no seat was vacant – an illegal transfer.307 
The PA would then order one of the men sitting in front of a desktop computer 
nearby to call the relevant EDO or DEO, or if the request was more complex, a 
Deputy Secretary in the department. The PA would recount the details to the officer at 
the other end of the line and then turn to the sifarishee and tell him to go speak to a 
department official (the Deputy Secretary or the relevant EDO or DEO) for further 
instructions. The PA did not make suggestions as to how the requested appointment 
was to happen. That was for the district or department officer to figure out – how to 
work around the transfer ban that was in place for the next six months, for instance. 
The PA’s job was to make sure that the supplicant saw that his request was 
                                                 
307 Note that requests were not being made by those outside the bureaucracy for fresh recruitment, but 
by bureaucrats themselves. 
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acknowledged and acted on. Legally speaking, a PA has no standing to order district 
officials to comply with his demands. No money exchanges hands – people are not 
bribing the PA to get them the appointment they want. They are drawing instead on 
their political connections, and the PA is exercising power that is associated with his 
position (not a degree or money or votes or membership of a particular powerful 
group) and made possible by the absence (and blessing) of the minister to place a 
request for an illegal appointment to be made.308 In cases of intra-district teacher 
transfers, for example, the bureaucrats that obey the PA’s instructions are well aware 
not only that the PA is operating with a blank cheque from the department’s minister, 
but that the minister’s close alliance with the CM means that non-compliant 
bureaucrats will be punished through punitive transfers, OSD designations, even 
suspensions.  
Though district and secretariat officials are well aware that a call from the 
Minister’s PA is essentially a call from the Minister, however, it is possible that the 
favour may not be granted. Where inter-district transfers or transfers of more senior 
teaching staff are involved, the sifarish may require approval from an official in the 
department secretariat (from a Deputy or Additional Secretary, or the Secretary), 
raising too many red flags. The PA has little regard for what the procedure is 
supposed to be and does not feel in any way strait jacketed by regulations that are 
neither his domain nor directly impacting him. In calling up district employees, 
though, the PA is essentially passing the buck to the district bureaucrat who will have 
to produce the necessary paperwork, and sign it, to put the appointment through. The 
risk to the PA is minimised, but the risk for the department bureaucrat is enhanced, 
making them more cautious. 
Where the transfer does not take place, the fault would (be perceived to) lie 
with the officials of the department, not the PA or the referring politician. This is an 
important point because it tells us something about the relationship between the 
supplicant and the patron whose influence they are drawing upon to get the illegal 
appointment of their choice.  The Minister or some other politician has no direct bond 
with those demanding an illegal appointment of the PA. While this means that the 
bureaucrats seeking transfers cannot hold him responsible if no transfer is 
forthcoming, it also means that the Minister cannot ensure that they will continue to 
                                                 
308 Furthermore, since the sifarishees were government servants themselves (clerks or stenographers, 
for instance), in helping them the PA was forming bonds that would last throughout their careers. 
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vote for him even if they get their desired transfer. The bond between the Minister and 
the appointee is therefore quite diffuse.  
 
Jobs for Their Boys  
Unlike the outsourcing of discretion and patronage by ministers to 
bureaucrats, interference by ministers in recruitments to their departments was carried 
out directly, openly and on a large scale during the 1990s and the first decade of the 
2000s. Despite the fact that the Rules of Business establish that ministers and 
legislators have no legal standing to recruit officers or determine their postings within 
departments, ministers often succeeded in appointing voters and party workers to their 
departments in the hope of winning or retaining their electoral support. Many 
bureaucrats I spoke to who were employed at the time mentioned the complete lack of 
regulation concerning appointments during this period, when lists of names would be 
sent in by politicians for vacant posts and accepted without question. The objective of 
such appointments was (and where it is attempted, still is) to reward those who cast 
votes for the politician at the last election, but more crucially, to ensure the support of 
voters in the next election – an electoral gain outcome.309 However, it is important to 
acknowledge that electoral gain is not something that politicians go looking for only 
as elections are approaching. The whole five-year term is spent preparing for the next 
round of voting. Bureaucrats acknowledged that as elections neared, the demands 
made on them increased, but almost every one I spoke to told me that electoral gain is 
sought throughout the electoral cycle. 
In a case from 1996, a Minister was accused of making illegal appointments to 
his department to help his own constituents and those of his fellow politicians. The 
Federal Minister of the Oil and Gas Development Corporation Limited (OGDCL), 
Anwar Saifullah Khan, recruited 145 people without advertisement (a legal 
requirement) and in violation of merit requirements. Khan was originally found guilty 
in 2000, but in 2002, the Lahore High Court overturned the conviction on appeal on 
the basis that Khan’s actions – making illegal appointments for political gain - had not 
                                                 
309 It is important to remember that throughout the 1990s, none of the governments completed their 
term. With no way of knowing when an election would be held, appointments for electoral gain were 
made throughout the term. 
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involved criminal intent and was the ‘prevalent practice’.310 The state appealed this 
judgement before the Supreme Court in 2006, but the judgement was reserved till 
2016. Authored by Justice Asif Saeed Khosa, the judgement includes a 
comprehensive and authoritative review of case law on misuse of authority by 
politicians and bureaucrats, and finds that the Minister had ‘maneuvered the relevant 
appointments and that too against the resistance of the Chairman, Oil & Gas 
Development Corporation and against the interests of that Corporation and with the 
sole object of pleasing his political friends in the Parliament.’311 In many cases of this 
type, courts and tribunals find the appointments to be illegal, but may not dismiss the 
appointees.312 The only politician I spoke to who openly admitted to distributing jobs 
amongst constituents in exchange for their vote was a former MNA from Jhang. 
Sitting in his marble-floored, tastefully decorated, spotless office, Interviewee 79 (a 
former MNA who has changed parties a number of times) said, ‘Unemployment is a 
huge issue and I try to provide for my people. This is not Westminster style of 
democracy. Legislators don’t only legislate. When I ask for votes, people ask what 
will you give us in return?’  
Faisal Saleh Hayat is a religious pir and thus has dedicated followers (a vote 
bank) in his constituency. His bond with his voters is almost paternal. However, his 
constituency has never been a safe one. This is because his most prominent opponents 
are his cousin, Abida Hussain, and now her son, Abid Hussain Imam, who bring their 
own religious vote bank to the table.313 This makes the distribution of patronage (here, 
government jobs) essential to his success as a politician. In 2002, Hayat became 
Minister of Interior. Though there are no reports regarding corruption from the press 
                                                 
310 Khan, S. SC restores Anwar Saifullah’s sentence after 15 years. January 22, 2016. The News. 
Available at: <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/92958-SC-restores-Anwar-Saifullahs-sentence-after-
15-years> [Accessed 17 March 2016]. These rulings were suspect because of the role the Musharraf 
military administration played in judicial decision making at the time. 
311 Page 24, Judgement Criminal Appeal No. 264 of 2006. Supreme Court of Pakistan. Official website. 
Available at: <http://www.supremecourt.gov.pk/web/user_files/File/crl.a.264_2006.pdf> [Accessed 28 
April 2017]. There was one dissenting judge. The judgment was sent out to all government departments 
by the S&GAD in an attempt to make the rules of bureaucratic appointment clear to everyone – Iqbal, 
J. Punjab officers on the horns of dilemma. June 9, 2016. The Nation. Available at: 
<http://nation.com.pk/national/09-Jun-2016/punjab-officers-on-the-horns-of-dilemma> [Accessed 18 
September 2016]. 
312 Arguments for this include preserving the departmental status quo, preventing further litigation, and 
allowing those who may have worked diligently despite an illegal appointment a career.  
313 His vote bank and willingness to dispense patronage with largesse, has allowed him to be flexible in 
his political loyalties, going where his personal interests direct him. 
227 
 
at the time,314 later accounts of Hayat’s career note that his tenure at the Ministry of 
Interior was dogged by rumours of corruption.315 In 2008, Hayat was re-elected in 
NA-87 Jhang and became the Minister of Housing and Works under the coalition 
government between the PPP and PMLQ. Thereafter, two separate investigations 
were launched by NAB regarding illegal recruitment during his term as Minister. In 
2012, NAB launched an investigation into allegations of illegal recruitment of daily 
wagers in the Pakistan Public Works Department (an attached department of the 
Ministry) after receiving evidence from department employees.316 Then, in 2014, 
NAB initiated an investigation into the illegal appointment of 130 people (in violation 
of merit and age requirements, some with fake degrees, and some after the payment of 
bribes) in the Pakistan Housing Authority (an autonomous body under the 
Ministry).317 The investigation began when the majority of the recruits in the Housing 
Authority were found to be from Jhang, Hayat’s constituency318, suggesting that 
Hayat had used the jobs to reward voters and loyalists in his constituency and ensure 
their future support. When NAB questioned the illegal recruits, they allegedly 
admitted that they were appointed in violation of the rules, through a ‘special 
order’.319 The fact that the people Hayat had recruited to win their electoral support 
reported his illegal activities is evidence of the risk of making illegal appointments. 
Since Hayat was making appointments in bulk, his bond with the illegal appointees 
was diffuse. For now, some of Hayat’s illegal appointments stand in both the Pakistan 
                                                 
314 This is likely because the media was more regulated at the time since Musharraf was in power and 
was determined to ensure that the PMLQ’s government seem successful. 
315 Khan, A. F. The many lives of Faisal Saleh Hayat. April 27, 2013. DAWN. Available at: 
<http://www.dawn.com/news/794438/the-many-lives-of-faisal-saleh-hayat> [Accessed 18 September 
2015]. Farooq, U. 2014. Diminishing Returns: Sufi Shrines in Pakistan’s Politics. The Revealer. 
Available at: <https://wp.nyu.edu/therevealer/2014/01/15/diminishing-returns-sufi-shrines-in-
pakistans-politics/> [Accessed 18 September 2015]. 
316 No personal grudge against Faisal Saleh, says NAB. November 1, 2012. The Nation. Available at: 
<http://nation.com.pk/national/01-Nov-2012/no-personal-grudge-against-faisal-saleh-says-nab> 
[Accessed 22 November 2016]; Faisal blasts NAB chief. October 24, 2012. The News. Available at: 
<https://www.thenews.com.pk/archive/print/392452-faisal-blasts-nab-chief> [Accessed 22 November 
2016]. 
317 Malik, Z. NAB all set to file reference against Faisal Saleh Hayat. 11 May 2016. Daily Times. 
Available at: <http://dailytimes.com.pk/islamabad/12-May-16/nab-all-set-to-file-reference-against-
faisal-saleh-hayat> [Accessed 22 November 2016]; Report of the Standing Committee on Housing and 
Works, July 2012 to January 2015. Senate of Pakistan. Official website. Available at: 
<http://www.senate.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1428322616_348.pdf> [Accessed 23 November 2016]. 
318 NAB reference against PHA ready. January 24, 2014. The News. Available at: 
<https://www.thenews.com.pk/archive/print/635722-nab-reference-against-pha-ready> [Accessed 22 
November 2016]. 
319 Malik, Z. NAB all set to file reference against Faisal Saleh Hayat. 11 May 2016. Daily Times. 
Available at: <http://dailytimes.com.pk/islamabad/12-May-16/nab-all-set-to-file-reference-against-
faisal-saleh-hayat> [Accessed 22 November 2016]  
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Public Works Department and the Pakistan Housing Authority. However, the 
proverbial sword of Damocles hangs over the heads of Hayat’s appointees, as well as 
Hayat himself, with NAB liable to prosecute on the basis of these investigations at 
any time.320 As a result, Hayat’s expected outcome from the appointments – electoral 
gain – was not achieved.321  
 
Personal Enrichment and Protection 
Personal advantage is what makes the risk of illegal appointments worthwhile. 
Patrons and bureaucrats both seek to gain something for themselves (government 
funds, jobs, services, protection), in a manner that is outside the law. These gains may 
or may not be monetary and may or may not be used for other purposes – for instance, 
campaign funding, personal expenditures, investment, etc. Here, I focus on (1) money 
and employment, (2) services, resources, and protection. 
 
Money and Employment 
 In 2013, when the PMLN came back into power in Punjab and won at the 
centre as well, both the provincial and federal governments decided to crack down on 
corruption, and bureaucratic corruption in particular.322  The only real challenge for 
the PMLN in Punjab had been the PTI and its anti-corruption rhetoric. The PPP, 
plagued by corruption scandals throughout its term (2008-2013), was more or less 
wiped out in Punjab in the 2013 election. At the same time, ‘anti-corruption’ tied into 
the CM’s desire to retain control of all aspects of governance, including the 
dispensing of patronage in the province. 
                                                 
320 No further information is available on this since the case is still pending with NAB.  
321 Hayat’s inability to provide stable (though illegal) appointments to his voters, alongside a party 
wave favouring the PMLN and Hayat’s last minute disqualification (then requalification as an 
independent candidate) on a charge of water theft in April 2013, all contributed to his loss by a margin 
of roughly 13,000 votes to the PMLN candidate in the 2013 election. (Elections: Faisal Saleh Hayat, 
Abid Imam disqualified for stealing water. April 4, 2013. Geo News online. Available at: 
<https://www.geo.tv/latest/85825-election-faisal-saleh-hayat-abid-imam-disqualified-for-stealing-
water> [Accessed 23 November 2016].)  
322 In November 2013, the government decided that an official who had been convicted in a corruption 
case by the courts would be suspended from service with immediate effect - Ahmed, S. Officials under 
ACE spotlight to be ‘removed’. November 29, 2013. DAWN. Available at: 
<http://www.dawn.com/news/1059319> [Accessed 26 September 2015]; Officials facing corruption 
cases to be suspended. November 20, 2013. The Express Tribune. Available at: 
<http://tribune.com.pk/story/633983/officials-facing-corruption-cases-to-be-suspended/> [Accessed 26 




The CM’s focus on eradicating petty corruption (through a ‘citizen response 
system’ for example) highlighted a distinction that was brought up by certain 
bureaucrats – between corruption on a grand scale but limited to the higher echelons 
of government, and petty, personal corruption carried out on all kinds of everyday 
transactions. Those who make this distinction have a great disdain for the latter, 
which they associate with the PPP. Unsurprisingly, it is this form of petty corruption 
that has been the focus of accountability measures in the recent past.  
Members of the PPP, as some party members themselves freely admit 
(Interview 46 and 80), are more likely to ask voters for bribes for small tasks 
(arranging a transfer, getting leave approved). Interviewee 46, who contested (but 
lost) an MPA seat on a PPP ticket in 2013 and was obviously unhappy with the 
direction the party has taken in recent years, went a step further and admitted that the 
PPP’s politicians were ‘pick pockets’ taking petty amounts from constituents for 
helping them get a transfer, etc. In essence, they are making illegal bureaucratic 
appointments to benefit personally through the bribes they receive. There are no 
meaningful bonds. There are simply transactions creating temporary and diffuse 
bonds – money in exchange for a post, with the patron expecting little more than 
enrichment as an outcome. Though some of this money may be re-directed toward 
electoral campaigning or running the politician’s dera, electoral gain is seen as a 
(distant) secondary objective.  
This kind of petty personalised corruption extended to the highest levels of 
government while the PPP was in power at the centre between 2008 and 2013, and is 
perhaps best exemplified in the illegal appointment of the Prime Minister’s son-in-law 
to a post with the World Bank. Raja Azeem-ul-Haq Minhas, an Income Tax group 
officer and son-in-law of Raja Pervaiz Ashraf, Prime Minister of the PPP government 
toward the end of its tenure, came to the attention of the press and then the Supreme 
Court when he was illegally appointed an Executive Director of the World Bank, a 
post for bureaucrats to represent Pakistan’s (and selected other countries323) economic 
and development interests at the Bank in Washington. Not only was Mr Minhas too 
junior and inexperienced for the job, he was appointed without the formation of a 
selection board or a head-hunting committee, completely at the discretion of the PM 
and in the face of resistance from advisors and representatives of the Finance 
                                                 
323 The Office of the Executive Director, the World Bank. Official website. Available at: 
<http://www.worldbank.org/en/about/leadership/directors/eds06#1> [Accessed 28 April 2017]. 
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Division.324 However, the PM’s expected outcome was stymied by the press attention 
the illegal appointment garnered, which led to the Supreme Court taking suo moto 
notice of the appointment. When the court ordered the Establishment Division to 
furnish the details of his appointment, Minhas resigned from his post. In its ruling in 
2014 on various petitions related to illegal appointments, the Supreme Court referred 
Mr Minhas’ case to NAB.325 Appointments made for personal gain in this manner 
ensured that the PPP’s reputation amongst elite bureaucrats was that of a party that 
would do anything to benefit itself and nothing to benefit anyone else. In contrast, 
bureaucrats would tell me that though the PMLN is also corrupt, at least they benefit 
others alongside themselves.  
Indeed, PPP politicians are by no means the only ones to indulge in illegal 
appointments for personal gain. Despite the Punjab CM’s claims of eradicating 
corrupt appointment practices through policies and an emphasis on merit, the reality is 
that the government has succeeded only in establishing a hierarchy of illegal 
appointment practices – some are acceptable and some are not. The distinction 
between the two depends on who is indulging in it and the potential for the illegal 
practice to be found out and linked definitively back to a well-connected political 
patron. This makes the PMLN’s indulgence in politicised appointments subtler than 
the PPP’s. For instance, protection for those stealing irrigation water is often ensured 
at the highest levels of the department and the government as a whole. In 2013, an 
incident in Bahawalnagar involved members of the local Farmers’ Organisation 
attacking and detaining an EXEN and SDO.326 The officials were there to check 
outlets after a complaint that some had been tampered with (to steal water). The 
incident was investigated by the CM’s Inspection Team, but when the report was sent 
to the CM Secretariat, no action was taken against those named and found guilty in 
                                                 
324 Rana, S. PM appoints son-in-law to key World Bank post. December 15, 2012. The Express 
Tribune. Available at: <http://tribune.com.pk/story/480045/pm-appoints-son-in-law-to-key-world-
bank-post/> [Accessed 15 January 2017]. 
325 Judgement Constitution Petition No. 6 of 2011, C.M.A. No. 5216 of 2012, H.R.C. No 49012-P of 
2010. Supreme Court of Pakistan. Official website. Available at: 
<http://www.supremecourt.gov.pk/web/user_files/File/const.p.6_2011_final.pdf> [Accessed 15 
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326 Sumra, A. Theft with impunity: No action over assault on irrigation officers. September 27, 2013. 
The Express Tribune. Available at: <http://tribune.com.pk/story/609837/theft-with-impunity-no-action-
over-assault-on-irrigation-officers/> [Accessed 2 September 2016]. 
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the report. Journalists quoted an official as saying that the men who had attacked the 
officials were backed by prominent local politicians.327  
 
Services, Resources and Protection  
When I asked the Secretary Irrigation (Interview 89) about political pressure 
he faced on the job, he mentioned the existence of ‘a political economy of flood’. 
‘Floods bring with them compensation issues, lead to fake paperwork, patwaris 
carrying out fake surveys [of flood risk/damage]’, the Secretary told me. ‘And people 
demand that we do flood work (repair/prevention) near to flood [season] so 
accountability is zero.’  
There is plenty of evidence of this ‘political economy of flood’. Over the past 
few years, Pakistan has seen devastating flooding in parts of the country. In 2010, 
Muzaffargarh was hit particularly hard allegedly due to the corruption of irrigation 
officials in the district – 51 died and 1.5 million were displaced.328 Much of the 
damage was caused by the unwillingness of officials to divert flood water into land 
that had been set aside for that purpose. The reason for this was that the designated 
land was being used by influential families in the area to grow crops. Therefore, no 
bureaucrat was willing to risk the ire of these influential families by flooding their 
crops and causing them losses.329 One of these influential families was the Khosas, 
the family of then prominent PMLN politician and senior adviser to the CM, Zulfiqar 
Khan Khosa.  
This kind of decision making and the financial malfeasance surrounding 
procurement and construction that has become a hallmark of the flood season is 
enabled by what I call a political economy of bureaucratic appointments around 
floods. Seated behind a solid wood desk in a massive, luxurious office, the Secretary 
Irrigation told me,  
…there are posts where a lot of money is involved, and posts that are in charge of distribution 
and flow. So when politicians would come to make a request for an illegal appointment [close 
to flooding season], they had already made exchange arrangements [with the bureaucrat] in 
advance.  
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The evidence of these illegal appointments can be found in the inquiries into 
the 2010 floods by the ACE, the Irrigation Department330, the Supreme Court331, and a 
judicial commission. The Supreme Court enquiry (p.24) found that the department 
had abolished a number of posts in the recent past but had retained the staff, (illegally) 
transferring them to positions for which they lacked the required qualifications and 
skills.332 This suggests that there was room for politicians to intervene on behalf of 
these employees to have them posted to particular areas. Though none of the 
investigations explored why and on whose orders these illegal appointments were 
made, it is not difficult to come to the conclusion that they were the result of strong 
transactional bonds of patronage that influential politicians like Zulfiqar Khan Khosa 
had with bureaucrats to ensure that their lands were protected from flooding and their 
losses were limited.  
Despite investigations into the flooding by various bodies, this time the 
politicians’ expected outcome of personal gain was achieved. The reason that the 
reports on the flooding did not stymie the outcome is that protection for these 
politicians and ‘their’ illegal bureaucrats was provided by the highest levels of the 
government; the reports into the floods of 2010 were buried and the recommendations 
never followed up on.333 No one was held responsible – the Secretary Irrigation at the 
time was transferred to the post of Secretary Energy and faced no repercussions 
whatsoever.334  
However, it is misleading and unfair to suggest that only politicians are 
looking to gain financially through illegal appointments – bureaucrats are too. In fact, 
most cases of illegal appointments made for personal financial advantage can be 
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traced back to bureaucrats who occupy posts in the lower tiers of the bureaucratic 
hierarchy.  
 
Politicians and Bureaucrats Lacking Access to the Centre 
In the introductory chapters of this thesis, I suggested that bureaucrats and 
politicians in Punjab are currently preoccupied with ‘delivering’. What precisely is 
being delivered (i.e. where objectives meet outcomes) varies substantially from case 
to case - it could be an electoral win, a project completed on time, improvement in 
departmental performance, providing electricity to a certain village, or protection 
from an enquiry. While Martin (2014) argues that patronage exercised by landlords in 
rural Punjab unequivocally disadvantages the poor, I argue that patronage 
appointments to the bureaucracy produce more mixed results. Certain kinds of 
patronage appointments to the bureaucracy allow some politicians and some 
bureaucrats to ‘deliver’ to select beneficiaries. For instance, the appointment of lower 
and mid-tier Irrigation Department bureaucrats is key to aiding farmers (both rich and 
poor) in stealing irrigation water.  
The average constituency politician (holding no political party or government 
office) continues to try to influence bureaucratic appointments in the face of attempts 
by the PMLN’s Punjab government to limit such politicisation. Though districts and 
departments are endeavouring to reduce politicised recruitment (in line with the 
Punjab government’s centralisation of patronage), much less attention has been paid 
to transfers and promotions. It is mainly in the transfer of street-level officials that 
many politicians (even those lacking contact with the CM) continue to find a 
discretionary – albeit illegal – toe hold against an increasingly centralised 
bureaucracy.  
Though the CM has tried to remove the power to politicise appointments from 
politicians outside his inner circle, there are times when he has had to make 
concessions to members of the ruling party. These concessions take the form of an 
intervention by the CM permitting ruling party politicians to make illegal 
appointments of their choice to lower-tier posts – for instance to posts for the 
baildaars (BPS 11) who maintain and repair water distributary channels. After an 
advertisement was published in 2011, tests and interviews were conducted and 756 
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people were selected for vacant baildaar posts in April 2012.335 However, the CM 
Secretariat then ordered the Secretary Irrigation to stop the recruitment process. A 
news report quotes an official as revealing that DCOs were asking district politicians 
to hand in their own lists for appointments. A similar controversy over baildaar 
appointments emerged in Toba Tek Singh in 2004.336 The posts were advertised and 
interviews were held, but recruitment was delayed because politicians insisted that 
they be given a quota of appointments. These quotas would allow politicians to 
appoint favoured officers to baildaar posts – baildaars who would overlook outlets 
that had been tampered with (allowing the theft of irrigation water with impunity). 
Strong bonds based on loyalty and kinship ensure that the patron’s personal gain 
outcome is achieved.  
 
Bureaucratic Efficiency 
Amongst junior politicians, concerns of bureaucratic performance are only a 
priority in so far as they impact their electoral performance. And although bureaucrats 
at the department level will often form alliances with their subordinates to achieve 
bureaucratic efficiency goals, these alliances will rarely be the result of illegal 
appointments. The reason for this is simple – no bureaucrat would risk an illegal 
appointment simply to improve government performance. Illegal appointments are 
made where patrons and appointees wish to benefit personally (whether it be in the 
form of votes or money or protection), by occupying particular bureaucratic posts. 
Furthermore, improving bureaucratic performance is rarely in the hands of those most 
likely to be appointed illegally – junior and some mid-tier bureaucrats. These 
bureaucrats do not set policy agendas or oversee the development or implementation 
of projects. These are bureaucrats who carry out instructions issued by those higher up 
the bureaucratic hierarchy where illegal appointments are less likely. 
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Interview 61, a PMLN MPA from Lahore, told me that although he made 
attempts to get some girls from his constituency teaching jobs, he was refused by the 
EDO and the school principal. The girls did not meet the merit requirement for the 
posts, and another EDO had recently been dismissed by the CM for allowing such 
appointments. No other EDO or principal was willing to risk the same fate. 
Interviewee 90 is an MNA who contested and won his seat as a PPP candidate in 
Punjab in 2008. During the 5 years the PPP was in his office, the MNA told me he 
distributed many jobs. In 2013, however, Interviewee 90 switched parties to join the 
PMLN. And, in contrast to his previous term, he told me he is no longer able to help 
his constituents with jobs. When he tries, he tells me that the official response is, 
‘Humaare bas mai nahin hai’ (We do not have the ability to do this). There is 
therefore considerable anxiety amongst many politicians who lack connections to the 
nerve centre of the provincial government.  
An example of a politician faced with voter demands will serve to illustrate 
this anxiety. I was interviewing a PMLN MPA whose constituency falls in 
Gujranwala district (Interviewee 138) at his political office when a group of men 
came in. After an elaborate exchange of handshakes, hugs, and greetings, the MPA 
ushered the men into an adjoining room requesting that they wait a few minutes while 
he finished an interview. The MPA began by asking his assistant to serve the men 
some tea, but quickly amended his instructions, telling him to offer a meal instead. I 
could tell just by his tone, the near anxiety to please in his voice, that these were 
constituents. When I asked him if people came to him with requests for bureaucratic 
transfers, the MPA lowered his voice to a whisper and told me that that was why the 
group of constituents were there. Still in the same low voice, the MPA told me that 
this was the third time these men had come to his office to push for the transfer. Thus 
far, the MPA had not succeeded in securing the transfer they wanted because of 
resistance from the bureaucracy. The MPA said he had previously helped these men 
by getting a murder case against their relative dropped. ‘But if I don’t get this 
[transfer] done, they will forget what I did previously, and they will remember this – 
he didn’t get this done for us’, the MPA told me. The MPA’s own vote bank (a secure 
group of voters on the basis of biraderi ties – the MPA is from the Chattha biraderi) 
was in the largest town in his constituency, but most of his constituency was rural. 
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Therefore, he relied on local biraderi leaders to bring in votes from other areas (vote 
blocs – see Nelson 2011 and Mohmand 2011) and pleasing these leaders who had 
arrived at his office demanding a teacher transfer be arranged while a transfer ban was 
in place was critical to the MPA’s success.  
These stakes, alongside the closing of avenues of patronage by the CM, are 
what drive politicians without access to the centre to break the law in making 
appointments that benefit both themselves and their constituents. In such 
circumstances, citizens and bureaucrats (with the nudging of political patrons) turn to 
illegal methods such as faking documents, making paperwork disappear, and drawing 
up their own recruitment, seniority/promotion, and transfer lists (or tampering with 
existing ones) – i.e. disengaging with the rules entirely – to get the posts they want. 
Some believe that money is necessary to turn bureaucratic wheels; in fact, Interviewee 
90, an MNA who had switched parties from the PPP to the PMLN in 2013, told me, 
‘Money is far more effective – [citizens] just have to pay a Personal 
Secretary/Assistant or clerk. It is more effective than sending a politician, to whom 
the bureaucrat just makes excuses. However, if there is sifarish and money, then it is 
most effective.’ A report into teacher recruitment337 argues though that either a 
teacher will bribe a department clerk for a transfer or use political connections, but 
does not consider that a teacher may do both to cement the transaction. In some cases, 
teachers will ask politicians to intercede on their behalf, and may even pay them, to 
ensure their request goes through.  
It is, however, unsustainable for politicians to pay bribes to have constituents 
or party workers appointed – no politician has the resources to pay for the 
appointment of thousands of people. And, if they do so for one person, word will 
invariably get out causing resentment amongst constituents who were not able to 
benefit from such generosity. For this reason, and others, illegal methods of 
appointment do not always produce sustainable results.  
Still, the increasing power of elite bureaucrats and attempts to institutionalise 
lower and mid-tier appointments has created a sort of alliance between some 
politicians (those not close to the party leadership) and their voters. The most 
common refrain in the Punjab Assembly, and in the National Assembly, amongst 
                                                 
337 Bari, F., Raza, R., Aslam, M., Khan, B. and Maqsood, N. 2013. An Investigation into Teacher 
Recruitment and Retention in Punjab. IDEAS – Institute of Development and Economic Alternatives. 
Available at: <http://ideaspak.org/images/Publications/Teacher-Recruitment-and-Retention_Final.pdf> 
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party workers, the average citizen, and recently even the PM’s son-in-law (a sitting 
MNA)338, is that the bureaucracy is running the show in league with the Sharif 
brothers’ kitchen cabinet. Both citizens and politicians find bureaucrats (babus) 
condescending, unapproachable, rigid, and unhelpful. For most ordinary citizens, 
there is a specific terror associated with going to a bureaucratic office while ordinary 
politicians find that asking bureaucrats for assistance is pointless. Since we were 
meeting at his house and could be overheard by only his own family, Interview 78 (a 
PMLN MPA from Narowal) felt comfortable complaining to me of the treatment of 
MPAs by bureaucrats. He told me that he found it so hard to get development funds 
released, he had to ask his constituency’s MNA (a Minister) to get the job done. So 
disgruntled are the MPAs that they were holding meetings to discuss ways of 
complaining about bureaucrats and having them removed for obstructing the work of 
MPAs (Interview 78). This unity of experience creates an interesting situation with 
regard to electoral gains. When a politician tries to have a voter or party worker 
illegally appointed, and the sifarish is not granted after a meeting with the bureaucrat, 
the voter will not blame the politician. Though the appointment is never made, the 
politician’s expected electoral gain outcome may still be achieved. This is due to the 
mutual understanding between the politician and the voter that it is the babu who is 
blocking the appointment. In this manner, the voter stays loyal to his local politician 
even though an appointment is never actually made.  
At a PMLN politician’s constituency office in Lahore, an MNA (Interviewee 
13) sat behind a large desk, with his PA seated at his elbow – close enough to reach 
over and whisper in the MNA’s ear. The room was rectangular, with the desk at one 
end and, incongruously, a cage with a white parrot in it at the other. Other than the 
chairs that lined one wall, where voters sat patiently to be seen by the MNA, the room 
was bare. As I waited for the MNA to grant me an interview, I watched one after the 
other voter get called up to the desk and have his issue dealt with – like at a bank. 
Eventually, the MNA called a young man to approach. The young man wanted the 
politician to intercede on his behalf with an Additional Secretary to get him a job. 
After hearing out the young man, the MNA said, ‘Yeh too ghalat baat hai [this is 
wrong], procedure must be followed.’ Regardless, the MNA made sure that the young 
man (who had waited over an hour to speak to him personally) did not feel like he 
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<http://www.dawn.com/news/1297309> [Accessed 10 January 2017]. 
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was being let down. After making the young man wait a while longer, the MNA asked 
his PA to make a phone call. The PA swiftly dialled a number and after some back 
and forth, managed to get the right person on the line. He handed the phone to the 
MNA, who asked the person at the other end, very politely, to hear out the case of the 
young man, to help him if possible. In such situations, the supplicant goes into the 
meeting with the bureaucrat knowing that the chances of his request being granted are 
small. The typical response from the bureaucrat in such cases is a noncommittal ‘I 
will try my utmost’ (Interview 45, a PAS officer serving as DCO Narowal), but all 
parties are well aware that it is extremely unlikely that the favour will be granted. 
However, the voter may well be satisfied with having received a hearing from the 
bureaucrat and continue to support the politician who got him that hearing.  
 
‘Misplaced’ Documents  
In order to achieve an illegal appointment for electoral gain objectives, 
politicians need an intermediary ally within the department who will actually process 
the appointment for them. This need not be a particularly senior bureaucrat – often, a 
clerk or a Section Officer is sufficient – but it does need to be someone the politician 
trusts to carry out the illegal task. The bond between the politician and this 
intermediary bureaucrat may be based on an exchange – the politician may have, for 
the express purpose of making illegal appointments, arranged the extra-legal 
appointment of the bureaucrat (through the CM or the department Secretary, for 
example) or even bribed him, or promised him future rewards, to make appointments 
to lower tier posts.  
An effective way of making illegal appointments for those without access to 
the CM and his cronies involves ‘losing’ or ‘misplacing’ documents – a common 
practice in government departments. Interviewee 30, a PAS officer in BPS 18 serving 
in the S&GAD, for instance, was aware that politicians were in contact with the junior 
staff seated outside her door and sometimes asked them to make files ‘disappear’. The 
purpose of this is to delay a pending decision, for example enquiries or transfers, for a 
favoured bureaucrat.  
Perhaps the simplest way of making illegal appointments is through tampering 
with recruitment and seniority lists. Interview 39, a PAS bureaucrat in BPS 19, was 
serving as a DCO when an MPA demanded that she have teacher transfer lists sent to 
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his political office so that they could be checked and approved by him. In the past, the 
issuance of such lists was a common practice, but as bureaucrats occupying DCO 
posts have come increasingly within the CM’s ambit, local politicians have found it 
hard to make illegal appointments in this manner. Instead, they have had to employ 
other illegal means to get their voters and party workers appointed. Interviewee 23 (a 
retired School Education Department bureaucrat) told me that when applications 
come in for new posts or transfers, one means of thinning the herd is to separate the 
signature page from the rest of the application, or remove one required document (a 
No Objection Certificate, for example) and destroy it. When the applicant turns up to 
ask why he was not selected, he will be shown an incomplete application. Such 
behaviour produces results because it changes the merit or seniority list for posts, 
removing people so that others – favoured by politicians – can be moved up or 
inserted.  
In March 2015, for example, applicants for educator posts in Sialkot 
complained that their forms and documents had been ‘misplaced’ by department 
officials.339 It is a beautifully simple and yet perfectly believable excuse – the sheer 
volume of paperwork that the average bureaucrat has to deal with, particularly in 
departments with thousands of employees like Education or Health, make misplaced 
documents a common occurrence. A patron will encourage this kind of behaviour 
because he wants particular people (key party workers, loyal voters, even friends and 
family) – those with whom he has established bonds of patronage, even if diffuse 
since the outcome is unenforceable – to get the posts, rather than those deserving on 
merit, for electoral gain outcomes.  
 
Personal Enrichment and Protection 
Despite various anti-corruption initiatives and campaigns, promises to 
eradicate corrupt practices by the next election, claims of merit-based appointments in 
the bureaucracy, and the centralisation of discretion and sifarish, illegal appointments 
are continuously made. The CM Secretariat may appoint a loyalist as department 
Secretary or DCO and that allows for an element of control and supervision. 
However, as we move down the hierarchy to districts, tehsil, and markaz (School 
                                                 
339 Mehdi, A. H. ‘Mockery of merit’ by education department. March 5, 2015. DAWN. Available at: 
<http://www.dawn.com/news/1167460> [Accessed 28 September 2016]. 
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Education) or divisions, canals, and distributaries (Irrigation), we have to 
acknowledge that there is no way one PAS or PMS officer can control every single 
person in the department. This means that bureaucrats in the middle tiers (even those 
appointed by the Secretary) have a level of discretion in dealing with their juniors, 
and with local politicians. Government departments in the districts are where 
centralised control often wavers. 
Though limited to some extent by performance targets and monitoring, mid-
tier and junior bureaucrats are free to establish their own bonds of transaction-based 
patronage, typically based on work ties or kinship, to benefit themselves and their 
cronies. The sheer volume of staff, paperwork, and appointments at this level of the 
government are such that not even monitoring units can track every single action. A 
Secretary or DCO cannot keep track of the minutiae of each street-level appointment, 
nor do they want to. So long as district officials achieve set performance targets and 
do not flag unwanted attention from local politicians or senior bureaucrats (DCO), the 
courts, or the media, the department at the centre will allow them to work without 
interference.  It is, therefore, at the district level that politicisation (by politicians and 
by bureaucrats) really takes hold beyond the CM and senior party advisors or 
bureaucrats.  
What benefit do junior bureaucrats gain from illegal appointments? For junior 
bureaucrats, such illegal appointments are a readily available means of personal gain 
in three forms: (i) jobs for friends and relatives who would not otherwise be eligible 
for them, or (ii) financial gain in bribes paid for appointments, or (iii) crooked access 
to state services and resources. Just like senior bureaucrats, those at lower tiers of the 
bureaucratic hierarchy also use work ties to establish relationships of transaction with 
other bureaucrats. However, unlike senior bureaucrats, kinship ties can be much more 
important at this level since appointments and outcomes are often being arranged 
within, and by people from, a relatively small geographical area. They are next to 
impossible to identify since news reports do not delve into these details and officials 
themselves are hesitant to answer questions on illegal appointments. The one account 
I got from my fieldwork was a Deputy DEO in Lahore who was found to have 
appointed his friends and relatives to various teaching posts using forged appointment 
letters and certificates by Interviewee 23 – a retired education department official 
(while he served as EDO). However, most cases of illegal appointments in the 
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department seem to involve the exchange of money, and it is unclear whether or not 
there is any kinship tie.  
Regardless of whether they are based on kinship or work ties, the bonds mid-
tier or junior bureaucrats form with patrons for financial gain are transactional. But 
the transactional nature of the bond makes the patronage relationship contingent on 
the achievement of a single goal – the agreed upon transaction (enrichment or 
protection in exchange for an illegal appointment). The outcomes do not need to be 
achieved in the future by the appointee once he is in his post. Instead, the outcome is 
achieved in exchange for the appointment alone.  
 
Bribery and Financial Gains  
In any given week, the newspapers will run a number of stories about clerks, 
patwaris, assistants, and other lower-tier bureaucrats accepting bribes to recruit, 
transfer, and promote people. In 2015, the media reported extensively on numerous 
cases of teachers in Muzaffargarh recruited on the basis of fake appointment letters 
and other documentation.340 One news report revealed that according to officials 
within the School Education Department, more than 100 teachers had been recruited 
since 2012 on the basis of fake degrees and result cards from the National Testing 
Service.341 The investigation in Muzaffargarh began when the appointment letters of 
three teachers were found to be fake, which led to the questioning of all the new 
recruits in the district that year. One man told reporters that he had paid two 
department officials Rs 200,000 for a job as a teacher.342 A female recruit told the 
press that she had paid an agent Rs 200,000 to be provided with a fake degree and 
appointment letter – indeed that department employees were complicit in providing 
the forgeries.343 One of the officials implicated in forging documents was a computer 
assistant working for the district monitoring team.  
                                                 
340 Three female teachers booked for fake degrees. June 13, 2015. DAWN. Available at: 
<http://www.dawn.com/news/1187947> [Accessed 27 September 2016]; Raza, M. T. More teachers 
with fake documents booked. June 15, 2015. DAWN. Available at: 
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342 Three booked for getting job on fake documents. June 6, 2015. DAWN. Available at: 
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343 Three female teachers booked for fake degrees. June 13, 2015. DAWN. Available at: 
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Of the Irrigation department employees I spoke to, many referred obliquely to 
illegal appointment practices but only one admitted to paying a bribe for a post. An 
Assistant EXEN in Gujranwala, Interviewee 130, told me that in 1995, he had a zidd 
(obstinate desire) to be promoted. So he paid money to the appointing authorities for 
the post. A few months into his new promotion, the authority told him to pay some 
more money and they would regularise his new appointment. Interviewee 130 had no 
money left to pay, so his peers got regularised while he did not.  
In these examples, and particularly in interactions with the general public, the 
ability to facilitate illegal appointments allows junior bureaucrats an inordinate 
amount of power, completely incommensurate to their salary and social position. 
Clerks, Section Officers, accounts officers, and other department district officials, for 
instance, are all relatively poorly paid with limited opportunity for rising up the 
bureaucratic ladder and limited power within the departmental hierarchy. But their 
control over department paperwork and access to senior officials – particularly when 
they work together – allows these junior officials to act as patrons and enrich and 
protect not just themselves, but their family, friends, and cronies. In such cases, a 
junior bureaucrat makes illegal appointments primarily for financial gain in the form 
of bribes (or by appointing a family member to a government job to increase the 
household income).  
An example will highlight the power clerks can have, and how they can utilise 
it to make illegal appointments for personal financial gain. In 2011, a news report 
revealed that six officials with a history of corrupt practices– members of the booti 
mafia (see also Nelson 2014, unpublished manuscript) – had been illegally appointed 
as invigilators by the Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education (BISE) for 
matriculation examinations.344 The six teachers had previously been barred from 
invigilating when they were found aiding students in answering examination 
questions. Officials from the BISE claimed that clerks from the BISE and the EDO-
Education’s office were responsible for these appointments, having taken Rs 35,000 
from each of the officials they appointed.345 In other words, the clerks formed a 
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diffuse transactional bond with the teachers – the clerks achieved their personal gain 
outcome and the teachers got the posts they wanted. 
However, junior and mid-tier bureaucrats making illegal appointments need 
protection from discovery, investigation, and prosecution, just as senior bureaucrats 
do. As many bureaucrats pointed out to me, corrupt transfers, promotions, and 
appointments are not possible at the lower or middle tiers of the department without 
the involvement and collusion of higher tiers.  
Most cases reported in the press are not able to pin down these networks 
within a department’s hierarchy. For instance, stories of patwaris being illegally 
appointed are common but there is rarely any clarity on who appointed them or for 
what purpose. In rare cases, there are reports of illegal appointments made in order to 
gain financially where the network of officials involved are pinned down clearly. I 
recount one such story here. In 2004, in Sheikhupura, fifteen officials of the education 
department in the district, including the district education officer, two deputy district 
education officers, an assistant education officer, headmasters, and clerks, were 
arrested for their involvement in a teacher recruitment scam. The scam was brought to 
the attention of the police by primary school teachers who claimed that they would 
have to bribe various department officials each month to have their salaries approved. 
During the investigation, the police found that the gang of department officials took 
bribes of between Rs 50,000-100,000 to appoint 200 teachers to various posts in the 
district. In addition, the men faked the official stamps of the Punjab Services Tribunal 
and forged court orders to convince the department to reinstate officials fired for 
disciplinary reasons.346  
 
Services and Resources  
Alongside jobs, access to state services and resources (electricity, clean water, 
telephone, television, and mobile connectivity, sewage, roads, etc.) is a key concern. 
Most citizens find that they have to approach state functionaries and politicians to get 
access to their basic rights. However, state services and resources are also limited, 
which results in both politicians and bureaucrats battling to ensure that those they 
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favour get what they need. One way of ensuring ‘selective’ provision is to make 
illegal appointments to junior and mid-level posts in government departments.  
Though illegal appointments made for access to resources and services are a 
common practice, it is very difficult to assign responsibility for such behaviour. 
Reports of such behaviour do not disentangle the network of connections that lead to 
illegal appointments, so patterns must be guessed at. For instance, appointments made 
to posts of head teachers in schools are frequently made with interference from 
politicians with the intention of diverting school funds and handing out contracts for 
canteens and furniture, but the precise connection between the patron and the 
appointee is often difficult to establish. 
Though it may be hard to tease out the ties that underpin bonds of transaction 
in cases where the outcome is to gain personally through service and resource 
allocation, we can generally say that these ties need to be meaningful enough to 
produce strong bonds if the desired ‘delivery’ outcomes are to be achieved. Unlike 
bonds formed where the outcome is financial gain and the transaction is an immediate 
one, service or resource allocation requires sustained work and effort on the part of 
the illegal appointee once he is in his post. The ‘delivery’ of expected outcomes is 
only possible therefore if the patron trusts the appointee not to renege on the deal. 
Such trust is engendered either through biraderi ties or established political loyalties. 
 
Water  
In 2013, a PMLN MPA from Rahim Yar Khan accused the military and 
politicians (including members of his own party) of causing shortages of water in his 
constituency’s distributaries.347 While the PMLN MPA couched his objections to such 
behaviour in terms of his constituents’ suffering, the fact is that many politicians – 
particularly those who contest from rural constituencies – are landowners and 
‘agriculturists’. While the politician may think in electoral terms - access to water is 
the key to votes from village farmers and their families - there is also a distinct 
element of personal gain in water theft. Influential landowners will try to ensure that 
sympathetic officials are appointed to monitor and maintain channels in their area, 
aiding water theft to allow for better crop yields and higher earnings on the landlord’s 
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land. There is also the added benefit that such appointments can be used to provide 
constituents with jobs. 
At mid-tier levels, posts such as Sub-Divisional Officer (SDO) and Executive 
Engineer (EXEN), a common practice is to harass or intimidate subordinate officials 
if they are unwilling to look the other way on water theft or appoint junior officials 
who will enable it. Irrigation Department officials reported, in lowered voices and 
only after making sure the office door was tightly closed, that they received 
threatening phone calls from senior bureaucrats such as department secretaries 
(Interviewee 113, EXEN Operations Small Dams) and from military and intelligence 
officials (Interviewee 115, an Irrigation Department Section Officer, and former 
SDO). An EXEN in Lahore told me that an EXEN of his acquaintance was threatened 
because he refused to provide a No Objection Certificate for a politician who wanted 
to have his water outlet widened (thus allowing an increased flow of water). 
Interviewee 152 (Superintending Engineer Lahore) revealed that the Jhang politician 
Faisal Saleh Hayat once shot an SDO while the latter was monitoring a channel.  
The powerlessness of these officials was explained by Interviewee 152. Some 
Irrigation Department officials (SDOs, patwaris, etc.) live on land held by influential 
landowners. The threat of being evicted is ever present should he stray out of line. 
The threat of actual violence is important too, or the perception of the 
ability/willingness to use it. For instance, in South Punjab, landowners will travel in 
daalas (pickups) with two or three guards in the back with weapons. The implication 
is very clear – interfere with what the landowner wants, and there will be violence.  
The appointment of patwaris is key to the enterprise of stealing water. 
Patwaris can easily tamper with land records and, therefore, water allocations, 
allowing a landowner to receive more water than he is owed. Second, a patwari can 
tamper with revenue records so that landowners can avoid paying the (nominal) water 
tax (aabiana).348 For this reason, politicians and other influential landowners exert a 
great deal of pressure on mid-tier bureaucrats for the appointment and transfer of 
patwaris. However, for those without the connections required to have Executive 
Engineers obey them, bribery is common. In 2012, the ACE launched an investigation 
into the appointment of patwaris in selected districts since 2004. It was found that 
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bribes in excess of Rs 1,750,000 were paid to Section Officers for these posts.349 Once 
appointed, the patwari reciprocates by helping his patron steal irrigation water. 
 
Protection in Line Departments 
Patron bureaucrats involved in illegal appointments are looking for protection, 
and not just from investigation and prosecution for illegal activity but also from their 
appointee reneging on their deal. Protection in circumstances of illegal appointment 
can be achieved in a number of ways. The first is by co-opting senior bureaucrats into 
the scam itself, thereby leaving nothing to chance – for instance by including a 
judicial magistrate or Deputy Secretary. This could involve establishing additional 
relationships of patronage, based on work ties or kinship and a different set of 
outcomes. For instance, an investigation into the recruitment of ghost employees in 
the Rawalpindi School Education Department revealed that officials of the education 
and accounts departments were involved in the scam350 and the district department’s 
investigation named a Deputy Education Officer as being involved as well.351 
However, when the EDO filed an FIR for fraud, he named only a department clerk as 
the culprit. Leaving the Deputy Education Officer off the FIR was no doubt an 
intentional decision by the EDO – to protect a junior colleague with whom he had a 
strong bond of patronage that the EDO relied on to achieve bureaucratic efficiency 
outcomes in his district, and potentially, to gain personally through scams such as the 
one that had been discovered. 
A further avenue of protection, focused on protecting a bureaucrat from a 
partner who might renege on the deal, are the very rules that are violated in making 
illegal appointments. In the pursuit of personal advantage, neither the patron nor the 
appointee will hesitate in going to the authorities and admitting to participating in an 
illegal exchange in the hope that the ‘authorities’ will intervene to get them ‘justice’. 
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So pervasive are illegal appointments driven by purely personal motivations that 
disputes over the terms of the agreement – the exact amount of the bribe, what was 
promised in exchange - are often put before the department itself, through its 
Efficiency and Discipline Wing.352  Interviewee 57, the Section Officer of the 
Efficiency and Discipline Wing in the School Education Department, sat in a tiny 
office surrounded by stacks of files. Gesturing toward them, he told me that 
complaints regarding back-dated promotions, politicised transfers, disputes over the 
amount of a bribe, and the failure of a bureaucrat to deliver on the expected outcome 
after the payment of a bribe are all brought to the Efficiency and Discipline Wing. 
Since the department’s internal disciplinary proceedings are open only to department 
staff (and not the general public) these complaints are filed by bureaucrats against 
other bureaucrats. 
There have been numerous cases of people (bureaucrats and citizens) 
approaching the Anti-Corruption Establishment (ACE) to file complaints against 
officials to whom they paid a bribe but who have failed to deliver their side of the 
agreement. In 2015, a District and Sessions Court senior clerk agreed to get a job for 
the sister of a resident of Sahiwal within an agreed time frame, demanding Rs 500,000 
as a bribe.353 However, the time passed, and though the money was paid, the clerk 
was not able to secure the job. The man who bribed the clerk filed a case with the 
ACE, who launched an investigation and issued a warrant for the arrest of the clerk. 
The man who had paid the bribe did not face punishment. (This sends an interesting 
message – paying a bribe is not illegal, but reneging on the deal is.) 
The willingness to pull authorities into a dispute over an illegal appointment 
distinguishes the activities of junior bureaucrats from bureaucrats and politicians who 
are well-connected. The latter have the clout of the ruling party and the elite 
bureaucracy behind them, and fear of their ability to punish through appointments will 
drive bureaucrats to obey them and achieve expected outcomes. Amongst those 
without such access, however, fear is not a sufficient motivator. As a result, quite 
ironically, lower and mid-tier bureaucrats (and citizens) are forced back onto the same 
rules and regulations they violated in the first place. Luckily for these bureaucrats, the 
anti-corruption and disciplinary systems have their own unique nuances – they seem 
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<http://www.dawn.com/news/1214720> [Accessed 10 November 2016]. 
248 
 
to expect that illegal appointments are being made and (seemingly) make no serious 
attempt to hinder this. 
Cases of bribery placed before anti-corruption bodies like the ACE, or the 
department itself, tell us something about the bonds between patrons and illegal 
appointees. Where the method of appointment is illegal, there is always a risk that 
either party will renege. The bond is diffuse since there is often no prior relationship, 
or an insufficient one, that would encourage trust or reliance. Each party is therefore 
interested solely in their own personal financial gain, meaning that the chances the 
deal will break down are high as both parties look to benefit themselves. The patron 
may fail to produce the agreed upon posting, or the appointee may fail to pay the 
bribe.  
Where the Secretary or the EDO takes action and transfers or disciplines a 
bureaucrat in the district administration for making illegal politicised appointments, 
the consequences may go one of two ways. The first is that the Secretary or EDO 
succeeds in removing the official and is able to manage any fallout with disappointed 
and, therefore, angry politicians. This means that the appointing officer was acting 
without any substantial backing from influential parties (typically for personal 
enrichment). However, it could be that, although the appointing officer had political 
backing, the illegally appointed bureaucrat went beyond his purview and indulged in 
practices which had not been agreed upon. For instance, the agreement with the 
political patron may have involved making politicized appointments to Class IV posts, 
but may not have included embezzlement from the department or the granting of 
contracts to favoured parties.  
The second option is that, even when clear punishments are meted out, they 
may not have much of an effect. In 2013, an official with the School Education 
Department in Gujranwala filed a complaint against 45 new recruits with the regional 
director of the Anti-Corruption Establishment (ACE).354 The official claimed that all 
45 had forged documents to get their jobs. The ACE investigation held five clerks of 
the department and an Assistant Education Officer, Zaib un Nisa, responsible for 
                                                 
354 Corruption: ACE orders registration of cases against 45 Education Department employees. 
December 9, 2013. The Express Tribune. Available at: <http://tribune.com.pk/story/642883/corruption-




accepting bribes for the appointments.355 However, the named Assistant Education 
Officer, Zaib un Nisa, was also implicated in making illegal appointments in 
Gujranwala division in 2011 and suspended for her involvement. This suggests not 
only a pattern of corrupt behaviour for the purpose of personal gain, but also that 
punishments like suspensions are insufficient disincentive. This is perhaps why, 
though illegal appointments made by bribing officials and faking documents are 
precarious when it comes to achieving long-term personal gains, they remain 
pervasive. Many believe that, in pursuing such illegal appointments, there is really not 
much to lose.  
  
Conclusion 
Illegal appointments involve substantial risk. Though they were common for 
many years, a combination of factors – donor influence, greater political competition, 
an activist judiciary, an aggressive media industry – have all contributed to making 
illegal methods less sustainable. However, even before illegal appointments became 
riskier, tactics such as forging documents, bypassing selection and recruitment 
procedures, threats, and significant violence were rarely conducive to achieving 
outcomes that have to do with improving bureaucratic efficiency. Using illegal 
methods for such outcomes is like using a hammer on a common pin. Not only does it 
attract the wrong kind of attention, diverting from the desired outcome, it is likely to 
taint the effectiveness of both the patron and the appointee.  
When desired outcomes are electoral, illegal methods can be effective in 
satisfying voters and gaining their support (at least temporarily), typically in making 
bulk appointments with the collusion of bureaucrats. Though ministers have no legal 
power to make bureaucratic appointments, they seek electoral gains by influencing 
illegal appointments – tampering with merit and recruitment lists or issuing lists of 
names to bureaucrats for recruitment. However, the margin to indulge in such 
appointments for electoral gain is shrinking as the Punjab government centralises 
patronage in its own hands and both the courts and the media become more engaged 
in prosecuting such behaviour. In the past, politicians were allowed a quota of 
                                                 
355 ACE orders registration of cases against 60 female educators. December 9, 2013. Pakistan Times. 
Available at: <http://news.pakistantimes.com/2013/12/09/ace-orders-registration-of-cases-against-60-
female-educators-266405.html> [Accessed 20 November 2016]. 
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government jobs to distribute as they wished. These quotas have (formally) been 
withdrawn and politicians have had to find other ways of influencing the appointment 
process. Some politicians rely on junior bureaucrats in their offices (for example, 
clerks and personal assistants) to influence illegal appointments; others establish 
relationships with department bureaucrats in charge of appointments. Though these 
avenues are available to senior politicians, the pool of patrons making them has 
shrunk as the CM has centralised discretion and patronage. Amongst politicians 
without access to the centre, making illegal appointments in pursuit of electoral gain 
is therefore difficult as requests are often refused by bureaucrats.  
Illegal methods are, however, ideal for personal gain outcomes made on the 
basis of short-term (typically financial) transactions. Though I have discussed a 
number of cases, these reports are likely just a drop in the ocean – there are probably 
thousands of such illegal appointments that have never been discovered. In recent 
years, there are some departments that have been more successful in investigating 
such practices – School Education, for example – but, by and large, even these efforts 
are too half-hearted to fully dis-incentivise illegal appointments. 
In many cases, patrons are happy to risk illegal appointments for short-term 
gains. Some are incredibly lucky in that they repeatedly escape serious consequences. 




CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
This thesis was inspired by conversations about Pakistan’s politics, policy 
making, and policy implementation with academics, politicians, journalists, and 
observers. Though the military (as a political force) was ever present in these 
conversations, explanations for politicians’ behaviour often had little to do with the 
military and more to do with those who actually ran the machinery of the state – 
bureaucrats. Though the literature on Pakistan accounts for military interference in 
politics, the shortcomings of politicians and parties, and problematic interactions 
between bureaucrats and citizens, it gives short shrift to ties/exchanges between 
politicians and bureaucrats, or bureaucrats themselves. This thesis aims to fill this 
gap.  
The politicisation of the bureaucracy – that is, political influence over 
bureaucratic appointments and, thus, bureaucratic behaviour and action – is no secret 
in Pakistan. The practice has garnered significant attention in recent years due to the 
growth of private media and an activist Supreme Court (e.g. under Chief Justice 
Iftikhar Chaudhry), which issued various judgements on bureaucratic appointments. 
However, the practice is invariably defended through claims of political and 
bureaucratic ‘discretion’ for the purpose of defending the ‘the public interest’. This is 
a convenient phrase used to explain away a wide range of (often extra-legal) practices. 
Identifying a gap in the political science literature on South Asia in particular, and 
bureaucracies in general, this thesis has developed an analytical framework to 
decipher the intentions, incentives, methods, and relationships that lie behind the 
exercise of discretion in making bureaucratic appointments, at least ostensibly for the 
sake of ‘delivering’ positive outcomes for the public.  
Throughout this thesis, I have explored why politicians and bureaucrats feel 
the need to influence bureaucratic appointments, what outcomes they seek in doing 
so, and how politicised appointments are made. I stress the interaction of three 
factors: objectives (bureaucratic efficiency, electoral gain, or personal enrichment and 
protection), methods (legal, extra-legal, or illegal), and bonds (strong or diffuse), 
showing how these factors come together to produce differential outcomes for the 
politicians and bureaucrats who make politicised bureaucratic appointments. I argue 
that, overall, the most effective means of achieving desired outcomes are extra-legal 
methods of bureaucratic appointment. However, this finding can be nuanced further - 
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bureaucratic efficiency outcomes are more likely to be achieved through legal and 
extra-legal methods of appointment; electoral gain outcomes are more likely to be 
achieved through extra-legal methods of appointment; and personal enrichment and 
protection outcomes are more likely to be achieved through extra-legal and, 
especially, illegal methods of appointment.  
 




The ability to utilise different methods of bureaucratic appointment (legal, 
extra-legal, or illegal), however, depends on the proximity of politicians and 
bureaucrats to the centre of power – in Punjab, the CM and his kitchen cabinet. 
Patrons with close ties to the CM Secretariat were able to benefit (in terms of 
bureaucratic performance, electoral gain, or personal enrichment and protection 
outcomes) from both legal and extra-legal methods of bureaucratic appointment. 
Politicians and bureaucrats excluded from the CM’s inner circle, however, were often 










Figure 2: Patron Objectives and Appointment Methods for  













The variables I use in my argument and the conclusions I draw in this thesis 
emerge from a year of fieldwork. For many conducting research in bureaucratic or 
political circles in South Asia, ties to figures within these institutions offer an 
important point of access. I found that I had none of these advantages and had to 
spend a substantial amount of time establishing contact and trust with bureaucrats and 
politicians across a range of positions. Though my lack of connections made my 
fieldwork time consuming and at times frustrating, I also believe it provided valuable 
insight. As someone who was largely a stranger to political and bureaucratic 
processes, I took the time to have my interviewees explain their work, their duties, 
their concerns, and their complaints to me in detail.  
What resulted was a multi-faceted picture of something that many consider a 
monolith – the ‘bureaucracy’. I traced people’s lives, experiences, and interactions, 
acquiring a rich tapestry depicting the inner workings of governance in Punjab, 
Pakistan. This is not an abstract thesis. It is a thesis grounded in conversations, 
observations, experiences, and patterns in the real world. It is not based on the fleeting 
(numerical) observations we see in quantitative work. 
It was senior bureaucrats’ persistent emphasis on their need to ‘deliver’, and 
the pressure exerted by the CM Secretariat (or senior politicians and bureaucrats), that 
led me to place ‘patterns of delivery’ at the heart of this thesis. In pursuing this notion 
of ‘delivery’, I began by exploring the motivations and ‘objectives’ of politicians and 
bureaucrats – what is it they want? This exploration led me to three outcomes pursued 
by both politicians and bureaucrats: bureaucratic efficiency, electoral gain, and 
personal enrichment and protection, and what each of them meant in real terms. I was 
quickly able to draw up a list of specific illustrations of each of category – the Lahore 
Metro Bus project, fighting off a challenger from the PTI in the next election, or 
getting more irrigation water, for example. 
Next, I asked how politicians or bureaucrats would set about (successfully) 
achieving these broad outcomes: their ‘methods’. It was this question that led me back 
to the notion of politicisation. All of the ‘delivery’ that bureaucrats were frantically 
pursuing was tied to bureaucratic appointments by politicians and other bureaucrats. 
Interference in bureaucratic appointments, even at the most junior tiers of the 
bureaucracy, was driven by clear intentions. This was evident in the fact that 
bureaucratic appointments were closely monitored by the CM, other politicians, and 
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other bureaucrats. In sharp contrast were any number of other activities, projects and 
initiatives that aroused little interest amongst politicians, bureaucrats, the CM 
Secretariat, or the media. This difference was brought home to me most sharply when 
the main site of my fieldwork shifted from the School Education Department to the 
Irrigation Department. The former was in the midst of a donor-funded reform 
program alongside tens of thousands of employees all belonging to very active 
unions. The latter was a sleepy department for which an urban-focused CM office had 
little time, and whose employees rarely banded together to influence policy decisions. 
In the education sector, every step was scrutinized. In the irrigation sector, deadly 
flooding (for example) was considered par for the course, but appointments still 
attracted considerable attention. Appointments, I noticed, were always at the heart of 
the (‘delivery’) machine. Getting the right bureaucrat into the right post was always 
the key to achieving the goal a patron politician or bureaucrat desired, whether it be 
bureaucratic efficiency, electoral gain, or personal enrichment or protection. Anything 
that disrupted this well-oiled ‘delivery’ machine – for instance, the arrival of an 
unsympathetic DCO or Secretary – caused complaints, protests, or (anonymous) 
quotes in related newspaper articles, not just from department employees, but also 
from politicians and senior bureaucrats.  
But how did a politician or bureaucrat seeking a particular outcome ensure that 
the bureaucrat appointed to achieve it actually did what was required? My 
conversations with politicians, bureaucrats, political observers, and journalists, 
various newspaper reports of bureaucratic and political activity, and my own 
observations from the field all pointed toward intricate patterns of patronage, 
specifically in the intervening but critical process of making bureaucratic 
appointments, as the means for ensuring results. I found that actors within the state 
(politicians or bureaucrats) rely on informal bonds of trust, far more than I had 
imagined they would and over and above biraderi ties, to stave off the precarity that 
comes with their profession in a poorly institutionalised country such as Pakistan. 
This was most evident in the stories I heard of mentorship between politicians and 
bureaucrats, and amongst bureaucrats themselves, at all levels of the hierarchy, from 
the elite PAS to teaching staff and Executive Engineers. In making bureaucratic 
appointments to achieve a specific outcome, patrons and bureaucrats are initiating a 
bond, a relationship based on professional networks or exchange. It is this bond and 
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its strength or diffusion that determines whether or not the patron’s desired outcome 
will be achieved. Identifying the existence, and the nature, of these bonds required 
thinking outside the proverbial box – politicians and bureaucrats would not openly 
reveal (or even consciously notice) these informal ties. So I began tracing the careers 
of bureaucrats – the districts in which they had been posted, what posts they occupied, 
who they had offended, and, most importantly, who they had worked with more than 
once. Mapping career trajectories, and investigating political and bureaucratic 
performance along the way, allowed me to pinpoint where the lives of politicians and 
bureaucrats intersected. It was from this investigation that I was able to identify, and 
characterize, these crucial bonds between key actors. 
Detecting and characterizing bonds is tricky; detecting whether or not 
outcomes were achieved was often even harder. In some cases, the outcome is visible 
– the red Metro Buses in Lahore can be seen traversing their route. In other cases, 
outcomes are less tangible – electoral gain can only be part and parcel of a number of 
other factors that affect an election, personal enrichment is not something patrons 
declare on a tax form, and protection from investigation involves burying the cover 
up. In these cases, I relied on winning the trust of politicians and bureaucrats so they 
would tell me ‘what happened’ (even if it was a whispered conversation in the middle 
of a large hall full of other department employees) as well as newspapers. The 
examples I have presented in this thesis focus on instances where I was able to verify 
the sequence of events and the outcome.  
Finally, it was almost by coincidence that I stumbled into the pivotal 
connection between what might be described as ‘the centralisation of discretion’ in 
Punjab and the politicisation of the bureaucracy. As I expanded my research to 
politicians and bureaucrats on the fringes of the centre of power (the CM Secretariat 
and the provincial secretariat), I tapped into the resentment and frustration of 
politicians and bureaucrats with regard to access – not just vis-à-vis the CM, but 
power in general. It was not just the differential experiences of those with and without 
access to the CM’s kitchen cabinet, it was also the discrepancies in how these two sets 
of people understood the system and their place within it – for instance, what a 
politician is supposed to do once he is elected, who bureaucrats are accountable to, 
and (a more complex problem) whether decision-making power over district-level and 
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lower appointments legally rested with the DCO or the department Secretary – that 
underscored the reality of the centralisation of discretion and patronage in Punjab.  
 
Contributions 
Bureaucratic politicisation is a worldwide phenomenon. Though the degree 
and legality varies, politicised appointments are used everywhere to achieve outcomes 
desired by politicians and bureaucrats alike. Even though my research was conducted 
in Punjab, Pakistan, my findings are likely to be generalizable to other parts of South 
Asia, other postcolonial states, and beyond. In the US, for example, (legal) politicised 
appointments are used by politicians to further particular agendas. In Pakistan and 
India, even where politicised appointments are not legal, they are widely used by state 
actors within the state to achieve their own ends. 
Although ‘politicisation’ is a term used frequently in popular discourse 
concerning bureaucracies, there is surprisingly little political science literature on the 
concept itself – what it means, how it takes place, and why. This thesis seeks to fill 
this gap in the disciplinary literature on bureaucracies in general, and South Asian 
bureaucracies in particular. It explores what precisely politicisation is, why and how 
politicised appointments are made, and explicates the consequences of politicised 
appointments for governance, as well as for the actors involved. In doing so, I 
consider institutional and structural hierarchies and regulations in some detail – for 
instance, in my detailed discussion of the rules on bureaucratic appointments in 
Pakistan (Chapter 2) – and, even beyond the rules themselves, I investigate how these 
rules influence the pursuit of outcomes by actors operating within or alongside them. 
In particular, I provide a detailed account of, and emphasise the critical importance of, 
specific regulatory loopholes related to bureaucratic appointments – loopholes that 
allow patrons (politicians or bureaucrats) to make extra-legal appointments in pursuit 
of targeted outcomes. As a result, I contribute to the political science literature on 
bureaucratic politicisation, and on bureaucracies more generally, by linking the 
manipulation of regulations on bureaucratic appointments to the pursuit of wider 
outcomes.  
This thesis contributes to three further bodies of literature within the discipline 
of political science. The first contribution is a criticism of Principal-Agent Theory’s 
(PAT) overly simplistic representation of the relationship between politicians and 
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bureaucrats. In emphasising political oversight and delegation (or subversion), while 
focusing primarily on senior bureaucratic cadres, the political-economy literature on 
PAT misrepresents the more nuanced ties between politicians and several different 
layers of the bureaucracy. In this thesis, I present evidence of the variety of ways in 
which bureaucrats and politicians interact, across their respective hierarchies, through 
relationships that reach beyond simple monitoring to transactional relationships of 
exchange curated to suit specific strategic objectives. I contend that politicians’ 
relationships with bureaucrats often reach beyond delegation, information control, and 
monitoring. In fact, bureaucrats and politicians often work together on a more 
equitable footing than envisioned in much of the PAT literature, with both parties 
subscribing to the same worldview and vision of ‘good governance’. And, yet, the ties 
between these actors often extend beyond the pursuit of simple ‘governance’ 
outcomes. I argue that politicisation is often a means not only for politicians and even 
bureaucrats to gain electorally, but also to achieve more personal objectives – 
personal enrichment or protection.  
In this thesis, the most important transactional relationships are defined by the 
fact that, although those who engage in them are unequal, both benefit. Rather than 
using the rather confusing, and in some ways limiting (see Chapter 1), term 
‘clientelism’, I describe strategic (‘curated’) relationships based on bonds of trust or 
exchange – what I call strategic patronage relationships – to show exactly how 
politicised appointments are used to achieve targeted outcomes. In South Asia, the 
existing literature on patronage has been used to examine relationships between 
politicians and voters (for instance, Nelson 2011; Mohmand 2011; Javid 2012; 
Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2015) as well as politicians and criminality (for instance, 
Michelutti 2010, 2014; Piliavsky 2014). Moving beyond this targeted focus on 
politicians, my work places both politicians and bureaucrats at the centre, exploring 
ties not just between politicians and bureaucrats, but also between individual 
bureaucrats themselves. As a result, this thesis contributes to the political science 
literature on patronage in South Asia by considering the interests and objectives of 
bureaucrats, rather than just those of politicians and/or citizens.  
In addition, this thesis cuts against the conventional focus on biraderi and 
kinship ties in the South Asia literature on patronage, emphasising, instead, the 
professional and school networks that underpin crucial bonds between politicians and 
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bureaucrats (and, again, bureaucrats themselves). This is not to say that biraderi or 
kinship ties do not exist in the contexts I examine. They do. However, my research 
revealed that bureaucrats placed greater emphasis on relationships built during 
schooling, training, and working together.  
This thesis does not focus on discuss criminality, with the exception of 
Chapter 5, which discusses illegal methods of appointment. However, even here, not 
all cases of illegality are matters of criminal law – most are matters of administrative 
(or civil) law, dealt with by tribunals, rather than the police. As such, my work does 
not discuss the role of the police (or the politicisation of police appointments) in any 
great detail. In fact, my work expands our understanding of politicisation beyond the 
realm of the police and criminal law – focusing attention on the use of legal and extra-
legal appointment as well as ‘illegal’ administrative acts. 
Unlike PAT’s focus on senior bureaucrats and the patronage literature’s focus 
on street-level bureaucrats, my research is not limited to elite or street-level 
bureaucrats (PAS, patwaris, etc.). instead, my focus extends to politicisation amongst 
mid-tier bureaucrats as well. These are the officials responsible for implementing 
policies formulated in the federal or the provincial capital. These are the people who 
are most aware of both administrative and local realities; they play a key role in 
achieving the outcomes sought by individual patrons and the bureaucrats they seek to 
appoint (legally, extra-legally, or illegally).  
Broadly, this thesis extends the study of strategic patronage ties to their role in 
promoting bureaucratic performance – an underrepresented aspect in the political 
science literature on bureaucratic politics in South Asia. Amongst those who do use 
patronage as a lens to study bureaucracy (Grindle 2012), the objective is often to 
explain patterns of bureaucratic career advancement. What is often overlooked in this 
body of work, however, are the more diverse motivations that underpin existing 
patronage relationships, as well as the significance of politicised appointments for the 
success of governance, electoral, and personal enrichment or protection goals.  
Typically, even the political science literature on bureaucratic appointments 
(Grindle 2012; Iyer and Mani 2012; and Akhtari, et al. 2017) investigates only the 
initial recruitment or political turnover of bureaucrats, overlooking the ways in which 
legal (regular and irregular), extra-legal, and illegal appointments can be made during 
the course of a bureaucrat’s career. I explore not just the initial recruitment of 
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bureaucrats or bureaucratic movement (transfers, promotions, etc.) following a change 
in political leadership, but also a variety of appointments taking place throughout 
individual bureaucratic careers. In doing so, I contribute to the existing literature on 
the politics of bureaucratic appointments by exploring the ways in which regulations 
on bureaucratic recruitment, promotion, and transfer are manipulated and bent to 
extra-legally appoint particular bureaucrats to particular posts for particular ends. 
My additional contributions target is to the literature on Pakistan and South 
Asia more generally. Until 2000, much of this literature focused on the structure of 
Pakistan’s postcolonial state, particularly its colonial heritage and comparisons with 
India. During the early 2000s, however, the focus on terrorism and security studies 
side-lined explorations of the state and the actors who comprise it – their motives, 
behaviour, and interests. Furthermore, the dominance of the military in Pakistan’s 
political sphere has meant that far too much academic attention has been paid to the 
military and its interactions with other organs of the state. After Alavi’s notion of the 
over-developed bureaucratic-military state and Kennedy’s exploration of the 
evolution of the Pakistan bureaucracy, few academics have focused on the operation 
of the postcolonial bureaucracy in itself.356 I aim to revive and extend this crucial part 
of the political science literature by studying the ways in which bureaucratic 
appointments shape governance.  
My exploration of variation in patterns of bureaucratic appointment reveals 
some of the consequences associated with the centralisation of power – specifically, 
how such power is used to benefit some while excluding others. Such centralisation 
goes against the spirit of Pakistan’s landmark 18th Amendment (2010) which 
envisioned not just a devolution of power from the federal to the provincial level, but 
also the devolution of decision making and the creation of an empowered, democratic 
local government system. While most elite bureaucrats I spoke to like the idea of local 
government (in theory), few are willing to concede power to provincial civil servants 
or to local representatives in practice. Elected local governments have been resisted 
by federal and provincial bureaucrats alike, for they take power and money away from 
the bureaucracy as well as federal and provincial politicians. The new local 
government system introduced in Punjab in 2016/17 does little to enable elected 
representatives to make independent decisions at a local level. Instead, it continues to 
                                                 




provide the provincial government (and senior bureaucrats, e.g. Deputy 
Commissioners) with inordinate power over local representatives’ decision making 
(see Chapter 2). As such, the 18th Amendment has had an impact on the bureaucracy 
in a manner opposite to the principle of devolution. It has allowed federal bureaucrats 
to take over provincial departments, side lining provincial civil servants and resisting 
the creation of an empowered local government system. Ignoring the amendment’s 
basic tenets, politicians and bureaucrats have sought instead to centralise power rather 
than redistribute it. 
While it is by no means novel to argue that politicians in positions of power 
favour their cronies, illuminating exactly why and how they do so (via bureaucratic 
appointments) is still a worthwhile contribution. My research reveals that politicians 
in positions of leadership (such as the CM) create hierarchies within both the 
bureaucracy and their political parties in order to cement their own position with 
voters. This is done via appointments that help them prioritise the delivery of policies 
and projects favoured by the members of the kitchen cabinet. Indeed, a deeper 
understanding of this process helps to explain inconsistencies in government 
performance within a particular province – why and how certain policies and projects 
are developed, implemented, and completed at light speed even as others languish 
behind the scenes. Distributing government largesse in a targeted manner, and 
favouring the requests of some while ignoring others is enabled when political leaders 
create a class of elites comprised of bureaucrats and other politicians that orbit around 
them.   
Still, these links respond to political and personal circumstances (for instance, 
the calculus surrounding an approaching election or the challenge of an opposition 
party). In Punjab, changes in the party of government at the centre have often shaped 
the interaction of provincial bureaucrats and politicians – particularly, with reference 
to the ease (or lack thereof) of making politicised appointments. If a party holds 
Punjab but not the centre, there is always some tension over elite (PAS and PSP) 
appointments. The elite cadres become divided along party lines. And, when this 
happens, their elite bureaucratic powers are checked – as much by their internal 
divisions as by the whims of two different parties. It is important to remember, 
though, that whoever wins Punjab will be in a stronger position. Forming a 
government at the centre without winning Punjab (the province with the most 
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National Assembly seats) will typically require a coalition. As such, a coalition 
central government that differs from the provincial government in Punjab will rarely 
succeed in regulating the appointment of elite bureaucrats against the wishes of 
Punjab’s ruling party. If, on the other hand, a party wins both Punjab and the centre, 
that party will enjoy full control of PAS and PSP bureaucratic appointments. Barring 
military intervention or some type of external shock (such as the release of the 
Panama Papers), there is little to stop such a party from moving forward with its 
agenda by appointing its favoured bureaucrats in key posts. During such periods, 
favoured bureaucrats from the elite cadres of the bureaucracy and the ruling party 
work as one. This often involves handing substantive powers (administrative and even 
political) to senior bureaucrats in key positions at both the federal and provincial 
levels, often concentrating the powers of multiple posts in one or a handful of offices 
(see the case of Jehanzeb Khan in Chapter 4).  
Recent literature on the Pakistan bureaucracy focuses on bureaucratic artefacts 
(for instance documentation and paperwork) as a means of political or state control 
(Hull 2012) or uses quantitative methods (interventions, regressions, large-N studies, 
randomised control trials, and experiments) to research bureaucratic performance and 
the factors that shape it. In using qualitative methods (interviews, semi-participant 
ethnographic observation, and research through newspaper archives) to study the 
interactions between actors within the state, I provide a more nuanced account of the 
political and bureaucratic landscape, moving beyond mere artefacts to various types 
of formal and informal relationships. I do not confine my remarks to just one 
government (as Martin 2016 does). My qualitative work for this thesis explores and 
recounts events, experiences, and interactions between political and bureaucratic 
actors across nearly thirty years of Punjab’s, and Pakistan’s, history.  
However, my preference for qualitative methods is not to suggest that further 
data collection is not needed. Any academic working on the subject of Pakistan’s 
bureaucracy will be aware of the lack of publicly available data. Though records are 
kept, they are often inaccessible even to those working inside the system – filing 
systems are complicated and outdated and paperwork is frequently lost, misplaced, or 
buried (often intentionally, of course). Much of the information on the bureaucracy’s 
activities can only be found in the newspapers. The first step for any future work on 
Pakistan’s bureaucracy must be to encourage better (digitised) records, making them 
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more accessible to those who lack connections in the bureaucracy (e.g. via Right to 
Information requests).357  
 
In sum, this thesis investigates political and bureaucratic efforts to realise three 
types of outcomes: bureaucratic efficiency, electoral gain, and personal enrichment or 
protection via legal, extra-legal, and illegal methods of bureaucratic appointment. In 
setting out the interaction between (a) the objectives of politicians and bureaucrats, 
(b) their methods of bureaucratic appointment, and (c) the patronage bonds that exist 
between patrons and their appointees, as well as (d) how these factors may (or may 
not) come together in ways that ‘deliver’ desired outcomes, I criticise the Principal-
Agent Theory body of literature and contribute to the political science literatures on 
politicisation, patronage, and the bureaucracy. Moreover, I contribute to the literature 
on South Asia with my use of qualitative methods to study bureaucratic regulations, 
relationships, and performance.  
 
Future Research 
For the most part, this thesis has focused on Punjab with occasional references 
to the federal bureaucracy. A comparative study of Punjab with Sindh or Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa, however, may prove instructive. Do provincial bureaucrats lacking 
access to the central government (now controlled by the PMLN) behave like those in 
the Punjab who lack access to ‘the centre’ in Lahore? 
Though I drew cases from across the bureaucracy, my fieldwork was focused 
on two departments – School Education and Irrigation. A simple method of verifying 
my findings would be to conduct fieldwork in other departments such as Health.358 
Furthermore, it would be valuable to study departments as they are brought 
increasingly into public-private partnerships. At the federal level, it would also be 
worth studying how ‘autonomous’ bodies such as the Oil and Gas Regulatory 
                                                 
357 The Punjab Transparency and Right to Information Act was passed in 2013. When I did my 
fieldwork, the Act had had little impact on the day-to-day operations of departments beyond the 
creation of a post (or an officer being put in charge of) dealing with Right to Information requests. 
Since then, there has been resistance by the bureaucracy to sharing data, but it is still too soon to judge 
the impact of the Act. 
358 This thesis has not covered the politicisation of the Pakistan Police Service. This was a conscious 
decision – my lack of contacts meant that it would take me a very long time to gain the kind of access I 
needed to win trust; in fact, I believe the police’s interactions with politicians and other bureaucrat 




Authority, the National Electric Power Regulatory Authority, and the Pakistan 
Electronic Media Regulatory Authority operate. The ruling PMLN is aware that it is 
under scrutiny for its close relationship with particular bureaucrats. In fact, for 
precisely this reason, it has increasingly relied on public-private partnerships and the 
creation of autonomous bodies to stifle criticism. However, the leadership also 
ensures that it retains a critical stake in decision making by appointing trusted 
bureaucrats to head not just important government departments but also ‘autonomous’ 
bodies and corporations.  
In the two years since I completed my fieldwork, the most significant 
development in Pakistan has been the initiation of a new China-Pakistan Economic 
Corridor (CPEC) – a series of infrastructure projects that extend across the length of 
the country supported by Chinese investment and management. The involvement of 
the Chinese state has provoked criticism; however, there is no doubt that the 
corridor’s development and implementation will shape Pakistan’s bureaucracy. How 
Pakistan’s politicised bureaucracy might cope with this infrastructural behemoth is a 
question that deserves more attention. Studying the interaction of the Chinese and 
Pakistani bureaucracies will produce fascinating insights. 
What does my argument imply for other countries? Though this thesis focuses 
on Pakistan, it is inspired and influenced by work on bureaucracies from around the 
world. In some countries, political appointments to the bureaucracy are, of course, 
perfectly legal and acceptable – presidential systems like the US, for instance. 
However, in countries that inherited the British parliamentary system, where 
bureaucracies are supposed to be neutral and rational (Weberian), bureaucracies are 
often anything but. Even in Canada and in the UK, there are concerns that the 
bureaucracy is compromised.359 Understanding how this politicisation works, and 
particularly what interests it serves, is an undertaking with broad significance.  
Pakistan is just one of many countries today with weak institutions. Even 
countries like India, which many would have certified as democratic and stable just a 
year ago, seem to be back-sliding. My focus on how actors within states take 
advantage of weak institutions to hijack official processes to serve their own interests 
might be useful in other countries. In particular, studying politicised bureaucratic 
                                                 
359 Grube, D. 2015. Civil servants are taking on an increasingly public role, allowing for perceptions of 
partisanship to emerge. February 25, 2015. LSE British Politics and Policy Blog. Available at: 
<http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/are-civil-servants-now-promiscuous-partisans-and-does-it-
matter/> [Accessed 6 June 2017]. 
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appointments is important for those with an interest in understanding how strongmen 
(like Narendra Modi) operate. In addition, my emphasis on interactions and prior 
professional relationships between actors taps into a growing interest in behavioural 
sciences while acknowledging that politicians’ and bureaucrats’ behaviour is shaped 
by the institutions in which they operate.  
 
Conclusion 
This thesis presents a nuanced account of the politicisation of the bureaucracy 
in Pakistan. I highlight the use of legal, extra-legal, and illegal bureaucratic 
appointments, by politicians as well as bureaucrats, to achieve specific outcomes, 
including bureaucratic efficiency, electoral gain, and personal enrichment or 
protection. In doing so, I underscore the increasing centralisation of discretion and 
patronage in the hands of the CM and his kitchen cabinet, which enables insiders to 
make legal and extra-legal appointments to benefit themselves while pushing 
outsiders to use illegal methods to achieve their goals.  
One of the triggers for this PhD was the periodic claim that Pakistan is a 
‘failing’ or ‘failed’ state. Pakistan may have a weak state, but I believe it is a state that 
can achieve much of what it wants to achieve. For all its weakness, inequality, and 
injustice, Pakistan is not a failed state; it is merely one that, as I have tried to 
illustrate, is driven by elite actors who pursue a range of interests, or ‘objectives’, not 
all of which seek to enhance the well-being of the public at large. 
My fieldwork and writing up for this thesis were conducted at a unique 
moment in Pakistan’s history. The historic 18th Amendment to the 1973 Constitution 
had been passed (in 2010), devolving power to the provinces and getting rid of Article 
58(2)b (thus preventing the president from dissolving the National Assembly). And, 
in 2013, for the first time ever, the country saw an elected government complete its 
term and hand power directly to a different party in a peaceful electoral transition. 
When I started this project, there was palpable hope that ‘devolution’ and 
‘democracy’ would bring rewards in the form of development and improved 
governance. However, these conclusions were evidently premature.  
At the time of my fieldwork (2014-15), there were rumblings of a new local 
government system being introduced. By 2017, local elections had been held and that 
new system was operational. Though touted as a sea change in the conduct of 
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governance, the system in fact changed little. The ruling PMLN has simply used this 
local government system to press on with its centralising tendencies by enhancing the 
power of the district bureaucracy at the expense of elected local government 
representatives (and by retaining provincial control or a veto over local level decision-
making and staffing). ‘Democratising’ changes at both the national and the local level 
have not always produced the ‘good governance’ outcomes they were expected to 
support. In Pakistan, bureaucratic politicisation as a means of control by those in 
power at the centre seems likely to increase.  
At its heart, this is a thesis about the underpinnings of governance. It identifies 
the ways in which well-connected actors in Pakistan’s most populous province get 
what they want. Where the public good happens to coincide with their objectives, 
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Post: Dean, National Management College (NMC) 
Dean’s office, NMC, Lahore; 19 August 2014, 11am 
 
Interview 2 
Post: Chief Instructor, National Institute of Management 
NIM Campus, Lahore; 19 August 2014, 3pm 
 
Interview 3 
Post: Program Director, Punjab Education Sector Reform Program, PAS officer, BPS 
19. 
PESRP, PMIU, Lahore, 2 September, 2014, 12pm 
 
Interview 4 
Post: Director General, Civil Services Academy 
Civil Services Academy, Walton Campus, 12 September 2014, 1130am 
 
Interview 5 
Post: Teacher, Government Islamia High School, Lahore/Punjab Teachers’ Union 
General Secretary 
Govt Islamia High School (as above), 13 September 2014, 11:15am. 
 
Interview 6 
Post: Deputy Secy Higher Education Punjab, PAS officer. 
Her office, Punjab Civil Secretariat, Lahore, 18 September, 2014, 9:30am 
 
Interview 7 
Post: Chairman WAPDA 
Chairman’s office, WAPDA House, Lahore, 19 September, 2014, 4:45pm. 
 
Interview 8 
Post: ex-Director Public Instruction Punjab. Retired. Began his career as a teacher.  
His residence, Lahore, 24 September, 2014, 2pm.  
 
Interview 9 
Post: Deputy Secretary, Services, Services and General Administration Department, 
PAS officer, BPS 18. 
Her office, Punjab Civil Secretariat, Lahore, 25 September, 2014, 11am 
 
Interview 10 
Post: Secretary Labour and Human Resources, Punjab, PAS officer, BPS 20. 
His office, P & D Dept Building, Nabha Road, Lahore, 24 & 29 September, 2014, 
11am & 4pm. 
 
Interview 11 
                                                 
360 A full list of interviewee names are available with the author 
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Name of Interviewee: Dr Saeed Shafqat 
Post: Professor FC College & Director Centre for Public Policy and Governance 
His office, FC College, Lahore, 30 September, 2014, 2:15pm. 
 
Interview 12 
Post: Secretary Planning and Development, PAS officer, BPS 20. 




Party Affiliation: PMLN. MNA, NA 124 (Lahore-VII).  
Party office, Lahore, 14 October, 2014, 3pm 
 
Interview 14 
Post: Secretary Services, S&GAD, Punjab, PAS officer, BPS 21. 
His office, Civil Secretariat, Lahore, 15 October 2014, 12:30pm 
 
Interview 15 
Post: Advocate of the Supreme Court, ex Governor, ex Minister, legal representative 
of the PMLN. 
His office, Lahore, 16 October 2014, 10:45am 
 
Interview 16 
Post: Consultant with SNG - Sub National Governance. PAS officer. On leave from 
the civil service while in BPS 20. 
SNG office, 22 October 2014, 3pm. 
 
Interview 17 
Post: Deputy Secretary Establishment, S&GAD 
Secretariat, Lahore, 23 October 2014, 9:30am 
 
Interview 18 
Post: Deputy Secretary, NACTA, Federal Ministry of Interior, BPS 18 
Her office, Ministry of Interior, Pak Secretariat, Islamabad, 28 October, 2014, 10am 
 
Interview 19 
Post: Journalist with DAWN Islamabad 
DAWN Islamabad office, Zero Point, 28 October, 2014, 4:30pm 
 
Interview 20 
Post: Retired federal secretary, PAS officer. 
His office, Islamabad, 29 October 2014, 1130am 
 
Interview 21 
Post: Head of the Centre for Civic Education 
His office, Islamabad, 29 October, 2014, 12:30pm 
 
Interview 22 








Post: Retired Additional Director of Public Instruction, School Education Department. 
Quaid College, Lahore, 8 December, 2014, 5pm 
 
Interview 24 
Party Affiliation: PTI, MNA NA 126 (Lahore-IX) 
Party office, Lahore, 22 November, 2014, 5pm 
 
Interview 25 
Party Affiliation: PTI MPA PP 151 (Lahore-XV), Leader of the Opposition in the 
Punjab Assembly. 
Party office, Lahore, 25 November, 2014, 11am 
 
Interview 26 
Post: Information and Complaints Officer, School Education Department 
School Education Department, Old P&D Building, Nabha Road, Lahore, 27 
November 2014, 9:30am 
 
Interview 27 
Post: Deputy Secretary Elementary Education 
School Education Department, Old P&D Building, Nabha Road, Lahore, 27 
November 2014, 10am 
 
Interviews 28 and 29 
Post: Head teachers, Government Boys and Girls High Schools, Lidher 
Government Boys and Girls High Schools, Lidher, Bedian Road, Lahore, 6 
December, 2014, 11am 
 
Interview 30 
Post: Deputy Secretary (Confidential), S&GAD, PAS officer, BPS 18 
Her office, Punjab Secretariat, Lahore, 12 December 2014, 11am 
 
Interview 31 
Post: Professor, SDSB, LUMS 
His office, SDSB, LUMS, 15 December, 2014, 10 am 
 
Interview 32 
Post: Assistant Professor at LUMS. Retired bureaucrat 
His office, SDSB, LUMS, 17 December, 2014, 10am 
 
Interview 33 
Post: Rector, National School of Public Policy (NSPP), PAS officer on extension after 
retirement. 
His office, NSPP, Lahore, 9 January 2015, 11am 
 
Interview 34 
Post: former Deputy Chairman Planning Commission 
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His house, Lahore, 10 January 2015, 10:30am 
 
Interview 35 
Post: Registrar, Punjab Services Tribunal 
His office, PST, Lahore, 14 January 2015, ~ 12pm; 23 January 2015, 11am; 11 
February 2015, 12pm 
 
Interview 36 
Post: Senior clerk, Punjab Minister for Food  
His office, 14 January, 2015, 12:30pm 
 
Interview 37 
Post: Additional Secretary Schools, School Edu Department 
His office, Nabha Road, Lahore, 26 January 2015, 11:30am 
 
Interview 38 
Post: Director of Public Instruction (Secondary Education)  
His office, Lahore, 28 January 2015, 10:45am 
 
Interview 39 
Post: Director General Civil Defence Department Punjab, PAS officer, BPS 19 
Her office, Lahore, 28 January 2015, 11:30am 
 
Interview 40 
Post: Director Monitoring, Schools 
His office, School Education Department, Lahore, 29 January 2015, 11am 
 
Interview 41 
Post: Deputy Secretary Secondary Education 
His office, School Education Department, 29 January 2015 9am, 17 February 2015 
10am, 24 August 2016, 12pm 
 
Interview 42 
Post: Secretary Higher Education Punjab, PAS officer, BPS 21. 
His office, Punjab Secretariat, 6 February 2015, 11:45am 
 
Interview 43 & 44 
Post: Retired Provincial Civil Service officers 
Chenab Club, Faisalabad, 9 February 2015, 12pm 
 
Interview 45 
Post: DCO, Narowal, PAS officer. 
DCO Complex, Narowal, 12 February 2015, 11:45am 
 
Interview 46 
Party Affiliation: PPP, member Central Executive Committee, losing candidate for 
PPP for NA-121 (Lahore-IV). 





Post: Additional Secretary, Home Department, Punjab, PAS officer, BPS 18 
His office, Punjab Secretariat, 16 Feb 2015, 11am 
 
Interview 48 
Party Affiliation: PPP, former MPA PP-59 (Faisalabad-IX) 
His office, Lahore, 19 February 2015, 2:30pm 
 
Interview 49 
Post: Section Officer Promotions – IV, School Education Department 
His office, SE dept., 24 February 2015, 12 pm & 24 August 2016, 11am 
 
Interview 50 
Post: Section Officer (Admin), School Education Department 
His office, SE dept., 24 February 2015, 12:30pm 
 
Interview 51 
Post: Budget officer, Lahore Education Complex 
His office, Education complex, Hall Road, Lahore, 27 February 2015, 10am 
 
Interview 52 
Post: AEO Lahore city 
His office, Education Complex Lahore, 27 February 2015, 10:45am 
 
Interview 53 
Post: Secretary Food Balochistan, PAS officer 
His house, Lahore, 1 March 2015, 11am 
 
Interview 54 
Post: Punjab Ombudsman. Former Chief Secretary Punjab 
His office, Nabha Road, 3 March 2015, 10am 
 
Interview 55 
Post: Section Officer Recruitment, School Education Department 
His office, SE Department, 10 March 2015, 9am 
 
Interview 56 
Post: Section Officer (Secondary Education - I) 
His office, SE Department, 11 March 2015, 9:15am 
 
Interview 57 
Post: Section Officer (Efficiency & Discipline - I) – Discipline, School Education 
Department 
His office, SE Department, 11 March 2015, 9:45am 
 
Interview 58 
Post: Additional Secretary Admin, School Education Department 
His office, SE Department, 11 March 2015, 10am 
 
Interview 59 
Party Affiliation: PMLN, MPA PP-145 (Lahore-IX) 
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Outside Services Hospital building, 17 March 2015, 5pm 
 
Interview 60 
Party Affiliation: IND, previously PML, PMLQ, PTI. Former MNA NA-94 (Toba 
Tek Singh-III) and Minister of Education Punjab.  
Gymkhana, 18 March 2015, 4:15pm 
 
Interview 61 
Party Affiliation: PMLN, MPA PP-138 (Lahore-II) 
His office, Lahore, 20 March 2015, 2pm 
 
Interview 62 
Party Affiliation: PMLN, MNA NA 123 (Lahore-VI) 
His house, Lahore 22 March 2015, 12:30pm 
 
Interview 63 
Post: DCO Gujranwala, PAS officer, BPS 18. 
His office, Gujranwala, 27 March, 2015, 10am 
 
Interview 64 
Post: District Monitoring Officer Edu and Health, Gujranwala 
His office, Gujranwala 27 March 2015, 11am 
 
Interview 65 
Post: Section Officer Operations, Irrigation 
His office, Irrigation Department secretariat, Lahore, 26 March 2015, 10:50am 
 
Interview 66 
Post: Head of PMIU Irrigation 
His office, Irrigation Department, Lahore, 26 March, 2015, 11:15am-ish 
 
Interview 67 
Party Affiliation: PMLQ. Former MPA PP-111 (Gujrat-IV). 
Gymkhana, Lahore, 2 April 2015, 2pm 
 
Interview 68, 69, 70 
Post: PIDA Employees - Deputy General Manager (Social Mobilisation), 
Communications Manager, Accounts officer 




Post: EDO (E) Rawalpindi 




Post: Deputy DEO Rawalpindi 






Post: Project Manager, Alif Ailaan 
His office, Alif Ailaan, Islamabad, 9 April 2015, 1145am 
 
Interview 74 
Party Affiliation: PMLN. Former Senator (on a PPP ticket) and chairperson of the 
Benazir Income Support Programme. 
His office, Islamabad, 9 April 2015, 4pm 
 
Interview 75 
Post: PAS officer, presently OSD. PAS officer, BPS 21. Former Press Secretary to 
PM Nawaz Sharif.  
His house, Lahore, 13 April 2015, 4pm 
 
Interview 76 
Post: Retired PAS officer, former Secretary Irrigation 
His house, Lahore, 14 April 2015, 11:30am 
 
Interview 77 
Post: ex-PAS officer, presently World Bank 
Executive Lounge, Third Floor, Avari Hotel, Lahore, 16 April 2015, 4pm 
 
Interview 78 
Post: PMLN MPA PP 135 (Narowal-IV) 
His home, Lahore. 21 April 2015, 10am 
 
Interview 79 
Party Affiliation: IND, formerly PMLQ, PPP. Ex-MNA NA-88 (Jhang-III) 
His office, FIFA House, Gaddafi Stadium, Lahore, 25 April 2015, 3pm 
 
Interview 80 
Post: PPP member. Former MPA PP-112 (Gujrat-V) and Finance Minister Punjab. 
PPP party office, Cantt Lahore, 28 April 2015, 2pm 
 
Interview 81 
Post: MPA PMLN PP-100 (Gujranwala-X) (now deceased) 
Punjab Assembly, 29 April 2015, 11am 
 
Interview 82 
Post: MPA PMLN PP-28 (Sargodha-I) 
Punjab Assembly, 29 April 2015, 11am 
 
Interview 83 
Post: Former MPA PMLN PP-52 (Faisalabad-II) 
His residence DHA Lahore, 29 April 2015, 6pm 
 
Interview 84 
Post: Section Officer Admin Irrigation 





Post: Admin officer irrigation 
His office, Irrigation Secretariat Lahore, 4 May 2015, 1130am 
 
Interview 86 + 87 
Post: Deputy Secretary Irrigation + anonymous bureaucrat 
His office, Irrigation Department, 4 May 2015, 10am 
 
Interview 88 
Post: Deputy Secretary General Irrigation 
Her office, Irrigation Secretariat Lahore, 4 May 2015, 1230pm 
 
Interview 89 
Post: Secretary Irrigation, Punjab, PAS Officer, BPS 19. 
His office, 6 May 2015, 6pm 
 
Interview 90 
Post: MNA PMLN NA-159 (Khanewal-IV) 
His office, Barkat Market Lahore, 7 May 2015, 1030am  
 
Interview 91 
Post: PMLN party worker 
MPA’s Party office, Lahore, 12 May 2015, 11am 
 
Interview 92 
Post: MPA PMLN PP-150 (Lahore XIV) 
His home, Lahore 12 May 2015, 1pm 
 
Interview 93 
Post: MPA PMLN PP-30 (Sargodha-III). 
His office, Mall road Lahore, 12 May 2015, 6pm 
 
Interview 94 
Post: Budget officer School Education Gujranwala 
His office, Gujranwala, 14 May 2015, 11:30am 
 
Interview 95, 96, 97 
Post: School Education Gujranwala teachers 
EDO office, Gujranwala, 14 May 2015, 12:15pm 
 
Interview 98  
Post: Education Grievance Officer Gujranwala 
Education office, Gujranwala, 14 May 2015, 11:50am 
 
Interview 99 
Post: EXEN Irrigation Gujranwala 
Irrigation office, Commissioner office, Gujranwala, 14 May 2015, 1230pm 
 
Interview 100 + 101 
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Post: DEO E female Hafizabad + 1 her colleague 
Her office, Hafizabad, 15 May 2015, 10am 
 
Interview 102 
Post: DEO E male Hafizabad 
His office, Hafizabad, 15 May 2015, 11:30 
 
Interview 103 
Post: Deputy DEO SE Hafizabad 
His office, Hafizabad, 15 May 12pm 
 
Interview 104 
Post: Superintendent Admin Edu Faisalabad 
Education Complex, Faisalabad, 19 May 2015, 1pm 
 
Interview 105 
Party Affiliation: PMLN MPA PP-165 (Sheikhupura-IV) 
MPA Library, Punjab Assembly, 25 May, 2015, 6:15pm  
 
Interview 106 
Party Affiliation: PMLN MPA PP-102 (Gujranwala-XII) 
Punjab Assembly MPAs Library, 25 May 2015, 6:30pm 
 
Interview 107 
Post: EXEN LCC West Hafizabad 
Irrigation office, Faisalabad, 19 May 2015, 3:30pm 
 
Interview 108 
Post: Deputy Speaker Punjab Assembly, PMLN MPA PP-247 (Rajanpur-I) 
His office, Punjab Assembly, 22 May 9:30am 
 
Interview 109 
Party Affiliation: MPA PMLQ PP-32 (Sargodha-V), former Minister for Irrigation; 
Livestock and Dairy Development 
Opposition Chamber, Punjab Assembly, 22 May 2015, 1145am 
 
Interview 110 
Post: Assistant director planning and development Faisalabad 
His office, Faisalabad, 19 May 2015, 2pm 
 
Interview 111 
Post: Deputy DEO Secondary Education Faisalabad 
His office, Faisalabad Education Complex, 19 May 2015 2:30pm 
 
Interview 112 
Post: Assistant Superintendent Admin irrigation  
His office Lahore, 27 May 2015 9:30am 
 
Interviews 113, 114, 115 
Post: EXEN Operations Small Dams, Deputy Secretary, Section Officer (ex-SDO) 
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His office, Lahore Irrigation Secretariat, 27 May 2015, 10am 
 
Interview 116 
Post: EXEN Irrigation Lahore 
His office, Lahore Irrigation Secretariat, 27 May 2015, 1030am 
 
Interview 117 
Post: Deputy Manager PIDA 
His office, PIDA, Lahore Irrigation Secretariat, 27 May 2015 10am 
 
Interview 118 
Post: retired Irrigation Department bureaucrat 
His house, Lahore, 27 May 2015 3pm 
 
Interviews 119, 120, 121 
Post: Design in-charge Lahore + 2 SDOs Irrigation 
Irrigation office, Dharampura, Lahore, 28 May 2015 11am 
 
Interview 122 
Post: Superintendent development irrigation Lahore 
His office, Irrigation office, Dharampura, Lahore, 28 May 2015 1pm 
 
Interviews 123, 124 
Post: Superintending Engineer UCC Lahore + Additional Secretary Irrigation 
His office, Irrigation office, Dharampura, Lahore, 30 May 2015, 9:30am 
 
Interview 125 
Post: DEO female Elementary Education Lahore 
Her office, Lahore Education Complex, 9 June 2015, 9am 
 
Interview 126 
Post: Superintendent male elementary Lahore  
His office, Lahore Education Complex, 9 June 2015 9:30am 
 
Interview 127 
Post: Student Welfare Officer Lahore 
Education Complex, Hall Road, Lahore, 9 June 2015, 10:15am 
 
Interview 128 
Post: EDO-E Lahore 
His office, Education Complex Lahore, 9 June 2015 11am 
 
Interview 129 
Post: Chief engineer development, irrigation, Lahore  
His office, Irrigation office, Dharampura, Lahore, 9 June 2015, 1pm 
 
Interview 130, 131 
Post: Assistant XEN Gujranwala + Anti-Corruption Establishment officer Gujranwala 





Post: Head clerk irrigation Gujranwala 
His office, Gujranwala, 10 June 2015, 1pm 
 
Interview 133 
Post: DEO Elementary Education male Gujranwala 
His office, Gujranwala, 10 June 2015 2pm 
 
Interview 134 
Post: Deputy DEO Elementary Education male Gujranwala 
His office, Gujranwala, 10 June 2015 2:30pm 
 
Interviews 135, 136, 137 
Post: DEO-Secondary Education Gujranwala + 2 
His office, Gujranwala 10 June 2015, 3pm 
 
Interview 138 
Post: MPA PMLN PP-103 (Gujranwala-XIII) 
His office, Lahore, 11 June 2015 11am 
 
Interview 139 
Post: MPA PMLN PP-94 (Gujranwala-IV) 
His office, Lahore, 11 June 2015 2pm 
 
Interview 140 
Post: MPA PMLN PP-62 (Faisalabad-XII) 
His office, Lahore, 11 June 2015, 4pm 
 
Interview 141 
Post: DEO Elementary Education female Narowal 
Her office, Narowal, 16 June 2015 9:30am 
 
Interview 142 
Post: Irrigation SDO Narowal 
Irrigation office complex, Narowal, 16 June 2015 11:30am 
 
Interview 143 
Post: EDO Hafizabad 
His office, Hafizabad Education Complex, 17 June 2015, 9:30am 
 
Interview 144 
Post: DEO Secondary Education Hafizabad 
His office, Hafizabad Education Complex, 17 June 2015 10am 
 
Interviews 145, 146, 147 
Post: SDO Gujranwala , 2 Sub-Engineers Gujranwala 





Post: MPA PMLN PP-5 (Rawalpindi-V). Chairman Punjab Education Foundation 
(PEF). Former civil servant. 
PEF office Gulberg Lahore, 18 June 2015 11am 
 
Interview 149 
Post: Superintending Engineer Lahore link Canal  
His office, Lahore, 25 June 2015 10am 
 
Interview 150 
Post: SDO Lahore  
His office, Lahore, 25 June 2015, 11am 
 
Interview 151 
Post: MPA PMLN PP-1 (Rawalpindi-I), Minister Labour and Human Resources 
His office, Lahore, 9 July 2015 10am 
 
Interview 152 
Post: Lahore Superintending Engineer + 1 colleague 
His office, Dharampura, Lahore, 9 July 2015, 3pm 
 
Interview 153 
Post: DCO Sargodha 
His office, Sargodha, 28 July 2015, 10am 
 
Interview 154 
Post: SDO Sargodha 
Irrigation complex Sargodha, 28 July 2015 11:30 am 
 
Interview 155 
Post: EXEN Sargodha 
His office, Irrigation complex Sargodha, 28 July 2015 12pm 
 
Interview 156 
Post: School Education Department Law Officer Sargodha 
His office, Sargodha, 28 July 2015 1pm 
 
Interview 157, 158 
Post: Section Officer admin (non-gazetted officers) irrigation + 1 colleague 
His office, Irrigation Secretariat, Lahore, 31 August 2015 9am 
 
Interview 159 
Post: Section Officer Enquiries irrigation 










Semi-Participant Ethnographic Observations 
 
Courts 
Punjab Services Tribunal, 14 January 2015; 23 January 2015; 11 February 2015; 26 
March, 2015; 4 May 2015; 25 June 2015; 31 August 
 
Politician’s offices  
PMLN MNA, office Lahore, 14 October, 2014 
PTI MNA, office Lahore, 22 November, 2014 
PMLN MNA office, Lahore, 7 May 2015 
PMLN MPA office, Lahore, 12 May 2015 
Deputy Speaker Punjab Assembly’s office, 22 May 
MPA PMLN, his office Lahore, 11 June 2015  
 
Bureaucrats’ offices 
Deputy Secretary’s office, School Education Department, 29 January 2015, 17 
February 2015, 24 August 2016, 
 
Secretary Higher Education Punjab’s office, Punjab Secretariat, 6 February 2015 
 
Secretary Planning and Development’s office, P&D Building, Nabah Road, Lahore, 2 
October, 2014 
 
DPI (Secondary Education) office Lahore, office, 28 January 2015 
 
DG office Civil Defence Department Punjab, office, Lahore 
 
Additional Secretary, Home Department, Punjab, office, Lahore 
 
EDO (E) Rawalpindi office, 8 April 2015 
 
Punjab Education Foundation (PEF), Disciplinary meeting with head of school in 

















































INTERVIEW GUIDE - POLITICIANS 
 
PERSONAL HISTORY AND POLITICAL CAREER 
 
When did you first contest an election? 
Have you contested from multiple or different constituencies? 
Are you usually resident in your present constituency?  
Is your family amongst the top 20% of landholding families in your constituency? 
Is any other member of your family in politics?  
Is a member of your family in the bureaucracy or in the military? 
Have you ever held party office?  
Have you ever switched parties or contested as an independent? If yes, why? 
Have you ever held a position in the Cabinet? 
If yes, why do you think you were chosen for this position? 
 
RELATIONSHIP OF PARTY WITH THE CANDIDATE and CONSTITUENCY 
 
What function does the political party serve for the candidate? Does the party provide 
an access to winning state resources? 
How does your political party establish links with the citizen? Programmatic agendas, 
charismatic leadership, or ties to particular local groups? 
Does your party have a clear ideological position? What is it?  
Explain to me how policy is made in your party. Research and policy-making unit? 
How many people are dedicated to this task? 
How strong are lobbies, businesses and businessmen in impacting policy? 
What is the role of civil servants in policy making and implementation? 
 
Does your party have a policy on education? Can I have a copy? 





How do you prepare for an election – when do you start preparing? How do you 
prepare? Walk me through it 
Do you think your seat is a safe seat or a competitive one? 
What are the major local families, biraderis and social cleavages in your 
constituency? 
What is the difference between urban and rural settings within the constituency? 
How much autonomy does the individual candidate have when designing his 
campaign strategy? 
What is the candidate selection process? When does the party let you know that you 
will be its candidate? 
What are your core priorities/concerns at this time? 





Does your party assist with constituency politics/development? 
If other parties have won from your constituency in the past, how are you different 
from them?  Do you do different types of things, or simply more of the things people 
like? Apart from ‘development’, jobs, and education, what do people like? 
Does it make a difference to you as a constituency politician if your party is in or out 
of provincial or federal government during the election campaign? Explain. 
Do you think it is easier for a politician to win as an incumbent? 
Do you think it is easier for a party to win as an incumbent? 
 
MONEY 
How much do you spend – approx. – on an election? 
Where does this money come from? Does the party help? Personal? 
Are accounts kept of this money? Can I get a copy? 
How much money is usually made available to you by the government (per year) at 
your discretion for your constituency? 
Have you ever faced problems in either receiving, accessing or spending this money? 
How is this money spent? Are accounts kept and submitted?  Who keeps these 
accounts? If so, are they public/can I have a copy? 
Does the party control how this money is spent? 
In terms of development funds, when is the greatest amount spent - soon after the 
election or close to an upcoming election? 
 
PEOPLE 
Do you think it is important for a politician and a party to have connections in the 
bureaucracy and with businessmen?  
In your opinion, do businessmen in this country influence elections/campaigns? 
How/Why not?  
Are bureaucrats useful in campaigns? How? 
 
To what extent do parties make an effort to ensure compatibility between MPA and 
MNA candidates when handing out tickets? 
Are electoral campaigns, efforts before the election, more difficult if the MPA is from 
a different party? 
During your campaign/s, have you ever faced opposition or restrictions from anyone? 
How are these restrictions to be overcome? Can parties, party leaders, courts, or 
bureaucrats help? 
If a minister at any point - is it easier to campaign as a sitting minister? What are the 
advantages? 
There tends to be a flurry of development activity just prior to an election. How do 
you make such work happen on such a tight deadline? What needs to be done to 
ensure that ministerial instructions are carried through? 
 If has held/holds party office - is this useful prior to an election? How? 
 When you are the incumbent, what are the advantages of campaigning in your 
constituency? 
 Have you ever had to campaign in a constituency in which you have no roots? 
 
 If party-switcher - when you changed your party, did you find it harder to campaign, 
to convince people to support you? 




 Do bureaucrats make things more difficult if you are from a certain party? 
 How did you appeal to voters after you had changed parties? 
 
 To what extent is constituency politics and campaigning easier if your party is ruling 
at the centre? 
 Is it also easier if your party is ruling at the province but not the centre?  
 Does it make a difference if they are the ruling party at both centre and province? 
 
PROCESSES 
How do district level bureaucracies prepare for elections? 
Who is in charge of delimitation? 
Who does the measuring and counting for delimitation? 
Who is in charge of voter lists? 
Who does the door to door work for the list? 
It has been a while since the census, but who would be responsible? 
What was the impact of Musharraf’s devolution? 
What has changed since that devolution was suspended? 
Are bureaucrats more powerful now or were they before? 
 Do you think a local government system is needed? Why or why not? 
 Can bureaucrats impact election processes and results? 





What happens after the election? What are your core priorities in your constituency? 
What expectations do constituents have right after an election? How have they 
changed? 
Does the party have any expectations of you post-election? 
 
Do you think that your preoccupations and interests as a politician change before and 
after an election? Explain. How does this work for incumbents seeking reelection? 
Do policy priorities change for you or for your party? 
Does the behavior of bureaucrats change before and after an election? 
 
How has your relationship been with MPAs from your own party?  
What happens in terms of constituency politics if the MPA is from a different party? 
How do MPAs from a different party impact the post-election scenario? 
 If has held/holds party office -Is it useful after an election (provided you won)? How? 
  
 Are party policy ideas actively pursued when in office? Why or why not? 
 Is policy implementation blocked? By whom? 
 
BUSINESSMEN 
In your opinion, do businessmen in this country influence politics and decision 
making after the election? How/Why not? 
 
BUREAUCRATS 
What problems do politicians face when fulfilling their agenda once elected to office? 
How are these problems exacerbated by the bureaucracy? 
307 
 
Does the bureaucracy manipulate circumstances, or directly interfere?  In what ways? 
Have bureaucrats ever clearly disobeyed you?  
How do you deal with such situations? 
 
How do you view the politician-bureaucrat relationship in general?  
How have politicians’ relationships with the bureaucracy changed over time? Give 
examples of cooperation, cooptation or confrontation? 
Are there specific situations where this relationship is smoother/harder? Explain. 
Do you think bureaucratic power needs to be reduced? 
 How would you suggest doing that? 
 
 In your opinion, who are bureaucrats loyal to?  
 To whom should they owe loyalty? 
 Is there a list of favoured bureaucrats for each party? Like for the PMLN, PPP, etc. 
 PMLN, Shahbaz Sharif are said to have a close relationship with bureaucrats, BB is 
said to have maintained a list of favoured bureaucrats, Zardari is known to have 
cronies. Do you agree? 
 
 Do you think bureaucrats are hired on merit? 
 How and when are bureaucrats assigned, for example to the education department?  
 Have you ever had a constituent complain about a bureaucrat? If yes, what did you 
do then? 
 Have you ever had a constituent ask you for a job in the district bureaucracy? If yes, 
when and what did you do then? 
 Has a bureaucrat ever asked you for a promotion or transfer? If yes, when and what 
did you do then? What were the terms?  
 Do you have any say in promotions or transfers? 
 
 What is ‘acting incharge’? Do you have any say in such appointments? 
 What is Officer on Special Duty? Do you have any say in such appointments? 
 
 Governments often put in place bans on transfers and postings. Why? 
 Who makes these decisions? 
 Is such a move more likely before or after an election? 
 Is the ban respected? Or are ways found around it? What are those ways? 
 Where can I get a record of appointments, transfers, promotions in the education 
department in a district? 
 
EDUCATION 
What are your thoughts on government provision of education in your constituency? 
How many primary and secondary schools are there? 
Do you know if they are all functional? 
Have you initiated any changes in the education set up in your area? 
Which bureaucrat is the most influential in the education set up in your area? 
Have you ever felt that the bureaucrats are not listening to you? 
Have you ever felt that the bureaucrats are not doing their job? 
If yes to either, what did you do? 
Have you ever complained about a bureaucrat in the education department? To whom 
and what was the result? 
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 How are teachers appointed to schools in your area? Who makes the decision and on 
what basis? 
 Do you know any of these teachers personally? 
 How is the EDO appointed? His PA? DCO? AEO? 
 What is your relationship like with the EDO, AEO in your area? 
 
 
INTERVIEW GUIDE – BUREAUCRATS 
 
PERSONAL HISTORY AND CAREER 
What year did you enter the civil service? 
Why did you choose the specific cadre you are in? 
Are there/Have there been other members of your family in the civil service? 
Are there/Have there been members of your family involved in elected office? 
Where are you originally from - town, district, constituency? 
What offices, appointments have you held?  
What districts have you been posted to? Who posted you there?  
Have you ever been acting in-charge? 
 Have you ever been made OSD? 
 Have you ever been affiliated with a political party? 
 
THE BUREAUCRACY 
Explain the bureaucratic hierarchy to me in terms of grades and cadres.  
Who oversees the district bureaucracy? 
Explain to me the source of the DMG’s prestige. 
Do you think the DMG has too much power? 
 
SELECTION and TRAINING 
Walk me through your selection and training process. 
During training, what are you taught about your interaction with politicians? 
To whom do you owe loyalty?  
 
TASKS 
What tasks do DMG officers perform? 
What duties were you expected to perform in the different positions you have held? 
Do you think individual bureaucrats are able to impact decisions through their 
bureaucratic or political contacts? For example, kin, caste, old school tie, etc 
Do you think bureaucrats shape decisions through information to which they have 
access? 
 
Explain to me how policy decisions are made in Pakistan. Who plays what role? What 
is the procedure to, for example, make a policy re education? 
 
APPOINTMENTS, PROMOTIONS and TRANSFERS ETC 
Explain to me how appointments, transfers and promotions take place in the civil 
service. Walk me through your own. Why do you think you were transferred and/or 
promoted? 
In your experience, is merit of primary importance in bureaucratic appointments, 




Is there a Transfer Sanctioning Authority? Who is the ultimate arbiter of transfers? 
What is acting in-charge? Who makes such appointments and why? 
What is Officer on Special Duty? Who makes such appointments and why? 
Have you ever made an appointment/promotion? If yes, what factors do you keep in 
mind in deciding?  
When were you most likely to make appts/promos/trans? Before or after an election? 
The government frequently places a ban on transfers and postings. What happens at 
such times? Is there contract hiring?  
Why is the ban put in in the first place, and who decided to put it in? 
 In your opinion, are such bans more likely before or after an election? Why? 
 Where can I get a record of appointments, transfers, promotions in the education 
department in a specific district? 
 
GENERAL ELECTIONS 
1) The ECP uses district officials to do some of its work. In your opinion, is this a 
good or bad idea? 
2) To what extent do bureaucrats at the provincial and district levels have the ability 
to influence the electoral process? 
 
BEFORE ELECTION 
What is the role of district bureaucrats in the lead up to a general election? 
Specifically, the DCO, the DEO, EDOs (education in particular). 
When does preparation for the election start amongst district bureaucracies? 
Who monitors the election related activities of the district bureaucracy? 
 
What is the chain of command in a district in the run up to the election? 
What is the role of PCS officers in electoral decision making at the district level? 
What is the role of DMG officers in electoral decision making at the district level? 
Are these roles (of PCS and DMG officers) within their legal powers? Or do you 
think they exceed them? 
 
Do you think polling staff are neutral? 
 How and by whom are polling agents (including Presiding Officers) chosen? 
Criteria? 
 Is it possible to influence these appointments?  
 Do politicians try and influence them? How? 
 Do PCS officers try to influence them? 
 Do DMG officers try to influence them? 
 Who trains polling staff? 
 Who decides where to set up polling stations? 
 Who is in charge of election finances in a district? 
 Who is in charge of any delimitation exercise? Who chooses the officers who will do 
the actual re-drawing of boundaries? 
 Who checks voter lists? Who chooses the officers who go door to door? 
 Do politicians influence these appointments? How? 
 Do you think election management at district level ensures fairness in the electoral 
process? 




 How did Musharraf’s devolution impact the role of district bureaucracies in the 
election? 
 Since the devolved set up has been suspended, what has changed since? 
 Do bureaucrats assist politicians during the election? Why? How? 
 Are bureaucratic appointments/transfers/promotions more frequent before or after an 
election? Why? 
 Do you think there is a difference in district management of elections in competitive 
seats as compared to safe seats? 
 Do politicians in competitive seats make more of an effort/attempt to influence the 
appointment of polling staff? 
 Are politicians who have not been able to deliver services to their constituents more 
likely to influence polling staff appointments?  
 In a constituency where the MPA and MNA are from different parties, do bureaucrats 
choose sides? On what basis? 




Once the election is over, what is the first interaction between the politician and 
district bureaucrats? 
Does the newly elected politician influence appointments/promotions/transfers to get 
the people he wants in power? 
Is this more likely to happen if: 
Competitive or safe seat 
Poor service delivery in the past (if incumbent won) 
MPA and MNA from different parties 
Politician recently switched parties 
Incumbent party wins but with different candidate 
Non-incumbent from non-incumbent party wins 
 
Do bureaucrats have influence over politicians in developing policy? 
If incumbent wins, is he in a weaker or stronger position vis a vis his ability to 
pressurize bureaucrats? 
Do newly elected politicians (non-incumbents) make more political appointments 
than an incumbent winner? Why? Who do they appoint? 
When a new person is elected, what are the first actions of the district bureaucracy, 
specifically DCO? 
Usually, do polling staff remain in their position after elections? Or are they 
promoted? Or transferred? 
Are teacher appointments higher before or after an election? 
 Are party loyalists appointed before or after elections? To what positions? 
 How do such appointments take place – do these people go through the merit 
process? If not, what is the process through which they get the post? 
 How do politicians get bureaucrats to make these appointments? 
 How is the appointment of such loyalists effected by: 
Competitive or safe seat 
Poor service delivery in the past (if incumbent won) 
MPA and MNA from different parties 
Politician recently switched parties 
Incumbent party wins but with different candidate 
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Non-incumbent from non-incumbent party wins 
 
INTERACTION 
What is the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats? 
Does this relationship vary? Federal, provincial, district? Between provinces? Under 
military rule? Before an election/after an election? 
How does the bureaucrat-politician relationship develop?  
What is the role of the political party in this relationship? 
Does the bureaucrat approach the politician to form a tie? Under what circumstances 
is this more likely than the other way around?  
At what time in the electoral cycle is this more/less likely? 
 
Is an external actor involved in connecting politician and bureaucrat? A businessman? 
Another bureaucrat? Another politician? A family member?  
Is this more likely before or after an election? 
 
Is the bur-pol relationship impacted by the politician being a minister - (a) before the 
election; (b) after the election? 
 Is the bur-pol relationship impacted by whether the seat is competitive or safe - (a) 
before the election; (b) after the election?  
 Is the bur-pol relationship impacted by the politician’s service delivery record - (a) 
before the election; (b) after the election?  
 Is this relationship impacted by the MNA and MPA being from different parties - (a) 
before the election; (b) after the election? 
 Is this relationship impacted if the politician is not an incumbent - (a) before the 
election; (b) after the election? 
 Is this relationship impacted if the politician is a party switcher - (a) before the 
election; (b) after the election? 
 Is this relationship impacted if the politician holds party office - (a) before the 
election; (b) after the election? 
 Is this relationship impacted by the seniority/place in hierarchy of the bureaucrat - (a) 
before the election; (b) after the election? 
 
 Do politicians pressurize bureaucrats? How? At what level of the hierarchy? When? 
 How do these factors impact the pressure exerted by politicians on bureaucrats: 
Competitive or safe seat 
Poor service delivery in the past (if incumbent won) 
MPA and MNA from different parties 
Politician recently switched parties 
Incumbent party wins but with different candidate 
Non-incumbent from non-incumbent party wins 
Politician is a minister 
 
What are the consequences of resisting such pressure? 
Do bureaucrats manipulate politicians? How? At what level of the hierarchy? When? 
How do these factors impact the manipulation of politicians by bureaucrats: 
Competitive or safe seat 
Poor service delivery in the past (if incumbent won) 
MPA and MNA from different parties 
Politician recently switched parties 
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Incumbent party wins but with different candidate 
Non-incumbent from non-incumbent party wins 
Politician is a minister 
 
What are the consequences of resisting/fighting back against such manipulation? 
 
Do politicians ‘request’ bureaucrats to do something? In what situation is it a request 
and not an order? When? 
How do ties of kin, caste, old school tie, etc. between politicians and between 
bureaucrats matter? When do they matter most? 
Do politicians, parties favour specific bureaucrats? Examples? 
Do bureaucrats prefer working with particular politicians? Is this preference stronger 
at particular times or in particular situations? 
Do senior bureaucrats have preferences amongst their juniors in terms of 
appointments/transfers/promotions? Why? What do they do about it? 
Do you prefer working with bureaucrats you already know? Why or why not? 
 
What is the role of bureaucrats in constituency politics - (a) before the election; (b) 
after the election? 
If seat is competitive or safe? 
 If service delivery record is poor 
 If MPA/MNA is from a different party 
 If recently switched parties 
 If incumbent party affiliated but non-incumbent winner 
 If minister 
 
Do bureaucrats ignore politicians’ orders - (a) before the election; (b) after the 
election?  
Do bureaucrats disobey politicians’ orders? 
What are the consequences of such disobedience? 
 
Do bureaucrats obstruct/ delay politicians’ orders? Why? - (a) before the election; (b) 
after the election?  
If seat is competitive or safe? 
 If service delivery record is poor 
 If MPA/MNA is from a different party 
 If recently switched parties 
 If incumbent party affiliated but non-incumbent winner 
 If minister 
 
Do senior bureaucrats move around junior ones at the request of politicians? - (a) 
before the election; (b) after the election?  
If seat is competitive or safe? 
 If service delivery record is poor 
 If MPA/MNA is from a different party 
 If recently switched parties 
 If incumbent party affiliated but non-incumbent winner 




Do politicians pressurize bureaucrats on behalf of constituents? - (a) before the 
election; (b) after the election?  
 If seat is competitive or safe? 
 If service delivery record is poor 
 If MPA/MNA is from a different party 
 If recently switched parties 
 If incumbent party affiliated but non-incumbent winner 
 If minister 
 
Do politicians pressurize bureaucrats on behalf of influential businessmen?  - (a) 
before the election; (b) after the election?  
 If seat is competitive or safe? 
 If service delivery record is poor 
 If MPA/MNA is from a different party 
 If recently switched parties 
 If incumbent party affiliated but non-incumbent winner 
 If minister  
 
Do politicians pressurize bureaucrats on behalf of other groups (religious, military, 
etc.) - (a) before the election; (b) after the election? 
If seat is competitive or safe? 
 If service delivery record is poor 
 If MPA/MNA is from a different party 
 If recently switched parties 
 If incumbent party affiliated but non-incumbent winner 
 If minister 
 
Do politicians ask bureaucrats for help in pressurizing other bureaucrats? - (a) before 
the election; (b) after the election? 
If seat is competitive or safe? 
 If service delivery record is poor 
 If MPA/MNA is from a different party 
 If recently switched parties 
 If incumbent party affiliated but non-incumbent winner 
 If minister 
 
Do the political parties maintain relationships with specific bureaucrats (at federal, 
provincial, district levels)?  
How are these ties maintained? 
When are they strongest - - (a) before the election; (b) after the election? 
 
What is the relationship like between DMG officers and Provincial Service officers?  
What is the relationship of DMG officers with politicians? - (a) before the election; 
(b) after the election?  
What is the relationship of Provincial Service officers with politicians? - (a) before 
the election; (b) after the election?  
How are they different and why? 
 
In your opinion, are decisions on policy influenced by businessmen? Saigols, 
Dawoods, Riaz, etc 
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How do businessmen influence decisions? - (a) before the election; (b) after the 
election? With whom do they interact? 
Do businessmen have links with bureaucrats? Familial, work, exchange? 
 
During your career, do you think that the bureaucracy has changed? How? 
During your career, do you think the relationship between bureaucrats and politicians 
has changed? How? Does it vary over time? 
During your career, do you think that there are significant variations in bureaucratic-
politician ties, behaviour before and after elections? 
 
INTERVIEW GUIDE – EDUCATION OFFICIALS 
 
How did the 18th amendment change the handling of education? 
How did local government under Musharraf impact education? 
How important are posts in the education department from a political perspective? 
Who appoints teachers? 
Who decides teacher transfers? 
Do teachers request transfers? Why? 
Do politicians request transfers for teachers? 
Who do they go to make such requests? 
What is the deal between a politician and bureaucrat to allow such transfers to 
happen? 
Why are teaching jobs so politicized? 
What are the duties of teachers, apart from teaching? 
What role do teachers play in elections? 
What role do education department bureaucrats play in elections? 
Explain the education bureaucracy to me 
How are officials appointed to education departments at district level? 
Do you think they are appointed on merit? 
To what extent do you think politicians can and do interfere in these appointments? 
Does the level of interference increase before an election?  
Does the level of interference decrease after an election? 
Is interference greater in constituencies with smaller margins? 
Is the interference affected by other factors – development, party, finances, etc? 
How frequently do transfers of these officials take place? 
How are transfers decided and by whom? 
How frequent are promotions? 
Who decides on promotions? 
Where can I get a record of appts, trans, promos? 
 
QUESTIONS SPECIFIC TO DISTRICT - FOR BUREAUCRATS 
 
Tell me about your district. 
How many constituencies in your district? 
Who are the major politicians and parties? 
What are the major biraderis, families in the area? 
Explain what your relationship with them is like 
How many teachers are hired in total? 
Are any of the constituencies competitive? Which ones are safe? 
What are elections like in your district? 
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What is the role of teachers in elections? 
Have any of them been hired, transferred at the request of a politician or other 
influential? 
Have you ever rejected a request for such an appointment/transfer? What were the 
consequences? 
Who appoints you? 
What are your duties? 
Have you ever been pressured by anyone in discharging your duties? 
Have you ever been transferred? 
Do you fear being transferred?  
When were you last promoted? 
Are regular promotions possible? 
Were you ever placed as acting in charge? 
On what basis do you appoint teachers? 
Have you ever had someone approach you to appoint a teacher against the rules? 
On what basis do you transfer or promote teachers? 
Have you ever had someone approach you to transfer/promote a teacher against the 
rules? 
Who exerts this pressure? Politicians? Senior bureaucrats? 
To what extent do provincial bureaucrats interfere with your work? 
Where can I get a record of trans,appts, promos? 
 
 
INTERVIEW GUIDE – ACADEMICS/JOURNALISTS/POLITICAL OBSERVES 
OF Political parties/politicians 
 
POLICY MAKING 
How is policy made in Pakistan’s political parties?   
How strong are lobbies, businesses and businessmen in impacting policy? 
What is the role of civil servants in policy making and implementation? 
 
ELECTIONS 
Does it make a difference to you as a constituency politician if your party is in or out 
of provincial or federal government during the election campaign? Explain. 
Do you think it is easier for a politician to win as an incumbent? 
Do you think it is easier for a party to win as an incumbent? 
 
What is the importance of development funds to politicians? 
How are such monies spent? Who decides? 
Are they used to control politicians by blocking receiving, accessing or spending this 
money? 
How much control do bureaucrats have over development funds and how they are 
utilised? 
In terms of development funds, when is the greatest amount spent - soon after the 
election or close to an upcoming election? 
There tends to be a flurry of development activity just prior to an election. How do 
you make such work happen on such a tight deadline? What needs to be done to 




Do you think it is important for a politician and a party to have connections in the 
bureaucracy and with businessmen?  
In your opinion, do businessmen in this country influence elections/campaigns? 
How/Why not?  
Are bureaucrats useful in campaigns? How? 
 
To what extent do parties make an effort to ensure compatibility between MPA and 
MNA candidates when handing out tickets? 
Are electoral campaigns, efforts before the election, more difficult if the MPA is from 
a different party? 
 Do bureaucrats make things more difficult if a politician has changed parties? Why or 
why not? 
 Do bureaucrats make things more difficult if a politician is from a certain party? 
To what extent is constituency politics and campaigning easier if the politicians’ party 
is ruling at the centre? 
 Is it also easier if party is ruling at the province but not the centre?  
 Does it make a difference if they are the ruling party at both centre and province? 
 
PROCESSES 
How do district level bureaucracies prepare for elections? 
Who is in charge of delimitation? 
Who does the measuring and counting for delimitation? 
Who is in charge of voter lists? 
Who does the door to door work for the list? 
It has been a while since the census, but who would be responsible? 
What was the impact of Musharraf’s devolution? 
What has changed since that devolution was suspended? 
Are bureaucrats more powerful now or were they before? 
 Do you think a local government system is needed? Why or why not? 
 Can bureaucrats impact election processes and results? 
 Are polling staff neutral? 
 
Do you think that preoccupations and interests of a politician change before and after 
an election? Explain. How does this work for incumbents seeking reelection? 
Do policy priorities change for the politician or the party? 
Does the behavior of bureaucrats change before and after an election? 
 
Are party policy ideas actively pursued when in office? Why or why not? 
 Is policy implementation blocked? By whom? 
 
BUSINESSMEN 
In your opinion, do businessmen in this country influence politics and decision 
making after the election? How/Why not? 
 
BUREAUCRATS 
What problems do politicians face when fulfilling their agenda once elected to office? 
How are these problems exacerbated by the bureaucracy? 





How do you view the politician-bureaucrat relationship in general?  
How have politicians’ relationships with the bureaucracy changed over time? Give 
examples of cooperation, cooptation or confrontation? 
Are there specific situations where this relationship is smoother/harder? Explain. 
Do you think bureaucratic power needs to be reduced? 
 How would you suggest doing that? 
 
 In your opinion, who are bureaucrats loyal to?  
 To whom should they owe loyalty? 
 Is there a list of favoured bureaucrats for each party? Like for the PMLN, PPP, etc. 
 PMLN, Shahbaz Sharif are said to have a close relationship with bureaucrats, BB is 
said to have maintained a list of favoured bureaucrats, Zardari is known to have 
cronies. Do you agree? 
 
Do you think bureaucrats are hired on merit? 
 How and when are bureaucrats assigned, for example to the education department?  
Governments often put in place bans on transfers and postings. Why? 
 Who makes these decisions? 
 Is such a move more likely before or after an election? 
 Is the ban respected? Or are ways found around it? What are those ways? 
 
INTERVIEW GUIDE – ACADEMICS/JOURNALISTS/POLITICAL OBSERVERS 
OF BUREAUCRACIES 
 
Explain the bureaucratic hierarchy to me in terms of grades and cadres.  
Who oversees the district bureaucracy? 
Explain to me the source of the DMG’s prestige. 
Do you think the DMG has too much power? 
 
SELECTION and TRAINING 
Walk me through the selection and training process. 
During training, what are bureaucrats taught about their interaction with politicians? 
 
What tasks do DMG officers perform? 
Do you think individual bureaucrats are able to impact decisions through their 
bureaucratic or political contacts? For example, kin, caste, old school tie, etc 
Do you think bureaucrats shape decisions through information to which they have 
access? 
Explain to me how policy decisions are made in Pakistan. Who plays what role? What 
is the procedure to, for example, make a policy re education? 
 
APPOINTMENTS, PROMOTIONS and TRANSFERS ETC 
Explain to me how appointments, transfers and promotions take place in the civil 
service. 
In your experience, is merit of primary importance in bureaucratic appointments, 
transfers and promotions? 
 
Is there a Transfer Sanctioning Authority? Who is the ultimate arbiter of transfers? 
What is acting in-charge? Who makes such appointments and why? 





When were burs most likely to make appts/promos/trans? Before or after an election? 
The government frequently places a ban on transfers and postings. What happens at 
such times? Is there contract hiring?  
Why is the ban put in in the first place, and who decided to put it in? 
 In your opinion, are such bans more likely before or after an election? Why? 
 
The ECP uses district officials to do some of its work. In your opinion, is this a good 
or bad idea? 
2) To what extent do bureaucrats at the provincial and district levels have the ability 




What is the role of district bureaucrats in the lead up to a general election? 
Specifically, the DCO, the DEO, EDOs (education in particular). 
When does preparation for the election start amongst district bureaucracies? 
Who monitors the election related activities of the district bureaucracy? 
 
What is the chain of command in a district in the run up to the election? 
What is the role of PCS officers in electoral decision making at the district level? 
What is the role of DMG officers in electoral decision making at the district level? 
Are these roles (of PCS and DMG officers) within their legal powers? Or do you 
think they exceed them? 
Do you think polling staff are neutral? 
 How and by whom are polling agents (including Presiding Officers) chosen? 
Criteria? 
 Is it possible to influence these appointments?  
 Do politicians try and influence them? How? 
 Do PCS officers try to influence them? 
 Do DMG officers try to influence them? 
 Who trains polling staff? 
 Who decides where to set up polling stations? 
 Who is in charge of election finances in a district? 
 Who is in charge of any delimitation exercise? Who chooses the officers who will do 
the actual re-drawing of boundaries? 
 Who checks voter lists? Who chooses the officers who go door to door? 
 Do politicians influence these appointments? How? 
 Do you think election management at district level ensures fairness in the electoral 
process? 
 
How did Musharraf’s devolution impact the role of district bureaucracies in the 
election? 
 Since the devolved set up has been suspended, what has changed since? 
 Do bureaucrats assist politicians during the election? Why? How? 






Do you think there is a difference in district management of elections in competitive 
seats as compared to safe seats? 
 Do politicians in competitive seats make more of an effort/attempt to influence the 
appointment of polling staff? 
 Are politicians who have not been able to deliver services to their constituents more 
likely to influence polling staff appointments?  
 In a constituency where the MPA and MNA are from different parties, do bureaucrats 
choose sides? On what basis? 




Once the election is over, what is the first interaction between the politician and 
district bureaucrats? 
Does the newly elected politician influence appointments/promotions/transfers to get 
the people he wants in power? 
Is this more likely to happen if: 
Competitive or safe seat 
Poor service delivery in the past (if incumbent won) 
MPA and MNA from different parties 
Politician recently switched parties 
Incumbent party wins but with different candidate 
Non-incumbent from non-incumbent party wins 
 
Do bureaucrats have influence over politicians in developing policy? 
If incumbent wins, is he in a weaker or stronger position vis a vis his ability to 
pressurize bureaucrats? 
Do newly elected politicians (non-incumbents) make more political appointments 
than an incumbent winner? Why? Who do they appoint? 
When a new person is elected, what are the first actions of the district bureaucracy, 
specifically DCO? 
Usually, do polling staff remain in their position after elections? Or are they 
promoted? Or transferred? 
Are teacher appointments higher before or after an election? 
 Are party loyalists appointed before or after elections? To what positions? 
 How do such appointments take place – do these people go through the merit 
process? If not, what is the process through which they get the post? 
 How do politicians get bureaucrats to make these appointments? 
 How is the appointment of such loyalists effected by: 
Competitive or safe seat 
Poor service delivery in the past (if incumbent won) 
MPA and MNA from different parties 
Politician recently switched parties 
Incumbent party wins but with different candidate 
Non-incumbent from non-incumbent party wins 
 
INTERACTION 
What is the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats? 
Does this relationship vary? Federal, provincial, district? Between provinces? Under 
military rule? Before an election/after an election? 
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How does the bureaucrat-politician relationship develop?  
What is the role of the political party in this relationship? 
Does the bureaucrat approach the politician to form a tie? Under what circumstances 
is this more likely than the other way around?  
At what time in the electoral cycle is this more/less likely? 
Is an external actor involved in connecting politician and bureaucrat? A businessman? 
Another bureaucrat? Another politician? A family member?  
Is this more likely before or after an election? 
 
Is the bur-pol relationship impacted by the politician being a minister - (a) before the 
election; (b) after the election? 
 Is the bur-pol relationship impacted by whether the seat is competitive or safe - (a) 
before the election; (b) after the election?  
 Is the bur-pol relationship impacted by the politician’s service delivery record - (a) 
before the election; (b) after the election?  
 Is this relationship impacted by the MNA and MPA being from different parties - (a) 
before the election; (b) after the election? 
 Is this relationship impacted if the politician is not an incumbent - (a) before the 
election; (b) after the election? 
 Is this relationship impacted if the politician is a party switcher - (a) before the 
election; (b) after the election? 
 Is this relationship impacted if the politician holds party office - (a) before the 
election; (b) after the election? 
 Is this relationship impacted by the seniority/place in hierarchy of the bureaucrat - (a) 
before the election; (b) after the election? 
 
 Do politicians pressurize bureaucrats? How? At what level of the hierarchy? When? 
 How do these factors impact the pressure exerted by politicians on bureaucrats: 
Competitive or safe seat 
Poor service delivery in the past (if incumbent won) 
MPA and MNA from different parties 
Politician recently switched parties 
Incumbent party wins but with different candidate 
Non-incumbent from non-incumbent party wins 
Politician is a minister 
 
What are the consequences of resisting such pressure? 
Do bureaucrats manipulate politicians? How? At what level of the hierarchy? When? 
How do these factors impact the manipulation of politicians by bureaucrats: 
Competitive or safe seat 
Poor service delivery in the past (if incumbent won) 
MPA and MNA from different parties 
Politician recently switched parties 
Incumbent party wins but with different candidate 
Non-incumbent from non-incumbent party wins 
Politician is a minister 
 




Do politicians ‘request’ bureaucrats to do something? In what situation is it a request 
and not an order? When? 
How do ties of kin, caste, old school tie, etc. between politicians and between 
bureaucrats matter? When do they matter most? 
Do politicians, parties favour specific bureaucrats? Examples? 
Do bureaucrats prefer working with particular politicians? Is this preference stronger 
at particular times or in particular situations? 
Do senior bureaucrats have preferences amongst their juniors in terms of 
appointments/transfers/promotions? Why? What do they do about it? 
Do you prefer working with bureaucrats you already know? Why or why not? 
 
What is the role of bureaucrats in constituency politics - (a) before the election; (b) 
after the election? 
If seat is competitive or safe? 
 If service delivery record is poor 
 If MPA/MNA is from a different party 
 If recently switched parties 
 If incumbent party affiliated but non-incumbent winner 
 If minister 
 
Do bureaucrats ignore politicians’ orders - (a) before the election; (b) after the 
election?  
Do bureaucrats disobey politicians’ orders? 
What are the consequences of such disobedience? 
 
Do bureaucrats obstruct/ delay politicians’ orders? Why? - (a) before the election; (b) 
after the election?  
If seat is competitive or safe? 
 If service delivery record is poor 
 If MPA/MNA is from a different party 
 If recently switched parties 
 If incumbent party affiliated but non-incumbent winner 
 If minister 
 
Do senior bureaucrats move around junior ones at the request of politicians? - (a) 
before the election; (b) after the election?  
If seat is competitive or safe? 
 If service delivery record is poor 
 If MPA/MNA is from a different party 
 If recently switched parties 
 If incumbent party affiliated but non-incumbent winner 
 If minister 
 
Do politicians pressurize bureaucrats on behalf of constituents? - (a) before the 
election; (b) after the election?  
 If seat is competitive or safe? 
 If service delivery record is poor 
 If MPA/MNA is from a different party 
 If recently switched parties 
 If incumbent party affiliated but non-incumbent winner 
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 If minister 
 
Do politicians pressurize bureaucrats on behalf of influential businessmen?  - (a) 
before the election; (b) after the election?  
 If seat is competitive or safe? 
 If service delivery record is poor 
 If MPA/MNA is from a different party 
 If recently switched parties 
 If incumbent party affiliated but non-incumbent winner 
 If minister  
 
Do politicians pressurize bureaucrats on behalf of other groups (religious, military, 
etc.) - (a) before the election; (b) after the election? 
If seat is competitive or safe? 
 If service delivery record is poor 
 If MPA/MNA is from a different party 
 If recently switched parties 
 If incumbent party affiliated but non-incumbent winner 
 If minister 
 
Do politicians ask bureaucrats for help in pressurizing other bureaucrats? - (a) before 
the election; (b) after the election? 
If seat is competitive or safe? 
 If service delivery record is poor 
 If MPA/MNA is from a different party 
 If recently switched parties 
 If incumbent party affiliated but non-incumbent winner 
 If minister 
 
Do the political parties maintain relationships with specific bureaucrats (at federal, 
provincial, district levels)?  
How are these ties maintained? 
When are they strongest - - (a) before the election; (b) after the election? 
What is the relationship like between DMG officers and Provincial Service officers?  
What is the relationship of DMG officers with politicians? - (a) before the election; 
(b) after the election?  
What is the relationship of Provincial Service officers with politicians? - (a) before 
the election; (b) after the election?  
How are they different and why? 
In your opinion, are decisions on policy influenced by businessmen? Saigols, 
Dawoods, Riaz, etc 
How do businessmen influence decisions? - (a) before the election; (b) after the 
election? With whom do they interact? 
Do businessmen have links with bureaucrats? Familial, work, exchange? 
Do you think that the bureaucracy has changed? How? 
Do you think the relationship between bureaucrats and politicians has changed? How? 
Does it vary over time? 
Do you think that there are significant variations in bureaucratic-politician ties, 




INTERVIEW GUIDE for BUREAUCRACY TRAINERS 
 
Could you please give me a brief synopsis of your career in the civil service. 
Please walk me through the selection and training process for bureaucrats, 
highlighting the role of the CSA. 
What is the profile of CSA inductees? Is there a record kept that I can access? 
What are the core elements of the training provided by the CSA - Common and 
Specialized?  
Are there any practical elements to the syllabus? 
Can I get access to the syllabi? 
Is there training provided regarding policy making? Could you please give examples 
from both the Common and Specialized programs? 
How is the policy making process explained to newly inducted bureaucrats?  
Is there training provided to guide bureaucrats regarding their interaction with (1) 
other bureaucrats, especially PAS with PCS officers; (2) politicians; (3) other 
influentials; (4) ordinary citizens? 
What are bureaucrats taught about their interaction with politicians? 
In your opinion, what is the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats? Is it 
different from what the CSA teaches? 
 Does this relationship vary? Federal, provincial, district? Between provinces? Under 
military rule? Before an election/after an election? With a specific party? 
 Most bureaucrats will at some point be pressured to do something. Does the CSA 
teach them how to deal with such pressure? How? 
Are there particular courses on election management, perhaps for the PAS? 
What are the concerns that bureaucrats bring up during their training on either course? 
 How is the PAS training different from other specialized groups?  
 What is the source of the PAS/DMG’s prestige? 
 Do you think the PAS/DMG has too much power? 
 In your opinion, is there a difference in the interaction of DMG officers with 
politicians, and the interaction of bureaucrats from other groups with politicians? 
 How did Musharraf’s devolution plan impact training imparted here at CSA? 
 How much influence does the government have on the training of bureaucrats? For 
example, when a government changes, is there pressure to change the training regime 
in any way? 
 Once the training courses are complete, does the CSA get feedback from its students 
on the courses? 
 Does the CSA get feedback from senior bureaucrats in the field or from those who 
conduct trainings for more senior bureaucrats? 
 Does the CSA retain contact with alumni, invite them back? 
 Are there ever alumni who turn to the staff at the CSA for advice later in their 
careers? 
 If so, on what sort of issues? 
 Do you think that the bureaucracy has changed? How? 
 
 
                                                 
i Man kills himself so his son is given a job. 24 May 2017. DAWN. Available at: 
<https://www.dawn.com/news/1335085> [Accessed 6 June 2017]. 
